Smt Bharathamma vs State Of Karnataka - Land Dispute Appeal

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• Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc -... Upgrade to Premium [Cites 16, Cited by 0 ] ### Karnataka High Court

Smt Bharathamma vs State Of Karnataka on 25 February, 2026

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WA No. 1876 of 2024

            HC-KAR

                IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                     DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

                                     PRESENT

                  THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE

                                        AND

                      THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA

                        WRIT APPEAL NO. 1876 OF 2024 (SC-ST)

           BETWEEN:

           1.   SMT. BHARATHAMMA
                D/O LATE RAMAKRISHNAPPA
                AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
                R/AT NO.17, THIPPANAHALLI VILLAGE
                NUGITHAHALLI MAJARA
                NANDI HOBLI
                CHICKBALLAPUR TALUK - 562 101
                CHICKBALLAPUR DISTRICT
                                                         ...APPELLANT

Digitally (BY SRI RAJESH P. MAHALE, SENIOR ADVCOATE A/W
signed by SRI MADHUKAR NADIG, ADVOCATE FOR
SRIDEVI S
Location:
SRI HANUMANTHAPPA HARAVI B. GOWDAR, ADVOCATE)
High Court
of Karnataka AND:

           1.   STATE OF KARNATAKA
                REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
                REVENUE DEPARTMENT
                M.S. BUILDING
                BANGALORE - 560 001
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                                  WA No. 1876 of 2024

HC-KAR

1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
   CHICKBALLAPUR DISTRICT
   CHICKBALLAPUR - 562 101

2. THE ASST. COMMISSIONER
   CHICKBALLAPUR SUB-DIVISION
   CHICKBALLAPUR - 562 101

3. THE TAHASILDAR
   CHICKBALLAPUR - 562 101

4. SRI H RAJRATHNAM
   S/O H.D. HANUMANTHARAYAPPA
   AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
   R/AT NUGATHAHALLI VILLAGE
   NANDI HOBLI
   CHICKBALLAPUR TALUK - 562 101
   CHICKBALLAPUR DISTRICT

                                    ...RESPONDENTS
   

   (BY SRI K.S. HARISH, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR R-1 TO
   R-4 & SRI M. SHIVAPRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR R-5)

   THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE

KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE

ORDER DATED 15.11.2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE

JUDGE IN WRIT PETITION No.20995/2024 & ETC.

  THIS   APPEAL,   COMING   ON    FOR     PRELIMINARY

HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN
AS UNDER:
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WA No. 1876 of 2024

HC-KAR

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA

                    ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)

1. The appellant, who is the daughter of late Ramakrishnappa,

has filed the present appeal impugning an order dated 15.11.2024

passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in

WP.No.20995/2024 (SC-ST). The appellant had filed the said

petition impugning the order dated 22.09.2023 passed by

respondent No.2 [the Deputy Commissioner], setting aside the

order dated 19.04.2022 passed by respondent No.3 [the Assistant

Commissioner], restoring the subject land in favour of the legal

heirs of late Ramakrishnappa [original grantee].

1. The land measuring 2 acres and 37 guntas falling in Survey

No.54 (New Sy.No.160) of Nugathahalli Village, Nandi Hobli,

Chickballapura, was granted in favour of the original grantee, late

Ramakrishnappa. On 10.08.1982, the saguvali chit was issued in

favour of the original grantee with a condition that the subject

property would not be alienated for a period of fifteen years. -4-

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1. One Sri. N. M. Muniyappa claimed that he acquired title to

the subject property pursuant to a deed of settlement of partition

dated 15.12.1991. He claimed that the subject land came to his

exclusive possession in 1991. On 24.08.1996, he filed a suit,

OS.No.368/1996, inter alia, praying for a declaration that he was

the absolute owner of the subject property and further restraining

the original grantee and his wife (who were arrayed as defendants

in the suit) from entering upon or otherwise interfering in his

peaceful possession of the subject land.

1. The summons in the suit was issued. Thereafter, the parties

to the suit filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC to record the settlement, whereby the defendants in the suit (late

Ramakrishnappa and his wife) accepted that the subject land was

settled in favour of Sri Muniyappa. In view of the said settlement,

Sri Muniyappa was declared the owner of the subject land.

1. Thereafter, on 20.10.2008, Sri. Muniyappa was granted

permission under Section 4(2) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands)

Act, 1978 [PTCL Act ] for sale of the subject land. -5-

NC: 2026:KHC:11910-DB WA No. 1876 of 2024 HC-KAR

1. Sri. Muniyappa sold the subject land under a sale deed dated

13.05.2010.

1. Thereafter, on 16.06.2010, the original grantee filed a suit,

being O.S.No.278/2010, seeking a declaration of his title in respect

of the subject property. The said suit was dismissed by a decree

dated 02.03.2018. Aggrieved by the same, the original grantee filed

an appeal, RA No. 55/2018, which was allowed by an order dated

05.03.2019. The learned Appellate Court held that the compromise

decree in O.S.No.368/1996 was obtained by fraud.

1. The appellant, who was the daughter of the original grantee,

initiated proceedings in PTCL (Chikka) 03/2014-15 under Section 5 of the PTCL Act seeking resumption of the subject land. The

Assistant Commissioner accepted the same and passed an order

dated 19.04.2022 setting aside all transactions and directing

resumption of land in favour of the original grantee.

1. In the meantime, respondent No. 5, who had purchased the

subject land from Sri Muniyappa, filed a second appeal (RSA No.

801/2019) impugning the order dated 05.03.2019 passed in RA No.

55/2018.

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1. By order dated 27.12.2022, this Court allowed the appeal

preferred by respondent No.5 (RSA.No.801/2019) and set aside

the order passed in RA.No.55/2018. This Court upheld the decree

dated 02.03.2018 passed in OS.No.278/2010, whereby the original

grantee's suit for declaration of title was dismissed. Thereafter, on

22.09.2023, the Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal against

the Assistant Commissioner's order directing resumption of the

subject land in favour of the original grantee and his heirs.

1. As noted above, the appellant challenged the said order by

filing a writ petition (WP.No.20995/2024), which was dismissed by

the impugned order.

Submissions

1. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that

the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, as well as the

learned Single Judge, is erroneous as they failed to consider the

provisions of the PTCL Act. He submitted that the said orders are

premised on the basis that the original grantee had entered into a

valid settlement with Sri. Muniyappa, whereby he acquired the title -7- NC: 2026:KHC:11910-DB WA No. 1876 of 2024 HC-KAR

to the subject land. He referred to Section 3(1)(e) of the PTCL Act,

which defines the term 'transfer' in very wide terms. The said

clause is reproduced below:

"(e) "transfer" means a sale, gift, exchange, mortgage
(with or without possession), lease or any other
transaction not being a partition among members of a
family or a testamentary disposition and includes the
creation of a charge or an agreement to sell, exchange,
mortgage or lease or enter into any other transaction."
13. He submitted that the definition of the word 'transfer' includes

any other transaction. He submitted that Section 4 of the PTCL Act

contains a non obstante clause, which expressly provides that any

transfer of granted land would be null and void. He submitted that,

under Section 4 of the PTCL Act, Sri Muniyappa could not have

acquired any right or title to the subject land, which was granted to

Sri Ramakrishnappa, the original grantee. He also referred to Section 4(11) of the PTCL Act and submitted that the provisions of

the PTCL Act would have an effect, notwithstanding any decree or

order of a court, tribunal or other authority. He contended that the

learned Single Judge had erred in accepting that Sri Muniyappa

had sold the land to respondent No.5 after obtaining the permission -8- NC: 2026:KHC:11910-DB WA No. 1876 of 2024 HC-KAR

of the concerned authorities, and therefore, the said transfer was

valid. He also submitted that the permission granted for sale of

property by Sri Muniyappa to respondent No.5 would be of no

relevance since Sri Muniyappa did not acquire any title to the

subject property.

1. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant.

2. As apparent from the above, the appellant's case rests on

the assertion that the transfer of land from Sri Ramakrishnappa to

Sri Muniyappa was void.

1. It is material to note that Sri Muniyappa's case is that he was

adopted by Sri Ramakrishnappa as his son and resided with him.

However, certain differences arose within the family, which he

blames on the women in the family. However, the same were

resolved and 'a deed of settlement of partition' was entered into on

15.12.1991, whereby he acquired absolute title to the subject

property. The plaint filed by Sri Muniyappa, which was OS No.

368/1996, alleges that the original grantee and his wife attempted

to alienate the property to third parties by entering into fake sale

agreements and disturbing his possession. As noted above, the -9- NC: 2026:KHC:11910-DB WA No. 1876 of 2024 HC-KAR

said suit was decreed in terms of a compromise arrived at,

whereby the original grantee acknowledged Sri Muniyappa's title to

the subject property.

1. The suit filed by the original grantee (OS.No.278/2010)

seeking a declaration of title was contested by Sri Muniyappa, who

was arrayed as defendant No.1 in the said suit. He had led

evidence in the said proceedings to the effect that he had been

adopted by Sri Ramakrishnappa, the original grantee. Before the

trial court, the defence witnesses (DW2 to DW4) specifically

deposed that Sri Muniyappa, who was defendant No. 1, was the

adopted son of the plaintiff, the original grantee. He also deposed

that the subject land had fallen to the share of Sri Muniyappa

pursuant to a compromise, which was recorded in

OS.No.368/1996.

1. The learned trial court noted that the defence witnesses were

subjected to extensive cross-examination. However, nothing had

been elicited to disbelieve their version in support of the written

statement.

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1. The decree passed in OS.No.278/2010 was set aside in an

appeal. However, it was restored by an order dated 27.12.2022

passed by this Court in RSA. No.801/2019. This Court held that

"the trial court, on proper appreciation of material on record, arrived

at the right conclusion and dismissed the suit on the plaintiff".

1. We may now refer to the meaning of transfer as defined

under Section 3(1)(e) of the PTCL Act. The said clause is

reproduced above. A plain reading of the said clause indicates that

the expression transfer excludes "a partition among members of a

family or a testamentary disposition". It is Sri. Muniyappa's case

that he was the adopted son and thus a member of the original

grantee's family. In his plaint (registered as OS.No.368/1996), he

asserted that he acquired the title and possession of the subject

land under the terms of a deed of settlement of partition dated

15.12.1991. The original grantee had compromised the said suit.

The same was decreed by declaring that the plaintiff is the absolute

owner of the subject property and further restraining the original

grantee or anyone claiming or interfering with the possession of the

subject land.

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1. As noted above, in the subsequent suit filed by the original

grantee (OS.No.278/2010), the trial court held that the compromise

recorded in OS.No.368/1996 is binding and that Sri Muniyappa had

acquired title and possession to the subject property.

1. In view of the above, the question whether Sri Muniyappa

had acquired title to the subject land became final.

1. It is important to note that thereafter, Sri Muniyappa had

sought permission for alienation of the land under Section 4(2) of

the PTCL Act, which was granted by the Government. After

securing the permission, Sri Muniyappa sold the subject land under

a sale deed dated 13.05.2010.

1. It is also relevant to note that the appellant had initiated

proceedings under Section 5 of the PTCL Act after an

unreasonable delay. According to the appellant, the alienation in

favour of Sri Muniyappa, which was in the year 1996, if not earlier

on 15.12.1991, is void. However, the proceedings for resumption

were initiated in the year 2014. The order of the Assistant

Commissioner for resumption of the land was passed on

19.04.2022, which is more than three (03) decades after the deed

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of settlement of partition under which Sri. Muniyappa claimed title

to the subject property was executed and more than twenty five

years after the decree declaring that Sri. Muniyappa was the owner

of the property had been passed.

1. The Supreme Court in [Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of

Karnataka1](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/112442753/) and as well as [Vivek M. Hinduja and Others v. M.

Ashwath2](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91000193/) held that the proceedings for resumption of land after an

inordinate delay would not be maintainable. The provisions of Section 5(1) of the PTCL Act were subsequently amended by the

insertion of clauses (c) and (d), by virtue of Act No.30 of 2023. However, the import of the said amendment came to be considered

by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of [Smt. Gouramma

@ Gangamma v. The Deputy Commissioner](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/64881803/) and others3, held

as under:

"(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with
retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing
legal position. Such duplication happened even in
English legislative history, hardly needs to be
mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of
limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c)
and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do 1 (2020) 14 SCC 232 2 2019 Kar.LJ 819 (SC) 3 KHC-D:10666-DB

• 13 - NC: 2026:KHC:11910-DB WA No. 1876 of 2024 HC-KAR

 not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the
 most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been
 all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned.
 Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period
 earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches,
 which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the
 Domain of Equity.

(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of "limitation period"

at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time
between alienation of granted land and the filing of claim
for its resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of
the decision lend support to this view:

"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to
terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any
interested person to make an application for having the
transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act.
This Section does not prescribe any period within which
such an application can be made. Neither does it
prescribe the period within which suo motu action may
be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v.
Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs., (2017) 6 Scale 459
and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy. Commissioner
(C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011)
reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute
provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the
Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is
held that action whether on an application of the parties,
or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.
This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the
Kosi River which make agricultural operations
impossible. An application for restoration was made
after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background
that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so.
We have no hesitation in upholding that the present
application for restoration of land made by respondent-
Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period
and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court,
namely, R. Rudrappa v. Deputy Commissioner, (2000) 1

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Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa v. State of
Karnataka, (2006) 4 Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G.
Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga
District, Chitradurga, (2000) 2 Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding
that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the
Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any
time, are overruled. ....."
(emphasis is ours)

       Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in
  the above case has not been altered by the subject
  amendment, even in the least.

(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have
taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in
Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the
Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to
the contention that the said amendment intends to
invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the
country which it did after considering all aspects of the
matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the
Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it
would have employed a different terminology. We
repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing
the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas
"laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors.
Cases are replete in Law Reports relating to delay and
laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12 , 226 & 227 of
the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.

(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay &
laches' that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay' that
obtain in law."

As such an application for resumption / restoration of land after an

unreasonably long delay, are not maintainable.

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1. In view of the above, the challenge to the order passed by

the Deputy Commissioner cannot be sustained. The learned Single

Judge's decision that the sale in favour of respondent No.5 was

after obtaining permission under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act and

therefore cannot be held as void, warrants no interference by this

Court.

1. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Sd/-

(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE

                                         Sd/-

(C.M. POONACHA)
JUDGE

SD
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 39