Rippling v O'Brien and Others - Jurisdiction Challenge

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  People Centre, INC [D/B/A Rippling] and Anor v O'Brien and Ors [No. 1] (Approved) [2026] IEHC 178 (20 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC178.html
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THE HIGH COURT

COMMERCIAL

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY

[2026] IEHC 178

[Record No. 2025/1289P]

BETWEEN

PEOPLE CENTER, INC (D/B/A RIPPLING)

?AND RIPPLING IRELAND LIMITED

PLAINTIFFS

AND

KEITH O'BRIEN, ALEXANDRE BOUAZIZ, ANDREA DAVID MIELI,

DEEL INC AND ASIF MALIK

DEFENDANTS ****

JUDGMENT No. 1 of Mr Justice Mark Sanfey delivered on the 20th day of??? March 2026.

Introduction.

1. These proceedings were commenced by the plaintiffs on 12 March 2025. At that point, the first named defendant (Mr O'Brien') was the only defendant. Where convenient, I propose to refer to the plaintiffs collectively as 'Rippling', the first named defendant as 'Mr O'Brien', the second to fifth defendants collectively as 'the Deel defendants', and the second, third and fifth named defendants as 'the individual Deel defendants', or 'the applicants'.

2. The fourth defendant ('Deel') has accepted the jurisdiction of the court. However, the individual Deel defendants - 'Mr Bouaziz', 'Mr Mieli' and 'Mr Malik' respectively - object to their joinder to the proceedings on grounds which I shall set out in detail.

3. In addition, Mr Bouaziz and Mr Mieli seek orders pursuant O.12, r.26 of the Rules of the Superior Courts ('RSC') and/or the court's inherent jurisdiction setting aside service on them of notices of concurrent amended plenary summons and dismissing or striking out the claims made against them by Rippling for want of jurisdiction on the part of the Irish courts pursuant to the Brussels Regulation (Recast) ('BRR'), Regulation (EU) number 1215/2012.

4. Mr Malik also seeks an order pursuant to O.12, r.26 of the RSC and/or the court's inherent jurisdiction in respect of the service on him of a notice of concurrent amended plenary summons outside of the jurisdiction pursuant to O.11, r.1(f) and (h) RSC.

5. The applications were heard as a single motion along with two motions brought by Deel which are the subject of separate judgments. All matters were heard by the court on 2-5 December 2025.

The parties

6. The first named plaintiff is a private limited company incorporated in Delaware, USA. It has its headquarters in San Francisco, California and is a provider of workforce management software. The second named plaintiff is a private limited company incorporated in Ireland and is the employer of workers in the Rippling Group who reside in Ireland and who provide services in support of the first named plaintiff's products and services. The second plaintiff is a wholly owned subsidiary of the first named plaintiff.

7. Mr O'Brien was employed by the second named plaintiff between 17 July 2023 and 20 March 2025, on which latter date Rippling alleges that his employment with the second plaintiff was terminated without the giving of notice.

8. Mr Bouaziz is the chief executive officer of Deel. Mr Mieli is "Head of Legal employed by Deel" [para. 5 of Deel's amended defence]. Mr Malik is "Associate Legal Director employed by Deel" [para. 7 of amended defence of Deel].

Background

9. The plaintiffs commenced the proceedings on 12 March 2025. Mr O'Brien was named as the sole defendant. At para. 10 of the amended statement of claim (the 'ASOC') delivered on 19 May 2025 after the joinder of the Deel defendants, the plaintiffs pleaded as follows:

"As against Mr O'Brien the Plaintiffs alleged that he had been engaged in a covert course of conduct whereby he had spied for Deel and provided Deel with the Plaintiff's trade secrets (within the meaning of the European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018 SI No. 188/2018... and proprietary and confidential information." [para 10 ASOC].

10. On 12 March 2025, this Court granted to the plaintiffs urgent ex parte relief aimed at obtaining and preserving evidence of Mr O'Brien's alleged wrongdoing. Mr O'Brien did not comply with the order, and it is alleged by the plaintiffs that, in breach of the tipping off provisions of the order, Mr O'Brien was in contact with each of the individual Deel defendants. On 17 March 2025, the plaintiffs issued proceedings against Deel in the US District Court for the Northern District of California ('the US proceedings').

11. At paras. 17 and 18 of the ASOC, Rippling pleads as follows:

"17. ?On or after 14 March 2025, the Deel Defendants agreed to use lawful and unlawful means to frustrate the Order [i.e. the order of 12 March 2025] and to create a false narrative to explain the bringing of these Proceedings, the obtaining of the Order and Mr O'Brien's non-compliance with the Order. The Deel Defendants' conspiracy is hereafter referred to as quote "the Scheme".

18.? The dominant purpose of the Scheme was to damage the Plaintiffs and their reputation by creating a false narrative whereby Mr O'Brien and Deel were portrayed as the victims of unmeritorious and abusive conduct on the part of the Plaintiffs and by causing Mr O'Brien to destroy evidence that would undermine that false narrative. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the Deel Defendants agreed that they would create a false narrative to the effect that:

(a) The Plaintiffs brought these proceedings and obtained the Order to punish Mr O'Brien for making protected disclosures in connection with sanctioned payments to Russia;

(b) The purpose of these proceedings was to manufacture evidence and to coerce Mr O'Brien into making false allegations against Deel; and

(c) After 27 March 2025, when Mr O'Brien agreed to cooperate, the Deel Defendants expanded the false narrative by alleging that the Plaintiffs had succeeded in their nefarious objects and had through coercion and duress caused Mr O'Brien to swear an affidavit in which he made false allegations against the Deel Defendants. The Deel Defendants made these claims notwithstanding that as of 27 March 2025, Mr O'Brien was represented by solicitors and counsel and the solicitors representing Mr O'Brien had been recommended to him by Deel's former solicitors, A&L Goodbody."

12. At paras. 19 to 45 of the ASOC, Rippling sets out particulars of the Deel defendants' conduct which it says forms part of the conduct which comprises the conspiracy or "Scheme". At paras. 46 to 52, details are given of alleged cooperation between Mr O'Brien and Rippling. In particular, Rippling pleads at paras. 49-51:

"49. On 27 March 2025, the Plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien entered into a Co-operation Agreement and a Termination agreement.

1. Under the Co-Operation Agreement, the Plaintiffs, inter-alia, waived, surrendered and released all claims that they might have against Mr O'Brien on foot of a representation that a summary account of his dealings with the Deel Defendants was true.

2. On 1 April 2025, Mr O'Brien provided an affidavit ('Mr O'Brien's affidavit') setting out the details of his dealings with the Deel defendants both in connection with the issues the subject matter of the U.S. Proceedings and the Scheme and the particulars pleaded above rely upon the substance and content of same."

13. The ASOC goes on to set out alleged details of "the Deel Defendants' conduct in pursuance of the Scheme", and sets out in detail a range of reliefs sought against the Deel defendants. Rippling filed a notice of discontinuance against Mr O'Brien on 1 August 2025.

14. The court was informed that, in broad terms, the US proceedings canvass alleged wrongdoing by Deel prior to the initiation of the proceedings in this jurisdiction, which are concerned solely with the alleged wrongdoing of the Deel defendants after the initiation of proceedings on 12 March 2025.

Joinder of the individual Deel defendants

15. The plaintiffs made an ex parte application on 2 April 2025 for the joinder of the Deel defendants. This Court made an order ('the joinder order') joining those defendants "pursuant to O.15, r.13 of the Rules of the Superior Courts", and made orders pursuant to O.11 of the RSC granting the plaintiffs liberty to serve notice of the proceedings on the fourth and fifth named defendants, who are resident in the USA and England respectively. Certain other consequential orders were also made.

16. In the present application, the individual Deel defendants submit that the court did not have jurisdiction under O.15, r.13 to make the order joining them as defendants, and seek to have the joinder order set aside. They say that, even if they are wrong about that, the Irish courts do not have jurisdiction over the individual Deel defendants.

The law in relation to joinder of parties

17. Order 15, r.13 is as follows:

"No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every cause or matter deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the names of any parties improperly joined, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, be struck out and that the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause of matter, be added...".

18. Mr Declan McGrath SC for the individual Deel defendants submitted that O.15, r.13 or its predecessors was intended to address the "plea of abatement" which was a plea permitted in the common law courts prior to the Judicature Acts. The plea would generally be to the effect that the proceedings were in some way improperly constituted, typically by joinder of the wrong parties, and provided a full defence to proceedings.

19. It was submitted that the current rule addresses the plea of abatement by providing that a misjoinder or non-joinder of parties will not be fatal to proceedings. The court can make an order to join appropriate parties or substitute parties in the proceedings where those parties "ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the case or matter...".

20. The individual Deel defendants submit that the rule is directed towards the proper constitution of the original proceedings; that the "cause or matter" refers to the cause or matter of the proceedings as originally constituted, prior to the joinder of the Deel defendants.

21. Essentially, the individual Deel defendants argue that the court could only add them as defendants to the matter if their "presence before the court" were "necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in... [the plaintiff's case against the first named defendant, Mr O'Brien]...". It is submitted that, as the case against Mr O'Brien had been settled before the joinder application was made, there are no "questions involved" between the plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien which rendered the presence of the individual Deel defendants "necessary" in the terms of O.15, r.13. Accordingly, they say that there is no basis upon which they could have been joined in accordance with O.15, r.13.

22. The individual Deel defendants emphasise what they contend is a strong line of authority supporting their submission. They rely in particular on the decision of the Supreme Court (Murphy J) in Allied Irish Coal Supplies Ltd v Powell Duffryn International Fuels Ltd [1998] 2 IR 519. In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Powell Duffryn plc ('the plc'), for breach of contract. The plaintiff became aware during the course of the proceedings that the plc was in the process of selling the defendant company and, being apprehensive that the plc was trying to distance itself from the defendant, sought to join the plc as a co-defendant.

23. The High Court (Laffoy J) refused the application, and the plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed. Having set out the texts of O.15, r.13, Murphy J confirmed that "the discretion conferred by O.15, r.13 should be exercised in those cases where, before the Judicature Acts, a plea of abatement would have succeeded...". The court then stated at p.532 as follows:

"Furthermore the words 'cause or matter' in O.15 r.13 mean the action as it stands between the existing parties (Amon v Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd [1956] 1 Q.B. 357 at p.369). Certainly the court has jurisdiction to refuse to add parties for the purpose of introducing a new cause of action. In Raleigh v Goschen [1898] 1 Ch 73, ?Romer J, explained why, in that case at any rate, such a course should not be adopted, although he was careful to indicate that the plaintiff would have whatever rights were available to it in other proceedings against the parties whom it had sought to add."

24. In Raleigh v Goschen, the plaintiffs brought an application to amend the action, inter alia, by suing the defendants in their individual capacity, having already sued them in their official capacity. The defendants had submitted to the court that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the action brought against them in the former capacity. Romer J refused the application, holding that "what the plaintiffs are seeking to do is to change one action into another of a substantially different character... If the plaintiffs have in fact any claim against any of the present defendants individually, that claim will be more properly and conveniently enforced in a separate action". [at p. 81].

25. In Amon v Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd, a dispute over ownership of the design for a writing pen, the defendant applied to court under O.16, r.11 of the RSC for an order that an individual, D, be joined as a defendant in the action. D alleged that he was in fact the inventor of the pen, and was willing to be joined as a defendant so that he could counterclaim as against the plaintiff, who denied D's allegations and opposed the application.

26. Order 16, r.11 was cast in the same terms as O.15, r.13 in this jurisdiction. In his judgment refusing the application, Devlin J, at p.369 of his judgment, stated as follows:

"It is not, I think, disputed that the 'cause or matter' is the action as it stands between the existing parties. If it were otherwise, then anybody who showed a cause of action against either a plaintiff or defendant could, of course, say that the question involved in his cause of action could not be settled unless he was made a party. Mr Aldous [counsel for the defendants] does not contend for so wide a construction as that. But he submits that if the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order, which is to avoid multiplicity of actions. In the present case he submits that the subject-matter of the dispute between the existing parties is the 'ownership,' if I may so put it, of an invention; the plaintiff claims that he is the owner of it and the intervener alleges that he is, and both disputes ought to be determined at the same time. This construction stresses the amplitude of the closing words 'all the questions involved in the cause or matter'.

The alternative construction treats the opening words as dominant. 'All the questions involved' is a phrase that, unless it is cut down, would be impossibly wide. It is cut down, the plaintiff submits, by the opening words. The intervener must be a party whose presence is necessary to enable all questions in the action to be adjudicated upon and settled, but the question must be one which has to be adjudicated upon in the issue between the existing parties and not in any new issue raised by an intervener".

27. In relation to the submission that the object of the rule was to prevent multiplicity of actions, Devlin J stated at p.378 of his judgment as follows:

"I do not, with deference to those who have thought otherwise, agree that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions, though it may incidentally have that effect. The court has other ways of doing that which are amply sufficient for the purpose - by ordering consolidation or the bringing of actions on together or third-party proceedings and so on. The primary object of the rule I believe to be to replace the plea in abatement. The object of that plea was to 'abate' an action in which all the proper parties were not before the court. The rule is more flexible than the plea, but its object is fundamentally the same. It is not to marry a future action to an existing one, but to ensure that all the necessary parties to the existing one (using 'necessary' in the broad sense of being necessary to effectual and complete adjudication in the existing action) are before the court. It does, of course, incidentally keep down multiplicity of actions, because if the necessary parties can't get before the court in an existing action, they will naturally try to do so in another action, but that appears to me to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective...".

28. In Persona Digital Telephony Ltd & Anor. v The Minister for Public Enterprise, Ireland and the Attorney General [2014] IEHC 78, the interpretation of O.15, r.13 was considered by Ryan J (as he then was). The State defendants had joined Mr Michael Lowry and Mr Denis O'Brien as third parties to the action. Mr O'Brien sought to be made a co-defendant in the proceedings; the State defendants consented to the application, but the plaintiffs refused their consent.

29. Ryan J framed the issue as follows:

"Is Denis O'Brien's presence before the court necessary to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate on all questions in the case?"

Ryan J. referred with approval to the decision in Amon v Tuck. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Barlow v Fanning [2002] 2 IR 593 as follows:

"Keane C.J. endorsed remarks of Viscount Dilhorne in Vandervell Trustees v White & Ors [1971] AC 912, when he said of the corresponding words in the English rule which were the same as ours:

'I cannot construe the language of the rule as meaning that a party can be added whenever it is just or convenient to do so. That could have been simply stated if the rule was intended to mean that. However wide an interpretation is given, it must be an interpretation of the language used. The rule does not give power to add a party whenever it is just or convenient to do so. It gives power to do so only if he ought to be joined as a party or if his presence is necessary for the effectual and complete determination and adjudication upon all matters in dispute in the cause or matter'".

30. Ryan J remarked that there was "considerable force in the argument that Mr O'Brien ought to have been joined as a defendant in this case... [36] If Mr O'Brien is not joined as a defendant and is left to stand by as the plaintiffs' claim [is] presented against the State defendants only, he and the Court will be observing a drama unfold in which he is the central participant but without any entitlement to intervene. The case alleging misconduct of the most serious nature will proceed without any involvement of the person alleged to be the major wrongdoer." In those circumstances, the court acceded to the application.

31. In In Re CTO Greenclean Environmental Solutions Limited (in liquidation) [2017] IEHC 246, Haughton J also referred to the passage of the Supreme Court judgment in Barlow v Fanning endorsing the dicta of Viscount Dilhorne in Vandervell Trustees Limited. At para. 17 of the judgment, Haughton J refers to Or. 15 r.13 as "facilitative and enabling", although he also stated at para.17 that "[T]he main purpose of the rule is evident from the first sentence - it is to ensure that no cause or matter is defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties".

32. Counsel also referred to as the decision of Stewart J in Blanchfield v Garvey [2018] IEHC 259, in which the court followed the decision in Allied Irish Coal Supplies, but decided that the introduction of the proposed co-defendant "would not introduce a new cause of action". Stewart J stated at para. 25 of her judgment that "... I am of the view that joining [the proposed co-defendant] may be necessary in order to enable the Court to fully address the questions involved [in the existing proceedings] ...". Accordingly the court acceded to the plaintiff's application to join a party as a co-plaintiff to the proceedings.

33. Counsel for the applicants also referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in O'Mahony & Ors. v Dwyer Properties Limited (In receivership) [2018] IECA 263. In that case, the plaintiffs applied pursuant to O.15, r.13 to join a statutory receiver over certain assets of the defendant company, a Mr Frank Ryan, as a defendant to the proceedings. The plaintiffs were disappointed underbidders in respect of the sale of land being sold by the statutory receiver, and had initiated proceedings against the company in receivership, which was the vendor of the property. Whelan J summarised the plaintiff's position as follows:

"20. ?In essence, what the appellants contend is that the proposed defendant deliberately and wrongfully procured the exclusion of the appellants from the right to enter into a contract to purchase the property by reason of, inter alia, certain misrepresentations alleged [to be] made by him. They also alleged that the provisions of s. 438 of the Companies Act 2014 are engaged and certain breaches have occurred of the said statutory provisions by the statutory receiver and the applications thereunder. It is further alleged that there were acts of deception and deceit perpetrated by the proposed defendant which caused injury, damage and loss to the appellants."

34. In the High Court, the court noted that it was sought to join Mr Ryan on the basis of a collateral contract. Baker J, in her ex tempore judgment, commented that the plaintiff "has pleaded that such implied terms under a collateral contract exist between the plaintiff and the defendant, [and that the plaintiff] now seeks to join another defendant in order to make the same claim against that defendant but it seems to me that the claim he seeks to make is not one that arises in these proceedings" [see para.23 of Court of Appeal judgment].

35. The Court of Appeal set out that Baker J had noted that "[T]he provisions of the rule allow the court to add a party... that is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and to completely adjudicate on the issues...", and recorded Baker J's conclusion in the matter:

"I consider that if there is a claim against the receiver, and I can't judge from this vantage point whether there is or not, it is a completely separate claim. It cannot be one that arises in the course of these proceedings. The determination of that issue is not necessary in order that the Court can fully determine or effectually and completely adjudicate on the issues between the parties and the existing proceedings, and those issues probably will require Mr Ryan to be a witness but I am not convinced of the requirement to be a party. So for all those reasons I consider that I will refuse the application to join Mr Ryan as co-defendant but I take no view as to whether he is a proper defendant in other proceedings whether for negligence or breach of another contract, although it seems as a matter of first principle that the answer to that would have to depend on whether the plaintiff wins or loses the main action...".

36. Having recited the terms of O15, r.13, the Court of Appeal noted that the existing proceedings "are founded on contract and the wrongs alleged and reliefs sought derive from that asserted contractual legal basis". The court points out that Mr Ryan was not a party to the contract pleaded, and notes at para. 38 of its judgment that "the causes of action against the existing defendant company and the proposed defendant are substantially different though both spring from events surrounding the tender process and occurrences in the months of January and February 2014. The addition of Frank Ryan as a defendant will have the effect of adding several new different causes of action to the proceedings".

37. The court cites the dicta of Murphy J in Allied Coal Supplies set out at para. 23 above and notes that it was "clearly acknowledged... that the appellants have a continuing entitlement to institute such proceedings as they see fit against Mr Frank Ryan..." [para. 40]. The court further noted that "... whereas the plaintiff may institute proceedings against any defendant without seeking the permission of anyone, the High Court undoubtedly has discretion as to whether or not to order the addition of a defendant such as Mr Frank Ryan..." [para. 46].

38. The court noted "the separate and distinct issues arising for determination as between the appellants and the existing defendant on the one hand and the appellants and the proposed defendant on the other..." and commented that "... the mere fact that the allegations being advanced had their genesis in the tender process is not sufficient in and of itself to warrant joinder..." [para. 48].

39. At para.53 of its judgment, the court stated that "[T]here is a well-established jurisprudence that the court has jurisdiction for valid reasons to refuse to add parties for the purpose of introducing a new cause of action...", and held that "... [c]learly the High Court judge had jurisdiction to refuse to add parties particularly in circumstances where this would result in the introduction of new causes of action" [para.58].

The applicants' position

40. The applicants' case is simple. Firstly, they say that the proposed joinder of the individual Deel defendants is to enable the plaintiffs to pursue new causes of action against them, and that this takes the joinder of those parties outside the scope of O.15, r.13.

41. Secondly, they say that the presence before the court of the individual Deel defendants could not be "necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter" because, as of the date of making the application for joinder - 2 April 2025 -there were no questions involved in the cause or matter because all causes of action between the plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien, and all liability for costs, had been definitively settled by 27 March 2025 when the cooperation agreement was concluded.

42. The applicants make the point that, as of 2 April 2025, the only pleading in the case was the plenary summons, which was issued on 12 March 2025. The action against Mr O'Brien therefore comprised complaints about the events up to that date, so that the proceedings against Mr O'Brien could not have encompassed any claims by the plaintiffs about the conduct of the Deel defendants which, as para. 16 of the ASOC makes clear, are "confined to their unlawful conduct to frustrate the Order [i.e. the order granted to the plaintiffs on the ex parte application made on 12 March 2025] subsequent to the time on 14 March 2025 when Deel learned that Rippling had discovered its wrongful conduct and to defamatory statements made by the Deel defendants to that end".

43. The applicants rely particularly on the terms of the Cooperation Agreement. Recital F of that agreement provides that "... the parties have agreed to resolve these proceedings and all disputes between them on the terms set out in this Agreement". There are a number of terms of the agreement consistent with a full settlement of all matters between the plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien. For instance, para.1.6 (f) of the agreement states as follows:

"The Plaintiffs and their affiliates agree to waive surrender and release all claims that they might have howsoever arising against the Defendant and for the avoidance of any doubt, the Plaintiffs hereby release and forever discharge all and/or any actions, claims, rights, demands and set-offs, whether in this jurisdiction or any other, whether or presently known to them or to the law, and whether in law or equity, that they ever had, may have or hereafter can, shall or may have against the Defendant, arising out of or connected to the Defendant's contracts with the Plaintiffs".?

44. The applicants also rely on various filings by Rippling in the US proceedings which acknowledge that "by agreement between the Plaintiffs (Rippling and Rippling Ireland) and O'Brien made on March 27, the proceedings and all disputes between the parties were resolved" [Day 1, p.175, lines 11 to 14].

45. In the affidavit of Ms Wu grounding the application for joinder, the deponents set out details as to the effect of the cooperation agreement:

"23. The second agreement was a cooperation agreement whereby Mr O'Brien agreed to cooperate with the Plaintiffs in any litigation worldwide in connection with the wrongdoing the subject matter of these proceedings. Under that agreement, the Plaintiffs agreed to contribute towards Mr O'Brien's costs of these proceedings and to pay his reasonable out of pocket and legal expenses in connection with the cooperation to be provided under that agreement. The Plaintiffs also waived any claims against Mr O'Brien arising out of the subject matter of these proceedings."

46. At para. 27 of her affidavit, Ms Wu averred as follows:

"The Plaintiffs seek leave of this Honourable Court to join the intended Defendants to these proceedings. The basis for the intended Defendants joinder relates to the conduct of the intended Defendants since the attempted execution of the Court Order on 14 March 2025. The Plaintiffs have entered into a compromise agreement with the first Defendant. The first Plaintiff has brought proceedings against Deel Inc in the United States relating, inter alia, to the misappropriation of the first Plaintiff's trade secrets. Therefore, the Plaintiffs do not propose proceeding against the intended Defendants in this jurisdiction in respect of the wrongdoing the subject matter of the Plaintiffs' original claim against Mr O'Brien , i.e . the spying and theft of Confidential Information and Trade Secrets prior to the attempted execution of the Court Order on 14 March 2025."

47. Finally, the applicants make the point that the ASOC itself contains no prayer for relief against Mr O'Brien. Relief is sought only as against the Deel defendants.

48. In the premises, the applicants say that it is clear that the purpose of the joinder of the Deel defendants was to add new causes of action, in circumstances where all of the original causes of action against Mr O'Brien had been compromised by the time the application for joinder was made. It is submitted therefore that the presence of the Deel defendants was not "necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter", and that the court did not therefore have jurisdiction under O.15, r.13 to make the joinder order.

The plaintiffs' position

49. Counsel for the plaintiffs, Marcus Dowling SC, submitted that O.15, r.13 was "entirely permissive in nature", and that "a party is free to sue whoever they want... unless there is a prejudice or an abuse..." [Day 1, p.16, lines 2 to 17]. In their written submissions, the plaintiffs contend, at para.12 (e), that "the discretion to join parties where it is just to do so is so broad that a party may even be joined after the proceedings have concluded", and cited the decision of the Supreme Court in WL Construction Ltd v Chawke & Ors. [2020] 1 ILRM 50 in this regard.

50. The plaintiffs in their written submissions at para.16 embark on an analysis of the allegations against the individual Deel defendants from 14 March 2025, and submit that:

"It is entirely artificial for the individual Deel defendants to suggest that the settlement with Mr O'Brien could mean that the above issues, which arose out of the proceedings as originally constituted, and which were the means by which they conspired to frustrate the proceedings, had either fallen away or ought to have been brought in entirely separate proceedings".

51. The plaintiffs refer to many of the cases canvassed by the applicants and consider that the individual Deel defendants come within the criteria of O.15, r.13 in that their "presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter".

52. In particular, the plaintiffs submit that the dicta of Whelan J at paras. 53 and 58 of her judgment, quoted at para. 39 above, to the effect that the court "has jurisdiction for valid reasons to refuse to add parties for the purpose of introducing a new cause of action" suggest that the court can in an appropriate case join a party even where the effect of the joinder would be to allow that party to pursue a new cause of action separate from the cause of action against the existing parties. Counsel points out that similar language was used by Murphy J in Allied Irish Coal Supplies where the court, at page 537 of the judgment - albeit in a different context - said that "[T]he court undoubtedly has a discretion as to whether or not to order the addition of the new defendant...".

53. The plaintiffs also draw attention to the fact that the proceedings against Mr O'Brien were not discontinued until 1 August 2025, long after the joinder of the Deel defendants. They rely on the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in ROFA Sport Management AG v DHL International (UK) Ltd [1989] 2 AER 743. In that case, which involved a contractual dispute, a third party affected by the dispute informed the plaintiffs that they intended to be joined as a co-defendant, but before they had taken steps in this regard, a settlement was reached between the plaintiffs and the defendant resulting in a consent order staying the proceedings. The third party applied to intervene in the proceedings; the plaintiffs resisted the application on the basis that there was no action in existence after the date of the settlement, so that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the third party's application.

54. The Court of Appeal held that an action which had been stayed was still technically in being, even though a further order to lift the stay might be required for it to become "live", and that a distinction must be drawn between such a situation and one where the action has been discontinued or dismissed.

55. Counsel contended that there was no distinction between the situation in the present case and that which obtained in ROFA; as Counsel put it, "... it's as simple as that. The proceedings were still in existence and therefore parties could be joined to the proceedings" [Day 1 p.89 lines 12 to 14).

56. The plaintiffs referred in their written submissions to dicta of Haughton J in CTO Greenclean in which the court referred to O.15, r.13 as "an enabling procedural provision " which was "clearly... intended to be facilitative and enabling...", and to the dicta of Stewart J in Blanchfield in which the court held that it had a "wide discretion" under O.15, r13 to join necessary parties.

57. Counsel for the plaintiffs referred to what he saw as the practical effect of acceding to the individual Deel defendants' application. He submitted that, if the court were to reverse the joinder order in respect of the applicants, the plaintiffs could simply "make a fresh joinder claim in these proceedings, because there is a cause or matter now before the Irish courts... and all of these technicalities about there being no cause or matter fall away, now that Deel is before the Irish courts and has entered an appearance in these proceedings" [Day 1 p.11 lines 3 to 10].

Discussion

58. Counsel for the applicants submitted that, if the court was of the view that the joinder order should be set aside, it would be unnecessary for the court to address the challenges by the individual Deel defendants to jurisdiction. It seems to me that this is correct. For this reason, this judgment deals only with the challenge to the joinder order pursuant to O.15, r.13.

59. The plaintiff has a clear view that the convenience of the parties and the court would be best served by the joinder of the individual Deel defendants. However, the dicta of Viscount Dilhorne in Vandervell Trustees Ltd v White, cited with approval by Keane CJ in Barlow v Fanning and by Ryan J in Persona, make it clear that O.15, r.13 cannot be construed to permit the joinder of parties merely because it is just or convenient to do so. A specific amendment was required to the Rules of the Superior Courts in England and Wales to permit joinder of a party on this basis; O.15, r.6(2)(b) now permits the court to add as a party to proceedings;

"(ii) any person between whom and any party in the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause of matter which in the opinion of the court it would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter."

60. The position is different in this jurisdiction. The case law on which the applicants rely clearly establishes that a party may only be joined where they "ought to have been joined", or where their presence before the court "may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the cause or matter...".

61. This means that the parties who are joined must be necessary for the adjudication or settlement of the questions between the existing parties to the litigation. The authorities clearly establish that parties cannot be joined to the litigation if there are no "questions involved in the cause or matter" between the existing parties.

62. In the present case, all issues between the plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien had been resolved by March 27, 2025. This is the plaintiffs' own position as set out in Ms Wu's grounding affidavit for the joinder application. Notwithstanding that the proceedings against Mr O'Brien were not discontinued until a later date, there can be no doubt that no further "questions" as between the plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien required to be resolved in the proceedings after that date, which preceded the joinder of the individual Deel defendants. To hold that the mere fact that the proceedings had not been discontinued would justify the joinder of the applicants would be to do violence to the clear words of the rule and the authorities to which I have made reference above.

63. Likewise, the decision in ROFA Sports Management is in my view of no assistance to the plaintiffs. The application by the third party to intervene in the proceedings in that case was made pursuant O.15, r.6 (2) of the RSC of England and Wales which permits the court to add a party to proceedings where it would be "just and convenient" to determine the issues involving the third-party as well as the issue between the parties to the litigation. In that context - and as the proceedings, though moribund, were still in existence - the court exercised its discretion to add a third party. The context of that application was fundamentally different to the present case.

64. I do not consider that the plaintiffs are assisted by the dicta regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of Murphy J in Allied Irish Coal Supplies and Whelan J in O'Mahony. On no reasonable reading of those judgments could either court be thought to suggest that the jurisdiction to add parties pursuant to O.15, r.13 is unfettered. Indeed, Whelan J in particular specifically endorsed the construction of the rule in the court below by Baker J who, as we have seen, unequivocally held that a party could not be joined where the issue concerning that party was not "necessary in order that the Court can fully determine effectually and completely adjudicate on the issues between the parties and the existing proceedings...".

65. I think also that the dicta of Haughton J and Stewart J in CTO Greenclean and Blanchfield v Garvey respectively, on which the plaintiffs rely concerning the nature of the court's discretion under O.15, r.13, are taken somewhat out of context. The court undoubtedly has a jurisdiction to add parties to proceedings; that jurisdiction must however be exercised according to the clear words of the rule and consistently with the cases which indicate how the rule is to be interpreted.

Conclusion

66. The submissions of counsel for the plaintiffs made it clear that the plaintiffs are somewhat frustrated by the inconvenience of the present application: see para. 57 above. However, the correct interpretation of O.15, r.13 is clear, and clarified by the case law. At the point when the individual Deel defendants were joined, there were in fact no "questions involved in the cause or matter" between the plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien, so that the joinder of the individual defendants could not be said to be necessary to enable the court to adjudicate and settle such questions.

67. Accordingly, I am of the view that the application by the individual Deel defendants to set aside the joinder order is as well-founded, and I will make an order in that regard.

68. In the circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to decide the issues regarding the jurisdiction of the Irish courts as regards the individual Deel defendants. Those issues may surface in the future between the parties in these or other proceedings, with the arguments deployed by the parties considered on another occasion.

69. I will list the matter 10:30am on Wednesday 15 th April 2026 for consideration of the orders to be made as a result of this judgment.

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