Hunter v. Ritz - $5M Damages, Court Denies Ritz New Trial Motions

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April 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Antonio Hunter v. Stephen Ritz

District Court, S.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-00271

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.9K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANTONIO HUNTER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-CV-271-NJR

STEPHEN RITZ,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Antonio Hunter, a former inmate in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, sued Dr. Ritz for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1). After a
hung jury led to a mistrial in 2024, a jury in June 2025 found in favor of Hunter, awarding
$4 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. (Doc. 279).
Now pending before the Court are two motions filed by Defendant Dr. Stephen
Ritz: a Motion for New Trial (Doc. 280) and a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law (Doc. 282).
I. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Before reaching the merits of Dr. Ritz’s motion, the Court addresses a procedural
issue raised by Hunter. At trial, counsel for Dr. Ritz orally moved for judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50(a). (Doc. 275 at p. 32). Counsel said he would file a written
motion later that day, June 12, 2025, but he briefly argued that there was insufficient
evidence presented to support each and every element of Hunter’s claim of deliberate
indifference. (Id.). Because a written motion was to be filed, the Court took the matter

under advisement at that time. (Id. at p. 33).
Dr. Ritz did not file a written motion that day. The matter was submitted to the
jury, and a verdict was returned in Hunter’s favor for $4 million in compensatory
damages and $1 million in punitive damages. (Doc. 266). The following morning, June
13, 2025, Dr. Ritz filed his written Motion for Directed Verdict, arguing that the evidence
was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in Hunter’s favor on his claim of

deliberate indifference. (Doc. 269). Unlike Dr. Ritz’s oral motion, however, the written
motion also argued that Hunter failed to set forth substantial evidence demonstrating
that he was entitled to punitive damages. (Id.).
Hunter now argues that Dr. Ritz’s oral motion was his Rule 50(a) motion, his
written motion was his Rule 50(b) motion, and his current renewed motion is an

improper, third motion under Rule 50. Thus, it is procedurally barred.
In reply, Dr. Ritz asserts that his first written motion was a supplement to his oral
motion under Rule 50(a), while his current motion is a proper Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law under Rule 50(b). Moreover, because the Court ordered
Hunter to respond to Dr. Ritz’s “Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,” he

argues, the Court recognized that the motion was procedurally appropriate.
“Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a district court to enter
judgment against a party who has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial if ‘a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party
on that issue.’” Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 50(a), (b)). A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made any time before

the case is submitted to the jury, specifying the judgment sought and the law and facts
that entitle the movant to the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2). If the court does not grant
a motion made pursuant to Rule 50(a), “the court is considered to have submitted the
action to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding the legal questions raised by the
motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). “No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment . . . the
movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an

alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59.” Id. The 2006 Amendment to Rule 50 explains that “[b]ecause the Rule 50(b) motion is
only a renewal of the preverdict motion, it can be granted only on grounds advanced in
the preverdict motion.” Id. comm. note (2006 amend.). The Rule 50(a) motion informs the
opposing party of the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, affords an opportunity

to provide additional evidence that may be available, and alerts the court to the
opportunity to simplify the issues that will go to the jury. Id. Here, Dr. Ritz submitted his Rule 50(a) motion orally and supplemented it with a
written brief that was filed after the verdict was returned. That motion was denied by
written order on August 4, 2025. (Doc. 278). That makes Dr. Ritz’s current motion his

renewed motion under Rule 50(b).
The Court realizes that it contributed to the confusion by referring to Dr. Ritz’s
written supplement as his renewed motion. (Doc. 278). The Court also discussed the
evidence that was sufficient to support the jury’s punitive damages award, even though
Dr. Ritz did not raise that issue in his oral motion before the case was submitted to the
jury. But Hunter did not respond to Dr. Ritz’s written supplement, and therefore did not

argue that Dr. Ritz forfeited the punitive damages issue by not raising it in his oral Rule
50(a) motion. Thus, in effect, Hunter also forfeited this argument.
Regardless of any procedural issues, the Court still finds that sufficient evidence
was presented for a reasonable jury to find for Hunter on both the issues of deliberate
indifference and punitive damages.
With regard to deliberate indifference, Dr. Ritz argues there was no evidence that

he knew Hunter had a rectal prolapse when Dr. Myers referred him for a surgical
consultation, since Dr. Myers never diagnosed Hunter with a rectal prolapse. Instead,
Dr. Ritz only knew for certain that: (1) Hunter had a history of rectal prolapse that was
surgically corrected in 2012; (2) Hunter defecated when he was being examined by
Dr. Myers in April 2018; and (3) Hunter was reportedly experiencing bleeding with bowel

movements, having issues emptying his bowels, and having episodes of fecal
incontinence. (Doc. 283). Thus, Dr. Ritz argues, it was reasonable for him to believe that
Hunter’s condition was something other than a rectal prolapse and to pursue a more
conservative approach to treatment, which included acquiring Hunter’s past surgical
records and ordering bloodwork.

While it is true that Dr. Myers never diagnosed Hunter with a rectal prolapse,
Dr. Ritz’s argument ignores the evidence that he received an email in June 2019 from Joe
Ebbitt, Wexford’s Risk Management Director, which included a letter from Plaintiff’s
counsel informing Ebbitt and Dr. Steven Meeks that Hunter’s rectal prolapse symptoms
had returned, Dr. Myers referred Hunter for a surgical consultation for correction, and
Dr. Ritz or another Wexford physician denied the referral due to a need for Mr. Hunter’s

prior medical records. Dr. Ritz claims that Plaintiff’s counsel’s 2019 letter provided him
with “little new information,” but the letter included the medical records that he
specifically requested. Dr. Ritz then admitted at trial that he took no action to address the
claims and concerns raised in the letter. (Doc. 273 at p. 159). While it is true that the letter
did not provide a new diagnosis of rectal prolapse, it did provide him with the
information that he previously said he needed. Thus, there was evidence from which the

jury could conclude that, by June 2019, Dr. Ritz knew that Hunter’s rectal prolapse
symptoms had returned and that he had the medical records he previously requested,
yet he chose to take no action.
As to punitive damages, Dr. Ritz argues merely that the evidence at trial did not
demonstrate “knowledge of unlawfulness or reckless indifference to the law,” as required

to award punitive damages. The Court previously addressed this argument in its August
4, 2025 Order denying Dr. Ritz’s initial Motion for Directed Verdict. Because he has raised
no new arguments, the Court stands on its prior analysis and denies Dr. Ritz’s Renewed
Motion for Directed Verdict.
II. Motion for New Trial

Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a district court to grant a
new trial on all or some of the issues, for any reason for which a new trial has been granted
in federal court. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that a new trial is appropriate “if the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence or if the trial was in some way unfair to the moving party.” Martinez v. City of
Chicago, 900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018). A jury verdict “should only be overturned if ‘no

rational jury’ could have rendered it.” Hakim v. Safariland, LLC, 79 F.4th 861, 868 (7th Cir.
2023); see also Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Clarett v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011)) (“A new trial should be granted, however, ‘only when
the record shows that the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the
verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks [the] conscience.’”).
A “new trial is not automatically required whenever a jury is exposed to material

not properly in evidence.” United States v. Coney, 76 F.4th 602, 607 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting
United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1333 (7th Cir. 1989)). The relevant question is
whether there was a “ ‘reasonable possibility’ that the improper material affected the
verdict.” Id. “This is a fact-intensive inquiry . . . and the primary responsibility for
deciding whether this prejudice occurred lies with the district judge . . . .” Id. (internal

citation omitted).
Dr. Ritz alleges that four prejudicial errors precluded him from receiving a fair
trial. The Court addresses each alleged error in turn.
The Court’s Limiting Instruction Addressing Hunter’s Improper Testimony

Dr. Ritz first argues that he was deprived of a fair trial when the Court refused to
give his proposed limiting instruction after Hunter falsely testified that the Court ordered
Dr. Myers to immediately send him out for medical care. Dr. Ritz contends that Hunter
made up this testimony to suggest to the jury that even the Court had problems with
Dr. Ritz, and that the Court’s refusal to properly instruct the jury prejudiced him.
The following exchange took place at trial during Hunter’s redirect examination
by his counsel:

Q. And it wasn’t until after you filed the lawsuit that they finally sent you
to see a colorectal specialist, right?

A. As I remember—As a matter of fact, I was in Pinckneyville when the
Judge ordered Dr. Myers in a video conference to send me out right
now.

Q. We will not go into all of that. But, you had to do a lot, you had to wait
a long time, you had to jump through many hoops in order to finally get
to see a colorectal surgeon?

A. Yes.

(Doc. 274 at p. 226).
Defense counsel did not object to the testimony at trial, although counsel did
indicate, on a break, that he would propose a limiting instruction that evening. The
instruction submitted by Dr. Ritz stated:
In reaching your verdict, you shall not consider testimony about any order
made by the Court in this case. That testimony was mistaken. You must
disregard all such testimony when deliberating.

The Court rejected this instruction, instead instructing the jury as follows:

Yesterday you heard testimony that the Court previously entered an order
in this case directing Dr. Myers to take certain action. You must entirely
disregard this testimony; you must not consider it at all during your
deliberations.

(Doc. 275 at pp. 5-6). The Court explained that if the instruction said Hunter’s “testimony
was mistaken,” then the Court would need to explain what actually happened, which
would be inappropriate.1 (Id.). By telling the jury to entirely disregard the testimony
about a previous order, the Court reasoned, the jury would not consider the testimony in

any way, shape, or form. (Id.).
Dr. Ritz argues that when Hunter testified that the Court had ordered Dr. Myers
to immediately send him out for a surgical consultation, Hunter effectively told the jury
that the Court believed his treatment had been inadequate. When combined with
testimony that Dr. Ritz was the “decision maker” in the collegial review process, he
argues, this testimony could not simply be disregarded by the jury.

Hunter avers that Dr. Ritz never objected to the testimony during trial; thus, he
has forfeited this issue and cannot raise it in a motion for new trial. In Christmas v. City of
Chicago, the plaintiffs did not object to a witness’s testimony, instead waiting until the
conclusion of his examination before asking the court to reprimand the witness for failing
to adhere to the court’s in limine rulings. 682 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs

later moved for a new trial based, in part, on the prejudice caused by that witness’s
testimony. Id. at 639. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial, finding
that they failed to preserve the issue when they did not timely object. Id. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit agreed that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
plaintiffs’ motion for new trial when the plaintiffs did not timely and properly object to

the testimony. Id. at 640.

1 The Court notes that while Hunter’s testimony was indeed untrue, it was not entirely baseless. At a
preliminary injunction hearing held via videoconference on September 7, 2022, the Court ordered
Defendants to provide a status report as to whether Hunter had been scheduled for a surgical consultation
and/or surgery. (Doc. 78).
Here, however, Dr. Ritz’s argument is based on the language of the limiting
instruction given by the Court, not an objection to the testimony itself. Dr. Ritz clearly

objected to the Court’s instruction, which the Court noted and overruled. (Doc. 275 at
pp. 5-6). But juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them by the court, id.
at 641, and the undersigned told the jury to entirely disregard Hunter’s testimony about
a court order directing Dr. Myers to take certain action.
Dr. Ritz points to the concurrence in United States v. Jones, where Judge
Easterbrook noted that, in some circumstances, a limiting instruction telling a jury to

ignore evidence “is like telling jurors to ignore the pink rhinoceros that just sauntered
into the room.” United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800, 811 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring). In Jones, Judge Easterbrook was referring to evidence of a defendant’s prior
conviction in a criminal case. Id. He explained that a limiting instruction telling jurors not
to infer that someone who violated the law is likely to do so again is unhelpful unless the

judge explains to the jury what inferences it is allowed to make. See id. at 812 (“A good
limiting instruction needs to be concrete so that the jury understands what it legitimately
may do with the evidence.”).
In this case, the Court told the jurors exactly what to do with the testimony, which
was to disregard it entirely. Moreover, the Court explained that using Dr. Ritz’s proposed

limiting instruction would draw more attention to the testimony, requiring the Court to
clarify the circumstances behind the “mistake.” Given that Hunter’s comment was
isolated, his attorney quickly moved on, and it involved Dr. Myers’s involvement in his
care (not Dr. Ritz’s), the Court finds that Dr. Ritz was not prejudiced and denied a fair
trial.
Evidence of a Previous Settlement

Dr. Ritz next asserts that he was deprived of a fair trial when the Court “allowed”
Plaintiff’s counsel to publish, and then have Dr. Ritz read aloud, an email concerning a
settlement that Wexford reached with Hunter in 2016. The relevant portion of the email,
which should have been redacted, stated: “I think it is very odd that this guy got a large
settlement from us in late 2016 when he was free, then committed armed robbery in late
2017. His next parole date is 2022.” Dr. Ritz argues that the Court’s failure to issue a

limiting instruction or strike the reference to the earlier settlement, despite his objection,
undermined his ability to receive a fair trial.
In response, Plaintiff’s counsel states that she mistakenly presented the unredacted
version of the email for Dr. Ritz to read, which actually prejudiced Hunter: it suggested
he was playing the system, it revealed he had committed armed robbery, it showed he

had been in and out of prison, and it revealed that he was eligible for parole in 2022 but
was still incarcerated in 2025. Even if the evidence somehow prejudiced Dr. Ritz, defense
counsel did not object, did not ask for the testimony to be stricken, and did not request a
limiting instruction.
Having carefully reviewed the trial transcript, the Court finds that Dr. Ritz waived

this argument. Defense counsel neither objected when the email was read to the jury, nor
requested a limiting instruction at any time. In fact, the testimony regarding the prior
settlement occurred on the second day of trial (the first day of testimony), while the
“objection” referenced by Dr. Ritz did not occur until the following day. (See Docs. 273,
274). And, it only arose in the context of defense counsel arguing that the testimony
opened the door to questioning Hunter about his phone calls with his attorney—not that

the testimony should be stricken or that a limiting instruction should be given. (Doc. 274
at pp. 160-67). Because Dr. Ritz never objected to the evidence and instead chose to assert
that it opened the door to questioning about the call logs between Hunter and his
attorneys, he has waived the issue. See Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc. v.
Church Mut. Ins. Co., S.I., 168 F.4th 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2026) (“Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”) (cleaned up).

Even if Dr. Ritz had not waived the argument, a new trial is not warranted just
because the jury heard that Hunter received a prior settlement from Wexford. As noted
by Plaintiff’s counsel, Hunter was just as likely, if not more likely, to be prejudiced by the
evidence. It revealed that he was litigious, he was out of prison before committing armed
robbery and returning to prison, and he was still in prison in 2025 despite a 2022 parole

date. The Court therefore finds that the evidence of the settlement did not influence the
verdict against Dr. Ritz such that a new trial is required.
A Reference by Dr. Myers to “the Previous Trial”

Dr. Ritz asserts a new trial should be ordered because the Court failed to intervene
when his own witness, Dr. Myers, made a reference to the “previous trial.” He contends
that the Court should have issued a limiting instruction or struck the testimony, but it
did not do so even though it later acknowledged it “probably should have.” Dr. Ritz
argues this error allowed the jury to infer that a second trial was needed because the case
was a close call. He also claims it allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to improperly reference the
prior trial and to suggest that a second trial was necessary because Dr. Ritz allegedly hid
evidence.

At trial, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Dr. Myers if he recognized Hunter in the
courtroom “from patient interactions.” (Doc. 274 at p. 26). Dr. Myers responded,
“I recognize him because of the previous trial.” (Id.). Nothing was mentioned about why
there was a previous trial, that there was a hung jury, or that the “previous trial” even
involved Hunter. Defense counsel did not object to the testimony.
After Dr. Myers was excused as a witness, the undersigned said, “I think we need

a limiting instruction to the jury about reference to a prior trial. I’ll put that on counsel.”
(Doc. 274 at p. 82). Later that day, the Court noted that it was waiting for the limiting
instruction with regard to Dr. Myers’s testimony about the prior trial. (Id. at p. 167). When
the Court mentioned the limiting instruction a third time that day, Plaintiff’s counsel
proposed one but also noted that giving the instruction may draw more attention to the

issue. The Court agreed that drawing more attention to the testimony is always a risk and
then mused, in an off-hand remark, that the Court probably should have said something
at the time of the testimony. (Id. at p. 228).
After Plaintiff’s counsel read their proposed instruction, defense counsel stated
that he was fine with the language. He then admitted:

I think I also agree with [Plaintiff’s] counsel. I’m not even sure a limiting
instruction is necessary. Dr. Myers just kind of randomly mentioned it on
accident. I will represent to the Court he was told to not talk about there
having been a prior lawsuit. I think he got confused by the question and
said it. I personally don’t think a limiting instruction is necessary.
I wouldn’t object to one being entered if the Court and opposing counsel
wants one, but it’s such a nonissue, I don’t –I don’t think that the jury is
going to have any confusion about there being—We have talked about prior
proceedings a bunch of times, prior testimony. I really do think it’s a
nonissue.

(Id. at p. 229).

Because both parties agreed that a limiting instruction was not necessary, the
Court did not give one. Indeed, defense counsel went so far as to call it a nonissue. The
Court thus rejects Dr. Ritz’s argument that the Court’s failure to sua sponte strike the
testimony or give a limiting instruction was so prejudicial that he is entitled to a new trial.
The Court also is not persuaded by Dr. Ritz’s claim that the Court’s failure to
intervene allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to improperly reference the prior trial. Dr. Ritz cites
Hunter’s closing argument, during which counsel referred to the internal Wexford emails
and said, “We didn’t have those when Dr. Ritz gave all the past testimony that you have
seen and he believed we never would, so he testified the way that he did.” (Doc. 275 at
p. 49).
First, Dr. Ritz did not object to this statement in closing argument. Second,
Plaintiff’s counsel did not reference the previous trial. Instead, her reference to “past
testimony” was to Dr. Ritz’s video deposition testimony that the jury watched. Dr. Ritz
did not suffer any prejudice warranting a new trial by the Court’s failure to sua sponte
strike Dr. Myers’s testimony about the previous trial or issue a limiting instruction that

both parties agreed was not necessary.
The Cumulative Effect of the Alleged Errors

Finally, Dr. Ritz argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors, even if
harmless on their own, deprived him of a fair trial.
To prevail on a cumulative effect argument, the movant must show that multiple
errors occurred at trial and that those errors, in the context of the entire trial, were so
severe that the trial was “fundamentally unfair.” Christmas, 682 F.3d at 643 (quoting
United States v. Powell, 652 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011)). The court must look at the entire
record, examining the alleged errors, their interrelationship and combined effect, the
efficacy of any remedial measures, and the strength of the plaintiff's case. Id. As discussed above, Dr. Ritz waived the argument that he was prejudiced by
evidence of the prior settlement, he agreed that evidence of a “previous trial” was a
nonissue, and Plaintiff's counsel never improperly mentioned the prior trial. The
remaining alleged error regarding the Court’s instruction to entirely disregard all
testimony about an order directing Dr. Myers to take certain action cannot, on its own,
constitute a cumulative error. See United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“If there are no errors or a single error, there can be no cumulative error.”). Thus, Dr. Ritz
has failed to demonstrate that any cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion for New Trial (Doc. 280) and Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 282) filed by Defendant Dr. Stephen Ritz are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 10, 2026 Tl
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
United States District Judge

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