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April 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Chase Romine v. Shayla Geene West

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0291
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Acree

• Disposition: OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (573)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING

Combined Opinion

                        by [Glenn Acree](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7319/glenn-acree/)

RENDERED: APRIL 3, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0291-ME

CHASE ROMINE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LAUREN ADAMS OGDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-D-504410-001

SHAYLA GEENE WEST; G.R. (A
CHILD); AND K.C.W. (A CHILD) APPELLEES

OPINION VACATING
AND REMANDING

---

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Chase Romine challenges the Domestic Violence Order (DVO)

entered against him by the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division. We vacate

and remand for further proceedings.

Appellee filed no brief in this case. Pursuant to RAP1 31(H)(3)(c),

this Court is authorized to deem that failure “a confession of error and reverse the

1
Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
judgment without considering the merits of the case.” We do consider that failure

a confession of error by the family court, but we will consider the merits of the

case, nonetheless.

Appellee Shayla West filed a petition for a protective order based on

her allegations Chase sent her harassing and threatening text messages and

repeatedly told the minor child he would harm Shayla. After a hearing, the family

court entered a DVO in favor of both Shayla and the minor child, based on

adoption of its oral findings on the record. This appeal followed.

Interpreting our statutes governing domestic violence orders, this

Court said, relative to cases such as this:

Prior to entry of a DVO, the court must find “from a
preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of
domestic violence and abuse have occurred and may again
occur . . . .” KRS[2] 403.750(1). The preponderance of the
evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence
establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to
have been a victim of domestic violence. Baird v. Baird,
234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007). The definition of
domestic violence and abuse, as expressed in KRS
403.720(1), includes “physical injury, serious physical
injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of
imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual
abuse, or assault between family members . . . .” The
standard of review for factual determinations is whether
the family court’s finding of domestic violence was clearly
erroneous. CR[3] 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d

2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-2-
442, 444 (Ky.1986). Findings are not clearly erroneous if
they are supported by substantial evidence.

Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114–15 (Ky. App. 2010). Also relevant to this

appeal is the definition of hearsay. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” KRE4 801.

Chase’s most direct argument is that the family court’s findings were

based on impermissible hearsay and not substantial evidence. We agree based on

our complete review of the January 3, 2025 hearing.5

Chase attended the hearing in person, without aid of legal

representation, and Shayla attended by video conferencing, also without counsel.

In addition to the parties, the minor child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) participated.

The family court began by reading Shayla’s petition into the record and asking her

to adopt the petition as her testimony, which she did.

But Shayla’s petition included the hearsay statement that the minor

child told her that Chase had “been yelling at [minor child] saying he [was] going

to kill me” and other threats. During the hearing, the family court inquired of

4
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
5
Testimony and statements by the family court quoted from the hearing omit all verbal
disfluencies (e.g., “um,” “uh,” etc.).

-3-
Shayla how the minor child was doing. The court allowed Shayla to testify not

from her own knowledge but by repeating statements allegedly made by the minor

child. The court went even further, allowing Shayla to represent the child’s

thoughts and feelings regarding Chase, including: that the minor child was feeling

“uncomfortable” and “doesn’t want to deal with her dad”; that the child said, “I

don’t want to see [Chase]”; that the minor child “still has a paranoia in her about

every time we bring up this subject or talk about [Chase]” offering as evidence of

the perceived paranoia the minor child’s statement, “My dad’s not going to be

there, is he?”; and that the minor child is “scared of her father.” Video Record

(VR) 1/3/25 at 11:17:00.

Later in the hearing, the minor child’s GAL solicited hearsay from

Shayla, asking: “Has your daughter ever spoken to you anything about drugs or

anything like that?” VR 1/3/25 at 11:27:30 AM.

The family court addressed Chase in the courtroom, making oral

findings as follows:

Well, it does sound like there was a serious blow-up here,
and serious threats were made, you know, in the presence
of the child. And threatening the child’s mother’s life and
placing that child in fear. And I just have to weigh, with
your, you know, violent history, who I believe.

-4-
VR 1/3/25 11:38:50 AM. The trial court also made a written finding, based on

Shayla’s hearsay statement, that the minor child “reported [Chase] cooking drugs

in her presence.”

Little analysis is needed to reveal the error here. The child did not

testify, and Shayla’s testimony as to the child’s words, thoughts, and feelings is

impermissible hearsay.

In Allen v. Gueltzow, this Court addressed a near identical scenario in

which a parent attempted to testify on behalf of a child. We explained:

By allowing Robert to testify about statements made to
him by his then six-year-old daughter, over Tyler’s
objection, the court allowed testimony in the record that
constitutes hearsay. A DVO petition is subject to the same
evidentiary standards as other forms of evidence. Rankin
v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. App. 2008).
Therefore, unless an exception applies, hearsay cannot be
considered as evidence. While we respect the court’s
concern about having a six-year-old testify in court, there
are numerous ways in which to protect children when they
need to testify in court.

535 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Ky. App. 2017). The minor child in this matter was nine (9)

years old at the time of the hearing. The family court’s oral findings were based on

impermissible hearsay the family court should not have considered. We remind

the family court: “[T]he issuance of a DVO is a serious matter, in that it affords the

victim protection from physical, emotional, and psychological injury. However,

-5-
the impact of having a DVO entered improperly, hastily, or without a valid basis

can have a devastating effect on the alleged perpetrator.” Id.

Because we vacate and remand based on the family court’s reliance

on hearsay, we need not reach Chase’s remaining arguments as to whether the

statutory elements of domestic violence were met. However, we emphasize two

remaining points.

First, the respondent to a petition for a DVO must be afforded “a

meaningful opportunity to be heard[.]” Hawkins v. Jones, 555 S.W.3d 459, 462

(Ky. App. 2018). During the hearing in this case, the family court repeatedly

indicated its acceptance of Shayla’s statements at face value even before hearing

from Chase. For example, after the family court learned the minor child’s age, the

court opined: “Wow, that’s pretty young to be dealing with this, yes.” VR 1/3/25

11:17:40 AM. At that juncture, Chase had not yet been given an opportunity to

respond or present any evidence.

Also, it cannot be said that a respondent has been afforded a

meaningful opportunity to be heard where a family court appears to abandon her

role as impartial adjudicator. “[A] dispassionate court is the defendant’s only

guaranty that his rights will be determined by the rule of law.” City of Cold Spring

v. Ross, 358 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Ky. 1962). The respondent to a DVO petition is

entitled to nothing less. The trial court here did not appear to be dispassionate.

-6-
The family court judge even stepped out of the role circumscribed by

the judicial Canons6 to assist Shayla by providing the phone number for Legal Aid

so she might pursue a custody action: “I just sent you a phone number for Legal

Aid statewide hotline where they can kind of explain how to file a custody case,

and then there’s a website with all the forms.” VR 1/3/25 11:19:35 AM.

We take no position on the ultimate merits of Shayla’s petition, which

contains disturbing allegations that might be proven with admissible evidence.

Text messages entered into the record do not reflect well on Chase, nor did his lack

of decorum after the family court made its oral findings. But Chase’s courtroom

decorum is not substantial evidence of domestic violence. Even where a family

court simply “believes” a petitioner, that does not ensure due process if such belief

goes beyond the guardrails of evidentiary rules and substantive and procedural law.

The January 3, 2025 DVO entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court,

Family Division is vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this Opinion, the rules of evidence, legal precedent, and our judicial

Canons.

ALL CONCUR.

6
Supreme Court Rule (SCR) Canon 1: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the independence,* integrity,* and impartiality* of the judiciary, and shall
avoid impropriety* and the appearance of impropriety.”

-7-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Bethanni Forbush-Moss
Louisville, Kentucky

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