O.P. v Q.R. - Discovery Motion in Cohabitation Financial Relief Proceedings

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O.P. v Q.R. (discovery, cohabitation, relevance, Affidavits of Means) (Approved) [2026] IEHC 228 (14 April 2026)
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APPROVED

FOR PUBLICATION

REDACTED

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THE HIGH COURT

FAMILY LAW

[2026] IEHC 228

Record No. 135M/2022

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 173 OF THE CIVIL PARTNERSHIP AND CERTAIN RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF COHABITANTS ACT, 2010

BETWEEN/

O.P.

APPLICANT

AND

Q.R

RESPONDENT

Judgment of Ms Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the             14 th day of April 2026

PRELIMINARY

1. The motion which I have been asked to consider in this matter has been brought pursuant to the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010 ('the 2010 Act').  The proceedings at hearing before me concern an application for financial relief by the Applicant pursuant to the 2010 Act but, in addition, there are proceedings before me in respect of maintenance for the dependent child of the parties.  The latter proceedings are pursuant to the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976 ('the 1976 Act') and sections 42 of the Family Law Act, 1995 ('the 1995 Act').  I have considered this application in the context of both such applications.  I do so in circumstances in which the proceedings have been ongoing before me over a considerable period of time and, as both are being heard together, it is expeditious to consider the reliefs being sought at the present time in both contexts.

INTRODUCTION

1. The substantive proceedings herein have been at hearing over a number of days.  In consequence of the hearing days not being immediately consecutive, the proceedings have been ongoing over a prolonged period of time.  I have been concerned in relation to the attritional impact of this on the parties and these concerns have been heightened by the present motion.  Clearly where proceedings are ongoing over a prolonged period, the circumstances of the parties and their families may alter to some degree.  A court must be vigilant to adopt an appropriate response to such changes.  Some may be of pivotal relevance; others of no relevance and some such changes will be elsewhere along the spectrum of these two extremes.  In assessing how to deal with such changes and the evidence (and evidence gathering) pertaining to them, a court must always be mindful of the factors to which it is obligated by statute to have regard in reaching its determination.  While the parties must be entitled to bring all necessary and relevant evidence before a court, at the same time, the values of conclusion and finality in proceedings involving personal relationships ought not to be underestimated.

2. To this end, in this instance, I must have particular regard to sections 172 and 173 of the 2010 Act and section 5A of the 1976 Act.

THE MOTION

1. The Respondent seeks discovery relief pursuant to Order 31, rule 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.  He seeks that the Applicant make:

"Discovery of documents which are or have been in her possession, power or procurement (to include electronically stored documentation) and in particular:

1. All SMS texts, WhatsApp messages, emails and other electronic communications between the Applicant and [AB, a third party] from 1 st May 2025 to 15 th February 2026.

2. All SMS texts, WhatsApp messages, emails and other electronic communications between the Applicant and any third parties from 1 st May 2025 to 15 th February 2026 which touch upon the Applicant's relationship or contact with AB."

1. Submissions made to me indicate that the reason why this discovery is sought is to establish whether or not the Applicant is in a relationship with AB (a matter which is without doubt not germane to the substantive application before me), whether she is in receipt of any financial or monies' worth support from AB and, additionally, to test her credibility in light of evidence previously proffered by her during the substantive hearing.  It is common case that AB commenced a relationship with the Applicant after her relationship with the Respondent ended.  It seems to me that the financial arrangements between the Applicant and AB may have relevance in the context of:

(a) Section 173(3)(a) of the 2010 Act - the "... financial circumstances, needs and obligations ... existing as at the date of the application or which are likely to arise in the future" of the Applicant;

(b) Determining what is "just and equitable" having regard to "all the circumstances" (section 173(2) of the 2010 Act);

(c) Potentially, determining whether the Applicant has possible cohabitation entitlements under the 2010 Act arising from this subsequent relationship which may engage section 173(3)(a) of the 2010 Act (recited above).  In this regard, it should be noted that the Applicant in her replying Affidavit to this motion deposes, referring to AB,: "I have no legal right to pursue him for any financial relief";

(d) Section 5A(3)(a) of the 1976 Act as it refers to the "other financial resources" of each parent;

(e) Having regard to "all the circumstances of the case" pursuant to section 5A(3) of the 1976 Act.

EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE MOTION

1. The motion is grounded upon an Affidavit of the Respondent sworn on the 13 th March 2026.   He refers to the letter in which voluntary discovery was sought.  This letter accords with the requirements of the Rules of the Superior Courts.  The letter references previous financial support received by the Applicant from AB (evidence in relation to which was proffered earlier at hearing).  It states the Court was informed (by Counsel for the Applicant) in the course of submission concerning a procedural matter that the relationship had ceased and that the Applicant's financial position had deteriorated in consequence and that there has been no indication on a number of stated occasions thereafter that the relationship has resumed.  The letter continues:

"The Court is thus left with the clear impression that the relationship has ended and that consequentially, your client's personal financial circumstances have further disimproved.  The current status of your client's relationship with AB and the support he provides is clearly a matter to which the court must have regard in considering both the cohabitation case and in considering the maintenance case.

The actual state of the relationship may also have a relevance to the overall credibility of your client, which you will be aware has been put in issue by the Respondent.

It is our client's position that your client has continued to be in an intimate and committed relationship with [AB] since June 2025 notwithstanding that she moved back to [an address] in August 2025."

1. The letter continues on to refer to the observations of a private investigator retained by the Respondent as regards the nature of the relationship between the Applicant and AB [1].  The letter states that the documents sought

**

"have the potential to enable our client to undermine your client's claims as well as advancing his own defence" and also " may have the effect of supporting the yet unwithdrawn assertion that the relationship between AB and your client has fully ended."

1. The Respondent's Affidavit substantially repeats the contents of the voluntary discovery letter.

2. The letter was not responded to by the Applicant.

3. The Applicant has sworn a replying Affidavit, dated the 19 th March 2026.  It accuses the Respondent of delay in bringing the motion, the references to submissions by Counsel for the Applicant as to the changed nature of the relationship being from dates in May and June 2025 and the photographs of the private investigator dating between September 2025 and January 2026, with the voluntary discovery letter being dated the 16 th February 2026 and the motion issuing on the 13 th March 2026.  She avers that if the relationship with the third party is relevant, no explanation has been given by the Respondent as to why the motion did not issue for in excess of six months after he had the material upon which he relies in support of his application (namely the private investigator's report which has observations made in September 2026).  Indeed, the Applicant avers that she has been under observation prior to that date.  She avers to the distress that this has caused her and steps which she took in consequence of such distress.  The Applicant disputes the adequacy of the reasons for discovery stated in the voluntary discovery letter.  She avers that the conduct of the Respondent has invaded her privacy, is "wholly oppressive" and that the nature and scope of the discovery sought is disproportionate.  She avers that the discovery sought will serve only to further prolong the hearing and will lead to no saving of time.

SUBMISSIONS

1. I heard oral and received written submissions in this case.  The Respondent contends that:

(i) The relationship circumstances of the Applicant and AB are relevant to her financial circumstances which financial circumstances are relevant to the within proceedings.  In this context, the Respondent makes particular reference to the accommodation circumstances of the Applicant.  In consequence, he seeks discovery of correspondence/communications which would identify the relationship circumstances;

(ii) The cessation of the relationship was a matter introduced during the course of the hearing and the necessity for discovery in this regard could not have been anticipated at an earlier time.  This is not a case of further and better discovery being sought or varied discovery being sought but rather it is an additional class of discovery arising from changed circumstances disclosed during the hearing;

(iii) The categories of documents being sought are "relevant, necessary and proportionate" and are required in the interests of justice;

1. The principles relating to additional discovery, as set out by Murray J. in Hireservices Ltd v An Post [2020] IECA 120 and by Holland J. in Wegner v. Murphy [2022] IEHC 525, are referenced.  It is contended that the discovery being sought is not only necessary and relevant but that there is also a good reason for the late timing of such discovery.

2. The Applicant's lack of response to the request for voluntary discovery is highlighted.

3. It is further submitted that the discovery, while not being sought solely to undermine the credibility of the Applicant, is also relevant in this regard in circumstances in which the Applicant's credibility is being substantially challenged by the Respondent in these proceedings.

4. The Applicant contends:

(i) That discovery is out of time as provided for in Order 31 rule 12(9) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, that provision stating that an application for discovery "shall" be made not later than 28 days after the action has been listed for trial.  She contends that the circumstances for the extension of this period provided for in the Rules (that it is "just and reasonable to do so") are not satisfied in this instance.  The decision of Ni Raifeartaigh J. in Victoria Hall Management Ltd v Cox [2020] IECA 79 is referenced.

(ii) That the reasons why discovery is needed, as set out in the letter seeking voluntary discovery, are inadequate and that there is an insufficiency of connection between the documents being sought and the reasons proffered.  Specifically, the Applicant submits that financial documents might be relevant to the issue of financial support but that communication messages such as are sought are not;

(iii) That the discovery being sought here is oppressive and reference is made to Stafford v Revenue Commissioners (O'Flaherty J.) Supreme Court 27 th March 1996 and furthermore must be viewed as only being sought for the purposes of testing credibility which is not permissible (BAM v. National Treasury Management Agency [2015] IECA 249).

(iv) The documents being sought here fail the necessity test in that they are not proportionate. Dicta of Clarke J. in Tobin v. Minister for Defence [2020] 1 IR 211 (Tobin) are referenced in this regard;

(v) The present application is oppressive and calculated to impose unjustified pressure on the Applicant.

THE LAW

1. The first port of call in this regard must be Order 31 of the Rules of the Superior Courts which sets out clearly the procedural rules applicable to discovery applications.  Most importantly in the context of this application, voluntary discovery must be sought as a prerequisite to any court application in this respect, reasons why the discovery is required must be specified and the appropriate time within the litigation for seeking discovery is provided for.

2. As to the timing of this application, while the general principle of discovery being sought prior to hearing is clearly set out in the Rules of the Superior Courts, exceptional circumstances requiring later discovery are envisaged.  Order 31, rule 12(9) sets down time limits but does recognise that an exception may arise where "it appears just and reasonable to do so." In Victoria Hall Management Limited v. Cox [2020] IECA 79, it is clearly envisaged that a court may order discovery during a trial.  Ni Raifeartaigh J. references the discretionary nature of such an order and sets down the test as being that:

"... such a case would have to present with exceptional features such that the interests of justice could be said to outweigh the potential prejudice that would be caused to the other side ...."

The learned Judge went on to set out a potential circumstance where this might arise:

"..., I could anticipate that such a situation might arise where, for example, the need for some crucial piece of discovery had only become evident during the trial for some particular reason, such as the unforeseen (and not reasonably foreseeable) emergence at the last minute of new information, or some entirely unexpected twist in the evidence of the witnesses."

It seems to me that the emergence of the cessation of the relationship between the Applicant and AB might be said to have brought new information to light during the hearing which new information potentially impacts upon the financial resources of the Applicant.  I am therefore satisfied that the exceptional circumstances envisaged in Order 31, rule 12(9) are engaged.

1. In the present case, the argument of the Respondent is that financial support received in the context of a relationship with AB is a financial resource and is relevant to the matters to which I must have regard in this case.  It is clear that the Respondent did put into evidence the relationship between the Applicant and AB, the Applicant was cross-examined about the relationship and photographs demonstrating such relationship and benefits being received by the Applicant in this context were put to her.  It is undoubtedly the case that during the course of the hearing, it was indicated to me that the relationship had ended (although this was done by way of submission by Counsel, the evidence of the Applicant having been completed at that point).  The alleged changed status of the relationship thus only emerged during the course of the hearing and, consequently, this is not a matter which could have been addressed within the discovery timescales envisaged in Order 31 rule 12(9).  Having regard to the factual circumstances, it is my conclusion that the just and reasonable requirement of that provision is satisfied.

2. I therefore conclude that this application is not out of time.

3. However, it being permissible to make application for discovery does not mean that the discovery application made is fully or even partially appropriate, having regard to the legal principles applicable to discovery applications.

4. Voluntary discovery was sought in this instance.  The reason(s) for such discovery being sought was/were specified.

5. The principles to be applied in relation to discovery are set out with clarity and great assistance in Tobin v Minister for Defence [2020] 1 IR 211.  It is unnecessary to recite these principles, which are established and well-known, at length.  The documentation must be relevant and necessary and the element of necessity encompasses, inter alia, issues of whether there are other "equally effectual means" of establishing the point arising, prohibitive cost and proportionality.

6. I do have some concerns as to relevance in this instance.  I fully accept that the financial resources (or lack thereof) of the Applicant are relevant to the applications before me and that financial support being obtained by her from AB is a financial resource (although one which would require careful qualitative analysis having regard to its voluntary and non-binding nature).  However, I agree with the Applicant that there is a lack of connection between the documentation sought and issue sought to be proved.  Messaging of the type sought might demonstrate much about the relationship, as whether or not it is ongoing, but that is not the issue of relevance.  Financial support is what is relevant and such messaging may have little impact in terms of evidence in that regard.

7. In so far as the Respondent states that he seeks discovery in aid of a challenge to the credibility of the Applicant (although I accept that he clearly states that this is not the sole reason for his request), the dicta of O'Flaherty J. in Stafford v. Revenue Commissioners Supreme Court, 27 th March 1996 indicates the inappropriateness of such application.  Referencing the submission of the appellant in that case, the learned Judge stated:

"..., she submitted that if this application has really been sought to attack the credit of her client that is not a ground for discovery.  She opened to us a passage in Matthews and Malek on Discovery which sets forth at p. 100:-

"Discovery will not be ordered of material which would be used solely for cross- examination of a witness as to credit, since it would be oppressive if a party was obliged to disclose any document which might provide material for cross-examination as to his credibility as a witness.  Interrogatories will be refused on the same ground."

In that regard she also relies, too, on the old case of Kennedy v. Dobson [1895] 1 Ch 334.  For my part I am perfectly prepared to adopt these authorities as representing the current position in Irish law."

1. However, my greater concern in relation to this application arises in the context of necessity.  It is clear that the Respondent has an ample alternative source of evidence concerning the ongoing relationship in the form of the surveillance reports and the observations of the private investigator retained by him over a long period of time.  To recite the dictum of Clarke J.:

"Where there are other equally effectual means of establishing the truth and thus providing for a fair trial then discovery may not be "necessary"."

1. I believe it appropriate also to have regard to the highly confidential nature of the documentation being sought, a factor in the necessity test also referenced by Clarke J..  Furthermore, it seems to me that the issue of proportionality is also engaged. Clarke J. stated:

"7.16. Having regard to the importance which discovery can play in at least some cases, it should, in my view, remain the case that the default position should be that a document whose relevance has been established should be considered to be one whose production is necessary. However, that remains only a default position and one which is capable of being displaced for a range of other reasons. If it can be demonstrated that compliance with the obligation to make the discovery sought would be particularly burdensome, then a court will have to weigh in the balance, in deciding whether discovery is truly 'necessary', a range of factors, including the extent of the burden which compliance will be likely to place on the party concerned, the extent to which it might reasonably be expected that any of the contested documentation whose discovery is sought will play a reasonably important role in the proper resolution of the proceedings and, importantly, the extent to which there may be other means of achieving the same end as that which is sought to be achieved by discovery but at a much reduced cost. While not relevant to this case, it might be said that the postponement of the requirement to disclose confidential documentation may also come into play. Likewise, there may be other situations which arise in the particular circumstances of an individual case which would allow a court to consider that disclosure was not truly 'necessary', in the more nuanced sense in which that term has now come to be understood." [2]

1. I do not conclude that the discovery being sought herein satisfies the test of necessity having regard to the burden it would impose, the confidential nature of the information and the proportionality of the request in the context of the matters at issue between the parties.  In so concluding, I have found the summary of principles set out by the Court of Appeal in BAM PPP PGGM Infrastructure Cooperatie UA v National Treasury Management Agency [2015] IECA 246 at paragraph 29 of the judgment most instructive:

"29. It may be convenient to summarise these principles as they are applicable to this case.

1. The primary test is whether the documents are relevant to the issues between the parties. Once that is established it will follow in most cases that their discovery is necessary for the fair disposal lose issues.

2. Relevance is determined by reference to the pleadings. O. 31, r. 12 specifies discovery of documents relating to any matter in question in the case

3. There is nothing in the Peruvian Guano test which is intended to qualify the principle that documents sought on discovery must be relevant, directly or indirectly, to the matter in issue between the parties on the proceedings.

4. An application for discovery must show it is reasonable for the court to suppose that the documents contain relevant information.

5. An applicant is not entitled to discovery based on speculation.

6. In certain circumstances a too wide ranging order for discovery may be an obstacle to the fair disposal of proceedings rather than the converse.

7. As Fennelly J. pointed out in Ryanair plc v. Aer Rianta cpt [2003] 4 IR 264, the crucial question is whether discovery is necessary for "disposing fairly of the cause or matter."

8. There must be some proportionality between the extent or volume of the documents to be discovered and the degree to which the documents are likely to advance the case of the applicant or damage the case of his or her opponent in addition to ensuring that no party is taken by surprise by the production of documents at trial.

9. Discovery could become oppressive and the court should not allow it to be used as a tactic in war between parties."

**

1. However, I must have regard to the general principles which operate in this area and the rationale behind discovery/disclosure rules applicable to litigation.  These principles were clearly enunciated by Clarke J. when he stated:

"7.1. There is no doubt that discovery can pose problems in at least certain types of cases. However, the starting point has to be to recognise the importance of discovery in our legal system.

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7.2. Cases in a common law jurisdiction are decided on evidence which is presented by the parties themselves and which can be tested for its veracity or reliability by cross examination or challenged by the presentation of competing evidence. For such a system to work well, it is necessary that parties have a reasonable opportunity to be in a position to present to the court any evidence which may bear on questions of fact which have the potentiality to influence the proper result of the case. Obviously, in many circumstances, a party may have access to much of the evidence which they would wish to present from within their own knowledge or resources. But there may be circumstances where a party does not have ready access to all material evidence without recourse to the various procedural measures which the Rules of Court permit. Discovery is clearly one such measure.

**

7.3. In addition, discovery can play an important role in ensuring that the case presented by an opponent is not inconsistent with the documentation which that opponent possesses but which is withheld from the court. Thus, from as far back as Peruvian Guano, discovery has been seen as playing a role in either strengthening the discovery seeking party's case or potentially damaging the opponent's case. I might add that, in my experience, discovery can also play a role in keeping parties honest, for it cannot be ruled out that some parties might succumb to the temptation to present a less than full picture of events to the court, were it not for the fact that they know that any attempt to do so may be significantly impaired if there is a documentary record which shows their account either to be inaccurate or materially incomplete. I consider that latter point to be of particular importance, for it provides a potential counterweight to the oft quoted argument that the vast majority of documents which are discovered do not find their way into the evidence presented to the court." [3]

1. A number of these objectives are engaged in the present instance and I will proceed to consider how they should be addressed in the context of disclosure in this instance.  It must be remembered that in the context of family law, the applicable rules make significant provision for mandatory disclosure, separate and distinct from any application for discovery (although such provisions in the family law/cohabitation rules are expressly without prejudice to the entitlement to seek discovery [4]).  This specific provision is in the context of requiring the swearing of Affidavits of Means and the vouching of such Affidavits upon request.

AFFIDAVITS OF MEANS

1. It cannot be gainsaid that the most important documents in financial relief cases are the Affidavits of Means of the protagonists.  Section 197 of the 2010 Act states:

"197.— (1) In proceedings under this Part, each of the qualified cohabitants shall give to the other the particulars of his or her property or income that may be reasonably required for the purposes of the proceedings.

(2) The court may direct a person who fails or refuses to comply with subsection (1) to comply with it.

(3) A qualified cohabitant who fails or refuses to comply with subsection (1) or a direction under subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding €254, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to both."

1. Order 70B, III of the Rules of the Superior Courts applies to cohabitation proceedings.  This provision requires the swearing of Affidavit of Means in such proceedings (rule 16(5)).  The form of such affidavit is appended to the Order.

2. "Family law proceedings" for the purposes of Order 70A of the Rules of the Superior Courts include proceedings under the 1976 Act (Order 70A, rule 1(1)(e)) and, in consequence, Order 70A, rule 6 (Affidavit of Means) applies.  Sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 6 require the filing of Affidavits of Means and specifies the format of them.

3. There is no substantial difference between the template forms for such affidavits provided in the Rules of the Superior Courts in the two instances referenced. Pertinent to the current application, it is stated in the forms appended to Order 70B that the Affidavit of Means should set out:

"2. I say that I have set out in the First Schedule all the assets, property and financial resources to which I am legally or beneficially entitled and the manner in which such assets, property and financial resources are held.

3. I say that I have set out in the Second Schedule all income which I receive, including any income or benefits to which I am entitled by or under statute, and the source(s) of such income, and details of my current employment and employment prospects."

1. In the template Affidavit of Means contained in the form appended to Order 70A, it is stated:

"2. I say that I have set out in the First Schedule hereto all the assets to which I am legally or beneficially entitled and the manner in which such property is held.

3. I say that I have set out in the Second Schedule hereto all income which I receive and the source(s) of such income."

1. It is worthy of comment that financial support received by the Applicant from AB is not such as she is legally or beneficially entitled to but rather would be by way of voluntary payment.  The legal definition of income has not been argued before me and I therefore make no determination in this regard but it does seem to me, consistent with the purpose of the Affidavit of Means, that income in this context cannot be limited to remuneration or earnings but requires the broader definition of money which comes in or to which the deponent has access.  Different income sources have different characteristics in terms of stability, enforceability and continuity and this must be part of the court's assessment in examining the evidence before it but such broader definition is consistent with the Affidavit of Means clearly evidencing the full financial picture.

2. These legislative templates clearly envisage that the Affidavit of Means is a snapshot in time, setting out the financial position of the parties as of the date of its swearing (although figures stated will be derived from financial information averaged over a period of time).  They are framed in the present tense.  All too often, the usefulness of these documents is undermined by the information therein being historical or aspirational. This results in the overall picture presented by the Affidavit being inaccurate and unhelpful, at times illogical and inconsistent.  The Affidavit of Means should present a current picture and provide a consistent analysis of the financial circumstances which pertain as of the date of its swearing.

3. Of course, different living standards, higher or lower, in the past may be relevant (and particularly so in the context of judicial separation and divorce proceedings where section 16 of the 1995 Act and section 20 of the 1996 Act specifically refer to previous standards of living enjoyed [5]).  Likewise, future forecasts of expenditure consisting of expected expenditure not currently being incurred or, sometimes, aspirational expenditure which it may be argued will be justified going forward, may likewise be relevant and useful to a court.  The Affidavit of Means may be adapted to great benefit to address these issues whether through the use of additional schedules or through designation of expenditure as past or future.  However, the legislative focus is clearly on the present and clarity in this respect should not be sacrificed to highlight standards of the past or the expectations of the future.

4. The Affidavits of Means of the parties in this case, regrettably, are far from exemplary.

5. The most recent Affidavit of the Applicant, sworn in January 2025, states a monthly income of €8,350.83 net, stated to be reducing to €4,064 in April 2025.  The expenses in the Fourth Schedule reference expenditure of €15,504.60.  There is simply no reconciliation between these entirely disparate figures.

6. The most recent Affidavit of the Respondent, while showing no such disparity, is replete with generalised figures which cross-examination has shown to be predictive rather than actual.

7. These shortcomings serve to diminish the value of each such document and to defeat the legislative intention.

CONCLUSION

1. At the conclusion of submissions, I was invited by Counsel for the Respondent to narrow the scope of the discovery sought if I considered it to be too extensive.  I do not find this a constructive approach in proceedings involving parties who have had emotional involvement and co-existence.  There is much emotionality in such proceedings and requesting vastly extensive disclosure such as was requested here serves only to increase the already considerable stress which litigation of this type invokes.  While I have no difficulty with discovery being sought which is somewhat broader than a court ultimately permits, there must be some correlation between the reliefs being sought, the proofs required in the proceedings and the breathe of discovery requested.  The breathe of discovery sought in the present instance goes far and away beyond what might be considered relevant or necessary.  Whether the Applicant is in another relationship or not is relevant in these proceedings only to a limited degree and the discovery sought ought to have reflected this to a greater degree.  It is unsatisfactory to seek vastly broad discovery and then to abdicate to the court the curtailment of it.  What is relevant in this instance is the extent to which the Applicant's financial resources are being enhanced by funds received from or payments made by AB relevant to the expenditure of the Applicant.  I therefore will order that the Applicant swear an up-to-date full Affidavit of Means which sets out benefits (in money, in kind or otherwise) which she has received from AB from 1 st May 2025 to 1 st March 2026.  If expenditure in the Fourth Schedule of such Affidavit or other expenditure which benefits the Applicant or her dependents has been discharged by AB, this should be specified.  The Respondent, upon receipt of such Affidavit of Means, may seek vouching thereof as the rules of court provide.  I will allow a period of seven days for the swearing of such Affidavit of Means.  I am of the view that this will address the issues of relevance in the within proceedings as provided for by statute.

2. I will list this matter for mention in relation to any issues arising when it is next before me for resumed hearing.

[1] The report of the private investigator is exhibited.  While the invasive nature of such observation cannot be doubted and is unfortunate and undesirable, I accept that such activities can sometimes be the only or the most expedient manner in which to gather necessary and relevant evidence.  However, when resort is being had to evidence gathering in this manner, consideration must be given to the extent and proportionality of such activities.  In this instance, the report (with photographs) indicates that observation occurred on divers dates between September 2025 and January 2026.  The Applicant avers that she is aware that she has been under such surveillance for a longer period, being since July 2025.  I simply comment that this is a very considerable period of intrusion.

[2] Tobin v. Minister for Defence [2020] 1 IR 211, par 7.16.

[3] Tobin v. Minister for Defence [2020] 1 IR 211, para 7.1 to 7.3.

[4] Order 70A, rule 6; Order 70B, rule 5

[5] Section 16(2)(c) of the Family Law Act, 1995 and section 20(2)(c) of the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996)

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