Sr. Prakash N vs State Of Karnataka - Criminal Petition

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Sr. Prakash N vs State Of Karnataka on 4 March, 2026

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

-1-
NC: 2026:KHC:13230
CRL.P No. 10665 of 2024

               HC-KAR

                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                        DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026

                                        BEFORE
                      THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
                        CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10665 OF 2024
               BETWEEN:

               SRI PRAKASH N.,
               AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
               C/O LATE NARAYANAPPA
               NO.65, KODIYALA
               KARENAHALLI
               RAMANAGARA
               KARNATAKA - 562 109.
                                                            ...PETITIONER
               (BY SMT. REENA R., ADVOCATE)

               AND:

               1.    STATE OF KARNATAKA

Digitally signed
REPRESENTED BY
by SANJEEVINI J WILSON GARDEN SUB DIVISION
KARISHETTY
Location: High HALASUR GATE P.S
Court of
Karnataka BENGALURU - 560 027
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU.

               2.    SRI D.GOPI
                     B.M.T.C. GENERAL OFFICE (SECURITY GUARD)
                     CENTRAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION,
                     BENGALURU CITY, KARNATAKA - 560 027.
                                                          ...RESPONDENTS
                          -2-
                                      NC: 2026:KHC:13230
                                 CRL.P No. 10665 of 2024

HC-KAR

(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
R2 SERVED)

 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS)

PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET FILED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 IN CC.NO.26620/2018 DATED 25.06.2018
ON THE FILE OF HON'BLE VI ACMM COURT, BANGALORE CITY,
FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 474, 476,
484, 120(b) R/W 34 OF IPC.

 THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,

ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

                    ORAL ORDER The petitioner-accused No.4 is at the doors of this Court

calling in question the proceedings in C.C.No.26620 of 2018

registered for offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 474, 476, 484, 120B r/w Section 34 of the IPC.

NC: 2026:KHC:13230

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1. Heard Smt Reena R, learned counsel appearing for

petitioner and Sri B N Jagadeesha, learned Additional State

Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1.

1. Facts adumbrated are as follows:

A complaint comes to be registered by the 2nd

respondent, an officer of the BMTC alleging that certain persons

are creating bogus bus passes in the names of disabled

persons, which is causing huge loss to the Corporation. On the

strength of the said complaint, a crime in Crime No. 133 of

2016 comes to be registered. The police conduct investigation

and drop several persons as accused and draw several persons

as accused. The petitioner is the one who comes while filing the

charge sheet. Filing of the charge sheet is what has driven the

petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would

vehemently contend that the name of the petitioner did not

figure while the complaint was registered nor in the crime. But

for the first time, it comes up in the charge sheet, not on the

merit of the matter, but on the voluntary statements rendered

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by accused Nos.1 and 2. The learned counsel submits that

there is no corroboration of the statements by any material

with the prosecution and therefore the proceedings should be

quashed.

1. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would

refute the submissions of the petitioner to contend that the

police after investigation have filed a charge sheet and this was

a cartel that was operating by taking bogus bus passes in the

names of disabled persons, which undoubtedly caused lossses

to the Corporation and therefore the petitioner should come out

clean in a full blown trial.

1. I have given my anxious consideration to the

submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have

perused the material on record.

1. The afore-narrated facts and the allegations are a

matter of record. The petitioner is accused no. 4. The name of

the petitioner admittedly did not spring in the complaint, did

not also spring while filing the FIR which was in furtherance of

the complaint, but springs for the first time while filing the

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charge sheet. It is no law that a name that does not figure in

the FIR, should not come in the charge sheet, but, there should

be material. The material in the case at hand, admittedly is the

voluntary statements of accused nos.1 and 2 who pinned down

the petitioner to be involved in the said act of preparing bogus

bus passes, in the names of disabled persons.

1. The Petitioner himself a disabled person who is the

beneficiary of the said pass is now hauled for conspiring to

create bogus bus passes. Other than the voluntary statements,

there is no document produced by the prosecution, as material

appended to the charge sheet, to demonstrate any

corroboration as is necessary under Section 27 of the Indian

Evidence Act. In the light of the absence of corroboration, or

any corroborative material in the charge sheet, the

petitioner/accused no. 4 cannot be dragged into the web of

proceedings solely on the voluntary statements of accused

nos.1 and 2.

1. With there being no corroboration except the

voluntary statements, permitting further proceedings against

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these petitioners would run foul of plethora of judgments

rendered by the Apex Court on the issue.

9.1. In the case of PREM PRAKASH v.

ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE1, the Apex Court holds that

the prosecution against an accused cannot start with the

statement of the co-accused as such statements are not

substantive pieces of evidence. The Apex Court observes as

follows:

"Statement of Afshar Ali -- Co-accused
...... ....... .......

1. Being a co-accused with the appellant, his
   statement against the appellant assuming there is
   anything incriminating against the present appellant
   will not have the character of substantive evidence.
   The prosecution cannot start with such a statement
   to establish its case.

2. We hold that, in such a situation, the law laid
   down under Section 30 of the Evidence Act by this
   Court while dealing with the confession of the co-
   accused will continue to apply. In Kashmira
   Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P.,
   (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526] , this Court neatly
   summarised the principle as under : (SCC pp. 281-82, para

11)
"11. ... The proper way to approach a case of this
kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the
accused excluding the confession altogether from
consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a
conviction could safely be based on it. If it is
capable of belief independently of the confession,
then of course it is not necessary to call the
confession in aid. But cases may arise where the

(2024) 9 SCC 787

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Judge is not prepared to act on the other
evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it
would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In
such an event, the Judge may call in aid the
confession and use it to lend assurance to the
other evidence and thus fortify himself in
believing what without the aid of the confession
he would not be prepared to accept."
(emphasis in original)

1. Hence, insofar as Afshar Ali's statement is concerned, the investigating agency will have to first marshal the other evidence and can at best look at the statement for lending assurance."

9.2. The Apex Court in the case of [KARAN TALWAR

v. STATE OF T.N.2](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62902257/), holds that a confession statement of the

co-accused by itself cannot be the reason for the implication

of the accused in a crime. The Apex Court observes as

follows:

"10. As is evident from the said Section, the alleged
offence is consumption of narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance other than those specified in or under clause (a)
of Section 27, NDPS Act, and therefore, the question is
whether any material is available to charge the appellant
thereunder. The contention of the appellant is that he
has been arraigned as accused No. 13 based on the
confession statement of co-accused viz., accused
No. 1. Certainly, in the absence of any other material
on record to connect the appellant with the crime,
the confession statement of the co-accused by itself
cannot be the reason for his implication in the crime.
This view has been fortified by the law laid down
in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra [(1998) 7 SCC 337; 1998 INSC 364], wherein it was

2024 SCC OnLine SC 380

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stated that a co-accused's confession containing
incriminating matter against a person would not by
itself suffice to frame charge against him. The
materials on record would reveal that the
investigating agency had not subjected him to
medical examination and instead, going by
complaint Witness No. 23, he smelt the accused. The
less said the better and we do not think it necessary
to comment upon adoption of such a course. We
need only to say that even if he tendered such
evidence, it would not help the prosecution in
anyway. There is absolutely no case that any
recovery of contraband was recovered from the
appellant. As regards the confession statement of
the appellant in view of [Section 25](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/494844/) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 there can be no doubt with
respect to the fact that it is inadmissible in evidence. In this context it is worthy to refer to the decision of
this Court in [Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of
Narcotics](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166707333/),[(2011) 11 SCC 347; 2011 INSC 342]. In [the said decision](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166707333/), this Court held that [Section 25](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/494844/) of
the Indian Evidence Act would make confessional
statement of accused before police inadmissible in
evidence and it could not be brought on record by
prosecution to obtain conviction. Shortly stated,
except the confessional statement of co-accused No.
1 there is absolutely no material available on record
against the appellant.

...... ....... .......

1. As noted hereinbefore, the sole material available against the appellant is the confession statement of the co-accused viz., accused No. 1, which undoubtedly cannot translate into admissible evidence at the stage of trial and against the appellant. When that be the position, how can it be said that a prima facie case is made out to make the appellant to stand the trial. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that standing the trial is an ordeal and, therefore, in a case where there is no material at all which could be translated into evidence at the trial stage it would be a miscarriage of justice to make the person concerned to stand the trial."

NC: 2026:KHC:13230

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     9.3. Subsequently, the Apex Court in [P. KRISHNA

MOHAN REDDY v. STATE OF A.P.3](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/155599735/), while discussing the

law on the evidentiary value and admissibility of confessional

statements of a co-accused observes as follows:

"40. Where a confessional statement is otherwise
excluded or inadmissible by virtue of
Section(s) 25 or 26 of the Evidence Act, respectively,
there can be no question of such confessional
statements being made admissible against another
co-accused by stretching it with the help of Section 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 places a
complete ban on the making of such confession by
that person whether he is in custody or not. Section
26 lays down that a confession made by a person
while he is in the custody of a police officer shall not
be proved against him unless it is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate. [See : Sahib
Singh v. State of Haryana, (1997) 7 SCC 231] Confessional
statement contemplated under Section 30 of the Evidence
Act, must be both relevant and admissible in terms of
the Evidence Act.

...... ....... .......

1. This is because a statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. stands on a different footing from a police statement of any ordinary witness. Statements of an accused person under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. by virtue of ordinarily being in the form of either an admission or a confession cannot be looked into qua another co- accused, as to say otherwise would be to ignore the substantive provisions of Section(s) 17, 21, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and the well settled cannons of law of evidence. However, the aforesaid does not apply, where the statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. is exculpatory in nature, which we shall discuss later. ...... ....... .......

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1157
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NC: 2026:KHC:13230

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1. As explained in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), a
   confession is one specie of an admission, this flows from
   the logic that every confession is an admission but not
   every admission is a confession, while admissions in itself is
   a specie or type of a statement. As a natural corollary to
   the aforesaid, any statement of the accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. which is in the form of an
   admission that admits any incriminating fact or
   implicates another person by such statement, would
   be governed by the provisions of Section 17 of Evidence Act, more particularly the
   prohibition of usage of such admissions against
   third-persons. An admission by one accused cannot
   be used against another co-accused. [See
   : Chintamani Das v. State, AIR 1970 Ori 100; Sohar
   Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 448]. The
   aforesaid may be looked at from one another angle,
   since the Evidence Act, more particularly, Section(s)
   17 and 30 clearly stipulate in well-defined terms,
   when an admission or a confession, respectively, may
   be used against another person, the logical sequitur
   of the aforesaid is that, except for the manner laid
   down under the said provisions, no admission or
   confession may be used against another person.
   Since, Section 17 of the Evidence Act does not
   postulate the use of an admission by one accused
   against another, any statement of the accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C., implicating such co-
   accused cannot be looked into by the courts.

2. Even where the police statement of an
   accused person under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. is neither
   an admission nor a confession, i.e., it is exculpatory in
   nature and not inculpatory, such statements can be looked
   into by the courts only for the limited purpose of culling out
   the stance of the accused person qua the allegations. An
   exculpatory police statement of an accused person under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. which at the same time
   implicates another co-accused, cannot be relied upon,
   merely because such statement is not hit by the safeguards
   and rigours that apply in respect of inculpatory statements
   in the form of an admissions or confessions under
   the Evidence Act. The fundamental cannon of criminal
   jurisprudence is that a statement of one accused

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person cannot be used against another co-accused
person. The limited exception to this aforesaid
general principle are inculpatory confessions, where
the accused person in his confessional statement not
only admits his own guilt but also implicates another
co-accused. The rationale behind this limited exception as
explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), is that an admission by
an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort of
credibility or sanction in support of the truth of his
confession against others as-well as himself. An
exculpatory statement is an affront to the aforesaid
principle. Thus, an exculpatory statement of an accused
person under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. can only be looked
into for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance
of the accused person qua the allegations or for
contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to be
examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.
P.C. However, such exculpatory statement insofar as
it implicates another co-accused person can in no
manner be relied upon by the courts as against such
co-accused as such statements by their nature
cannot be tested by cross-examination if such
accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in
terms of Section 315 of the Cr. P.C., and because
such exculpatory statement has no credibility.

1. Such statements at best could be said to be
   helpful to the investigating authorities for the purpose of
   ascertaining that the investigation is proceeding in the right
   direction or not, as ordinarily, once the investigation is
   over, these statements are neither supplied to the accused
   along with chargesheet nor placed on record.

2. Thus, Section 30 itself makes it clear that
   the whole legal exercise by virtue of which this
   provision of law can be made applicable, depends
   upon the proving of confession before a court which
   makes it into an admissible one in order to implicate
   the other accused provided the confession given by
   such person is established with full strength on the
   basis of other materials pertaining to the attendant
   circumstances. It would necessarily mean that mere
   confession alone will not be adequate or sufficient to
   implicate other persons. It is incumbent that there are

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other materials also which would render support or
substantiate the case of the confession. However, it is
subject to the standard of proving as contemplated by law.
If this is the position, the court should look into the
statements alleged to have been given by the co-
accused and that too before a police officer during
the course of investigation with great care and
circumspection. The said statements are directly hit
by Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Particularly, the statement given by any one of the
accused persons and recorded by the police officer
during the course of investigation cannot be relied
upon by the prosecution, except subject to the
limitations provided by Section 145 of the Indian
Evidence Act. The statement given by an accused
involving himself in the crime and also implicating
third person cannot be proved legally in the court. It
will be in direct conflict with Sections 25 and 26 respectively of the Evidence Act. If such evidence or
confession cannot be proved, then the occasion for
utilizing such statement against another person
would not arise.

1. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges:--

(i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the
first information report, can be examined by the police and
his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr. P.C., as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra).

(ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.
P.C., would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory
in nature or may be exculpatory in nature.

(iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of
an admission or a confession. If such statement admits
either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the
facts which constitute the offence, respectively, as held
in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it amounts to
confession.

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(iv) Where such police statement of an accused is
confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25
and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A
confessional statement of an accused will only be
admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25
respectively and is in tune with the provisions of
Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively. In other words, a police statement of an
accused which is in the form of a confession is per
se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be
placed on such statements either at the stage of bail
or during trial. Since such confessional statements
are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of
the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would
be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such
confessional statement of an accused to implicate
another co-accused.

(v) A confessional statement of one accused
implicating another co-accused may be taken into
consideration by the court against such co-accused in
terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the
stage of trial, where (1) the confession itself was
relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence
Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such
confessional statement incriminates the maker along
with the co-accused and; (4) both the accused
persons in question are in a joint trial for the same
offence.

(vi) Furthermore, because such confessional
statements are not "evidence" in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni
Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira
Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration
by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance
to the other evidence against such co-accused,
provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of
the Evidence Act, are fulfilled.

(vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in
the form of an admission, such inculpatory statement
even if it implicates another co-accused cannot be

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taken into consideration against such co-accused in
terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the [Evidence
Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1953529/), as doing so would militate against the general
principle, that an admission may be given as
evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to
the aforesaid general principle carved out under
the [Evidence Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1953529/), do not permit the usage of such
admission against a co-accused in any scenario
whatsoever.

(viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an
exculpatory statement i.e., it is neither a confession
nor an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the Cr. P.C., and the same may be
used only for the very limited purpose provided in
the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re-
examination of such accused person alone, as held
in Mahabir Mandal (supra). Even if such exculpatory
statement of one accused, implicates another co-
accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration
against such co-accused, as there can be no
credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an
accused implicating another co-accused, more
particularly because it is neither required to be given
on oath, nor in the presence of the co-accused, the
same cannot be tested by cross-examination and the
exculpatory nature of such statement militates
against the foundational principle that permits taking
into consideration a statement of one accused person
against another co-accused as explained in Bhuboni
Sahu (supra), i.e., 'when a person admits guilt to its
fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or
substantially all the facts which constitute the
offence, and in doing so exposes himself and in the
process other co-accused persons to the pain and
penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a
sincerity and semblance of sanction for the
truthfulness of such statement'.

(ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such
as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have
held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr.
P.C. ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of

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anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining
whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the
accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet
the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such statements
under [Section 161](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/357596/) were made by witnesses and not
accused persons. A statement of an accused under [Section 161](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/357596/) of the Cr. P.C. stands on a completely different
footing from a police statement of a witness. As already
discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police
statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature, its more
in the form of a confession or admission rather than a
statement, and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to
30 of the [Evidence Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1953529/), will apply with all its vigour. Where
such statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature, the
same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited
purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused
person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused,
if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in
terms of Section 315 of the Cr. P.C.. However, such
exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another
accused person cannot be looked into by the courts, as
such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-
examination if such accused person declines to be a
witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr. P.C.,
and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility
as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra).

(x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any
person under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. for the purpose of
anticipatory or regular bail, the court must first ascertain
whether such person is actually a witness or an accused
person, or likely to be an accused person in respect of the
offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations
where a person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. may not be an accused, but
later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be
mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still
ongoing, it is more likely for a person who was originally a
witness to happen to be later arrayed as an accused
person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on
statement of such a person merely because he is not
named in the first information report, without first seeing
whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused
or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the
statement of such a person may be relied upon up until

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 such person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the
 courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that
 such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the
 courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so
 that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner."

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

In view of the law as elucidated by the Apex Court in the afore-

quoted judgments, I deem it appropriate to obliterate the

proceedings as against the petitioner.

1. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

(ii) Impugned proceedings in C.C.No.26620 of 2018

pending on the file of VI Addl. CMM Court,

Bangalore stand quashed qua the petitioner.
Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE

BKP
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 27