Henderson v. Burrows - Claims Dismissed, Relief Denied
Summary
The District Court for the District of Colorado has accepted a Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss claims and deny relief in the case of Henderson v. Burrows. The court noted that no objections were filed by the parties within the fourteen-day period following the service of the recommendation.
What changed
The District Court for the District of Colorado has issued an order accepting a Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss all claims and deny relief to the plaintiff in the case Maggie Mae Henderson v. Leah Burrows, et al. The court's decision was based on the absence of any objections filed by the parties within the stipulated fourteen-day period after the recommendation was served on February 25, 2026.
This ruling signifies the final disposition of the case at the district court level, with the plaintiff's claims being dismissed. Regulated entities or individuals involved in litigation should be aware of the importance of adhering to court-ordered deadlines for filing objections to magistrate judge recommendations to avoid adverse rulings. No further action is required by external parties based on this court order.
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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Maggie Mae Henderson v. Leah Burrows, Tom Werlich, Tamara Gold, Cheryl Maes, Vanessa Ornales, Susan Prieto, and John/Jane Doe #7-17
District Court, D. Colorado
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 1:24-cv-00123
Precedential Status: Unknown Status
Trial Court Document
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 24-cv-00123-PAB-MDB
MAGGIE MAE HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEAH BURROWS,
TOM WERLICH,
TAMARA GOLD,
CHERYL MAES,
VANESSA ORNALES,
SUSAN PRIETO, and
JOHN/JANE DOE #7-17,
Defendants.
ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on the Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 76]. The Recommendation states that objections to the
Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days after its service on the parties.
Docket No. 76 at 15-16; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The Recommendation was
served on February 25, 2026. No party has objected to the Recommendation.
In the absence of an objection, the district court may review a magistrate judge’s
recommendation under any standard it deems appropriate. See Summers v. Utah, 927
F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It
does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s
factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party
objects to those findings.”). In this matter, the Court has reviewed the Recommendation
to satisfy itself that there is “no clear error on the face of the record.”1 Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b), Advisory Committee Notes. Based on this review, the Court has concluded that
the Recommendation is a correct application of the facts and the law.
The Court adopts the recommendation’s summary of plaintiff’s claims, which no
party has objected to. See Docket No. 76 at 4-5. Plaintiff brings Claims One and Two,
alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of “equal protection”; Claim Four,
alleging defamation (via libel and slander) and intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and Claim Six, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 4. Claim
One is asserted against the Leigh Burrows, Tom Werlich, Tamara Gold, Cheryl Maes,
Vanessa Ornelas, and Susan Prieto (collectively, “the Moving Defendants”); Claim Two
is asserted against the Moving Defendants, except for Ms. Prieto; Claim Four is
asserted against the Moving Defendants, except for Mr. Werlich; and Claim Six is
asserted against Mr. Werlich, Ms. Gold, Ms. Ornales, and “John/Jane Doe Defendants.”
See id. at 4 n.4-6. Plaintiff’s claims are asserted against the Moving Defendants in their
individual and official capacities. See Docket No. 39 at 2-5.
A. Claims One, Two, and Six – Retaliation and Equal Protection Claims
The Court agrees that the portions of Claims One and Two that assert retaliation
claims against Ms. Burrows, Mr. Werlich, Ms. Gold, and Ms. Prieto should be dismissed
1 This standard of review is something less than a “clearly erroneous” or “contrary
to law” standard of review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which in turn is less than a de novo
review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
2
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).2 See Docket No. 76 at 10-13. “A
dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile.” Brereton v. Bountiful City
Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006). Although the Court finds that plaintiff fails
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court does not find, and defendants do not
argue, that amendment would be futile. Thus, the Court will dismiss the retaliation
claims against Ms. Burrows, Mr. Werlich, Ms. Gold, and Ms. Prieto without prejudice.
Turning to the portions of Claim One and Two that assert equal protection claims,
the Court agrees that plaintiff fails to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) against the
Moving Defendants. See Docket No. 76 at 13-14. Thus, the Court will dismiss the
equal protection claims without prejudice, for the reasons discussed previously. The
Court also agrees that Claim Six, which is an equal protection challenge to Honor
House Program Rules, is appropriately dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). See id. at 14.
B. Claim Four – State Law Claims
The Court agrees that Claim Four should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See id. at 9-10. As noted by the magistrate judge, under the Colorado
Government Immunity Action (“CGIA”), Colorado “public employees” are immune from
liability in tort actions that “arise[] out of an act or omission of such employee occurring
during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment unless the
act or omission causing injury was willful and wanton.” See id. at 9 (quoting Colo. Rev.
2 The Moving Defendants do not seek dismissal of the retaliation claims against
Ms. Maes and Ms. Ornelas. Docket No. 67 at 17 n.6-7.
3
Stat. § 24-10-118(2)(a)). Because plaintiff’s allegations do not show willful or wanton
conduct, the Court will dismiss Claim Four without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
C. Plaintiff’s Requests for Relief
The Court agrees with the recommendation that plaintiff’s request for injunctive
relief and compensatory and hedonic damages must be dismissed. See id. at 7-9.
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief that seeks reform of various Honor House Program
policies is moot in light of plaintiff’s release on parole. See id. at 8. Plaintiff’s request
for compensatory and hedonic damages is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
because plaintiff does not allege physical injuries resulting from defendants’ alleged
conduct. See id. at 9. Thus, the Court will deny these requests for relief.
D. Qualified Immunity
The Moving Defendants ask that all individual-capacity claims asserted against
Ms. Prieto, Ms. Gold, Mr. Werlich, and Ms. Burrows be dismissed on the basis of
qualified immunity. Docket No. 67 at 22. They ask that Claims Four, Five, and Six
against the Moving Defendants in their individual capacities be dismissed on the basis
of qualified immunity. Id.3 Because the complaint fails to allege a constitutional
violation on these claims, the Court will dismiss with prejudice these claims on the basis
of qualified immunity. See Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 2010)
(instructing the district court to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified
3 The Court will not consider Moving Defendants’ request that individual-capacity
claims asserted under Claim Five be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity
because Claim Five is only asserted against the Jane/John Doe Defendants. See
Docket No. 39 at 11.
4
immunity “with prejudice”); McCrary v. Jones, 2015 WL 873641, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Feb.
27, 2015) (dismissing claim with prejudice where defendant was entitled to qualified
immunity).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [Docket
No. 76] is ACCEPTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) [Docket No. 67] is GRANTED. It is
further
ORDERED that the portions of Claim One and Two that assert retaliation claims
are DISMISSED without prejudice to the extent it is brought against Ms. Burrows, Mr.
Werlich, Ms. Gold, and Ms. Prieto. It is further
ORDERED that the portions of Claim One and Two that assert equal protection
claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Claim Four is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. It is further
ORDERED that Claim Six is DISMISSED without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief and compensatory and
hedonic damages is denied. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Prieto, Ms. Gold, Mr. Werlich, and
Ms. Burrows in their individual capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
5
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ claims against the Moving Defendants in their
individual capacities under Claims Four and Six are DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED March 17, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
oa eS
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
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