Gibson v. Community Choice Financial - Loan Denial Religious Discrimination

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April 22, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jaylon Ke’Andre Gibson v. Community Choice Financial of Mississippi, LLC

District Court, S.D. Mississippi

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-00949

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.9K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

JAYLON KE’ANDRE GIBSON PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-949-DPJ-ASH

COMMUNITY CHOICE FINANCIAL
OF MISSISSIPPI, LLC DEFENDANT

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Jaylon Ke’Andre Gibson sued Defendant Community Choice Financial of
Mississippi, LLC (CCFM) arising out of CCFM’s denial of Gibson’s application for a loan.
Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and alternatively moved for a more definite
statement. Mot. [18]. Plaintiff did not respond, and the time to do so has passed. But he did file
several motions: (1) “Motion to Discovery” [15]; (2) Motion to Strike/Enforce Statutory
Disclosure Obligations/Compel Compliance with Due Process/Fair Procedure [20]; (3) Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment/Default Judgment [21, 22]; (4) Motion to Supplement the Record
[23]; and (5) Motion/Request for Clarification/Explanation [29].1 The Court grants the motion to
dismiss [18] but will give Gibson an chance to seek leave to amend some claims. Gibson’s
motions [15, 20, 21, 22, and 23] are denied, but his motion seeking clarification [29] is granted.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In his December 8, 2025 Complaint, Gibson claims Defendant “denied [his] consumer
application . . . thus discriminating against [his] application.” Compl. [1] at 5. It appears the
“discrimination” he refers to is religious discrimination. Id.; see id. at 4 (citing scripture, the

1 Plaintiff filed his “Motion to Discovery” [15] before Defendant moved to dismiss. The Court
has reviewed all filings; they are addressed later in this Order. Even if any could be construed as
a response to the motion to dismiss, none would have changed the result.
“Free Exercise Clause” of the First Amendment, and “God Giving Rights of equality”
(unaltered)).
I. Standard
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Def.’s Mem. [19] at 4. When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court
accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). But “the tenet that
a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations and footnote
omitted). “This standard ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary claims or elements.” In re S. Scrap Material
Co., 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In this case, Gibson is proceeding pro se. “It is well-established that ‘pro se complaints
are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Taylor v. Books
A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986,
988 (5th Cir. 1981)). “However, regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is
represented by counsel, ‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’” /d. (quoting S. Christian
Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (Sth Cir. 2001)).
Finally, “a plaintiff's failure to meet the specific pleading requirements should not
automatically or inflexib[ly] result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice to re-filing.”
Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 n.6 (Sth Cir. 2000). Thus, “[a]lthough a court may
dismiss the claim, it should not do so without granting leave to amend, unless the defect is
simply incurable or the plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity after being afforded
repeated opportunities to do so.” Id.
II. Motion to Dismiss [18]
First Amendment/Section 1983. The form complaint Gibson used contains this prompt:
Section 1983 allows defendants to be found liable only when they have acted
“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory of the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If you are suing
under section 1983, explain how each defendant acted under color of state or local
law. If you are suing under Bivens, explain how each defendant acted under color
of federal law.
Compl. [1] at 4. Gibson responded by alleging that CCFM violated his rights under the First
Amendment, his “God Giving Rights of equality,” and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Jd.
Gibson was then prompted to “briefly” state the facts of his case and provided this:
(1) Violations against the U.S. Constitutional Rights regarding the First Amendment (Free Exercise
Clause) due to discrimination - such financial institution is an equal opportunity provider/lender and
oo but ee such er oe application denying such person of their God Giving
Rights of equality - (See ACTS 10:34 -36) 2). Violations against the Mississippi Credit Availability Act
(MCAA) which is regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) which gives consumers/customers
the right to full disclosure of files of a consumer reporting agency which was not provided within a
reasonable amount of time giving and the right to be informed of any decision that may be used against
consumers, additionally a licensee/lender may take as security any personal property (3) Violations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regarding discrimination against such person/consumer provided such
financial institution is an equal opportunity provider/lender Dishonoring basic consumer rights due to
failure to provide requested list of collateral within fourteen (14) a thus ee to such
contractual obligations (5) Branch of contract agar the COMMUNITY CHOICE FINANCIAL (CCF)
Privacy Policy/Agreement (6) Violations against the Bill of Rights regarding We The People rights to be
informed and right to be heard but failed to provide any significant and/or significance of evidence Id. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States[] and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Starting with the first prong—the violation of a right secured by the Constitution—Gibson
invokes the First Amendment.
At the second prong, Gibson must show that the deprivation of his First Amendment
rights “was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Id. Gibson has not sued any
state actors, he sued CCFM, a private company. “For a private actor to be held liable under
§ 1983, the challenged conduct must be ‘fairly attributable to the State.’” Arvie v. Cathedral of
Faith Missionary Baptist Church, No. 24-30759, 2025 WL 1565149, at *5 (5th Cir. June 3,
2025) (citing Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied sub nom.,
Arvie v. Cathedral of Faith, 223 L. Ed. 2d 526 (Jan. 12, 2026). To meet that test for a non-state
actor, “the plaintiff must allege and prove that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with

state actors.” Mylett v. Jeane, 879 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Adickes v. S. Kress
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)).
But there is no allegation that CCFM was acting under color of state law. Def.’s Mem.
[19] at 5. Plaintiff described CCFM as a financial institution, and his claims stem from the
denial of his loan application. See Compl. [1] at 2 (identifying CCFM as a “Financial
Institution”); Letter 1-1 (“After carefully reviewing your application,
we are sorry to advise you that we cannot grant a loan to you at this time.”). Defendant’s motion
is granted, and because this defect is incurable, leave to amend is unwarranted. The § 1983
claim alleging a violation of the First Amendment is dismissed.
Bill of Rights. Gibson similarly alleges that CCFM violated “the Bill of Rights regarding
We The People rights to be informed and right to be heard but failed to provide any significant
and/or significance of evidence regarding such denial of services and/or products within more
than a reasonable amount of time.” Compl. [1] at 4 (unaltered). The Bill of Rights comprises

the first ten amendments to the Constitution. So, Gibson’s reference to the Bill of Rights is
duplicative of his First Amendment claim. For the reasons explained above, Gibson’s claim
under the Bill of Rights is dismissed, and because this defect is incurable, leave to amend is
unwarranted.
Discrimination/Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gibson also references the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See Compl. [1] at 4. CCFM submits this claim should be dismissed because the Act “does
not address religious discrimination in the context of financial lending.” Def.’s Mem. [19] at 5.
Defendant goes on to accurately explain how various portions of the Act prohibit discrimination
in employment, in public accommodations such as restaurants and hotels, or in programs
receiving federal financial assistance. Id. at 6. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not alleged

facts suggesting Defendant violated the Civil Rights Act.
But, as mentioned, “[i]t is well-established that pro se complaints are held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Taylor, 296 F.3d at 378 (quotation marks omitted). Gibson is attempting to plead a case of religious discrimination in
lending, even if he has not used the correct label. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11
(2014) (holding that “[f]ederal pleading rules . . . do not countenance dismissal of a complaint
for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted”). So he will be
allowed to seek leave to amend his complaint to state a discrimination claim.2
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Gibson alleges Defendant violated
the Mississippi Credit Availability Act (MCAA) which is regulated by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) which gives consumers/customers the right to full
disclosure of files of a consumer reporting agency which was not provided within
a reasonable amount of time giving and the right to be informed of any decision
that may be used against consumers, additionally a licensee/lender may take as
security any person property.

Compl. [1] at 4 (unaltered).
The FCRA “regulates the consumer reporting agencies that compile and disseminate
personal information about consumers.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 418 (2021).
Under the Act, “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall, upon request, and subject to section
1681h(a)(1) of this title, clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer . . . [a]ll information in
the consumer’s file at the time of the request.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2). The Act defines a
“consumer reporting agency” as
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility
of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer
reports.

Id. § 1681a(f).
Defendant submits that Plaintiff has not alleged that it qualifies as a “consumer reporting
agency.” Def.’s Mem. [19] at 7. Nor does he allege it “regularly engages” in assembling or
evaluating credit information to furnish reports to third parties. Id. The Court agrees. Indeed, it

2 See Letter 1-1; Mot. to Strike [20] at 4
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691, Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Mot. [21] at 5 (citing to Equal Credit
Opportunity Act); Mot. [22] at 5 (same).
is hard to decipher what Gibson alleges Defendant did—other than deny his loan application—or
how it violated the FCRA. The FCRA claim will be dismissed. But, because Plaintiff’s claim
under the FCRA lacks factual detail, he will be allowed to seek leave to amend.
Mississippi Credit Availability Act (MCAA). As quoted above, Gibson combines the

FCRA and the MCAA into one allegation. Compl. [1] at 4. Defendant says the MCCA claim
should be dismissed for two reasons: (1) there is no private right of action under Mississippi
Code section 75-67-629; and (2) the MCAA “does not impose any obligation to disclose
consumer files to private individuals.” Def.’s Mem. [19] at 8. Because Defendant’s first
argument is dispositive; the Court does not reach the second point.
The MCAA provides that, when the Mississippi Commissioner of Banking and
Consumer Finance “has reasonable cause to believe that a person is violating any provision of
this article,” “the commissioner may sue in any circuit court of the state having jurisdiction and
venue to enjoin the person from engaging in or continuing the violation or from doing any action
in furtherance of the violation.” Miss. Code Ann. § 75-67-629 (3); see id. § 75-67-603(c)

(defining commissioner). The statute does not provide a private right of action. The MCAA
claim is therefore dismissed. And because this defect is incurable, leave to amend is
unwarranted.
Consumer Rights/Breach of Contract. Gibson says he has a claim for breach of contract
“regarding the [CCFM] Privacy Policy/Agreement.” Compl. [1] at 4 (capitalization altered).
And he asserts that “[d]ishonoring basic consumer rights due to failure to provide requested list
of collateral within fourteen (14) days thus resulting in default to such contractual obligations.”
Id.
“The elements of a breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a valid and binding
contract; (2) that the defendant has broken[] or breached it; and (3) that the plaintiff has been
thereby damaged monetarily.” Favre Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Cinque Bambini, 863 So. 2d 1037,
1044 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); see Def.’s Mem. [19] at 10. CCFM says Gibson has not alleged

“that any enforceable contract existed between himself and CCFM.” Def.’s Mem. [19] at 10.
And, as Defendant points out, Gibson attached a Letter to his Complaint indicating his
“application to CCFM was denied and that the parties never entered into a contract with one
another.” Id.; see Letter [1-1].3
The Court agrees that Gibson hasn’t alleged facts supporting a breach-of-contract claim.
This might be incurable, but given his pro se status, he will be allowed to seek leave to amend.
If he attempts to plead a breach-of-contract claim, he will need to describe the contract between
himself and CCFM and is instructed to attach that contract to his proposed amended complaint.
In sum, the Court finds Defendant’s motion to dismiss [18] should be granted. Gibson
may seek leave to file an amended complaint as to these claims: (1) discrimination in lending;

(2) FCRA; and (3) breach of contract.
III. Other Motions
A. Motion for Discovery [15]
To start, because the Court has granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, discovery is
inappropriate. But even if the motion had been denied, Gibson’s request for discovery is
premature. Under Rule 26(d)(1), “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the

3 Even assuming a contract exists that CCFM breached, it is unclear how Gibson was damaged
monetarily. He claims he suffered “[e]motional and physical damages due to oxidative stress”
and seeks “relief regarding medical malpractice of two hundred million dollars.” Compl. [1] at
5.
parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial
disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court
order.” The exceptions don’t apply, and nothing in the record suggests that the parties have had
their Rule 26(f) conference. “Without evidence of either the Rule 26(f) conference or a Rule 16

Scheduling Order, Rule 26(d)(1) generally precludes a party from seeking discovery.” Angers v.
Franco, No. 24-688, 2025 WL 50032, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2025).4 Under Rules 26(d)(1) and
(f), Gibson may not yet engage in discovery.5 The motion for discovery [15] is denied.
B. Motion to Strike [20]
Gibson labeled this filing as a “Motion to Strike/Enforce Statutory Disclosure
Obligations/Compel Compliance with Due Process/Fair Procedure.” Mot. to Strike [20] at 1.
CCFM responded in opposition [24]. It is not apparent what filing Plaintiff seeks to strike.
CCFM assumes he seeks to strike its motion to dismiss and properly argues that its motion is
permitted by Rule 12(b)(6). Def.’s Resp. [24] at 1.
Gibson does expand on his claims through a section titled “Statement of Facts,” Mot. to

Strike [20] at 4, and “Grounds for the Motion,” id. at 4–9. But such a motion is not the place to
raise new claims, facts, or legal theories. He may include these points in his motion for leave to
amend his complaint, if he chooses to file one. Plaintiff’s motion [20] is denied.

4 The Rule 26(f) conference should take place “at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is
to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1). The Court
has not yet set the case for a scheduling conference.

5 In addition to being premature, Gibson’s request for discovery is procedurally improper. After
the parties have their Rule 26(f) conference, the appropriate mechanism for Gibson to obtain
discovery from CCFM is by serving it with discovery requests under Rules 33, 34, and 36.
C. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment/Motion for Default Judgment [22]
Gibson titled this motion as a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment/Default
Judgment,” so the Clerk properly docketed the filing as two motions. Mots. [21, 22] at 1.
Because the Court finds that CCFM’s motion to dismiss should be granted, partial summary

judgment in Gibson’s favor is inappropriate. In addition, Gibson has not met the requirements of
Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”). Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment [21] is denied.
As for the request for default judgment, Gibson neither addresses nor complies with
Rule 55’s requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b). The Clerk had denied Gibson’s motion
for clerk’s entry of default [10]. See Jan. 6, 2026 Docket Entry [11]. In addition, the motion
lacks merit because CCFM is not in default. It filed a responsive pleading—the motion to
dismiss—as allowed by Rule 12(a)(4). Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment [22] is denied.
C. Motion to Supplement the Record [23]

Invoking Rule 15(d), Gibson next asks for permission to supplement the record,
apparently to add a summary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and an abstract of an article on
Oxidative Stress and the Central Nervous System. See Attachs. [23-1]. Rule 15(d) gives the
Court authority to “permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction,
occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented,” but it’s not
apparent that the supplementation Gibson seeks would qualify under Rule 15(d). Even if it did,
Gibson’s motion violates Local Rule 15, which requires a party seeking leave to file a
supplemental pleading to include as an exhibit to the motion the proposed supplemental
pleading. Plaintiff’s motion to supplement [23] is denied.
E. Motion for Clarification [29]
Finally, Gibson seeks “clarification and explanation regarding certain procedural aspects
reflected in the dockets and upon the record, so that the Petitioner may accurately understand the
basis, scope, and procedural posture” of the lawsuit. Mot. for Clarification [29] at 1. CCFM did

not respond, and the time to do so has passed.
Gibson asks the Court to clarify the procedures, issues resolved, applicable standards, and
“limitations, conditions, or assumptions that shall be relied upon in reaching the determination.” Id. This Order does that. The motion [29] is therefore granted.
As explained, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss but will allow Gibson to
seek leave to amend his complaint as to certain claims. If he chooses to do so, he must attach a
proposed amended complaint as an exhibit to his motion seeking leave to amend. CCFM may
oppose that motion if it believes Gibson still fails to state a claim. Gibson may then file a reply.
The standards addressed in this Order will apply when the Court determines whether Gibson’s
proposed amended complaint states a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Gibson’s proposed amended complaint should both identify his claims and present the
facts supporting those claims. In other words, the proposed amended complaint will need to
plainly state the kind of discrimination he alleges. As for the facts, statements like Defendant
discriminated “against such applicant application denying such person of their God Giving
Rights of equality” is a legal conclusion that cannot be considered when deciding whether he has
stated a claim. Compl. [1] at 4. Gibson’s proposed amended complaint should therefore include
a plain-spoken description of the facts that support his claim (i.e., what happened that made him
think discrimination occurred).
If the Court grants his motion for leave to amend, the Court will then instruct Gibson to
file an amended complaint. And if the case progresses, the Court will set a case-management
conference.
III. Conclusion

The Court has considered all arguments raised; those not addressed would not have
changed the result.
For the reasons stated, CCFM’s motion to dismiss [18] is granted. Gibson’s claims under
§ 1983, the First Amendment, the Bill of Rights, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the MCCA
are dismissed with prejudice. His claims for discrimination in lending, violation of the FCRA,
and breach of contract are dismissed without prejudice.
If he chooses, Gibson may move for leave to file an amended complaint under
Rule 15(a)(2) within 14 days of this Order. The motion for leave must comply with Local Rule
15, which requires Gibson to include, as an exhibit to the motion, the proposed amended
complaint. See L. U. Civ. R. 15.

If Gibson declines to seek leave to amend his complaint, this action will be dismissed
with prejudice to refiling and without further notice.
Plaintiff’s motions [15, 20, 21, 22, 23] are denied; Plaintiff’s motion for clarification [29]
is granted.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 22nd day of April, 2026.

s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE