Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Office

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Independent Office of Law etc. v. Sonoma County Sheriff's etc.

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: A171763

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (48.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/26/26
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

INDEPENDENT OFFICE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT REVIEW AND A171763
OUTREACH,
(Sonoma County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24CV04208)
v.
SONOMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

The Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach
(Independent Office or IOLERO) was established by Sonoma County (County)
to serve as an oversight entity over the County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff).
After receiving a whistleblower complaint, the Independent Office served
subpoenas on certain Sheriff employees. The Sheriff employees did not
comply with the subpoenas.
The Independent Office brought an action to enforce the subpoenas
pursuant to a state law addressing the subpoena power of county sheriff

• Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100, 8.1105(b), and

8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II.D.
of the Discussion.

1
oversight entities. (Gov. Code, § 25303.7.) 1 The Sheriff and the Sonoma
County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association (Union) argued that the Independent
Office lacked the authority to issue subpoenas in the investigation of a
whistleblower complaint. The trial court agreed with the Sheriff and Union
(collectively, Respondents) and found against the Independent Office. The
Independent Office appeals.
The parties first dispute whether the trial court’s order is appealable.
We agree with the Independent Office that it is. On the merits, the parties
dispute whether the Independent Office has the power to issue subpoenas in
the investigation of whistleblower complaints. We conclude that section
25303.7 grants subpoena authority to sheriff oversight entities within the
meaning of that statute. We further conclude that the Independent Office is
a sheriff oversight entity for purposes of section 25303.7, and that it therefore
has the authority to issue the challenged subpoenas. We reverse the trial
court’s order finding otherwise. 2
BACKGROUND 3
In 2016, the Board enacted an ordinance governing the newly created
Independent Office. (Sonoma County Ord. No. 6174, adding former art.
XXVII, § 2-392 et seq. to Sonoma County Code [adopted Sept. 13, 2016;

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

2 In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we reject two other claims

raised by Respondents.
3 We grant the Independent Office’s April 10, 2025, request that we

take judicial notice of a brief filed in a writ proceeding involving the County’s
board of supervisors (Board) and the Sheriff, Board reports from July and
August of 2020, and the ballot pamphlet for Measure P. We have considered
and rejected the arguments opposing this request advanced by the Sheriff
and the Union.

2
repealed by Ord. No. 6333, § 1, adopted by Sonoma County Local Ballot
Measure P, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 2020)].) The 2016 ordinance granted the
Independent Office various powers and duties, including to “[r]eceive and
review citizen complaints, and forward them to the Sheriff-Coroner for review
and investigation,” and to “[a]dvise if investigations appear incomplete or
otherwise deficient and recommend further review as deemed necessary.”
(Sonoma County Code, former § 2-394, subd. (b)(1) & (4).) The 2016
ordinance expressly provided that the Independent Office was not authorized
to perform certain acts, including “[c]onduct its own investigation of
complaints against law enforcement personnel” and “[c]ompel by subpoena
the production of any documents or the attendance and testimony of any
witnesses.” (Sonoma County Code, former § 2-394, subd. (c)(1) & (3).)
In August 2020, the Board adopted a resolution to put an initiative on
the November ballot that would repeal and replace the 2016 ordinance
governing the Independent Office (Measure P). The new ordinance submitted
to the voters in Measure P would grant the Independent Office various
powers, including to “[r]eview, audit and analyze administrative and public
complaint investigations in mutual coordination and cooperation with the
sheriff-coroner”; “[a]ct as a receiving and investigative agency for
whistleblower complaints involving the sheriff-coroner”; and “[i]ndependently
subpoena records or testimony, as the director deems appropriate, to
complete an adequate investigation.” (Sonoma County Code, § 2-394,
subd. (b)(2), (3), & (5)(ix).) Measure P was approved by the voters and the
new ordinance took effect.
Subsequently, the Union and another County peace officer association
filed unfair practice complaints with the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB) over Measure P. (County of Sonoma v. Public Employment Relations

3
Board (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 167, 173, 176.) As relevant here, PERB found
the County violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (§ 3500 et seq.) by failing
to bargain over its decision to place on the ballot many of the provisions
enacted by Measure P, including those granting the Independent Office
authority to conduct independent investigations and issue subpoenas.
(County of Sonoma, at p. 177.) PERB declared these and certain other
provisions adopted by Measure P to be void and unenforceable, and the
County sought review of PERB’s order. (Id. at pp. 177, 174.) With respect to
the independent investigation and subpoena provisions, the Court of Appeal
remanded the matter to PERB for additional analysis. (Id. at pp. 180–185.)
The Court of Appeal also held that PERB’s remedy of invalidating provisions
of Measure P was in excess of its authority, but that PERB had the authority
on remand “to declare void the Board’s resolution placing on the ballot the
Measure P provisions” found illegal by PERB. (Id. at pp. 191–192.)
While the appeal was pending, the County and the Union met and
conferred, and in June 2022, days before the Court of Appeal’s opinion issued,
the County and the Union executed a letter of agreement (Agreement). 4 The
Agreement states that it followed “the parties’ meet and confer sessions
pursuant to [the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act]” regarding the Independent
Office’s “authority to review, audit and analyze administrative and public
complaint investigations of bargaining unit members employed by the
Sheriff’s Office.” The Agreement includes detailed provisions about the
Independent Office’s procedures and authority.
On remand from the Court of Appeal’s decision, PERB found the
dispute had not been mooted by the Agreement because it did not resolve the

4 The Agreement was amended in May 2023 in aspects not material to

the issues on appeal.

4
underlying issue of whether the County had a duty to meet and confer before
placing Measure P on the ballot. PERB conducted the additional analysis
directed by the Court of Appeal and again found the independent
investigation and subpoena provisions of Measure P, among others, to be in
violation of the County’s duty to meet and confer with the Union. With
respect to the appropriate remedy, PERB declined to invalidate the Board’s
resolution placing the violative provisions of Measure P on the ballot, finding
“no reason to order such a remedy here” because, “[a]s the parties concede,
the June 2022 [Agreement] resolved all meet-and-confer issues arising out of
the Measure P amendments we have found could not be adopted or
implemented without bargaining. While the [Agreement] contain[s]
numerous relevant provisions, none are more important tha[n] those allowing
IOLERO to conduct independent investigations, thereby permitting the
parallel investigatory path at the core of the reasons multiple Measure P
provisions fell within the scope of representation. It would not effectuate the
[Meyers-Milias-Brown Act’s] purposes to disturb that agreement.”
In April 2024, the Independent Office served subpoenas on two Sheriff’s
employees seeking certain documents and testimony material to the
Independent Office’s investigation of a whistleblower complaint it had
received. The Sheriff and the Union both informed the Independent Office of
their position that the Independent Office lacked subpoena power in
connection with whistleblower complaints.
In July 2024, the Independent Office filed the underlying action
pursuant to section 25303.7, seeking an order to show cause directing the
subpoenaed parties to “explain why they should not be ordered to comply
with the subpoenas,” and further asking the court to “[i]nitiate contempt
proceedings” against the subpoenaed parties. The Sheriff and the Union both

5
filed oppositions. After briefing and argument, the trial court denied the
requested relief.
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
The parties dispute the appealability of the trial court’s order. We find
the order appealable.
Under section 25303.7, if a subpoena served by a sheriff oversight
entity as provided in that statute is not complied with, the oversight entity
“may certify the facts to the superior court” and the court “shall thereupon
issue an order directing the person to appear before the court and show cause
why they should not be ordered to comply with the subpoena.” (§ 25303.7,
subd. (b)(3)(A)–(B).) The statute further provides, “The same proceedings
shall be had, the same penalties imposed, and the person charged may purge
themself of the contempt in the same way as in a case of a person who has
committed a contempt in the trial of a civil action before a superior court.”
(Id., subd. (b)(3)(C).)
As an initial matter, all parties agree the trial court’s order denying the
Independent Office’s requested relief is a final judgment. We also agree. It is
immaterial that the order was not captioned as a “judgment.” “ ‘ “It is not the
form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is
determinative. As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular
circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left
for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with
the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further
in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final
determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.” ’ ”
(Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5,

6
italics omitted (Dana Point).) The sole matter before the trial court was
whether the Independent Office’s subpoenas were enforceable; after deciding
that question, no further judicial action was necessary. 5
The Independent Office argues the order is an appealable final
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) Respondents contend the
order is an exception to the general rule of appealability for final judgments
because it is a contempt judgment. (See McCord v. Smith (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 358, 367 [“Orders in contempt cases are final and conclusive
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1222) and are not appealable (id., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1))”];
Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1) [judgments are appealable “other than
. . . a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section
1222”].)
As Respondents note, the trial court’s order denied the relief sought in
the Independent Office’s petition, including that the court “[i]nitiate contempt
proceedings.” But under section 25303.7, the first step taken by the court is
to determine whether the subpoenaed parties should “be ordered to comply
with the subpoena” (§ 25303.7, subd. (b)(3)(B))—relief that was also sought by
the Independent Office and denied in the trial court’s order. Thus, under the
enforcement procedure set forth in section 25303.7, the immediate issue
before the court was whether to order the subpoenaed parties to comply, not
whether to hold them in contempt.
Indeed, Respondents have cited no authority, and we have found none,
suggesting that parties subpoenaed outside of a judicial proceeding could be

5 The appealed-from order leaves in place a case management

conference “for calendar control,” but the only outstanding issue appears to
be an anticipated motion for attorney fees. (See Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1316 [“A judgment is final and appealable if all
that remains is a determination of costs and interest”].)

7
found in contempt absent a court order directing compliance and disobedience
of that court order. Contempt of court includes “[d]isobedience of any lawful
judgment, order, or process of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209,
subd. (a)(5), italics added.) Although “[d]isobedience of a subpoena duly
served” also constitutes contempt, it only does so when “in respect to a court
of justice, or proceedings therein.” (Id., subd. (a)(10), (a).) The Independent
Office’s subpoenas were not served in respect to court proceedings.
This conclusion is supported by Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th 1, which
considered whether an order compelling compliance with a legislative
subpoena (a subpoena issued by a city) was final despite the possibility of
future contempt proceedings. Dana Point quotes with approval a prior case
also involving legislative subpoenas: “ ‘The statutory scheme at hand
provides for an original proceeding in the superior court, initiated by the
mayor’s report to the judge, which results in an order directing the
respondent to comply with a city’s subpoena. Indeed, the compliance order is
tantamount to a superior court judgment in mandamus, which, with limited
statutory exceptions, is appealable. [Citations.] Whether the matter is
properly characterized as an “action” [citation] or a “special proceeding”
[citation], it is a final determination of the rights of the parties. It is final
because it leaves nothing for further determination between the parties
except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with its terms. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] [¶] . . . Indeed, . . . because a contempt judgment is not appealable,
but reviewable only by a writ which may be summarily denied, ‘review of the
underlying order [compelling compliance] can reliably be had only if that
order is appealable.’ ” (Id. at pp. 9–10.) Dana Point thus supports the
conclusion that a party seeking to enforce an administrative or legislative
subpoena must first obtain a court order compelling compliance—which is an

8
appealable order—and only then, if successful and if the subpoenaed party
continues to refuse to comply, can the subpoenaed party be found in
contempt.
In sum, despite language in the trial court’s order declining the
Independent Office’s request to initiate contempt proceedings, the order was
substantively one declining to order the subpoenaed parties to comply with
the Independent Office’s subpoenas. The order is therefore appealable.
II. Subpoena Power
The parties dispute whether the Independent Office has the authority
to issue subpoenas in connection with its investigation of a whistleblower
complaint under section 25303.7 and/or Measure P, and whether, if so, the
Agreement nonetheless governs the matter. 6 We review these legal issues de
novo. 7 (See Childhelp, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 224,
235.)

6 The Union argues that the Independent Office impermissibly raises

new arguments on appeal. In the trial court, as here, the Independent Office
relied on section 25303.7, Measure P, and the Agreement. To the extent any
of the arguments raised on appeal can be characterized as new (an issue we
do not decide), “[o]n appeal, a party may raise a new issue of law based on
undisputed facts.” (C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th
1483, 1492.)
7 Respondents contend that our review is limited to determining

whether the trial court had jurisdiction. The argument is based on their
claim that the appealed-from order is a contempt judgment, which we have
rejected in part I, ante. (See Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1724, 1736 [“[T]o review an adjudication of contempt, ‘ “the sole
question before us is one of jurisdiction of the trial court to render the
judgment under review” ’ ”].)

9
A. Subpoena Power Pursuant to Section 25303.7
We begin by considering whether, as argued by the Independent Office
and amici curiae, 8 section 25303.7 grants subpoena power to all sheriff
oversight entities within the meaning of that statute.
“ ‘Our fundamental task in construing’ . . . any legislative enactment[]
‘is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of
the statute.’ [Citation.] We begin as always with the statute’s actual words,
the ‘most reliable indicator’ of legislative intent, ‘assigning them their usual
and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. If the words
themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it
said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs. On the other hand, if the
language allows more than one reasonable construction, we may look to such
aids as the legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory
construction.’ ” (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire
Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 837–838.)
Section 25303.7 provides that “[a] county may create a sheriff oversight
board” and “[a] county . . . may establish an office of the inspector general.”
(§ 25303.7, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1), italics added.) The statute further provides
that “[t]he chair of the sheriff oversight board shall issue a subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum in accordance with Sections 1985 to 1985.4, inclusive,
of the Code of Civil Procedure whenever the board deems it necessary or
important to examine the following: ¶ Any person as a witness upon any
subject matter within the jurisdiction of the board. ¶ Any officer of the
county in relation to the discharge of their official duties on behalf of the

8 A joint amici curiae brief was filed by American Civil Liberties Union

of Northern California, California Coalition for Sheriff Oversight, and Law
Enforcement Action Partnership.

10
sheriff’s department. ¶ Any books, papers, or documents in the
possession of or under the control of a person or officer relating to the affairs
of the sheriff’s department,” and that “[t]he inspector general shall have the
independent authority to issue a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum subject
to the procedure” set forth with respect to the sheriff oversight board. (Id.,
subds. (b)(1) & (c)(2), italics added.)
The statute uses the term “may” when setting forth a county’s ability to
create the identified sheriff oversight entities, but uses the term “shall” when
describing the entities’ subpoena powers. “Under ‘well-settled principle[s] of
statutory construction,’ we ‘ordinarily’ construe the word ‘may’ as permissive
and the word ‘shall’ as mandatory, ‘particularly’ when a single statute uses
both terms. [Citation.] In other words, ‘[w]hen the Legislature has, as here,
used both “shall” and “may” in close proximity in a particular context, we
may fairly infer the Legislature intended mandatory and discretionary
meanings, respectively.’ ” (Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 (Tarrant).) Thus, the plain language of the statute
indicates that counties have the discretion to create sheriff oversight entities
but, once created, section 25303.7 grants those entities subpoena power.
However, “in determining whether the Legislature intended a statute to be
mandatory or permissive, use in the statute of ‘may’ or ‘shall’ is merely
indicative, not dispositive or conclusive. [Citation.] Therefore, we may
properly consider other indicia of legislative intent, including relevant
legislative history.” (Tarrant, at p. 542.)
The language of section 25303.7 stands in contrast to that of statutes
governing other county entities that clearly provide these entities only have
subpoena power if the county so provides. For example, a statute governing
civil service commissions provides that “[a] county may by ordinance provide

11
that its civil service commission or equivalent body shall have the power to
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum . . . .” (§ 31110.2, italics added.)
Similarly, a statute addressing county hearings provides that “the county
hearing officer may be authorized by ordinance or resolution . . . to issue
subpoenas . . . .” (§ 27721, italics added.) “Where statutes involving similar
issues contain language demonstrating the Legislature knows how to express
its intent, ‘ “the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning
a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent
existed with reference to the different statutes.” ’ ” (County of San Diego v.
San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 825.) Thus, these statutes
demonstrate that the Legislature knows how to grant counties the discretion
to determine when to confer subpoena power on a county entity, and the
omission of such language from section 25303.7 indicates the Legislature did
not intend to allow this discretion here.
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest provides further support for this
construction by stating the bill “would authorize a county to establish a
sheriff oversight board” and “would authorize a county . . . to establish an
office of the inspector general,” but “would authorize the chair of the oversight
board and the inspector general to issue a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum
when deemed necessary to investigate a matter within their jurisdiction.”
(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1185 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), italics
added (Legis. Counsel’s Dig.).) “The Legislative Counsel’s summaries ‘are
prepared to assist the Legislature in its consideration of pending legislation.’
[Citation.] Although the Legislative Counsel’s summaries are not binding
[citation], they are entitled to great weight. [Citation.] ‘It is reasonable to
presume that the Legislature [acted] with the intent and meaning expressed

12
in the Legislative Counsel’s digest.’ ” (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines
Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169–1170.)
We acknowledge that, in other parts of the legislative history, there is
equivocal language. Specifically, some committee reports state that the bill
“provides statutory authority to general law counties that wish to establish
sheriff oversight boards and inspector general offices, and give general law
counties the ability to equip those entities with subpoena power.” (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1185
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 28, 2020, p. 6, italics added (Sen. 3d
Reading Analysis); accord, Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill
No. 1185 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 21, 2019, p. 5 (Assem.
Public Safety Rep.).) But the committee reports also include language
indicating that subpoena power is conferred by the statute itself, for example,
stating the bill “[a]uthorizes a county to create a sheriff oversight board and
an inspector general’s office and further authorizes those entities to issue a
subpoena whenever they deem it necessary or important.” (Assem. Floor
Analysis, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1185 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
as introduced Feb. 21, 2019, p. 1, italics added; see also Sen. 3d Reading
Analysis, at pp. 3–4 [bill provides “a county may create a sheriff oversight
board” and “a county . . . may establish an office of the inspector general,” and
further provides “the chair of the sheriff oversight board shall issue a
subpoena” and “the inspector general shall have the independent authority to
issue subpoenas” (italics added)].) We therefore do not find the former
statements in the legislative reports to be dispositive of the issue,
particularly in light of the statutory language discussed above.
Respondents argue Dibb v. County of San Diego (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1200
(Dibb), issued prior to the enactment of section 25303.7, weighs in favor of

13
construing section 25303.7 to grant counties the discretion to confer subpoena
power on sheriff oversight entities. Dibb involved a challenge to a charter
county’s creation of a citizens review board with oversight over the county
sheriff, and to the county’s grant of subpoena power to the board. (Id. at
p. 1204.) The court first held that boards of supervisors in all counties have
the statutory authority to supervise county officers, including the sheriff, and
to establish citizen commissions to assist them in that function. (Id. at
pp. 1209–1210, citing §§ 25303 [“The board of supervisors shall supervise the
official conduct of all county officers”] and 31000.1 [“The board of supervisors
may appoint commissions or committees of citizens to study problems of
general or special interest to the board and to make reports and
recommendations to the board”].)
Turning to the subpoena power question, the court first observed that,
“although the Legislature has granted the power to issue subpoenas to
various county entities,” including boards of supervisors, no such statute then
existed as to sheriff oversight entities. (Dibb, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)
The challengers argued the statutes granting subpoena power to other county
entities indicated “the Legislature has preempted the field of ‘entities entitled
to issue subpoenas.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court found it “unnecessary to
decide” the preemption question because, “even assuming the Legislature
intends to do so with respect to noncharter counties, it may not do so with
respect to” charter counties, for reasons not relevant here. 9 (Dibb, at
pp. 1210–1211.)

9 The County is a general law county.(See California State Association
of Counties, County Structure structure/> [as of Mar. 26, 2026].)

14
Respondents contend that, because the sheriff oversight entity in Dibb
was granted subpoena power by the county rather than by the Legislature,
this must be the system the Legislature intended in enacting section 25303.7.
We disagree. First, there is no indication in Dibb that the Legislature lacks
the authority to directly confer subpoena power on sheriff oversight entities
and instead is limited to granting counties the discretion to do so. Second,
the discussion of Dibb in the legislative history of section 25303.7 is
ambiguous—indeed, the same language was relied on by parties on both sides
of the issue. After discussing the facts and holdings of Dibb, committee
reports stated, “[T]his bill clarifies that general law counties have the
statutory authority to create sheriff-specific oversight boards and inspector
general offices that both have statutory subpoena power.” (Sen. 3d Reading
Analysis, at p. 5; accord, Assem. Public Safety Rep., at p. 4.) It is not clear
whether this statement indicates an intent to grant counties the discretion to
both create sheriff oversight entities and to determine whether these entities
have subpoena power, or whether it indicates an intent to allow counties the
discretion to create such entities which, if created, will have subpoena power.
Dibb was clearly a part of the legal landscape on which section 25303.7 was
enacted, however, we are not persuaded that it weighs in favor of a
construction of the statute contrary to the plain language.
The Sheriff argues that “[i]t defies logic and law to argue that a county
creating an oversight board/inspector general is now required to confer that
entity with broad subpoena powers.” We disagree. The legislative history
indicates a strong legislative concern with ensuring adequate oversight of
sheriffs. Committee reports quote the bill author as stating, “ ‘Honest
oversight of law enforcement is absolutely necessary if we want to rebuild
trust between officers and the communities they serve. AB 1185 will make it

15
clear that Sheriff Oversight Boards have the authority to properly review the
actions of Sheriffs, provide transparency to citizens and create opportunities
for real change.’ ” (Assem. Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 1185
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 28, 2020, p. 1, italics added (Assem.
Concurrence); accord, Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No.
1185 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 21, 2019, p. 4.) The reports
also quote the argument of bill proponents that “ ‘[m]eaningful independent
oversight and monitoring of sheriffs’ departments increases government
accountability and transparency, enhances public safety, and builds
community trust in law enforcement. Such oversight must have the authority
and independence necessary to conduct credible and thorough
investigations.’ ” (Assem. Concurrence, at p. 1, italics added; accord, Sen. 3d
Reading Analysis, at p. 7.) Thus, the reports indicate a legislative concern
with ensuring meaningful oversight of sheriff’s departments, and a
determination that subpoena power is a necessary component of this
oversight. (See also Dibb, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1216–1217 [“the power to
issue subpoenas is reasonably necessary to the full accomplishment of the
legitimate goals of the legislation” creating a sheriff oversight entity].)
Significantly, county boards of supervisors have oversight authority
over sheriffs and also have statutory subpoena power. (§ 25170; Dibb, supra,
8 Cal.4th at p. 1210.) Thus, a board of supervisors can issue subpoenas in
exercising its own oversight authority over a sheriff. The Legislature could
reasonably conclude that, if a county elects to create a sheriff oversight entity
to assist the board of supervisors, that entity must possess subpoena power
so that the oversight will be meaningful. This legislative intent is bolstered
by the fact that section 25303.7 confers subpoena power using language
strikingly similar to that of section 25170, the statute granting subpoena

16
powers to county boards of supervisors. Section 25170 provides, “Whenever
the board of supervisors deems it necessary or important to examine any
person as a witness upon any subject or matter within the jurisdiction of the
board, or to examine any officer of the county in relation to the discharge of
his official duties as to the receipt or disposition by him of any money, or
concerning the possession or disbursement by him of any property belonging
to the county, or to use, inspect, or examine any books, account, voucher, or
document in the possession or under the control of the person or officer
relating to the affairs or interests of the county, the chairman of the board
shall issue a subp[o]ena . . . .” (Italics added.) Section 25303.7, subdivision
(b)(1) provides, “The chair of the sheriff oversight board shall issue a
subpoena . . . whenever the board deems it necessary or important to examine
the following: ¶ Any person as a witness upon any subject matter within
the jurisdiction of the board. ¶ Any officer of the county in relation to the
discharge of their official duties on behalf of the sheriff’s department. ¶
Any books, papers, or documents in the possession of or under the control of a
person or officer relating to the affairs of the sheriff’s department.” (Italics
added.) The parallel language strongly suggests the Legislature intended to
confer on sheriff oversight entities the full scope of subpoena power held by
boards of supervisors with respect to oversight of county sheriffs, thus
ensuring that whichever entity was conducting oversight of the sheriff would
have adequate tools to do so.
The Union argues that, if section 25303.7 grants subpoena power
directly to sheriff oversight entities, a county would be unable to “target[] or
limit[] the powers of the entities it creates” such that “if a county created a
body charged only with investigating traffic stops, . . . that county could not
limit that entity’s subpoena powers to cases involving traffic stops.” We need

17
not and do not decide whether a sheriff oversight entity with limited
authority—i.e., over only certain aspects of the sheriff’s department—is
granted subpoena power only to the extent of that authority under section
25303.7. 10 We assume, without deciding, that if a county created a sheriff
oversight entity that did not have jurisdiction over whistleblower complaints,
section 25303.7 would not confer upon that entity subpoena power with
respect to whistleblower complaints. Such a case is not before us, as Measure
P indisputably includes whistleblower complaints within the Independent
Office’s jurisdiction. (Sonoma County Code, § 2-394, subd. (b)(3) [“IOLERO’s
powers and duties” include acting “as a receiving and investigative agency for
whistleblower complaints involving the sheriff-coroner”].)
In sum, we conclude that, if a county elects to create a sheriff oversight
entity within the meaning of section 25303.7, that statute grants the
oversight entity subpoena powers.
B. “Inspector General”
The parties also dispute whether the Independent Office is a sheriff
oversight entity—specifically, an “inspector general”—within the meaning of
section 25303.7 and is therefore granted subpoena authority pursuant to that
statute. We agree with the Independent Office that it is.
Section 25303.7 provides, “A county, through action of the board of
supervisors or vote by county residents, may establish an office of the

10 We note that the statute confers the power to subpoena “[a]ny

person as a witness upon any subject matter within the jurisdiction of the
board.” (§ 25303.7, subd. (b)(1)(A), italics added; see also Legis. Counsel’s
Dig. [“The bill would authorize the chair of the oversight board and the
inspector general to issue a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum when
deemed necessary to investigate a matter within their jurisdiction” (italics
added)].)

18
inspector general, appointed by the board of supervisors, to assist the board
of supervisors with its duties required pursuant to Section 25303[11] that
relate to the sheriff.” (§ 25303.7, subd. (c)(1).) Measure P was enacted by a
vote of County residents, provides that the Independent Office’s director is
appointed by the County’s board of supervisors, and states the Independent
Office was created by the Board “pursuant to its authority under California
law, including Government Code sections 31000.1 and 25303” and “[a]s part
of the board of supervisor’s duty to supervise the official conduct of the sheriff
under state law.” (Sonoma County Code, §§ 2-392, subds. (d)–(e), 2-393,
subd. (a).)
In substance, the Independent Office meets the requirements and
serves the function of a section 25303.7 inspector general. To find the
Independent Office not covered by the statute simply because it is named the
“Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach” instead of
the “office of the inspector general” would be to elevate form over substance
in a manner that would undermine the purpose of the statute to ensure that
sheriff oversight entities have subpoena power enabling them to perform
meaningful oversight. (See Civ. Code, § 3528 [“The law respects form less
than substance”]; County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301,
320 [“A general principle of statutory construction is that courts do not place
form over substance where doing so defeats the objective of a statute”].) 12

11 Section 25303 provides, “The board of supervisors shall supervise the

official conduct of all county officers . . . .”
12 The Union argues that a county could choose not to confer subpoena

authority on a sheriff oversight entity by simply “refrain[ing] from referring
to them as an inspector general.” We see no indication in the statutory
language or legislative history that the Legislature intended to allow such an
end-run around the provisions of section 25303.7. Had the Legislature

19
Respondents also claim that section 25303.7 cannot grant the
Independent Office subpoena powers because the statute did not take effect
until after Measure P took effect. The bill adding section 25303.7 was
enacted on September 30, 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 342, § 1), before the voters
approved Measure P on November 3, 2020. However, section 25303.7 did not
take effect until after the effective date of Measure P. 13
Respondents argue that finding section 25303.7 grants the Independent
Office subpoena power would constitute an impermissible retroactive
application of the statute. We disagree. “ ‘[A] statute is retroactive if it
substantially changes the legal effect of past events.’ ” (Guardianship of Ann
S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1136.) “ ‘A statute does not operate retroactively
merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application
depends came into existence prior to its enactment.’ ” (San Gabriel Valley
Water Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1230,
1238.) To be sure, section 25303.7 could not provide the authority for any
subpoenas issued by the Independent Office prior to January 1, 2021, as this
would constitute a change in the legal effect of a past event. But the
challenged subpoenas were issued after section 25303.7’s effective date. That
the Independent Office itself was in existence prior to this effective date does
not render the application of the statute to these subpoenas retroactive. (See
San Gabriel Valley, at pp. 1236–1239 [application of statute limiting fees for
an insured’s independent counsel to a policy entered into before the effective

wanted to give counties the ability to create sheriff oversight entities without
subpoena power, it could have done so.
13 Although the record does not reveal the effective date of Measure P,

all parties represent it was before January 1, 2021, the effective date of
section 25303.7.

20
date was not retroactive where the litigation necessitating independent
counsel did not arise until after the effective date].) 14
In sum, the Independent Office is a sheriff oversight entity for purposes
of section 25303.7 and is accordingly granted subpoena power, pursuant to
the terms of that statute, for subpoenas issued after section 25303.7’s
effective date.
C. The Agreement
In the alternative, Respondents argue that the Agreement entered into
by the Union and the County does not permit the Independent Office to issue
subpoenas in connection with the investigation of a whistleblower complaint,
and constitutes a partial waiver by the County of the Independent Office’s
section 25303.7 subpoena power. In other words, Respondents argue,
subpoena power is conferred by section 25303.7 only in the absence of a labor
agreement to the contrary. We disagree.
Respondents rely on language providing that a public employer’s
authority relating to its employees “is governed by the terms of the applicable
MOU [memorandum of understanding], rather than by any general statutory
provision that applies in the absence of an MOU.” (Professional Engineers in
California Government v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 989, 1041
(Professional Engineers).) 15 But Professional Engineers involved state
employee organizations, which are governed by a different statutory scheme

14 The Sheriff also argues application of section 25303.7 would

retroactively impair contractual rights under the Agreement. To the
contrary, section 25303.7 was in effect long before the Agreement was
executed.
15 A second case relied on by the Sheriff was ordered by the Supreme

Court not to be published and is therefore not properly cited. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 8.1105(e)(2) & 8.1115(a).)

21
than local public employee organizations. (Compare §§ 3500–3511 [the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act governing local public employee organizations]
with §§ 3512–3524 [the Ralph C. Dills Act governing state employee
organizations].) The statutory scheme governing state employee
organizations expressly provides that when certain enumerated statutes “are
in conflict with the provisions of a memorandum of understanding, the
memorandum of understanding shall be controlling without further
legislative action.” (§ 3517.6, subd. (a)(1).) As explained in Professional
Engineers, pursuant to this statute, “the terms and conditions embodied in an
MOU supersede most of the general statutory provisions that govern the
terms and conditions of state employment in the absence of an MOU,”
including the terms and conditions at issue in that case. (Professional
Engineers, at p. 1040.)
No comparable provision is present in the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
governing local public employee organizations. (See Professional Engineers,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1018 [Dills Act provision stands “in contrast to most
other collective bargaining statutes”].) If the Legislature had wanted to give
counties the discretion to enter into labor agreements addressing whether a
sheriff oversight entity has full subpoena power, limited subpoena power, or
no subpoena power, it could have done so. Respondents cite no authority, and
we have found none, that a county can divest a county agency of authority
conferred on it by state statute, by means of a labor agreement or otherwise.
(See Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7 [“A county or city may make and enforce within
its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
in conflict with general laws” (italics added)]; cf. Bagley v. City of Manhattan
Beach (1976) 18 Cal.3d 22, 24 [“When the Legislature has made clear its
intent that one public body or official is to exercise a specified discretionary

22
power, the power is in the nature of a public trust and may not be exercised
by others in the absence of statutory authorization”]; Costa Mesa City
Employees’ Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 310
[“whether enacting ordinances or entering into contracts, cities are required
to act in conformity with state law and are powerless to take measures that
conflict with the general laws of California”].)
Accordingly, we conclude that any conflicting provisions in the
Agreement do not impact the subpoena power granted to the Independent
Office by section 25303.7. 16

16 The Union complains that this outcome will “conflict with the final

decision of PERB, despite there being no timely appeal.” The PERB
proceeding and this appeal involve distinct issues: PERB did not decide the
construction or application of section 25303.7, and we do not decide the
obligation to meet and confer. Even assuming there was some conflict—an
issue we need not and do not decide—the Union does not provide argument or
authority discussing how such a conflict impacts our analysis.
Relatedly, Respondents argue generally that it is unjust that the
County agreed to be bound by the Agreement and relied on it in the PERB
proceedings, but now the Independent Office—a County entity—argues
section 25303.7 grants it subpoena powers in whistleblower complaints
regardless of any contrary provision in the Agreement. However,
Respondents have not contended we should preclude the Independent Office
from making this argument, much less articulated and analyzed a specific
equitable doctrine that could support such a contention. In any event, the
Agreement contains no provision definitively stating the Independent Office
lacks authority to issue subpoenas in whistleblower cases. Absent such a
clear provision in the Agreement, any equitable argument on this issue that
Respondents might have raised would likely be unavailing.

23
D. Remaining Issues
1. Jurisdiction Over the Sheriff Individually
The Sheriff argues the Independent Office lacks jurisdiction to
investigate alleged wrongdoing by the sheriff personally. 17 The Sheriff first
relies on Essick v. County of Sonoma (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 941 (Essick). The
relevant issue in Essick was whether a county is a sheriff’s employer. (Id. at
p. 951.) In considering this issue, Essick reasoned that a county board of
supervisors lacks “disciplinary power over the county sheriff.” (Id. at p. 952.)
The Sheriff argues the lack of disciplinary power renders any investigation
into the sheriff “utterly pointless.”
We disagree. As Essick explained, even though a county board of
supervisors cannot discipline a sheriff, it still has “oversight authority . . .
over other county officers. (Gov. Code, § 25303.) A central role of the Board
of Supervisors, like any other legislative body, is to investigate the conduct of
executive officials and thereby shine a light on matters that the voters of the
County may wish to know.” (Essick, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 953; see also
Dibb, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1210 [“We conclude that under section 25303, the
board of supervisors has a statutory duty to supervise the conduct of all
county officers”].) Thus, Essick does not establish that the Independent
Office lacks jurisdiction to investigate the sheriff personally, or that any such
investigation would be “pointless.”
The Sheriff also relies on Measure P, pointing to its definition of
“ ‘sheriff-coroner’ ” as “the Sonoma County Office of the Sheriff-Coroner,” and

17 It is unclear whether the whistleblower complaint does in fact

implicate the sheriff personally. The contention therefore appears unripe.
However, as the trial court ruled on the issue and both sides have briefed it
on appeal, we will resolve it as a matter of judicial efficiency.

24
its provision that the Independent Office can investigate “whistleblower
complaints involving the sheriff-coroner.” (Sonoma County Code, §§ 2-392,
subd. (d)(1), 2-394, subd. (b)(3).) The Sheriff argues the Independent Office’s
authority over whistleblower complaints “cannot be read to apply both to the
Sheriff individually and to the Office as a whole interchangeably.” We again
disagree. Measure P expressly references section 25303, which provides for a
county board of supervisors’ oversight authority over county officers.
(Sonoma County Code, § 2-392, subd. (d) [stating the Board established the
Independent Office “pursuant to its authority under California law, including
Government Code sections 31000.1 and 25303”].) Thus, Measure P’s
reference to “the Sonoma County Office of the Sheriff-Coroner” is most
reasonably understood to encompass both the sheriff individually and the
office as a whole.
2. Penal Code Section 832.7
The Sheriff also argues that compliance with the subpoenas would
require it to violate state laws protecting peace officer personnel records.
(See Pen. Code, § 832.7.) It is undisputed that the subpoenas seek in part
personnel records protected by this statute.
We need not decide whether, as the Independent Office argues,
disclosure of these records would not violate the statute under the version in
effect at the time the subpoenas issued. During the pendency of this appeal,
a newly enacted statute amended both section 25303.7 and Penal Code
section 832.7 to provide that sheriff oversight entities under section 25303.7
are authorized to access peace officer personnel records. (Stats. 2025, ch. 383,
§§ 1–2, eff. Jan. 1, 2026.) As particularly relevant here, the amendment
added subdivision (c)(3) to section 25303.7, providing, “The inspector general
shall have access to the personnel records of peace officers and custodial

25
officers required for the performance of the inspector general’s oversight
duties. The inspector general shall maintain the confidentiality of these
records consistent with Section 832.7 of the Penal Code.” (Stats. 2025, ch.
383, § 1.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to
enter a new order directing the subpoenaed parties to comply with the
subpoenas. The Independent Office is awarded its costs on appeal.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.

26
Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v.
Sonoma County Sheriff's Office et al. (A171763)

Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Trial Judge: Hon. Bradford J. DeMeo

Counsel: Renne Public Law Group, Jonathan V. Holtzman, Amy S.
Ackerman, Ryan McGinley-Stempel, Geoffrey Spellberg,
Imran M. Dar and Mauricio Grande for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Allyssa Villanueva for American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California, California Coalition for Sheriff
Oversight, and Law Enforcement Action Partnership as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jones Mayer, Denise Lynch Rocawich and James R.
Touchstone for Defendants and Respondents Sonoma
County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Eddie Engram.

Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Rockne A. Lucia, Jr.,
and Jonathan R. Murphy for Defendant and Respondent
Sonoma County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association.

27