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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Greenville Ranch v. Bristol Retail XV CA4/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: G064903

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (858)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/18/26 Greenville Ranch v. Bristol Retail XV CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

GREENVILLE RANCH, LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, G064903

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01381038)
BRISTOL RETAIL XV, LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Layne H. Melzer, Judge. Affirmed.
Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Edward F. Quigley and Cathy T. Moses
for Defendant and Appellant.
Bolstad Law Group and David C. Bolstad, for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
Defendant Bristol Retail XV, LLC appeals from an order
confirming an arbitration award that determined the fair market value of a
retail shopping center. Bristol contends the trial court wrongly deemed the
award final and denied its request to vacate the award. We hold the award
was final despite Bristol’s ongoing correction requests. We affirm.
FACTS
Bristol rents the land underlying a Santa Ana retail shopping
center from plaintiffs Greenville Ranch, LLC and co-owners (the landlord).
Their lease required an adjustment of rent in 2021 to account for any change
in the land’s fair market value. Calculating the adjustment required three
appraisals of the value, followed by averaging the two closest values. The
landlord’s and Bristol’s chosen appraisers valued the land at $37.8 million
and $22.7 million.
The landlord and Bristol selected Adam Bogorad of CBRE as the
third appraiser, who issued a September 30, 2023 report valuing the land at
$40.9 million. Bogorad e-mailed his report to the parties’ appraisers, stating:
“I have completed my appraisal report and you can find it attached. . . .” His
report stated: “CBRE, Inc. has prepared an appraisal” that “sets forth our
opinion of [the] fair market value of the subject land to assist in the rent re-
setting process.” The report’s analysis opened with “the market value of the
subject is concluded as follows,” and then walked the appraisers through
Bogorad’s “final value conclusion.” Bogorad’s delivery of his report concluded:
“I appreciate the opportunity to have been able to participate in this process
and work with both of you.”
The report contained a section titled “Assumptions and Limiting
Conditions,” noting that CBRE relied on the accuracy of the parties’
submissions. Paragraph 4 stated: “CBRE has assumed that all documents,

2
data and information furnished by or behalf of the client, property owner, or
owner’s representative are accurate and correct . . . .” It listed examples of the
party-supplied “data and information” upon which CBRE relied: “numerical
street addresses, lot and block numbers, Assessor’s Parcel Numbers, land
dimensions, square footage area of the land, dimensions of the improvements,
gross building areas, net rentable areas, usable areas, unit count, room count,
rent schedules, income data, historical operating expenses, budgets, and
related data.”
After explaining that “[a]ny error in any of the above could have a
substantial impact on the Report,” paragraph 4 created a 30-day window for
the parties to notify CBRE of any mistakes in their submissions. It provided:
“Accordingly, if any such errors are subsequently made known to CBRE,
CBRE reserves the right to amend the Report . . . . The client and intended
user should carefully review all assumptions, data, relevant calculations, and
conclusions of the Report and should immediately notify CBRE of any
questions or errors within 30 days after . . . delivery of the Report.”
Eleven days after Bogorad issued his report, Bristol’s appraiser
sent Bogorad a letter claiming he had made 34 errors in his analysis,
including using “misleading and inappropriate” comparable property sales,
failing to analyze the “critical concept” of “‘Growth Patterns’” for the “‘subject
submarket,’” and using 2023 demographic data “with no discussion of
how/why it is relevant for a 2021 date of value.” Thirty-one of the 34
criticisms leveled by Bristol’s appraiser focused on the methodology Bogorad
used in arriving at his appraisal; only three pointed out inaccuracy in the

3
“data and information” about the property that the parties had furnished the
appraiser.1
Bogorad did not amend his report in any way before the 30-day
notification window closed on October 30, 2023. Almost three weeks after the
notification window closed, the landlord’s appraiser e-mailed Bogorad on
November 19, 2023 to agree that he could “revisit . . . and make any
revisions” to his report. Bristol then filed a declaratory relief action in
December seeking a declaration that Bogorad should “review . . . [m]aterials
and additional information,” “perform a residual analysis and use that
analysis,” and “revise the Appraisal Report . . . if he determines such
revisions are appropriate.” The landlord responded by “rescind[ing]” and
“object[ing] to any revisit of, or redo to, [Bogorad’s] appraisal.”
Notwithstanding the landlord’s written objection to revising the
appraisal at this late date, Bogorad wrote to the parties on December 21,
2023: “In response to the correspondence I have received from both the
landlord’s and tenant’s representatives, I will review the information
provided . . . and, if necessary, revise the appraisal. I expect to report back to
you mid-January.”
One week later, Bristol’s appraiser advised Bogorad that “both
Landlord and [Bristol] are in agreement that you should not be doing any
further work on the preliminary CBRE Appraisal until the Court provides
further guidance.”

1
Complaints 13 and 19 both claimed the “site is noted as 631,105
SF, however, the subject is valued based on a size of 629,743 SF.” Complaint
23 claimed that “Tax and Assessment Data” for the subject land incorrectly
presented “market value[s]” as “assessed values.”

4
The landlord filed a petition on February 20, 2024 to confirm
Bogorad’s appraisal report as an arbitration award. Bristol filed its response
on April 2, 2024, contending: (1) the report was not a final arbitration award;
(2) the pendency of Bristol’s declaratory relief action prohibited confirming
the report as a final award; and (3) that even if deemed final, the report
should be vacated because Bogorad “exceeded his contractual authority,”
“failed to review . . . [m]aterials and other information provided,” and “failed
to provide disclosures” by Bogorad’s colleague who also signed his report.
The trial court granted the landlord’s petition. The court noted
the parties agreed the appraisal constituted an arbitration ruling (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1280, subds. (a) & (b))2 and ruled that Bogorad’s report was a final
award. The court found that the report “complied fully with the ground
lease,” “left nothing more to be determined” and was “replete with language
indicating it [wa]s ‘final’. . . .” The court interpreted the report’s
“Assumptions and Limiting Conditions” section as indicating a “mere
possibility of later ‘correction.’”
The court invoked the statutory “‘rule against changes in the
award’” of an arbitrator beyond 30 days. (Cooper v. Lavely & Singer
Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 13–14 (Cooper); § 1284.) It found
Bristol’s response seeking to vacate the award was filed beyond the 100-day
deadline for seeking vacatur. (See § 1288.2; see also Law Finance Group, LLC
v. Key (2023) 14 Cal.5th 932, 946 (Law Finance Group).)
DISCUSSION
The parties dispute whether the appraisal became a final award.
As they do not dispute that the appraisal was an arbitration, we agree with

2
All statutory references are to this code.

5
the trial court that the appraisal was governed by the statutes that define
and constrain an arbitrator’s ability and deadline for correcting an award.
(See §§ 1283.4 & 1284.)
Finality is the foremost objective of arbitration. “‘[T]he
fundamental purpose . . . is to finally resolve all of the issues submitted by
the parties as expeditiously as possible.’” (Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th
350, 364 (Heimlich).) “Because the decision to arbitrate grievances evinces
the parties’ intent to bypass the judicial system and thus avoid potential
delays . . .” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10), “‘arbitral
finality is a core component of the parties’ agreement to submit to
arbitration’” (Valencia v. Mendoza (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 427, 440
(Valencia)).
To be final, an arbitration award need only “be in writing,”
“signed,” and “include a determination of all the questions submitted to the
arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the
controversy.” (§ 1283.4.) The signed writing must “‘(1) “determine[ ] all issues
that are necessary to the resolution” of “‘the controversy’” being subjected to
arbitration, and (2) leave[ ] unresolved only those “issues” that are
“potential,” “conditional” or that otherwise “could not have been determined”
at the time of that ruling.’” (Taska v. RealReal, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1,
11.)
Bogorad’s appraisal report is final on its face. It is in writing. It is
signed. It determined the single issue necessary to resolve the parties’ rent
adjustment controversy: the fair market value of the rented land. The report
did not identify any remaining work. After he “[r]espectfully submitted” it to

6
the parties, there was nothing left for Bogorad to do—he had “completed” his
appraisal.3
Bristol concedes the report was in writing, signed, and
determined the fair market value. Bristol contends, however, that Bogorad’s
report was not final because of the possibility he could correct it. They rely on
paragraph 4’s “Assumptions and Limiting Conditions” providing the 30-day
window to notify CBRE of “any questions or errors.” (Cleaned up.) Bristol also
notes Bogorad agreed on December 21, 2023, to “review the information
provided” before his report “and, if necessary, revise [his] appraisal,”
“expect[ing] to report back . . . mid-January.” (Cleaned up.)
By statute, as the trial court correctly noted, there is a 30-day
window for an arbitrator to correct errors in a final award. A party’s request
to correct a final award “shall be made not later than 10 days after service of
a signed copy of the award on the applicant.” (§ 1284.) The arbitrator may
correct the award “not later than 30 days after service of a copy of the signed
award on the applicant.” (Ibid.)
“[A]fter that period, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
award to confirm, correct, or vacate it.” (Cooper, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 18.) “‘The issuance of an “award”’ meeting the requirements of section
1283.4 ‘is what passes the torch of jurisdiction from the arbitrator to the trial
court.’” (Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 594, 606
(Ortiz).) Any “leeway granted to the parties and their arbitrator” in
structuring their arbitration “does not relieve a trial court from its duty to
assess for itself whether the ruling of the arbitrator at issue meets the

3
The lease called for averaging the two closest appraisals “[u]pon
submission of the appraisals by the appraisers . . . .” Bogorad tracks this
lease language by stating his report is “[r]espectfully submitted.”

7
statutory definition of an ‘award.’” (Lonky v. Patel (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 831,
844.)
Here, the statutory 30-day correction window closed on October
30, 2023. Bogorad made no corrections before that date. After that date, he
lost jurisdiction to make corrections. (Cooper, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 18.) Instead, “‘the torch of jurisdiction’” passed to the trial court. (Ortiz,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 606.)
While Bristol reasonably asserts an arbitrator should retain some
inherent authority over the arbitration procedure,4 we see three reasons why
paragraph 4’s 30-day notification window did not expand Bogorad’s time to
make corrections.
First, the 30-day notification window was much more limited in
scope than Bristol suggests. By its terms, paragraph 4 of Bogorad’s report
applies only to corrections to errors in the basic “data and information” that
the parties had provided to the arbitrator, including such things as
“numerical street addresses, lot and block numbers,” “dimensions,” and “rent
schedules.” But Bristol’s complaints about Bogorad’s appraisal focused
overwhelmingly on various aspects of the methodology Bogorad had used in
preparing his analysis. Paragraph 4 therefore is almost entirely inapplicable
to Bristol’s complaints about the accuracy of Bogorad’s appraisal.5

4
There is no evidence the parties agreed in advance to paragraph
4’s notification provision. It is not included in the lease or Bogorad’s retention
agreement. Landlord’s counsel represented at oral argument that the parties
saw it for the first time when the report was issued.

5
Bristol has not shown how an alleged inaccuracy of 1,362 in a
600,000+ square foot property or a single errant word in an 85-page report
merits a revised valuation in any event.

8
Second, neither paragraph 4 nor Bogorad’s report set any
procedure for actually making any corrections. They did not say the award
was tentative and open for further discussion.6 They did not set a briefing
schedule, hearing date, or correction deadline. Once the statutory correction
date passed on October 30, 2023 without any word from Bogorad on Bristol’s
request, the parties had no reason to doubt the award was final. We are not
aware of any legal basis—and the parties cite to none—that would have given
Bogorad authority to later re-open the window in December 2023. And even if
he could do that, he closed it again by “mid-January” 2024. Greenville was
thus free to petition to confirm the award in February 2024—if not much
sooner.
Finally, the fundamental problem with Bristol’s position is that it
allows for the arbitration award to never be final. The “Assumptions and
Limiting Conditions” do not obligate Bogorad to make corrections or even
acknowledge a correction request. If Bogorad chose not to respond at all,
which would have been his right, the appraisal would be held in limbo, never

6
The report here is far different than the expressly “interim”
arbitration award in Ortiz. There, the award provided: “‘This Interim Award
will become final twenty days after service unless either side (a) points out in
writing an omission to decide a submitted issue . . . .” (Ortiz, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 601, italics added.) Those parties knew the award would not
become final if a party objected. Here, the award was final on its face—it
contained the “final value conclusion”—and was subject to correction only if
the parties realized within the statutory correction time (30 days) that the
“data and information” they had provided to the arbitrator was inaccurate.
Besides, Ortiz merely allowed the arbitrator to decide an unadjudicated issue.
(Id. at p. 602–603, 612.) “An arbitrator may amend or supplement a
previously issued final award to include an inadvertently omitted ruling (as
distinguished from an error in the intended ruling).” (Knight et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution (The Rutter Group 2025)
¶ 5:439.6.)

9
final and always subject to correction. That’s contrary to the purpose of
arbitration: to expedite finality. (Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 364;
Valencia, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 440.)
In addition, we reject Bristol’s contention that the trial court
wrongly found its “response to Landlord’s Petition was untimely.” The
deadline for Bristol to seek vacatur was 100 days from service of the final
award—September 30, 2023. (§ 1288.2; Law Finance Group, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 946.) But Bristol requested vacatur in its April 2, 2024
opposition, 185 days after Bogorad’s report was served.
While Bristol contends the 100-day deadline was extended by
“Estoppel, Waiver and/or Laches” (cleaned up) (see Law Finance Group,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 941), substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
implied rejection of equitable relief. For example, on equitable tolling, the
timeline shows that less than 60 days lapsed between the landlord’s
appraiser’s November 19, 2023 e-mail agreeing that Bogorad could
“revisit . . . and make any revisions” to his report, and the “mid-January”
timeframe that Bogorad said he would “report back” about possibly revising
his report.7 Even if that entire duration is not counted towards the deadline,
Bristol’s April 2, 2024 vacatur request was still presented over 120 days after
Bogorad’s final award was served.

7
There was less time—29 days—between the landlord’s
appraiser’s November 19, 2023 e-mail and his December 18, 2023 e-mail
stating the landlord “rescind[ed]” and “object[ed] to any revisit . . . or redo” of
the report.

10
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The landlord shall recover its costs on
appeal.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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