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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Goodall, A. v. Grose, B.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1293 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Sullivan

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.6K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Sullivan

J-S44043-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ALEXIS GOODALL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRADLEY GROSE :
:
Appellant : No. 1293 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered May 19, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations
at No(s): 2505V7848

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2026

Bradley Grose (“Grose”) appeals pro se from the order granting a final

one-year protection from abuse (“PFA”) order against him. Because Grose’s

numerous, unsupported, and often intemperately phrased claims that the trial

court erred in finding abuse under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102, relied on inadmissible

evidence, mischaracterized the evidence, and showed bias against him are

waived and/or meritless, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual history of this appeal as follows:

[Grose] and [Alexis Goodall (“Goodall”)] are both adult individuals
living in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The parties were involved in
a romantic relationship that ended approximately six years ago.
The parties are the parents of [a] six-year-old son[]. Pursuant to
a custody order issued by Delaware County, Pennsylvania[ court,]
[Goodall] has primary physical custody and [Grose] has partial
physical custody. The parties’ typical practice for custodial
exchange[s] is that [Grose] will either pick the child up and drop
off at school or [Goodall] does drop offs and pick ups at paternal
grandparent’s residence.
J-S44043-25

The actions giving rise to [Goodall’s] filing of the PFA petition were
that [Grose] was continuing to show up at her home unexpectedly,
the most recent of which time occurred on May 10, 2025. [Grose]
would peer into the windows on the side and back of her home
and would attempt to let himself into the home by turning the
doorknob. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/25, at 1-2.

On May 12, 2025, Goodall filed a PFA petition, and a temporary order

issued. Four days later, Grose filed a motion to dismiss, in which he denied

Goodall’s allegations of abuse and claimed, inter alia, he had never been the

subject of a complaint, police report, or arrest for domestic violence. The trial

court consolidated the motion to dismiss with the PFA petition for a hearing

on May 19, 2025.

Goodall and Grose both appeared at the hearing without counsel. At

the beginning of the hearing, the trial court denied Grose’s motion to dismiss,

noting that all allegations—including those in Goodall’s petition and Grose’s

motion to dismiss—needed to be established by evidence. See N.T., 5/19/25,

at 5. The court emphasized that Goodall had the initial burden of proof to

obtain a final PFA order. See id. at 8.

Goodall testified that there had been “plenty of times over the years

that [Grose] has popped up at [her] residence, banging on her windows,

turning the doorknob as if he’s trying to get in, [and] yelling outside.” Id. at

1. Goodall played three videos on her phone, which the trial court described

as follows:

. . . In the first video, [Grose] is looking right at the camera while
he is wielding . . . a sword of some kind. The [c]ourt cannot
determine whether it is real or not. It looks real. The next one is

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J-S44043-25

[Grose] . . . on [what] looks like a deck dressed in a white shirt.
...

The third one, [Grose] was on the deck dressed in a grey shirt.

Id. at 13-14. Goodall continued that Grose “just pops up random[ly,] he

never knocks on the door[, h]e’s always at the window[,]” and he scares her

each time. Id. at 14-15. Goodall testified about her anxiety about Grose

“pop[ping] up on [her] at any time,” and she explained:

He also has a very like aggressive demeanor and manner in the
way he conversates with me in general. He texts. And I have . .
. evidence of the type of language that he uses, even when we’re
trying to communicate about the child.

I have another police report here where he came to another
location that I lived at . . .. I have voice notes of just the tone of
voice and his demeanor. And it’s very harassing. It’s been going
on for years.

. . . Prior to us having a six[-]year-old son, we used to get in
physical altercations. He would hit me with a closed fist.

He’s choked me out on the floor of his mother’s home before. I
believe I was pregnant one of that -- those times too as well. So
that’s what is very alarming when it comes to him popping up at
my windows whenever he feels like.

Also, with the fact that he speaks so aggressive[ly] and
disrespect[fully], consistently throughout the time of even just
trying to co-parent with him.

Id. at 15-16.

On cross-examination by Grose, Goodall conceded the “sword,” which

the court had referred to in its summary of the first video, was their son’s

plastic toy that had been left outside. See id. at 33. Grose also attempted

to have Goodall point to a police report in which she alleged he physically

harmed or “did something to her.” When the trial court asked if Grose wanted

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J-S44043-25

the court to review all of the reports Goodall had with her, Grose responded,

“Yes,” and he further acknowledged, without objection, that if the court were

to review the reports, it would review the reports in their entirety. Id. at 40-

1. However, after the court read aloud the portions of those reports

indicating that police warned Grose about not appearing for custody

exchanges unannounced, Grose insisted the trial court should only consider

the police reports for the fact that they contained no allegations he physically

harmed Goodall. See id. at 42-45.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Grose maintained: he only went to

Goodall’s home for custody exchanges; there was a Delaware County custody

order now in place; and Goodall was using the PFA proceeding to interfere

with his custody of their child. See id. at 74-77. As the trial court rendered

its findings and concluded the hearing, Grose repeatedly questioned whether

he would get the child and how. See id. at 79. The court stated that the

hearing was concluded and that Grose was excused. A court officer told Grose

his questions involved custody matters, asked Grose to exit the courtroom,

and then asked Goodall to do the same. Id. at 80.

The trial court issued the final PFA order against Grose, and Grose timely

appealed.1 Both Grose and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Grose raises the following issues for review:

---

1 The trial court did not formally enter the order onto the docket but did so

after Grose took his appeal.

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J-S44043-25

1. Did the trial court err by failing to identify any act of “abuse”
   under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6102(a)?

2. Did the trial court enable retaliatory abuse of process by
   [Goodall], contrary to Pennsylvania statutes and
   constitutional rights?

3. Did the trial court mischaracterize video evidence by
   describing a toy sword as a “machete” to fabricate abuse?

4. Did the trial court engage in fraud on the court by falsifying
   the record regarding video evidence?

5. Did the trial court err by admitting irrelevant, dismissed
   police reports in violation of Pa.R.E. 401-403 and [Grose’s]
   due process rights?

6. Did the trial court apply selective evidentiary standards,
   admitting [Goodall]’s dismissed reports but excluding
   [Grose’s] custody order?

7. Did the trial court improperly interfere with an existing
   Delaware County custody order in violation of 23 Pa.C.S.[A.]
   § 6108(a)(4)?

8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to hear
   [Grose’s] motion to dismiss?

9. Did the trial court exhibit bias and make inflammatory
   commentary against [Grose] as a pro se litigant?

10. Did the trial court violate due process by ejecting [Grose]
    from the courtroom and concealing proceedings from the
    record?

Grose’s Brief at 5-6 (reordered; some capitalization omitted).

Preliminarily, we reiterate that appellate briefs must conform materially

to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and if

the defects in the brief are substantial, this Court may dismiss an appeal or

find issues waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (providing that “if the defects . . . in

the brief . . . are substantial, the appeal ... may be ... dismissed”); see also

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J-S44043-25

Gould v. Wagner, 316 A.3d 634, 639 (Pa. Super. 2024) (noting that “[i]f a

deficient brief hinders this Court's ability to address any issue on review, the

issue will be regarded as waived”). Although this Court liberally construes a

pro se litigant’s filings, he must comply with the requisite procedural rules,

and we will not act as counsel and develop arguments on his behalf. See

Elliot-Greenleaf, P.C. v. Rothstein, 255 A.3d 539, 542 (Pa. Super. 2021);

Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2014).

A review of Grose’s pro se brief shows that he supports his ten issues

with short, conclusory, and intemperate discussions without citation to, or

analysis of, the relevant law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Although Grose’s brief

borders on being so substantially defective that we could dismiss this appeal,

we will address his issues to the extent they are preserved and appropriately

developed.

In his first issue, Grose challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

presented at the PFA hearing. Our standard of review is as follows: we review

the trial court’s legal conclusions for an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

See Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2008). We

must view the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party. See Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021). On appeal,

this Court defers to the trial court’s credibility determinations. See id.

A PFA petitioner must establish that “abuse” occurred by a

preponderance of the evidence. See E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa.

Super. 2020). Relevantly, the statute defines “abuse” as including

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J-S44043-25

“[k]nowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts

toward another person, including following the person, without proper

authority, under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of

bodily injury.” See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(5).

Grose appears to assert that the trial court erred in finding abuse based

on past acts alone. See Grose’s Brief at 14-15 (citing R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d

341 (Pa. Super. 1996) with a parenthetical explanation that “past incidents

alone, without evidence of present threat or imminent harm, are insufficient

to support a PFA”); see also id. at 18.2 He also contends the trial court

impeded meaningful appellate review by not placing her reasons for issuing

the final PFA order on the record. See id. at 15. Grose’s argument, however,

consists principally of derogatory statements toward Goodall and the trial

court, see Grose’s Brief at 14 (asserting the trial court assisted in Goodall’s

lies), and to the extent he cites any legal authority, he engages in mere “issue

spotting” without developing a cogent argument. Therefore, we conclude that

Grose’s first issue is waived. See Elliot-Greenleaf, 255 A.3d at 542;

Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088.3

---

2 The quote which Grose attributed to R.G. does not appear in that case.

3 Even if not waived, we would note that, at the hearing, the trial court started

to explain the issues it found relevant at the hearing, but Grose continually
interrupted. See N.T., 5/19/25, at 71-79. Moreover, the court provided a
summary of its findings and legal conclusions in its Rule 1925(a) opinion,
wherein it credited Goodall’s testimony that “[Grose] was continuing to show
up at her home unexpectedly[ and] would peer into the windows on the side
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-S44043-25

In his second issue, Grose asserts that Goodall repeatedly called the

police during custody disputes with him, fabricated her testimony, misused

the PFA system, and committed criminal acts, including unsworn falsification,

false reports, and retaliation against a party. See Grose’s Brief at 17. This

claim goes to the credibility of Goodall’s testimony. As noted above, this Court

defers to the credibility determinations of the trial court, see Kaur, 259 A.3d

at 509, and we decline his invitation to reweigh the evidence in his favor. See

Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/25, at 3, 10. Thus, Grose’s second issue merits no

relief.

In his third and fourth issues, Grose asserts that the trial court

mischaracterized one of the videos played by Goodall when it suggested that

he had a real knife or machete while standing outside Goodall’s window, and

that the court then “created a false record” to minimize the testimony the

“machete” was a toy. Grose’s Brief at 11-13, 17. These issues lack any merit

---

and back of her home and would attempt to let himself into the home by
turning the doorknob.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/25, at 3. The court also
credited Goodall’s testimony that these actions were “alarming” in light of past
incidents of physical abuse. See id. As the court explained:

[Grose] engaged in a course of conduct which placed [Goodall] in
reasonable fear of bodily injury.[ Goodall] described [Grose’s]
conduct as “alarming” and cause[d] her to feel “anxiety” and be
“scared.” Due to the prior abuse history[, Goodall] was
reasonably “afraid that this behavior [would] escalate.”

Id. at 10 (record citations omitted). Thus, we discern no merit to Grose’s
contention that the trial court impeded meaningful appellate review of his
sufficiency of the evidence claims, nor would we disturb the trial court’s
conclusions of law.

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J-S44043-25

because the trial court acknowledged the machete was a toy and not a real

weapon. See N.T., 5/19/25, at 72-73; Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/25 at 14.

Grose’s fifth issue relates to the trial court’s admission and review of

police reports. Grose contends that the trial court’s consideration of prior

police reports violated Pa.R.E. 401 through 403. See Grose’s Brief at 8-10.4

Grose claims the trial court opinion misrepresented his agreement to admit

the police reports for the limited purpose of asking whether Goodall could

point to any police report in which she told police he physically harmed her.

See id. He contends the trial court “fabricated” the notion that he wanted to

admit the police reports for any purpose. Id. at 9.

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 103 states:

A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence
only:

(1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record:

(A) makes a timely objection, motion to strike, or motion in
limine; and

(B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from
the context . . .

Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not raised

in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”);

E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 522 (Pa. Super. 2020).

---

4 Although Grose does not articulate the substance of Rules 401 through 403,

or how they preclude the prior police reports, we are aware Rules 401 through
403 govern the general standards that to be admissible, evidence must be
relevant, and, even if relevant, not unfairly prejudicial. See Pa.R.E. 401-403.

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J-S44043-25

The trial court concluded Grose waived this issue by insisting it consider

the police report and failing to object. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/25, at

11.

A review of the record confirms that Grose waived this issue, as

established in the following exchange during Grose’s cross-examination of

Goodall:

Mr. Grose: Did you ever call the police for any abuse that I’ve --
you alleged that I’ve done.

Ms. Goodall: Yes, I have. Plenty of times. That’s why I have
plenty of police reports here. . . .

---

Mr. Grose: So you’re saying you have police reports of you
reporting me abusing you or doing something to you?

Ms. Goodall: Yeah. I have the police reports of you harassing me.
Plenty of times. There is police reports where the police strongly
advised that I get a PFA, because they know you.

Mr. Grose: Can? Can? Can you show that police report to
the [c]ourt[]?

Ms. Goodall: Let’s see. Which one is it where he said?

THE COURT: Do you mean the six of them that she has?

Mr. Grose: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that? Okay.

Ms. Goodall: He. Wow. Can you give the --

THE COURT: Do you want me to look at them, sir?

Ms. Goodall: -- here is one.

Mr. Grose: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

• 10 - J-S44043-25

Ms. Goodall: We can.

Mr. Grose: For any like abuse or --

THE COURT: Well --

Mr. Grose: -- stalking.

THE COURT: -- if I. If I look at them, I look at them.

Mr. Grose: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Grose: Okay.

N.T., 5/19/25, at 40-41 (emphasis added; some capitalization omitted).

Instantly, the record shows that Grose agreed when the trial court asked

if it wanted him to review the police reports, and he did not object when the

court cautioned that it would look at them in their entirety. Therefore, Grose

has not preserved an evidentiary challenge under Pa.R.E. 401-403, and we

will not address this waived issue. See Pa.R.E. 108; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); E.K.,

237 A.3d at 522.

In Grose’s sixth issue, entitled “selective evidentiary standard,” Grose

contends that the trial court allowed Goodall to introduce dismissed reports

(apparently referring to the police reports), but he was “denied reference to

the Delaware County custody order.” See Grose’s Brief at 13-14. Aside from

the issue of the police reports, discussed above, Grose points to no part of the

record where the trial court precluded him from referencing the custody order

or where he objected to the preclusion of the Delaware County custody order.

This Court will not act as Grose’s counsel to develop, and attempt to consider,

a vague, undeveloped, and likely waived argument. See Elliot-Greenleaf,

• 11 - J-S44043-25

255 A.3d at 542; Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088; see also Pa.R.E. 108; Pa.R.A.P.

302(a); E.K., 237 A.3d at 522. Thus, we will not consider Grose’s sixth issue.

Similarly, in his seventh issue, Grose asserts that the trial court

improperly nullified the Delaware County custody order and blocked his

custody time with his and Goodall’s child. See Grose’s Brief at 16. Grose’s

six-line argument only refers to the authority of the court to enter a temporary

custody order in conjunction with a final PFA order, see 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6108(a)(4), and does not specify any term of the Delaware County custody

order allegedly impeded by the PFA order. Grose’s seventh issue is too

undeveloped for review, and we will not consider it. See Elliot-Greenleaf,

255 A.3d at 542; Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088.

In his eighth issue, Grose asserts that the trial court refused to hear his

motion to dismiss “in retaliation against [him] for filing [the motion] pro se”

and in violation of his constitutional rights to access to the courts. See Grose’s

Brief at 10. Grose’s three-sentence argument focusing on the trial court’s

statement that “it had no choice” but to proceed to a hearing, not only ignores

the context in which the trial court made that statement, but misstates the

reasoning of the court, namely, that the court had no choice to proceed where

the averments in Grose’s motion to dismiss raised factual disputes that

required resolution at the hearing. See N.T., 5/19/25, at 5 (noting that the

allegations in Grose’s motion to dismiss needed to be established by

evidence); Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/25, at 12. Because the record belies

Grose’s assertions, no relief is due on Grose’s eighth issue.

• 12 - J-S44043-25

Grose’s ninth issue accuses the trial court of bias based on additional

discussions on Grose’s motion to dismiss. See Grose’s Brief at 15-16.

Specifically, the court stated Grose’s averments there were no police reports

or criminal records involving domestic violence filed against him were

“[i]rrelevant” until the trial court heard testimony, after which the following

exchange occurred:

Mr. Grose: I mean you’re saying it’s irrelevant. But if I choked,
or hit or harmed someone, I would be arrested for that.

THE COURT: Not necessarily, sir.

See N.T., 5/19/25, at 6 (some capitalization omitted). While Grose baldly

asserts that the trial court showed bias toward him as a pro se litigant while

excusing Goodall from the need to corroborate her allegations, we discern no

support for Grose’s baseless characterization and accusations. Thus, Grose’s

ninth issue fails.

In his tenth and final issue, Grose asserts that the trial court violated

his right to be present for judgment and hear an explanation for the court’s

decision—is predicated on his allegations that the trial court ejected him from

the courtroom before issuing a ruling on the final PFA order. The record simply

does not bear out any Grose’s allegations, and, to the contrary, shows that

Grose continually interrupted the court as it began to explain its view of the

• 13 - J-S44043-25

issues raised at trial. See N.T., 5/19/25, at 71-79. This frivolous issue merits

no further discussion.5

Order affirmed.

Date: 3/18/2026

---

5 We acknowledge that Grose’s last five issues attempted to show bias in favor

of Goodall and against him when the trial court refused to accept his claims
that Goodall was incredible and misused the PFA proceedings in retaliation for
his obtaining a Delaware County custody order. We reiterate that “[a]ssessing
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony
is within the exclusive province of the trial court as the fact finder.” Smith
obo M.T. v. Thomas, 328 A.3d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). We remind Grose that the mere fact
that the court ruled against a party does not show bias, prejudice, and
unfairness, see generally Ware v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 577 A.2d 902,
904 (Pa. Super. 1990). Moreover, as an appellant, Grose is certainly entitled
to argue the trial court erred, but we strongly disapprove of his repeated use
of inflammatory language against the trial court.

• 14 -