Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Harrius Johnson v. Miami-Dade County

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-12676

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (26.8K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 1 of 18

FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

---

No. 24-12676
Non-Argument Calendar

---

HARRIUS JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-21658-KMW

---

Before JORDAN, KIDD, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
Harrius Johnson, an African American male police officer,
was disciplined and eventually terminated by the Miami-Dade
County Police Department (“MDPD”). He sued Miami-Dade
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 2 of 18

2 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

County (“the County”), claiming that the real reasons for his disci-
pline and termination were racial discrimination and retaliation.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
County, and Johnson appealed to this Court. We reviewed his ap-
peal and remanded to the District Court to reconsider Johnson’s
argument in light of our decision in Lewis v. City of Union City, 918
F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). The District Court ap-
plied Lewis and affirmed its original grant of summary judgment
for the County. Johnson now appeals that decision. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter comes before us a second time after a remand
to the District Court. Since we have already set out the factual back-
ground underlying this appeal, we do not reproduce it here. See
Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1323–25 (11th Cir. 2020).
Instead, we offer a summary of the procedural history of this case.
In July of 2016, Johnson, represented by counsel, filed an
Amended Complaint against the County alleging, among other
things, discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and
the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”).1 After discovery,
Johnson and the County filed cross motions for summary judg-
ment. The District Court granted the County’s motion and denied
Johnson’s. It analyzed both the discrimination and retaliation
claims under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

1 Johnson also alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The

FLSA claims were resolved prior to the initial grant of summary judgment.
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 3 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 3

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973), noting that the same analysis
applies for § 1983, Title VII, and FCRA claims. 2
In granting summary judgment to the County, the District
Court began by assuming that Johnson could make the requisite
prima facie cases. It then listed the County’s proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for Johnson’s termination. According to
the County, Johnson was “terminated because of his disrespectful,
insubordinate, unprofessional, discourteous, and unbecoming con-
duct towards co-workers and superiors, coupled with his discipli-
nary history.” See Doc. 98 at 11. The Court reasoned that because
the County proffered legitimate reasons for its actions, the viability
of Johnson’s discrimination and retaliation claims depended on
whether he could raise a genuine dispute of material fact that the
County’s proffered reasons were pretextual.

2 We affirmed that conclusion in the original appeal:

[W]hen, as here, a plaintiff attempts to use Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as parallel remedies for the same allegedly un-
lawful employment discrimination, the elements of the two
causes of action are identical, Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490,
1508 (11th Cir. 1995), and identical methods of proof, such as
the McDonnell Douglas framework, are used for both causes of
action, Richardson, 71 F.3d at 805. And because the FCRA is
based on Title VII, decisions construing Title VII apply to the
analysis of FCRA claims. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139
F.3d 1385, 1387, 1389–90 (11th Cir. 1998). Therefore, all of
Johnson's claims are governed by the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work.
Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325.
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 4 of 18

4 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

Johnson made two arguments to establish pretext. First, he
argued that he was treated worse than similarly situated, non-Afri-
can American employees. Second, he argued that his complaints of
discrimination were not seriously investigated. But, the District
Court found that Johnson failed to show pretext because neither
argument was supported by the record. Thus, the Court concluded
that “even if [it] accept[ed] that [Johnson] ha[d] satisfied the first
step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, summary judgment in
favor of [the County was] still appropriate” because “[Johnson]
ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the City’s proffered non-discrimi-
natory reasons for [his] suspension and termination were pre-
textual.” Doc. 98 at 11.
Johnson, still represented by counsel, appealed to this Court,
arguing that he had presented sufficient evidence of pretext to sat-
isfy McDonnell Douglas and that he had presented a convincing mo-
saic from which a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimi-
nation and retaliation.
After full briefing and oral argument, this Court rendered its
decision affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding for re-
consideration by the District Court. Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1330. Spe-
cifically, we agreed with the District Court that Johnson failed to
provide evidence of pretext for retaliation based on MDPD’s re-
fusal to investigate his complaints. Therefore, we concluded that
Johnson’s only viable pretext argument rested with his comparator
evidence. Id at 1327–29. However, in the time between the District
Court’s summary judgment decision and Johnson’s first appeal, our
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 5 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 5

Court clarified the standard for evaluating whether a plaintiff’s pro-
posed comparators satisfy the “similarly situated” element of the
prima facie case for discrimination. See Lewis v. City of Union City,
918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc).3 We remanded to the Dis-
trict Court to reconsider Johnson’s comparator evidence in light of
the new standard. Id. at 1326.
On remand, the District Court considered supplemental
briefing on the comparator issue and individually evaluated each
of Johnson’s proposed comparators under the Lewis standard. It ul-
timately concluded that “even under the clarified standard set forth
in Lewis, Mr. Johnson still cannot establish that the County’s prof-
fered reasons for taking various adverse actions against him were
mere pretext for unlawful discrimination and retaliation.” Doc. 126
at 4. It therefore affirmed its original grant of summary judgment
in favor of the County. Johnson, who is now proceeding pro se,
filed this timely appeal. 4

3 In Lewis, 913 F.3d at 1224, we clarified that employment discrimination plain-

tiffs need not show that their comparators are “nearly identical” or the “same
or similar” to them. Rather, they need only show that their comparators are
“similarly situated in all material respects.” Id.
4 Shortly after the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on remand,

Johnson’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel, citing “irreconcilable dif-
ferences” and noting that Johnson did not object to his withdrawal. The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion.
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 6 of 18

6 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

II. DISCUSSION
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Anthony v. Georgia, 69 F.4th 796, 804 (11th Cir. 2023). Sum-
mary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genu-
ine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Qui v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016).
All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party, but a “mere scintilla of evidence . . . will not suffice to over-
come a motion for summary judgment.” Young v. City of Palm Bay,
358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).
After the District Court granted summary judgment the sec-
ond time, we issued our decision in Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th
752, 755 (11th Cir. 2025). There, we clarified that a § 1983 or Title
VII plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate pretext does not automatically
entitle the defendant to summary judgment. See id. at 761–63. It
appears that the District Court erroneously believed that Johnson’s
failure to evince pretext doomed his discrimination and retaliation
claims. Though the Court’s analysis was incomplete, the County is
entitled to summary judgment nonetheless. Since we review the
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 7 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 7

District Court’s decision de novo, we now model the analysis as our
circuit has come to understand it.

A. Discrimination
We begin with Johnson’s discrimination claim. Because
Johnson does not argue that there is direct evidence of discrimina-
tion, we proceed to analyze his claim under the McDonnell Douglas
framework.5
The first step under that framework is to consider whether
the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for discrimination. See
Ismael, 161 F.4th at 764. The term “prima facie case” can be mis-
leading in this context because it is not a “substantive standard of
liability.” See Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 944–45 (11th
Cir. 2023). Rather, the plaintiff’s establishment of the prima facie
case under McDonnell Douglas entitles her to a “legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption” of illicit intent. Id. at 945 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). But the failure to make the prima

5 “Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of discrim-

inatory intent without inference or presumption.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc.,
891 F.3d 911, 921 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and brackets omit-
ted). We have held that “[w]hen a plaintiff proves a case of discrimination by
direct evidence, application of McDonnell Douglas is inappropriate, and the dis-
trict court may not grant summary judgment . . . even where the movant pre-
sents conflicting evidence[.]” Id. at 922 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 8 of 18

8 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

facie case does not automatically entitle the defendant to summary
judgment. See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 765.
A plaintiff establishes the prima facie case “by showing (1)
that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was subjected to
an adverse employment action, (3) that she was qualified to per-
form the job in question, and (4) that her employer treated ‘simi-
larly situated’ employees outside her class more favorably.” Lewis,
918 F.3d at 1220–21.
If the plaintiff fails to make the prima facie case, then she
“must produce enough evidence, on her own and without any
helpful evidentiary burdens or presumptions, to demonstrate” that
a reasonable jury could conclude that she was subjected to adverse
employment action because of her race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. Ismael, 161 F.4th at 765. Accord Smith v. Lockheed-Mar-
tin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he plaintiff’s fail-
ure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom [her] case.
. . . [T]he plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if [s]he
presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue con-
cerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.”).
But if the plaintiff succeeds in making the prima facie case,
then she is entitled to “a rebuttable presumption of illicit intent,”
Ismael, 161 F.4th at 764, and the court proceeds to the second step
of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
In the second step, the court considers whether the defend-
ant has produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the adverse action. Id. at 759. Because the plaintiff’s estab-
lishment of the prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 9 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 9

of illicit intent, the defendant’s failure to rebut that presumption
with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse em-
ployment action would entitle the plaintiff to summary judgment
on liability. Id. at 764. If, on the other hand, the defendant produces
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action, the presumption of illicit intent is rebutted, and the court
must proceed to the third step.
Next, the court must determine “whether ‘the record,
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convinc-
ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to
infer intentional discrimination [or retaliation] by the deci-
sionmaker.’” Id. (quoting Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328). While evidence
that the defendant’s explanation is pretextual may be sufficient to
survive summary judgment, it is not necessary. Id. (“A showing of
pretext (or lack thereof ) would certainly be relevant. But a plain-
tiff’s inability to disprove the defendant’s rationale cannot be the
sole grounds for summary judgment.”).
We begin our analysis of Johnson’s discrimination claims by
asking whether he established the prima facie case. Since Johnson’s
failure to establish any of the four elements dooms his prima facie
case, we begin with the fourth element, which requires Johnson to
show that MDPD treated “similarly situated” employees outside
Johnson’s class more favorably than him––we call this the compar-
ator analysis. Proposed comparators are “similarly situated” within
the meaning of this framework if they are “similarly situated in all
material respects.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1229. Although there is no
bright-line rule for what constitutes a valid comparator, Lewis tells
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 10 of 18

10 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

us that a valid comparator is ordinarily someone who: (1) has en-
gaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff, (2)
is subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the
plaintiff, (3) is under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the
plaintiff, and (4) shares the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary
history. Id. at 1227–28. This is not a checklist that a valid compara-
tor must satisfy, but rather, a helpful guideline for answering the
ultimate question: Are the plaintiff and her comparators similar
enough that they “cannot reasonably be distinguished”? Id. at 1228
(quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 209, 135 S. Ct.
1338, 1343 (2015)).
Johnson proposed ten individuals as potential comparators.6
The District Court individually analyzed each comparator under
the Lewis standard and found that “the record does not support a
finding that any of Mr. Johnson’s proposed comparators were sim-
ilarly situated in all material respects” because “the proposed com-

6 Johnson cites his own declaration in support of his motion for summary judg-

ment as the factual basis for the alleged similarities with these individuals. The
District Court noted, and we agree, that many of the statements in Johnson’s
declaration would not clear the Rule 56(c)(4) requirement that a “declaration
used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set
out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
However, we also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that even taking
the declaration as true, Johnson cannot show that any of his comparators are
similarly situated in all material respects.
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 11 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 11

parators did not engage in the same basic misconduct as Mr. John-
son and/or did not share the same disciplinary history as Mr. John-
son.” Doc. 126 at 10–11.
We agree. Johnson was terminated after being subject to five
disciplinary actions in two and a half years, resulting in one Record
of Counseling (“ROC”) and four Disciplinary Action Reports
(“DARs”). The conduct that led to Johnson’s termination involved
violating MDPD’s rules for maintaining an accurate home address,
insubordination, disrespect, unprofessionalism, and conduct unbe-
coming a county employee.
Based on Johnson’s own declaration, five of his comparators
have no ROCs or DARs. Of the other five, the comparator with the
most disciplinary actions on his record has one ROC and two
DARs. However, that comparator’s misconduct involved falsifying
time records, deactivating his GPS device during shifts, and submit-
ting late reports. There is nothing in Johnson’s declaration that in-
dicates any of his ten comparators engaged in insubordination or
disrespect for the chain of command. While some of the compar-
ators appear to have engaged in unprofessionalism and conduct un-
becoming a county employee, none shared Johnson’s extensive dis-
ciplinary history.
Johnson’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He em-
phasizes that he and his comparators are sufficiently similar be-
cause, for example, they were governed by the same rules and pro-
cedures and they shared the same director. But at the prima-facie
step, the fact that there are some similarities between the plaintiff
and the comparator is not enough. They must be similarly situated
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 12 of 18

12 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

“in all material respects.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1224. Here, the com-
parators are not so situated because they had materially different
disciplinary records from Johnson’s.
We conclude that Johnson was unable to point to a compar-
ator with whom he was similarly situated in all material respects.
Therefore, Johnson cannot make a prima facie case for discrimina-
tion. The result of that failure is that Johnson does not enjoy the
benefit of a presumption of intentional discrimination. See Ismael,
161 F.4th at 765. Instead, he must demonstrate a material issue of
triable fact by constructing “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination
by the decisionmaker.” Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328.
As the mosaic analogy implies, circumstantial evidence of
discrimination comes in many forms––each image of discrimina-
tion is composed of irregular tiles, unique in size, shape, and color.
To provide some guidance to District Courts,
we have identified three nonexclusive categories of
circumstantial evidence that can raise a reasonable in-
ference of unlawful conduct: evidence of suspicious
timing, ambiguous statements, or other information
from which unlawful intent may be inferred; evi-
dence of systematically better treatment of similarly
situated employees; or evidence that the employer’s
justification for its action is pretextual.
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2023).
Johnson states that his evidence supporting an inference of
discrimination includes “internal affairs reports, deposition testi-
monies, and comparator evidence.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. But, upon
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 13 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 13

review of his brief, it is clear that Johnson’s discrimination claim
rests squarely on his argument that similarly situated employees
systematically received better treatment than him.
Here, we highlight a subtle yet crucial point. The require-
ment that comparators be “similarly situated in all material re-
spects,” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218, only applies at step one of the
McDonnell Douglas framework—when the plaintiff is attempting to
establish a presumption of illicit intent. See id. at 1221–24 (holding
that the qualitative assessment of comparator evidence must be
conducted at the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work). After the plaintiff has failed to establish the presumption, or
the defendant has successfully rebutted the presumption, the sole
question is whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, would allow a jury to infer discriminatory or retali-
atory intent. To answer that question, a district court should con-
sider the record as a whole, including all evidence of disparate
treatment, even if there are material differences between the plain-
tiff and the comparators. At this stage in the analysis, the extent of
the material differences only influences “how much weight the
comparator evidence should be given.” See Tynes, 88 F.4th at 947.
The failure to meet the Lewis standard does not render comparator
evidence irrelevant to the ultimate summary judgment inquiry. See
id. (“[I]t is possible that [plaintiff’s] comparators were insufficient
to establish a prima facie case yet still relevant to the ultimate ques-
tion of intentional discrimination.”).
Thus, our conclusion that Johnson’s comparators do not
meet the Lewis standard at step one does not foreclose his argument
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 14 of 18

14 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

that his comparators contribute to a convincing mosaic of discrim-
ination. However, Johnson’s convincing mosaic argument fails be-
cause his comparators are the only evidence of discrimination he
points to. In this case, Johnson’s distinguishable comparators,
standing alone, do not raise a reasonable inference of unlawful con-
duct. Thus, Johnson has not presented evidence that would allow a
jury to infer intentional discrimination, and summary judgment for
the County is appropriate.

B. Retaliation
Next, we turn to Johnson’s retaliation claims. The burden-
shifting framework for summary judgment on a retaliation claim
is the same as for a discrimination claim, with the caveat that the
prima facie case for retaliation is different than that for discrimina-
tion. To make a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must
show “[(1)] that she engaged in a protected activity, like filing a
complaint for discrimination; [(2)] that she suffered a material ad-
verse action; and [(3)] that there was a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ismael, 161 F.4th at
759.
For the sake of brevity, we assume Johnson has made a
prima facie case for retaliation on at least one set of allegations.
Based on that assumption, we presume retaliatory intent and con-
sider whether the County rebutted that presumption. Given John-
son’s disciplinary history, the County has provided a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for his suspensions and termination.
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 15 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 15

So, because the County has rebutted the presumption of re-
taliatory intent, Johnson’s only chance to prevail on his retaliation
claim is to either cast doubt on the County’s legitimate, nonretali-
atory reason, or otherwise present a record of evidence from
which a reasonable jury could infer a retaliatory motive. To that
end, Johnson points to evidence falling into two general categories:
suspicious timing and inconsistent explanations for adverse actions
by the County.
First, Johnson argues that his “protected activities, including
filing multiple EEOC complaints . . . directly triggered a series of
adverse employment actions culminating in his termination.” Ap-
pellant’s Br. at 58. The record shows that the shortest gap between
any EEOC complaints and disciplinary actions was about two
months.
This evidence, standing alone, fails to support a reasonable
inference of retaliatory intent because two months between an
EEOC complaint and discipline is too long to call the County’s ex-
planations for the discipline into question. See Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s
Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (reasoning
that a less than two-week gap between the protected activity and
adverse employment action was “probably insufficient to establish
pretext by itself ”).
Johnson also asserts that “there is no factual basis” for the
DARs issued by Captain White, and “a reasonable jury could infer
that the reason White falsified the disciplinary report[s] against
[him] was retaliation for the EEOC complaints.” Appellant’s Br. at
25. But Johnson points to no evidence from which a jury could infer
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 16 of 18

16 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

that the DARs were falsified. He argues that MDPD procedures re-
quire a complete investigation, which did not occur, and White’s
allegations were uncorroborated because MDPD failed to inter-
view two Lieutenants. But even if those assertions are true, they do
not suggest that the DARs were falsified. In this lawsuit, the burden
is on Johnson to come forward with evidence—not speculation or
conjecture—from which a jury could conclude that the County re-
taliated against him for engaging in protected activity. He has not
identified any such evidence.
Next, Johnson points to “inconsistencies in the [County’s]
explanations for the adverse actions taken against [him]” as evi-
dence of MDPD’s retaliatory motives. Appellant’s Br. at 59. His ar-
gument goes as follows. The two DARs issued by White were the
last two Johnson received before his termination. In deciding to ter-
minate Johnson in 2016, Director Patterson considered the DARs
issued by White and Johnson’s prior disciplinary record. But Patter-
son testified in a deposition that “as of . . . March 8, 2019,” he did
not trust White, who was later terminated himself. Doc. 143-1 at
11. To Johnson, this shows that Patterson “knowingly relied on
false testimony from Captain White.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. That,
too, is unsupported conjecture. A reasonable jury could not infer
from the fact that Patterson did not trust White in 2019 that he
knew White falsified a report in 2016. And to reiterate, there is no
evidence that White falsified anything.
Considered cumulatively and in a favorable light, Johnson’s
shards of evidence do not come together to produce an image of
retaliation. Thus, he has failed to raise a genuine issue as to the fact
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 17 of 18

24-12676 Opinion of the Court 17

of illicit intent, and summary judgment in favor of the County is
appropriate.

C. Other Claims on Appeal
Finally, in this appeal Johnson argues that the District Court
“erred in its evidentiary rulings, . . . and denied [his] due process
rights by limiting discovery and denying reconsideration.” Appel-
lant’s Br. at 17. Johnson had the opportunity to challenge the Dis-
trict Court’s evidentiary and discovery decisions in his first appeal.
Thus, any challenges Johnson now raises regarding the District
Court’s discovery and evidentiary orders have either already been
decided or waived as a consequence of the law-of-the-case doctrine.
See United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The
law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of issues that were de-
cided, either explicitly or by necessary implication, in an earlier ap-
peal of the same case.”); United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d
1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] legal decision made at one stage of
the litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the op-
portunity existed, becomes the law of the case for future stages of
the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have waived the
right to challenge that decision at a later time.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). We will not review the District Court’s pre-re-
mand decisions, which we have already reviewed, or which John-
son now challenges for the first time.
USCA11 Case: 24-12676 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 18 of 18

18 Opinion of the Court 24-12676

III. CONCLUSION
Given the foregoing analysis, we affirm the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. 7

AFFIRMED.

7 Johnson’s Emergency Motion to Supplement the Record, Emergency Mo-

tion for Reinstatement and Resumption of Duty, Motion for Sanctions and
Criminal Referral, Motion to Vacate Prior and Present Judgments, and Motion
to Take Judicial Notice are denied.