R v DYV — Juvenile Murder Appeal Refused, 16-Year Sentence Upheld

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R v DYV [2026] QCA 74

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R v DYV [2026] QCA 74

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

| CITATION: | R v DYV [2026] QCA 74 |
| PARTIES: | R

v

DYV

(applicant) |
| FILE NO/S: | CA No 309 of 2025

SC No 631 of 2025 |
| DIVISION: | Court of Appeal |
| PROCEEDING: | Sentence Application |
| ORIGINATING COURT: | Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2025] QSC 313 (Bowskill CJ) |
| DELIVERED ON: | 24 April 2026 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
| HEARING DATE: | 10 March 2026 |
| JUDGES: | Mullins P, Bond JA, Boddice JA |
| ORDER: | Leave to appeal sentence is refused. |
| CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the juvenile applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of stealing, one count of murder and one count of unlawful use of a motor vehicle in company – where the applicant was sentenced to 16 years’ detention to be released after serving 60 per cent for the count of murder and lesser periods of detention for the remaining counts – where the sentencing judge found special circumstances to displace the default position under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) that a child must serve 70 per cent of the period of detention imposed – where the applicant submits that yardsticks cases demonstrate that the sentence for the charge of murder was plainly unjust or unreasonable – whether the sentence imposed for the count of murder was manifestly excessive

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – JUDGE ACTED ON WRONG PRINCIPLE – where the juvenile applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of stealing, one count of murder and one count of unlawful use of a motor vehicle in company – where the charge of murder involved the applicant stabbing the deceased who was surrendering and retreating – where the sentencing judge rejected the submission that the offending the subject of the murder charge was a moment of madness – whether the sentencing judge failed to take into account the duration that the juvenile applicant held the intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm

Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld)

Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45, applied

R v Carroll [1995] QCA 399, distinguished

R v D [2000] 2 Qd R 659; [1999] QCA 231, distinguished

R v Gwilliams [1997] QCA 389, distinguished

R v HCZ [2025] QCA 147, considered

R v LZY & Porter [2024] QSC 237, distinguished

R v Rowlingson [2008] QCA 395, distinguished

R v SBU [2012] 1 Qd R 250; [2011] QCA 203, distinguished |
| COUNSEL: | M J Hynes, with J B Reeves, for the applicant

T A Fuller KC, with C M Cook, for the respondent |
| SOLICITORS: | Hannay Lawyers for the applicant

Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent |

1. [1] THE COURT: On 22 July 2025, the applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of stealing (counts 1, 2 and 3), one count of murder (count 4) and one count of unlawfully using a motor vehicle in company (count 5). The Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) applied to the sentencing.
2. [2] On 12 November 2025, the applicant was sentenced to detention for 16 years for count 4, detention for 12 months for count 5 and detention for 1 month for each of counts 1, 2 and 3. It was ordered that the applicant be released from detention after serving 60 per cent of the period of detention imposed for count 4.
3. [3] It was further ordered that a conviction be recorded for count 4, but that convictions not be recorded for counts 1, 2, 3 and 5.

4. [4] The applicant seeks leave to appeal the sentence imposed for count 4. If leave be granted, he relies on two grounds. First, that the sentence was manifestly excessive. Second, that the sentencing judge failed to take into account “the short duration that the applicant held the requisite intention as a relevant factor on sentence”.
   Indictment

5. [5] All of the counts on the indictment were committed on 3 February 2024. At the time, the applicant was aged 16 years and three months and was on bail for offences of robbery and unlawfully using his parents’ motor vehicle.

6. [6] Counts 1, 2 and 3 each involve the theft of property on the afternoon of 3 February 2024. Count 1 related to stealing items from a convenience store. Count 2 related to stealing a customer’s order from a fast-food store. Count 3 related to stealing alcohol from a liquor store.

7. [7] Count 4 was committed later on 3 February 2024. The victim was a 70 year old married grandmother, who was struck once with a knife, whilst standing in a shopping centre car park with her six year old granddaughter. Count 5 involved taking the motor vehicle of the victim who was the subject of count 4.
   Facts

8. [8] Early on the afternoon of 3 February 2024, the applicant was consuming alcohol with his friends, at a shopping centre. After about an hour, the applicant left the group to enter a convenience store where he stole items (count 1). At about 4.30 pm, the applicant went into a fast-food store. His face was covered with a surgical mask. He stole a customer’s order (count 2). Approximately 30 minutes later, the applicant went into a liquor store with one of his friends. Again, the applicant’s face was covered with a mask. The applicant stole some bottles of alcohol (count 3).

9. [9] After the commission of count 3, the applicant and his friends left the shopping centre and went to an abandoned house nearby. They continued drinking at that house. Shortly before 6.00 pm, the applicant left the group. The applicant travelled back to the shopping centre. At the time he was wearing a black hooded jumper with the hood up over his head. He also wore a surgical mask covering his face. He was armed with a knife.

10. [10] The applicant went into a lower-level car park at the shopping centre. At or about this time, the victim drove into the car park, accompanied by her six year old granddaughter. They left their vehicle to walk a short distance towards an entrance to the shops. As the victim and her granddaughter approached the entrance, the applicant moved quickly towards the victim. He was brandishing a knife. He demanded her car keys. The victim took a few steps back with her hands raised. The applicant stepped forward and stabbed her once to the left side of her chest (count 4). All of this took place in the sight of the victim’s granddaughter.

11. [11] Although the applicant knew he had seriously harmed the victim, he did not stop to render assistance or even to check on her. Instead, he took her keys. After successfully locating her vehicle, he drove her vehicle from the car park (count 5).

12. [12] Although extremely scared, the victim’s granddaughter bravely ran for help. Members of the public, including a doctor, assisted but were unsuccessful in saving the victim’s life. That was unsurprising as the knife used by the applicant had pierced the victim’s heart, creating an unrecoverable and deep wound of 17 centimetres.

13. [13] Later that night, the applicant made a telephone call. During that call, the applicant made reference to a knife and said words to the effect, “near the armpit area”.

14. [14] On 5 February 2024, the applicant was located by police. The applicant subsequently participated in an interview with police. Relevantly, during that interview the applicant identified himself, from CCTV footage, as being present in the convenience store, the fast-food outlet and the shopping centre. He told police that after taking alcohol from the liquor store, he went down to the underground car park in order to find a way out. He said he did not remove the surgical mask, although he did pull it down to drink. He told police that he did not otherwise recall the events at the shopping centre and did not recall having a knife at any time that day. He said he consumed a large quantity of alcohol.
    Sentence hearing

15. [15] The Crown submitted that the circumstances of the offences warranted the imposition of a detention order of 17 to 18 years for count 4. Defence submitted that detention of 12 to 13 years was appropriate. Each agreed that lesser concurrent terms of detention be imposed for the other counts.
    Sentencing remarks

16. [16] The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant’s pleas of guilty evidenced a taking of responsibility for his conduct. The plea of guilty for count 4 also saved the victim’s family the trauma of a trial. The sentencing judge also accepted that whilst the case against the applicant was a strong circumstantial case, the pleas of guilty were timely and had real utility in assisting the course of justice.

17. [17] The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant was ashamed of his conduct and felt deep regret and guilt for his actions. Whilst he had initially minimised and sought to externalise responsibility, his actions, since the commission of the offence, supported a conclusion that he had developed insight as to the impact of his offending.

18. [18] The sentencing judge recorded that the applicant had pleaded guilty to count 4 on the basis that he had deliberately stabbed the victim, intending to inflict, at least, grievous bodily harm. The sentencing judge also recorded that the applicant’s actions had caused immense pain and suffering to the victim’s family. The victim’s husband of almost 50 years had lost not only his partner, but also his support person and guide, in circumstances where he had poor eyesight. The catastrophic consequences of her death had devastated him and left him angry. They had also caused complete devastation for the victim’s daughters and grandchildren.

19. [19] The sentencing judge recorded that although the applicant was about to turn 18 years of age, he was still 17 years of age at sentence and was just over 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the offences. As such, he was to be regarded as a child and the general principles which applied to the sentencing of children were applicable. Those principles included recent legislative amendments which removed the requirement that a detention order be imposed only as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period, replacing it with a requirement that a child be detained in custody where necessary, including to ensure community safety and for no longer than necessary to meet the purpose of detention.

20. [20] The sentencing judge found that the effect of that change was to elevate the significance of community protection as a sentencing factor in relation to the sentencing of children. Where, as here, the offending involved the use of a knife, community protection, denunciation and deterrence were all important factors, supporting the imposition of stringent penalties. Deterrence, in the context of offending involving serious acts of public violence by young men upon innocent members of the community, needed to send a message that young people who go into the community armed with a knife and use it to stab others, will face substantial punishment in the courts.

21. [21] After finding that the only appropriate sentence was detention, the sentencing judge said that in determining the period of detention to be imposed, regard was to be had to the nature and seriousness of the offence, the applicant’s previous criminal history, any aggravating or mitigating factors such as the commission of the offences whilst on bail, information set out in the pre-sentence report, the impact of the offence and the harm caused to the victim’s family.

22. [22] The sentencing judge found that the applicant’s actions were callous and cowardly. He had attacked an innocent, older woman going about her own business at the shops with her young granddaughter, with the intention of stealing her car. He had used a knife to stab the victim, despite the victim stepping back with her hands raised thereby posing no threat whatsoever. The sentencing judge found that whilst the action of stabbing was not premeditated, it was not a “moment of madness”. The applicant had acted with determination, having adopted a form of disguise for his face, having armed himself with a knife and having planned to steal a car to commit other offences by whatever means necessary, including serious violence.

23. [23] The sentencing judge recorded that whilst the applicant did not have a substantial criminal history before the commission of these offences, he had already committed serious offences, including three offences of armed robbery in company with violence, as well as offences of unlawful use of a motor vehicle in June 2023. It was those offences that the applicant was on bail for at the time of the commission of these offences. The sentencing judge recorded that that fact was an aggravating factor, noting that in the armed robberies, the applicant’s co-offender had produced a knife to take phones from people without paying for them, with the applicant aiding the co-offender by either standing by, taking the phone, or calling out encouragement. On one occasion, a young female complainant was injured by the knife.

24. [24] The sentencing judge said that a pre-sentence report and a psychologist’s report recorded that the applicant had come from a loving and supportive family, with a positive childhood and early adolescence. However, the applicant had become disconnected when his family moved to Queensland from interstate. The applicant began to feel socially excluded and isolated, ultimately connecting with a criminal gang. These people used drugs and alcohol and carried knives as weapons, as a form of protection. The applicant had gradually normalised anti-social and pro-violent attitudes and began to commit offences to fit in and to feel valued and accepted by the group. The applicant had also reported that the offending gave him a thrill.

25. [25] The sentencing judge noted that although the applicant had a limited criminal history, his self-reporting to the psychologist included admissions to committing many other offences. The sentencing judge also noted that the applicant had said that he had no memory of the stabbing, having essentially “blacked out”. The sentencing judge did not accept that contention. The CCTV footage supported a conclusion that the applicant’s conduct was determined, deliberate and conscious. The sentencing judge did, however, accept the psychologist’s explanation that the applicant’s description might be as a result of profound shame and the trauma of confronting and processing the fact that he had murdered another human being.

26. [26] The sentencing judge recorded that the applicant had now been in custody on remand for a little over one year and nine months, which would be counted as part of the period of detention to be imposed on sentence. Whilst the applicant had also completed year 12 and undertaken a number of courses whilst in custody, the applicant’s conduct in custody had been mixed, with incidents of physical aggression towards his peers and the applicant having been charged in relation to one of those assaults whilst in detention.

27. [27] The sentencing judge recorded that the psychologist had made a provisional diagnosis of conduct disorder, adolescent-onset type, various substance-use disorders and an adjustment disorder with depressed mood which had developed since the applicant had been in custody. The psychologist also described low to moderate levels of psychopathic traits consistent with adolescent-onset conduct issues, driven by peer influence, substance use and situational factors, rather than an entrenched psychopathic personality. The psychologist assessed the applicant’s overall risk of re-offending with interpersonal violence as moderate, with the risk that he would inflict lethal violence being assessed at low to moderate, however, the harm that would be caused if that risk eventuated was serious injury or death, and therefore community protection remained an important factor in deciding the appropriate penalty.

28. [28] The sentencing judge found that the offence of murder committed by the applicant was properly to be regarded as a particularly heinous offence. As such, the maximum penalty was life imprisonment. The objective circumstances supporting that finding included the senseless and violent stabbing in a public car park of an innocent woman taking her granddaughter to the shops, with that violent attack being directly witnessed by the young granddaughter, the harm caused to the victim’s family which had been immense and profound, and the fact that the killing was intentional in the sense that the applicant had the relevant intent to cause grievous bodily harm. In addition, whilst the applicant was young and had a good upbringing from his parents, he had become desensitised to crime and violence and was on bail at the time for other violent crimes.

29. [29] After referring to various comparable authorities, the sentencing judge said:
    “There is no one right answer to the sentence to be imposed. It involves the exercise of a discretion in accordance with legal rules and principles. In your case, the purposes of punishment, ensuring community protection, deterrence and denunciation are particularly important, as well as rehabilitation. The Crown’s submitted penalty is, in my view, too high, and not supported by the cases to which I have referred; but the submission of your barrister is too low. The penalty which I find is just in all the circumstances is detention for 16 years.

The default position under the Youth Justice Act is that a child sentenced to detention must be released after serving 70 per cent of the period of detention; however, section 227(2) confers a discretion on the court to order that a child be released after serving between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of the period of detention if the court considers there are special circumstances.

I have taken your pleas of guilty into account in arriving at the sentence of detention to impose on you. The more recent comparable cases I have referred to all involved pleas of guilty. I have decided to impose a higher penalty as a head sentence of 16 years, but to balance that with an order that you be released from detention after serving 60 per cent. Your youth, pleas of guilty and prospects of rehabilitation support that order, leaving a substantial period of supervision in the community after release, which will be important.

In combination, the order I propose to make for detention for 16 years with release after serving 60 per cent meets the requirement in youth justice principle 18, of detention for no longer than necessary to meet the purposes of detention – punishment, community protection, deterrence, denunciation and rehabilitation.

I must also consider whether to record a conviction. The court has a discretion in this regard. Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, in particular the nature of the murder offence, it is appropriate that the conviction of count 4, murder, be recorded. The convictions of the other offences will not be recorded.”

Consideration

Ground 2

1. [30] As this ground asserts specific error, it is convenient to deal with it first.
2. [31] The applicant submits that the sentencing judge failed to take into account a fact that was crucial to the sentencing exercise, namely the duration for which the applicant held the requisite intention.
3. [32] A consideration of the sentencing remarks supports a conclusion that there was no such failure.

4. [33] The sentencing judge’s observation that the applicant had acted with determination, whilst accepting that his actions of stabbing the victim were not premeditated, must be viewed in the context of a submission made at sentence, that the applicant’s conduct was “a moment of madness”. The sentencing judge rejected such a flourish, noting that the stabbing had occurred in circumstances where the applicant had disguised his face, armed himself with a knife and planned to steal a car and then, when faced with a defenceless older woman offering no resistance, had plunged that knife into her chest. Those actions were properly described as acting with determination. The subsequent acknowledgment that the actions of stabbing were not premeditated recognised that the requisite intention to commit at least grievous bodily harm was of brief duration.
   Ground 1

5. [34] To succeed on a ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive, it is necessary for the applicant to establish that the sentence imposed was not merely different or even markedly different from comparable yardsticks, but was so different as to warrant a conclusion that there was a misapplication of principle, or that, having regard to all the circumstances, the sentence imposed was plainly unjust or unreasonable. [1]

6. [35] Whilst the applicant submits that a consideration of the comparable yardsticks supports a conclusion that the sentence imposed on the applicant was manifestly excessive, a consideration of those yardsticks in the context of the circumstances of the applicant’s offending supports a conclusion that there was neither a misapplication of principle, nor was there the imposition of a sentence that was plainly unjust or unreasonable.

7. [36] First, as the sentencing judge observed, some of the more dated yardsticks said to be comparable, such as R v Gwilliams [2] and R v Carroll, [3] ** were of limited assistance, having regard to the application of a maximum penalty of life imprisonment in the applicant’s case and changing relevant legal principles, such as deterrence and community protection. Other yardsticks, such as R v D, [4] and R v Rowlingson, [5] ** concerned more serious offending, involving significant pre-planning and extreme violence. There were also significant mitigating circumstances which were relevant to the sentence imposed in R v SBU. [6]

8. [37] Second, although the applicant submitted that the circumstances of the killing in R v LZY & Porter [7] were objectively more serious, there were significant mitigating factors in that case which were not present in the applicant’s case, including a lack of criminal history and the absence of the significant aggravating factor that the applicant was on bail for offences of violence when he committed these offences.

9. [38] Third, a consideration of the recent yardstick of R v HCZ, [8] supports a conclusion that a sentence of 16 years detention for the applicant’s offending fell within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion.

10. [39] In HCZ, ****** a felony murder attracted a sentence of 14 years detention. The circumstances of that offence were, however, different. That offence, which also involved the penetration of the victim’s chest with a knife, involved an offender who had initially sought to flee and upon being pursued by the occupants of the house, had lashed out with the knife, making two strikes at its occupants before penetrating the deceased’s heart with a further strike of the knife. Contrary to the applicant’s submission, HCZ’s offending was not objectively more serious. The applicant’s offending involved the striking of a victim who plainly was retreating and not pursuing him. It also involved a deliberate use of the knife, rather than a lashing out.

11. [40] Once regard is had to those circumstances, the imposition of 16 years detention for the offence of murder was neither plainly unjust nor unreasonable. It also did not evidence any misapplication of principle.
    Order

12. [41] Leave to appeal sentence is refused.

Footnotes

[1] Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520.

[2] [1997] QCA 389.

[3] [1995] QCA 399.

[4] [2000] 2 Qd R 659.

[5] [2008] QCA 395.

[6] [2012] 1 Qd R 250.

[7] [2024] QSC 237.

[8] [2025] QCA 147.

Editorial Notes

• Published Case Name: R v DYV
• Shortened Case Name: R v DYV
• MNC: [2026] QCA 74
• Court: QCA
• Judge(s): Mullins P, Bond JA, Boddice JA
• Date: 24 Apr 2026

Litigation History

Event	Citation or File	Date	Notes
Primary Judgment	[2025] QSC 313	13 Nov 2025	Sentenced to 16 years' detention for murder, to be released after serving 60%, with shorter concurrent terms for related counts of stealing and unlawful use, and conviction recorded for murder: Bowskill CJ.
Notice of Appeal Filed	File Number: CA 309/25	08 Dec 2025	Application filed.
Appeal Determined (QCA)	[2026] QCA 74	24 Apr 2026	Leave to appeal sentence refused: Mullins P, Bond and Boddice JJA.

Appeal Status

Appeal Determined (QCA)

Cases Cited

Case Name	Full Citation	References
Hili v The Queen	[2010] HCA 45	1 citation
Hili v The Queen	(2010) 242 CLR 520	2 citations
R v Carroll	[1995] QCA 399	2 citations
R v D	[2000] 2 Qd R 659; [1999] QCA 231	3 citations
R v DYV	[2025] QSC 313	1 citation
R v Gwilliams	[1997] QCA 389	2 citations
R v HCZ	[2025] QCA 147	2 citations
R v LZY and Porter	[2024] QSC 237	2 citations
R v Rowlingson	[2008] QCA 395	2 citations
R v SBU	[2012] 1 Qd R 250; [2011] QCA 203	3 citations

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.