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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Gonzales v. Armijo CA4/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: D085711

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (33.1K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26 Gonzales v. Armijo CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES C. GONZALES, D085711

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. TRUPS1900134)

RITA ARMIJO, as Personal
Representative, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Michelle H. Gilleece, Judge. Affirmed.
The DLJ Law Firm and Dorian L. Jackson, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Law Office of Robert J. Spitz and Robert J. Spitz, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Felicitas P. Gonzales executed a trust, naming her son, Victor
M. Gonzales, as the sole beneficiary. In 2017, Felicitas executed a second
trust, naming Victor, his brother James C. Gonzales, and their other siblings
as beneficiaries. The main asset identified in both trusts is Felicitas’s house
in Ontario, California.
James filed a petition to invalidate the 2009 trust due to Victor’s undue
influence and to confirm the 2017 trust. After filing his response to James’s
petition, Victor passed away. Victor’s daughter, Rita Armijo, as Victor’s
personal representative and administrator of his estate, was substituted in as
a defendant. Following a court trial, the probate court entered judgment
finding the 2009 trust invalid based on Victor’s undue influence over
Felicitas.
Rita appeals from the judgment raising four claims: (1) the probate
court lacked jurisdiction because James did not file the requisite creditor
claim and did not timely substitute Rita as a defendant in this action; (2) the
court based its judgment on an unpled legal theory; (3) the court’s finding of
undue influence is not supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) the court’s
evidentiary findings and rulings are not supported by the evidence. We reject
each of Rita’s arguments and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Felicitas’s Relationship with Victor
Felicitas had five children. Victor, the youngest, was the only one of
her children who never moved out of her home. All her other children owned
their own homes. Felicitas and Victor would argue, after which James had
seen Felicitas crying and disheveled. James once reported Victor to adult

2
protective services for using drugs around Felicitas. Felicitas kicked Victor
out of the house multiple times, but she always gave in later and allowed him
to move back into her home.
As of 2009, Felicitas and Victor had a good relationship, although they
fought over money. Victor often asked Felicitas for money, and she obliged.
She also gave money to her other children. Felicitas would not have trusted
Victor to manage her finances due to his drug use.
II.
Felicitas Executes Two Trusts
In June 2009, Felicitas executed the Felicitas P. Gonzales Family Trust
(2009 trust) and conveyed to the trust the house she owned in Ontario,
California. She named Victor as the sole beneficiary, first successor trustee,
and executor, with one of Victor’s sisters named as second successor trustee
and successor executor. In December 2009, Felicitas recorded a quitclaim
deed transferring the house to the trust.
In 2012, Victor was convicted of elder abuse against Felicitas and was
sentenced to prison.
On several occasions in 2017, Felicitas said she wanted her assets to
pass to her children equally. According to James, Felicitas believed she had
previously signed some papers at Victor’s direction, but she did not know
what they were. This made her worry that all her assets would pass to
Victor.
In July 2017, Felicitas executed the Felicitas Gonzales Living Trust
(2017 trust), directing that her assets be divided equally among her five

3
children.1 Felicitas named herself and James as co-trustees.
In March 2019, Victor recorded a trust transfer deed transferring
Felicitas’s house from the 2009 trust to himself.
III.
James Commences the Instant Action to Invalidate the 2009 Trust
In June 2019, James commenced this action by filing the original
petition against Victor, asserting a cause of action to invalidate the 2009

trust under Probate Code2 section 17200. In support of that cause of action,
James alleged that he and his other siblings “have a property right and
interest in” Felicitas’s house. In July 2019, James filed a notice of lis
pendens on the house.
In August 2019, Victor filed his response to the petition. In November
2019, Victor passed away. In March 2020, Rita was appointed as
administrator of Victor’s estate.
At a September 2020 hearing, Rita purportedly appeared as Victor’s
personal representative. In May 2021, the probate court granted James’s
motion to amend the petition to add defendants to the action. The following
month, James filed the operative first amended petition, naming Victor’s
estate and Rita, as the estate’s personal representative, as defendants.
In June 2023, Rita filed a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication. In October 2023, the probate court granted Rita’s motion for
summary adjudication in large part. But it denied the motion as to James’s
claim to invalidate the 2009 trust under section 17200 based on undue

1 The copy of the 2017 trust included in the record before us identifies as
trust property “the property described in Schedule A to the Trust.” However,
the record does not include any such schedule related to the 2017 trust.

2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Probate Code.

4
influence and his claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
The matter proceeded to a court trial on the surviving two claims. On
November 28, 2023, the court found the 2009 trust invalid because it was
obtained through Victor’s undue influence over Felicitas, but dismissed
James’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty for failure of proof. In May 2024,
the probate court entered judgment consistent with its ruling.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
“ ‘We apply well-established standards of review to a judgment based
upon a statement of decision issued after a bench trial. . . . We review
questions of law de novo and we review the trial court’s findings of fact under
the substantial evidence standard.’ ” (Rojas v. HSBC Card Servs. Inc. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 860, 872–873, citation omitted.) We presume the trial court
followed applicable law and affirm the judgment if it is correct on any theory.
(Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) An
error requires reversal only when, “in the absence of the error, a result more
favorable to plaintiffs probably would have occurred.” (Osborn v. Mission
Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 114.) The burden is on the appellant
to show reversible error. (Patz v. City of San Diego (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
225, 275 (Patz).)
II.
Creditor Claim and Statute of Limitations
Rita contends the probate court erred by failing to find this action
barred as a matter of law because James did not file a creditor claim against
Victor’s estate as required by Probate Code section 9370 or amend the
petition to add a new defendant within the statute of limitations provided for

5
under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2. We find these arguments

unpersuasive.3
A. Rita Has Not Shown James Was Required to File a Creditor Claim with
Respect to the Cause of Action at Issue Here
Section 9370, subdivision (a), provides that an action against a
decedent may be continued against the decedent’s personal representative
where three conditions are met: (1) a claim, as statutorily defined, is first
filed against the decedent’s estate; (2) the estate rejects the claim; and (3) the
plaintiff applies to the court to substitute the decedent’s personal
representative within three months of a notice of rejection of the claim. The
term “claim,” as used in section 9370, is defined as “a demand for payment”
(§ 9000, subd. (a)), and, thus, refers only to “a demand for money” (Wood v.
Brown (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 232, 236 [addressing § 709, the predecessor to
§ 9370]). The applicable definition expressly excludes “a dispute regarding
title of a decedent to specific property alleged to be included in the decedent’s
estate.” (§ 9000, subd. (b).)
Rita asserts that “some of [James’s] claims requested monetary awards

3 Rita asks this court to take judicial notice of the petition for probate of
Felicitas’s estate, the petition for probate of Victor’s estate, the proof of
publication of the notice of petition for probate of Victor’s estate, and the
order for probate of Victor’s estate. She argues these records are necessary
for this court’s review of her claim that James failed to file a creditor claim
against Victor’s estate. But, as we discuss later, Rita has failed to show that
James was required to file a creditor claim as to his cause of action to
invalidate the 2009 trust based on undue influence, the cause of action at
issue in this appeal. Accordingly, records offered to support the argument
that James did not file a creditor claim against Victor’s estate “are not
‘necessary, helpful, or relevant’ to the resolution of the appeal.” (Atempa v.
Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809, 819.) We therefore deny Rita’s
request for judicial notice.

6
against Victor after his death,” but does not acknowledge that James’s only
surviving claim subject to the judgment against Rita at issue here is James’s
non-monetary claim to invalidate the 2009 trust under section 17200. Rita
has not addressed, nor established, the applicability of section 9370 to this
non-monetary claim, which sought to determine property rights to Felicitas’s
house. Notably, the probate court found “[James’s] claims are not required to
be preceded by a creditor[ ] claim in order to preserve his time to file the trust
contest.” Rita has not shown otherwise. Accordingly, Rita has not carried
her burden of showing reversible error on this basis. (Patz, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 275.)
B. The Statute of Limitations Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 366.2
Does Not Bar This Action
Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a), provides: “If a
person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person,
whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not
accrued, dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and
the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced within one year
after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been
applicable does not apply.” However, for purposes of this statute, an
amended pleading relates back to a timely-filed original pleading where the
amendment adds as a defendant a decedent’s personal representative.
(Burgos v. Tamulonis (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 757, 761–763 [addressing Code
Civ. Proc., § 353, subd. (b), the predecessor to Code Civ. Proc., § 366.2,
subd. (a)].) Rita has not alleged that James’s original petition was untimely
filed. Thus, James’s first amended petition, which added Rita as a defendant,
relates back to the filing of the original petition against Victor for purposes of
the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2,

7
subdivision (a).
III.
Judgment Based on an Unpled Theory
Next, Rita argues the probate court violated her due process rights by
basing its judgment on an unpled legal theory. Specifically, she argues the
court’s judgment relied on findings under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 15610.70 despite that James did not cite this provision in his
pleadings. We are unpersuaded.
The Probate Code expressly provides that “ ‘[u]ndue influence’ has the
same meaning as defined in Section 15610.70 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.” (Prob. Code, § 86.) For this reason, when considering a claim of
undue influence under the Probate Code, courts apply the same standard as
applied under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70. (See Lintz v.
Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1356, fn. 3 (Lintz) [the standards for
undue influence under the Prob. Code and the Welf. & Inst. Code “are now
the same”].)
Here, James presented to the probate court a claim to invalidate the
2009 trust based on undue influence. In analyzing James’s claim, the
probate court applied the factors for determining undue influence as provided
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70. As Welfare and
Institutions Code section 15610.70 applies the same standard as the probate
code, the court’s analysis was entirely appropriate and did not insert into its
reasoning an unpled legal theory.
IV.
Sufficiency of Evidence of Undue Influence
Rita presents several challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the probate court’s finding of undue influence. We reject each

8
argument.
A. Standard of Review
We review the probate court’s finding of undue influence for substantial
evidence. (Butler v. LeBouef (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 198, 208.) “ ‘Under this
deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to
support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings.’ ” (Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115,
1125 (Keading).)
“A person challenging the validity of a trust instrument on the
ground[ ] that the trustor . . . execute[d] the document . . . under the undue
influence of another carries the heavy burden of proving such allegations.”
(Doolittle v. Exchange Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529, 545, as modified on
denial of rehg. Nov. 4, 2015 (Doolittle).) Such a showing must be made by
clear and convincing evidence. (Ibid.) “ ‘[U]ndue influence can be established
by circumstantial evidence so long as the evidence raises more than a mere
suspicion that undue influence was used.’ ” (Estate of Truckenmiller (1979)
97 Cal.App.3d 326, 334.) It “will not be inferred from ‘slight evidence.’ ”
(Ibid.)
B. The Probate Court Considered Each of the Applicable Elements Under
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 15610.70
While continuing to suggest James did not plead a claim based on
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70, Rita argues the probate
court failed to consider each of the four factors enumerated by that provision
for determining the existence of undue influence.
As we have already stated, “undue influence” under the Probate Code
“has the same meaning as defined in Section 15610.70 of the Welfare and

9
Institutions Code” (Prob. Code, § 86), and, thus, the applicable standards are
the same for each (Lintz, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356, fn. 3). In
determining whether undue influence exists, courts consider: (1) the victim’s
vulnerability; (2) the influencer’s apparent authority; (3) the tactics used by
the influencer; and (4) the equity of the result. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15610.70, subd. (a).)
Here, the probate court expressly stated it considered the applicable
factors, and then it discussed the evidence that satisfied these factors. As we
discuss later, substantial evidence supported the court’s findings as to each.
C. The Probate Court Did Not Err by Failing to Consider Sections 810 to
812
Rita next argues the probate court erred by failing to consider sections
810 to 812, which, she asserts, are prerequisites to a finding of vulnerability
of the victim and undue influence.
Section 810, subdivision (a), establishes “a rebuttable presumption
affecting the burden of proof that all persons have the capacity to make
decisions and to be responsible for their acts or decisions.” Sections 811 and
812 set out the criteria for determining whether an individual has the
capacity to make a decision or do a certain act.
Citing Doolittle, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pages 545–546, Rita asserts
“a party who seeks to set aside a trust based on undue influence must
overcome the presumption of [section] 810.” Rita misconstrues Doolittle. In
Doolittle, the court discussed a challenge to “the validity of a trust instrument
on the grounds that the trustor lacked capacity to execute the document or
did so under the undue influence of another.” (Id. at p. 545, italics added.) It
then set out the standard for determining whether a trustor lacked capacity
to execute a trust pursuant to sections 810 to 812, followed by the standard

10
for proving undue influence. (Doolittle, at p. 545.) Thus, the court identified
two scenarios under which a trust might be deemed invalid: (1) where the
trustor lacked the requisite capacity and (2) where the trustor executed the
trust under undue influence. Nothing in Doolittle suggests a finding
pursuant to sections 810 to 812 is a prerequisite for finding the existence of
undue influence.
D. Substantial Evidence Supports the Probate Court’s Finding That the
Vulnerability Factor Was Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence
Rita contends no evidence was presented to support a finding that
Felicitas was vulnerable, and the probate court’s ruling “contains no
discussion of this element at all.” This contention lacks merit.
As relevant here, “[e]vidence of vulnerability may include, but is not
limited to, . . . emotional distress [and] isolation.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15610.70, subd. (a)(1).) The probate court recognized that vulnerability is a
factor to be considered pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
15610.70 and stated it considered this factor. It then found Felicitas lived
alone with Victor, his conduct toward her exhibited a manipulative
relationship, he bullied her, and, at times, she would cry and appear
disheveled after arguing with him. The record supports the court’s findings
as to this factor, and these findings are sufficient to show Felicitas was
emotionally distressed and isolated.
Rita faults the probate court’s determination regarding the
vulnerability factor because it “neither referenced nor considered any medical
records, testimony from treating physicians, medical experts, or from family
members concerning Felicitas’s mental, physical or emotional condition” at
the time she executed the 2009 trust, and that the evidence showed Felicitas
was “ ‘very coherent’ and ‘paid all her bills and did everything herself’ ”

11
during that time. While factors such as “incapacity, illness, disability, injury,
. . . impaired cognitive function, . . . or dependency” may be relevant to a
determination of vulnerability (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(1)),
such facts are not essential to a finding under this factor. As stated,
sufficient evidence supports the probate court’s findings as to the existence of
other relevant facts.
E. The Evidence Produced at Trial Did Not Negate the Authority Factor
Next, Rita asserts the evidence produced at trial showed Felicitas did
not trust or rely on Victor, and this evidence negated any evidence supporting
the factor requiring that he asserted authority over her. Rita further argues
the probate court did not specify which of its factual findings it attributed to
this factor. We are not persuaded.
“Evidence of apparent authority may include, but is not limited to,
status as a . . . family member.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(2).)
Again, the probate court stated it considered this factor. Although it did not
specifically label which factual findings it attributed to each factor, there is
no dispute that Victor was Felicitas’s family member. In addition, the court
made other factual findings relevant to a determination that Victor exercised
authority over Felicitas.
Specifically, the court found Victor aggressively demanded money from
Felicitas, he had control over some of her finances in 2009 when the trust was
executed, and he was the only person who could have assisted her in
executing the 2009 trust. These findings are supported by the record. It is
immaterial to our inquiry that some other evidence Rita identifies may weigh
against this factor. (Keading, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125 [when we
consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment, we “ ‘liberally
construe[ ] [findings of fact] to support the judgment and . . . consider the

12
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party’ ”].)
F. Substantial Evidence Supports the Probate Court’s Finding That the
Tactics Factor Was Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence
Rita further argues no evidence was presented concerning Victor’s
actions or tactics underlying his undue influence. We reject this claim too.
“Evidence of actions or tactics used may include, but is not limited to,”
the use of “intimidation[ ] or coercion” and the use of “secrecy in effecting . . .
changes” to property rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(3).) As
relevant to this factor, the probate court found Victor abused and bullied
Felicitas, was “manipulative” and “aggressive” toward her, and he facilitated
her execution of the 2009 trust without the knowledge of any of his siblings.
These findings are supported by the record and are sufficient to support the
probate court’s finding that James had satisfied this factor by clear and
convincing evidence.
G. The Probate Court’s Finding Regarding Equity Did Not Improperly
Shift the Burden of Proof
Rita does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
probate court’s finding as to the factor regarding the equity of the result.
Instead, she suggests the probate court shifted the burden of proof by finding
there was no evidence presented that Felicitas wanted to leave all her assets
to Victor. Rita further argues evidence of an inequitable result, alone, does
not prove undue influence.
The probate court made a finding regarding the equity of the result
under the challenged trust, as required under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 15610.70, subdivision (a)(4). In doing so, the court cited evidence that
Felicitas made known to others that she wished her assets to be divided
equally between all her children and weighed this against the lack of

13
evidence that she ever expressed an intent to leave the house only to Victor.
Thus, the court merely weighed the evidence for and against a finding under
this factor of the undue influence analysis. It did not shift the burden of
proof.
Neither did the probate court rest its undue influence finding solely on
the inequity of the result. As we have discussed, the court considered each of
the factors enumerated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70
and the record supports its findings as to each factor.
V.
Evidentiary Findings and Rulings
Lastly, Rita challenges the probate court’s evidentiary findings and
rulings in six instances. We reject each of her contentions.
A. Consideration of Victor’s 2012 Conviction
First, Rita argues the probate court erred by relying on irrelevant
evidence of Victor’s 2012 criminal conviction to support its finding that he
maintained a “ ‘manipulative relationship’ ” with Felicitas in 2009.
Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) “ ‘Relevant
evidence’ means evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” (Id., § 210.) In addition, in making an undue influence
determination, a probate court “ ‘must determine the issue of undue influence
by inferences drawn from all the facts and circumstances.’ ” (Lintz, supra,
222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355, italics added.) In doing so, the court may
consider circumstantial evidence, and its “undue influence finding need not
be supported by direct evidence of undue influence at the moment decedent
signed the trust instruments.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Evidence that Victor was convicted in 2012 of elder abuse against

14
Felicitas was circumstantial evidence that he had a pattern of exhibiting
manipulative behavior toward her and had a “tendency in reason to prove or
disprove” this fact (Evid. Code, § 210). Accordingly, the court properly
considered this evidence.
B. Finding Victor Was the Only Individual Who Could Have Facilitated
the Execution of the 2009 Trust
Second, Rita asserts the probate court made an unsupported
assumption when it found Victor was the only person who could have
facilitated Felicitas’s execution of the 2009 trust.
The court’s finding was not an unsupported assumption but, rather,
was a proper inference made from the evidence presented at trial. (Lintz,
supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.) Specifically, the court based this finding
on evidence that no one else lived with Felicitas at the relevant time, Victor
had at least some involvement in her finances at that time, he possessed the
2009 trust at the time of her death, she did not know what she had signed
when she executed the 2009 trust and did not have her own copy, and he was
the only one who benefited from the 2009 trust. The court’s finding is
supported by the record.
C. Consideration of Evidence That Victor Stole Money from Felicitas
Third, Rita argues the probate court “held” Victor stole money from
Felicitas, despite questioning the sufficiency of the evidence to substantiate
such an allegation. We disagree with this characterization.
The probate court never “held” Victor stole money from Felicitas. It
merely acknowledged in its written ruling after trial and in the judgment the
existence of testimony that a large amount of money had been spent from
Felicitas’s savings account and that Victor had “misappropriat[ed]” funds.
Specifically, with respect to the issue of undue influence, the probate court

15
acknowledged that James “speculated” about money that was spent from
Felicitas’s savings account but dismissed this testimony because “the bank
records did not show how the [missing] money was spent” and “[t]here was no
other witness testimony on the use of these funds.” And, with respect to its
consideration of James’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court
acknowledged testimony from James and his sister “that Victor was
misappropriating funds and using his mother’s credit cards,” but still found
James had not established any fiduciary duty between Victor and Felicitas
and, for this reason, dismissed James’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. To the
extent the court might have given any weight to this testimony in its analysis
of James’s breach of a fiduciary duty claim, Rita has not challenged the
court’s ruling on that claim here.
D. Whether Victor Recorded the Quitclaim Deed
Fourth, Rita contends the evidence did not support the court’s finding
that Victor recorded the quitclaim deed transferring Felicitas’s house into the
2009 trust. The probate court stated:
A quitclaim deed was recorded, placing the title to
[Felicitas’s house] in the name of the 2009 [t]rust. It
appears Victor had this deed recorded. Victor had the 2009
[t]rust in his possession after his mother died. As the
named successor trustee of the 2009 [t]rust, he recorded a
deed transferring the [house] into his individual name after
the death of Felicitas. Victor was the only beneficiary of
the 2009 [t]rust, in spite of the fact that Felicitas had four
other children with whom she had close relationships.
(Italics added.)

Even if we found unreasonable the court’s inference that Victor
recorded the quitclaim deed transferring the house into the 2009 trust, Rita
still has not established reversible error. The fact of who recorded this
quitclaim deed is immaterial to the court’s ultimate finding of undue

16
influence, as it relied on many other facts to find James had established
undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. And, as explained herein,
the court’s finding of undue influence is supported by substantial evidence.
E. Consideration of Felicitas’s Medical Condition in 2017
Fifth, Rita asserts the court erred by finding testimony regarding
Felicitas’s medical condition in 2017 irrelevant to her execution of the 2009
trust.
In its written ruling after trial, the probate court found that “[m]uch of
the evidence elicited on examination of the witnesses focused on the
establishment of the 2017 trust which was not at issue in this trial[,] . . .
[which] was not relevant.” Rita contends that some of this evidence showed
Felicitas had a brain aneurysm and confusion from a urinary tract infection
in 2017, the same year James and his sister had discussions with Felicitas
about who she wanted to inherit her assets. She does not, however, cite to
any evidence showing what symptoms Felicitas experienced from her brain
aneurysm or how those symptoms might have impacted her ability to express
her testamentary intent. Although Rita points to evidence that Felicitas
experienced “confusion” from a urinary tract infection, Rita does not cite any
evidence indicating this confusion occurred around the time she expressed
her testamentary intent to James and his sister, or that the confusion was in
any way related to her desire to pass her assets to her children equally.
F. Evidence of Felicitas’s 2009 Testamentary Intent
Finally, Rita argues the probate court erroneously excluded evidence of
Felicitas’s 2009 testamentary intent and, thereby, improperly shifted the
burden of proof. Specifically, Rita points to her own proposed testimony
regarding what Victor told her about Felicitas’s intent, which she alleges the
court excluded.

17
Rita has forfeited her argument regarding the purported exclusion of
testimony, as she has failed to provide, or cite to, sufficient evidentiary
support. The page she cites in the record to support her argument that the
probate court excluded her testimony does not show the court excluded any
testimony, let alone the testimony at issue. It shows objections were made to
certain testimony but does not specify what testimony was objected to or the
result of those objections. It also shows the court excluded “[m]edical
records.” Even if evidence to support Rita’s argument exists somewhere in
the record before this court, she has not directed us to such evidence. Rita’s
failure to provide an adequate record, or to cite to evidentiary support for her
argument within the record provided, renders this contention forfeited.
(Anton’s Services Inc. v. Hagen (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 90, 104 [failure to cite
to volume and page number of record where the relevant matter appears
renders claim forfeited]; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 657, 684 [a reviewing court “is not required to develop the
parties’ arguments or search the record for supporting evidence and may
instead treat arguments that are not developed or supported by adequate
citations to the record as waived”].)
And, to the extent Rita argues again that the probate court shifted the
burden of proof by stating there was no evidence that Felicitas expressed an
intent to leave her house solely to Victor, as we have discussed, the court did
not so shift the burden of proof. Rather, it compared this lack of evidence
that Felicitas intended to leave her house solely to Victor to testimony that
she intended to leave her assets to all her children equally, which was
relevant to a determination of undue influence under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 15610.70.

18
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent James C. Gonzales is entitled to
his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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