R v DYV - Leave to Appeal Murder Sentence Denied

R v DYV [2026] QCA 74 (24 April 2026)

Last Updated: 24 April 2026

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

| CITATION: | R v DYV [2026] QCA 74 |
| PARTIES: | R v

DYV

(applicant) |
| FILE NO/S: | CA No 309 of 2025 SC No 631 of 2025 |
| DIVISION: | Court of Appeal |
| PROCEEDING: | Sentence Application |
| ORIGINATING COURT: | Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2025] QSC 313 (Bowskill CJ) |
| DELIVERED ON: | 24 April 2026 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
| HEARING DATE: | 10 March 2026 |
| JUDGES: | Mullins P, Bond JA, Boddice JA |
| ORDER: | Leave to appeal sentence is refused. |
| CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
– GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE OR
INADEQUATE – where the juvenile applicant pleaded guilty to three counts
of stealing, one count of murder and
one count of unlawful use of a motor
vehicle in company – where the applicant was sentenced to
16 years’ detention to
be released after serving 60 per cent for the
count of murder and lesser periods of detention for the remaining counts –
where
the sentencing judge found special circumstances to displace the default
position under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) that a child must serve
70 per cent of the period of detention imposed – where the applicant
submits that yardsticks
cases demonstrate that the sentence for the charge of
murder was plainly unjust or unreasonable – whether the sentence imposed
for the count of murder was manifestly excessive CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
– GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – JUDGE ACTED ON
WRONG PRINCIPLE –
where the juvenile applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of stealing, one
count of murder and one count
of unlawful use of a motor vehicle in company
– where the charge of murder involved the applicant stabbing the deceased
who
was surrendering and retreating – where the sentencing judge rejected
the submission that the offending the subject of the
murder charge was a moment
of madness – whether the sentencing judge failed to take into account the
duration that the juvenile
applicant held the intention to cause death or
grievous bodily harm Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45, applied R
v Carroll [1995] QCA
399, distinguished

R v D [2000] 2 Qd R 659; [1999] QCA
231, distinguished

R v Gwilliams [1997] QCA
389, distinguished

R v HCZ [2025] QCA
147, considered

R v LZY & Porter [2024] QSC 237,
distinguished

R v Rowlingson [2008] QCA
395, distinguished

R v SBU [2012] 1 Qd
R 250; [2011] QCA
203, distinguished |
| COUNSEL: | M J Hynes, with J B Reeves, for the applicant T A Fuller KC, with C M
Cook, for the respondent |
| SOLICITORS: | Hannay Lawyers for the applicant Director of Public Prosecutions
(Queensland) for the respondent |
[1] THE COURT: On 22 July 2025, the applicant pleaded guilty to three
counts of stealing (counts 1, 2 and 3), one count of murder (count 4) and
one
count of unlawfully using a motor vehicle in company (count 5). The Youth
Justice Act 1992 (Qld) applied to the sentencing.

[2] On 12 November 2025, the applicant was sentenced to detention for
16 years for count 4, detention for 12 months for count 5
and
detention for 1 month for each of counts 1, 2 and 3. It was
ordered that the applicant be released from detention after serving
60 per
cent of the period of detention imposed for count 4.

[3] It was further ordered that a conviction be recorded for count 4,
but that convictions not be recorded for counts 1, 2, 3 and
5.

[4] The applicant seeks leave to appeal the sentence imposed for
count 4. If leave be granted, he relies on two grounds. First,
that the
sentence was manifestly excessive. Second, that the sentencing judge failed to
take into account “the short duration
that the applicant held the
requisite intention as a relevant factor on sentence”.

Indictment

[5] All of the counts on the indictment were committed on 3 February
2024. At the time, the applicant was aged 16 years and three
months and
was on bail for offences of robbery and unlawfully using his parents’
motor vehicle.

[6] Counts 1, 2 and 3 each involve the theft of property on the afternoon of
3 February 2024. Count 1 related to stealing items from
a convenience
store. Count 2 related to stealing a customer’s order from a
fast-food store. Count 3 related to stealing alcohol
from a liquor
store.

[7] Count 4 was committed later on 3 February 2024. The victim was a
70 year old married grandmother, who was struck once with a
knife, whilst
standing in a shopping centre car park with her six year old granddaughter.
Count 5 involved taking the motor vehicle
of the victim who was the subject
of count 4.

Facts

[8] Early on the afternoon of 3 February 2024, the applicant was
consuming alcohol with his friends, at a shopping centre. After
about an hour,
the applicant left the group to enter a convenience store where he stole items
(count 1). At about 4.30 pm, the applicant
went into a fast-food
store. His face was covered with a surgical mask. He stole a customer’s
order (count 2). Approximately
30 minutes later, the applicant went into a
liquor store with one of his friends. Again, the applicant’s face was
covered
with a mask. The applicant stole some bottles of alcohol
(count 3).

[9] After the commission of count 3, the applicant and his friends left
the shopping centre and went to an abandoned house nearby.
They continued
drinking at that house. Shortly before 6.00 pm, the applicant left the
group. The applicant travelled back to the
shopping centre. At the time he was
wearing a black hooded jumper with the hood up over his head. He also wore a
surgical mask
covering his face. He was armed with a knife.

[10] The applicant went into a lower-level car park at the shopping centre.
At or about this time, the victim drove into the car
park, accompanied by her
six year old granddaughter. They left their vehicle to walk a short distance
towards an entrance to the
shops. As the victim and her granddaughter
approached the entrance, the applicant moved quickly towards the victim. He was
brandishing
a knife. He demanded her car keys. The victim took a few steps
back with her hands raised. The applicant stepped forward and stabbed
her once
to the left side of her chest (count 4). All of this took place in the
sight of the victim’s granddaughter.

[11] Although the applicant knew he had seriously harmed the victim, he did
not stop to render assistance or even to check on her.
Instead, he took her
keys. After successfully locating her vehicle, he drove her vehicle from the
car park (count 5).

[12] Although extremely scared, the victim’s granddaughter bravely ran
for help. Members of the public, including a doctor,
assisted but were
unsuccessful in saving the victim’s life. That was unsurprising as the
knife used by the applicant had pierced
the victim’s heart, creating an
unrecoverable and deep wound of 17 centimetres.

[13] Later that night, the applicant made a telephone call. During that
call, the applicant made reference to a knife and said words
to the effect,
“near the armpit area”.

[14] On 5 February 2024, the applicant was located by police. The
applicant subsequently participated in an interview with police.
Relevantly,
during that interview the applicant identified himself, from CCTV footage, as
being present in the convenience store,
the fast-food outlet and the shopping
centre. He told police that after taking alcohol from the liquor store, he went
down to the
underground car park in order to find a way out. He said he did not
remove the surgical mask, although he did pull it down to drink.
He told police
that he did not otherwise recall the events at the shopping centre and did not
recall having a knife at any time
that day. He said he consumed a large
quantity of alcohol.

Sentence hearing

[15] The Crown submitted that the circumstances of the offences warranted the
imposition of a detention order of 17 to 18 years for
count 4.
Defence submitted that detention of 12 to 13 years was appropriate. Each agreed
that lesser concurrent terms of detention
be imposed for the other counts.

Sentencing remarks

[16] The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant’s pleas of guilty
evidenced a taking of responsibility for his conduct.
The plea of guilty for
count 4 also saved the victim’s family the trauma of a trial. The
sentencing judge also accepted that
whilst the case against the applicant was a
strong circumstantial case, the pleas of guilty were timely and had real utility
in assisting
the course of justice.

[17] The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant was ashamed of his
conduct and felt deep regret and guilt for his actions.
Whilst he had initially
minimised and sought to externalise responsibility, his actions, since the
commission of the offence, supported
a conclusion that he had developed insight
as to the impact of his offending.

[18] The sentencing judge recorded that the applicant had pleaded guilty to
count 4 on the basis that he had deliberately stabbed
the victim, intending
to inflict, at least, grievous bodily harm. The sentencing judge also recorded
that the applicant’s
actions had caused immense pain and suffering to the
victim’s family. The victim’s husband of almost 50 years had
lost
not only his partner, but also his support person and guide, in
circumstances where he had poor eyesight. The catastrophic consequences
of her
death had devastated him and left him angry. They had also caused complete
devastation for the victim’s daughters and
grandchildren.

[19] The sentencing judge recorded that although the applicant was about to
turn 18 years of age, he was still 17 years of age at
sentence and was
just over 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the offences.
As such, he was to be regarded as a child
and the general principles which
applied to the sentencing of children were applicable. Those principles
included recent legislative
amendments which removed the requirement that a
detention order be imposed only as a last resort and for the shortest
appropriate
period, replacing it with a requirement that a child be detained in
custody where necessary, including to ensure community safety
and for no longer
than necessary to meet the purpose of detention.

[20] The sentencing judge found that the effect of that change was to elevate
the significance of community protection as a sentencing
factor in relation to
the sentencing of children. Where, as here, the offending involved the use of a
knife, community protection,
denunciation and deterrence were all important
factors, supporting the imposition of stringent penalties. Deterrence, in the
context
of offending involving serious acts of public violence by young men upon
innocent members of the community, needed to send a message
that young people
who go into the community armed with a knife and use it to stab others, will
face substantial punishment in the
courts.

[21] After finding that the only appropriate sentence was detention, the
sentencing judge said that in determining the period of detention
to be imposed,
regard was to be had to the nature and seriousness of the offence, the
applicant’s previous criminal history,
any aggravating or mitigating
factors such as the commission of the offences whilst on bail, information set
out in the pre-sentence
report, the impact of the offence and the harm caused to
the victim’s family.

[22] The sentencing judge found that the applicant’s actions were
callous and cowardly. He had attacked an innocent, older
woman going about her
own business at the shops with her young granddaughter, with the intention of
stealing her car. He had used
a knife to stab the victim, despite the victim
stepping back with her hands raised thereby posing no threat whatsoever. The
sentencing
judge found that whilst the action of stabbing was not premeditated,
it was not a “moment of madness”. The applicant
had acted with
determination, having adopted a form of disguise for his face, having armed
himself with a knife and having planned
to steal a car to commit other offences
by whatever means necessary, including serious violence.

[23] The sentencing judge recorded that whilst the applicant did not have a
substantial criminal history before the commission of
these offences, he had
already committed serious offences, including three offences of armed robbery in
company with violence, as
well as offences of unlawful use of a motor vehicle in
June 2023. It was those offences that the applicant was on bail for at the
time
of the commission of these offences. The sentencing judge recorded that that
fact was an aggravating factor, noting that in
the armed robberies, the
applicant’s co-offender had produced a knife to take phones from people
without paying for them, with
the applicant aiding the co-offender by either
standing by, taking the phone, or calling out encouragement. On one occasion, a
young
female complainant was injured by the knife.

[24] The sentencing judge said that a pre-sentence report and a
psychologist’s report recorded that the applicant had come from
a loving
and supportive family, with a positive childhood and early adolescence.
However, the applicant had become disconnected
when his family moved to
Queensland from interstate. The applicant began to feel socially excluded and
isolated, ultimately connecting
with a criminal gang. These people used drugs
and alcohol and carried knives as weapons, as a form of protection. The
applicant
had gradually normalised anti-social and pro-violent attitudes and
began to commit offences to fit in and to feel valued and accepted
by the group.
The applicant had also reported that the offending gave him a thrill.

[25] The sentencing judge noted that although the applicant had a limited
criminal history, his self-reporting to the psychologist
included admissions to
committing many other offences. The sentencing judge also noted that the
applicant had said that he had no
memory of the stabbing, having essentially
“blacked out”. The sentencing judge did not accept that contention.
The CCTV
footage supported a conclusion that the applicant’s conduct was
determined, deliberate and conscious. The sentencing judge
did, however, accept
the psychologist’s explanation that the applicant’s description
might be as a result of profound
shame and the trauma of confronting and
processing the fact that he had murdered another human being.

[26] The sentencing judge recorded that the applicant had now been in custody
on remand for a little over one year and nine months,
which would be counted as
part of the period of detention to be imposed on sentence. Whilst the applicant
had also completed year
12 and undertaken a number of courses whilst in
custody, the applicant’s conduct in custody had been mixed, with incidents
of physical aggression towards his peers and the applicant having been charged
in relation to one of those assaults whilst in detention.

[27] The sentencing judge recorded that the psychologist had made a
provisional diagnosis of conduct disorder, adolescent-onset type,
various
substance-use disorders and an adjustment disorder with depressed mood which had
developed since the applicant had been in
custody. The psychologist also
described low to moderate levels of psychopathic traits consistent with
adolescent-onset conduct
issues, driven by peer influence, substance use and
situational factors, rather than an entrenched psychopathic personality. The
psychologist assessed the applicant’s overall risk of re-offending with
interpersonal violence as moderate, with the risk that
he would inflict lethal
violence being assessed at low to moderate, however, the harm that would be
caused if that risk eventuated
was serious injury or death, and therefore
community protection remained an important factor in deciding the appropriate
penalty.

[28] The sentencing judge found that the offence of murder committed by the
applicant was properly to be regarded as a particularly
heinous offence. As
such, the maximum penalty was life imprisonment. The objective circumstances
supporting that finding included
the senseless and violent stabbing in a public
car park of an innocent woman taking her granddaughter to the shops, with that
violent
attack being directly witnessed by the young granddaughter, the harm
caused to the victim’s family which had been immense and
profound, and the
fact that the killing was intentional in the sense that the applicant had the
relevant intent to cause grievous
bodily harm. In addition, whilst the
applicant was young and had a good upbringing from his parents, he had become
desensitised
to crime and violence and was on bail at the time for other violent
crimes.

[29] After referring to various comparable authorities, the sentencing judge
said:

“There is no one right answer to the sentence to be imposed. It
involves the exercise of a discretion in accordance with legal
rules and
principles. In your case, the purposes of punishment, ensuring community
protection, deterrence and denunciation are particularly
important, as well as
rehabilitation. The Crown’s submitted penalty is, in my view, too high,
and not supported by the cases
to which I have referred; but the submission
of your barrister is too low. The penalty which I find is just in all the
circumstances
is detention for 16 years.

The default position under the Youth Justice Act is that a child sentenced to
detention must be released after serving 70 per cent of the period of detention;
however, section 227(2) confers a discretion on the court to order that a child
be released after serving between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of the period
of detention if the court considers there are special circumstances.

I have taken your pleas of guilty into account in arriving at the sentence of
detention to impose on you. The more recent comparable
cases I have referred to
all involved pleas of guilty. I have decided to impose a higher penalty as a
head sentence of 16 years,
but to balance that with an order that you be
released from detention after serving 60 per cent. Your youth, pleas of
guilty and
prospects of rehabilitation support that order, leaving a substantial
period of supervision in the community after release, which
will be
important.

In combination, the order I propose to make for detention for 16 years
with release after serving 60 per cent meets the requirement
in youth justice
principle 18, of detention for no longer than necessary to meet the purposes of
detention – punishment, community
protection, deterrence, denunciation and
rehabilitation.

I must also consider whether to record a conviction. The court has a
discretion in this regard. Having regard to all the circumstances
of this case,
in particular the nature of the murder offence, it is appropriate that the
conviction of count 4, murder, be recorded.
The convictions of the other
offences will not be recorded.”

Consideration

Ground 2

[30] As this ground asserts specific error, it is convenient to deal with it
first.

[31] The applicant submits that the sentencing judge failed to take into
account a fact that was crucial to the sentencing exercise,
namely the duration
for which the applicant held the requisite intention.

[32] A consideration of the sentencing remarks supports a conclusion that
there was no such failure.

[33] The sentencing judge’s observation that the applicant had acted
with determination, whilst accepting that his actions of
stabbing the victim
were not premeditated, must be viewed in the context of a submission made at
sentence, that the applicant’s
conduct was “a moment of
madness”. The sentencing judge rejected such a flourish, noting that the
stabbing had occurred
in circumstances where the applicant had disguised his
face, armed himself with a knife and planned to steal a car and then, when
faced
with a defenceless older woman offering no resistance, had plunged that knife
into her chest. Those actions were properly
described as acting with
determination. The subsequent acknowledgment that the actions of stabbing were
not premeditated recognised
that the requisite intention to commit at least
grievous bodily harm was of brief duration.

Ground 1

[34] To succeed on a ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive, it is
necessary for the applicant to establish that the sentence
imposed was not
merely different or even markedly different from comparable yardsticks, but was
so different as to warrant a conclusion
that there was a misapplication of
principle, or that, having regard to all the circumstances, the sentence imposed
was plainly unjust
or
unreasonable. [1]

[35] Whilst the applicant submits that a consideration of the comparable
yardsticks supports a conclusion that the sentence imposed
on the applicant was
manifestly excessive, a consideration of those yardsticks in the context of the
circumstances of the applicant’s
offending supports a conclusion that
there was neither a misapplication of principle, nor was there the
imposition of a sentence
that was plainly unjust or unreasonable.

[36] First, as the sentencing judge observed, some of the more dated
yardsticks said to be comparable, such as R v
Gwilliams [2] and R v
Carroll, [3] ** were of limited
assistance, having regard to the application of a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment in the applicant’s case
and changing relevant legal
principles, such as deterrence and community protection. Other yardsticks, such
as R v D, [4] and R v
Rowlingson, [5] ** concerned
more serious offending, involving significant pre-planning and extreme violence.
There were also significant mitigating
circumstances which were relevant to the
sentence imposed in R v
SBU. [6]

[37] Second, although the applicant submitted that the circumstances of the
killing in R v LZY &
Porter [7] were objectively more
serious, there were significant mitigating factors in that case which were not
present in the applicant’s
case, including a lack of criminal history and
the absence of the significant aggravating factor that the applicant was on bail
for
offences of violence when he committed these offences.

[38] Third, a consideration of the recent yardstick of R v
HCZ, [8] supports a conclusion that
a sentence of 16 years detention for the applicant’s offending
fell within a sound exercise of the
sentencing discretion.

[39] In HCZ, ****** a felony murder attracted a sentence of
14 years detention. The circumstances of that offence were, however,
different. That offence,
which also involved the penetration of the
victim’s chest with a knife, involved an offender who had initially sought
to flee
and upon being pursued by the occupants of the house, had lashed out
with the knife, making two strikes at its occupants before penetrating
the
deceased’s heart with a further strike of the knife. Contrary to the
applicant’s submission, HCZ’s offending
was not objectively more
serious. The applicant’s offending involved the striking of a victim who
plainly was retreating and
not pursuing him. It also involved a deliberate use
of the knife, rather than a lashing out.

[40] Once regard is had to those circumstances, the imposition of
16 years detention for the offence of murder was neither plainly
unjust nor
unreasonable. It also did not evidence any misapplication of principle.

Order

[41] Leave to appeal sentence is refused.

[1] Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010)
242 CLR 520.

[2] [1997] QCA 389.

[3] [1995] QCA 399.

[4] [1999] QCA 231; [2000] 2 Qd R 659.

[5] [2008] QCA 395.

[6] [2011] QCA 203; [2012] 1 Qd R 250.

[7] [2024] QSC 237.

[8] [2025] QCA 147.