Getachew et al. v. City of Willowick - Racial Discrimination in Code Enforcement

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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Lemma Getachew, et al. v. City of Willowick, et al.

District Court, N.D. Ohio

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-00219

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (81.7K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LEMMA GETACHEW, et al., ) Case No. 1:25-cv-219
)
Plaintiffs, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge
) James E. Grimes, Jr.
CITY OF WILLOWICK, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Lemma Getachew and Guenet Indale filed suit against fourteen
Defendants for alleged violations of their federal civil rights. They also bring various
claims under State law. All Defendants jointly move for judgment on the pleadings.
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion for judgment
on the pleadings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in
Plaintiffs’ favor, as the Court must in the current procedural posture, the complaint
alleges the following facts.
Lemma Getachew and Guenet Indale, who are black, immigrated from
Ethiopia and are naturalized U.S. citizens. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 19 & 20, PageID #5.) The
two own Shoregate Towers NS, LLC (“STNS”). (Id., ¶ 21, PageID #6.) This entity
held title to Shoregate Towers, an apartment complex in the City of Willowick. (Id.,
¶ 22, PageID #6.)
Sean Brennan and Al Ferritto are building and housing inspectors for the City
of Willowick. (Id., ¶ 23, PageID #6.) Mr. Brennan and Mr. Ferritto enforce certain
building, housing, and zoning codes within the City of Willowick and perform annual

inspections of residential rental properties to assess compliance. (Id., ¶¶ 25 & 27,
PageID #6.) Bill Malovrh and Dan O’Connell are fire inspectors for the City of
Willowick. (Id., ¶ 24, PageID #6.) They enforce the Ohio Fire Code and perform
regular inspections of residential rental properties to ensure compliance. (Id., ¶¶ 26
& 28, PageID #6.)
The “customary practice in [N]ortheast Ohio” regarding building, housing, or

property-maintenance violations is “for a municipality to work with the property
owner to correct identified maintenance issues.” (Id., ¶ 44, PageID #9.) Once the
municipality is satisfied that alleged violations are being addressed, code
enforcement officers and prosecutors “have traditionally agreed to discontinue
pursuit of violation notices and/or criminal charges”. (Id., ¶ 46, PageID #10.) And
once a property has been brought into compliance, code enforcement officers and
prosecutors customarily “dismiss cases against an alleged offender.” (Id., ¶ 45,

PageID #9.) However, Plaintiffs allege that the City of Willowick did not follow this
customary practice with respect to Shoregate Towers. (Id., ¶ 47, PageID #10.)
“Prior to Plaintiffs’ acquisition of their ownership interest in Shoregate
Towers,” Plaintiffs allege that building and housing officials “rarely visited” the
property and “generally did not follow up on maintenance inspections and/or alleged
violations.” (Id., ¶ 50, PageID #10.) In 2021 or 2022, Plaintiffs allege that the four
inspectors—Mr. Brennan, Mr. Ferritto, Mr. Malovrh, and Mr. O’Connell—learned of
Plaintiffs’ race and ethnicity. (Id., ¶ 29, PageID #7.) Then, these Defendants
allegedly “began increasing their code enforcement activities” at Shoregate Towers,

including issuing violation notices to STNS for alleged property-maintenance
deficiencies (id., ¶¶ 30–31 & 51, PageID #7 & #10), and Mr. Brennan and Mr. Ferritto
“refused to reinspect” Shoregate Towers to verify that STNS addressed the
maintenance issues (id., ¶¶32–33, PageID #7).
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Brennan and Mr. Ferritto treated Shoregate Towers
in a “different manner” from “other similarly situated properties within the City of

Willowick.” (Id., ¶¶34–35, PageID #7.) They claim that “the City and its employees
engaged in a pattern of harassment” in the enforcement of code violations at
Shoregate Towers. (Id., ¶ 48, PageID #10.) From December 2021 through August
2024, Mr. Brennan and Mr. Ferritto appeared at Shoregate Towers on a “regular
basis,” “often visiting the [p]roperty several times a day,” and “engaged on-site
management and maintenance staff in a relentless campaign of maintenance and
repair requests.” (Id., ¶ 49, PageID #10.) Beginning in December 2021, Mr. Brennan

“increased his code enforcement activity” by filing cases charging criminal code
violation against STNS for maintenance deficiencies. (Id., ¶ 36, PageID #7.) Also, he
filed criminal cases against Mr. Getachew and Ms. Indale individually. (Id., ¶ 37,
PageID #8.) Between December 1, 2021 and December 31, 2023, Mr. Brennan filed
thirteen separate criminal cases for property-maintenance code violations against
STNS and against Mr. Getachew and Ms. Indale. (Id., ¶ 38, PageID #8–9.) Six cases
were filed against Shoregate Towers. (Id.) Four cases were filed against
Mr. Getachew. (Id.) Three cases were filed against Ms. Indale. (Id.)
Plaintiffs allege that the proceedings included “duplicative and repetitive

claims” and were filed against Plaintiffs individually “contrary to customary
practice.” (Id., ¶¶ 39 & 52, PageID #9–10.) They claim that counsel for the City of
Willowick “refused to engage in customary negotiations with STNS” and “instead
insisted” that Plaintiffs and STNS plead guilty. (Id., ¶ 53, PageID #11.) Plaintiffs
allege that eleven of the thirteen cases resulted in “complete and final dismissals
and/or acquittals,” that none of the seven cases filed against them “resulted in a

judgment of conviction,” and that they “were ultimately absolved of all criminal
liability.” (Id., ¶¶ 40–42, PageID #9.)
Plaintiffs allege that “employees of the City” communicated with
representatives of Fannie Mae regarding the pending code violation cases (id., ¶ 54,
PageID #11), contacted tenants “to encourage those tenants to file complaints against
STNS . . . or to discontinue their tenancies” (id., ¶ 55, PageID #11), and communicated
with employees of Defendant Lake Metropolitan Housing Authority “to encourage

this entity to terminate its contracts with STNS” (id., ¶ 56, PageID #11). Lake
Metropolitan Housing Authority terminated its contact with STNS for Section 8
housing. (Id., ¶ 117, PageID #19.) Plaintiffs allege that it did so because of
“Brennan’s and Brewer’s conduct.” (Id.) “[A]ll because of the color of their skin, their
ethnicity[,] and their national origin,” Plaintiffs allege that the City of Willowick and
its employees intended to “destroy” Plaintiffs’ investment and “force” the dispossession
of their ownership interest in Shoregate Towers. (Id., ¶ 57, PageID #11.)
On May 24, 2024, Fannie Mae filed a foreclosure action in State court

regarding Shoregate Towers and moved to appoint a receiver. (Id., ¶ 67–68, PageID

12–13.) On August 16, 2024, the court appointed a receiver who assumed possession

and operational control of the property from STNS. (Id., ¶¶ 69–70, PageID #13.)
After the appointment of the receiver, Plaintiffs allege that the City of Willowick
ceased its code enforcement activity at Shoregate Towers, including inspections of the
property, discontinued all pending administrative enforcement actions against the

property, and stopped filing criminal cases for code violations. (Id., ¶¶ 71–73, PageID

13.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed this action against the City of Willowick, Sean Brennan, Al
Ferritto, Mandy Gwirtz, Stephanie Landgraf, Bill Malovrh, Dan O’Connell, and
Michael Vanni (the “Willowick Defendants”); the Lake Metropolitan Housing
Authority, Eric Martin, and Aaron Brewer (the “LMHA Defendants”); and the Fair

Housing Resource Center, Inc., Patricia Kidd, and Michelle Brunson (the “FHRC
Defendants”). (Id., ¶¶ 5–18, PageID #4–5.) Plaintiffs bring eight claims that arise
from the same alleged course of conduct, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of their civil rights, civil conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1985, and
defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, malicious prosecution,
and abuse of process under Ohio law. (Id., ¶¶ 58–119, PageID #11–19.)
The Willowick Defendants, LMHA Defendants, and FHRC Defendants filed
separate answers. (ECF No. 19; ECF No. 20; ECF No. 21.) Then, all Defendants
jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 27.)

ANALYSIS
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party
may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for
judgment on the pleadings essentially constitutes a delayed motion under Rule
12(b)(6) and is evaluated under the same standard. See, e.g., Holland v. FCA US
LLC, 656 F. App’x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2016). In other words, judgment on the pleadings

is appropriate where, construing the material allegations of the pleadings and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court
concludes that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anders
v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166, 1174 (6th Cir. 2021).
In construing the pleadings, the Court construes factual allegations in the light
most favorable to the non-movant, accepts them as true, and draws all reasonable
inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616 F. App’x 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2015). But a pleading must offer more than mere “labels and conclusions,”
because “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is a court required to accept
“[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations[.]”
Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations,”
which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not be. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of

further factual enhancement.”) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that
because some of the plaintiff’s factual allegations were “not well-pleaded[,]” “their
conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to the presumption of truth’”). Rule 8 “does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

Plaintiffs bring eight claims for violation of civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Claim 1); defamation (Claim 2); tortious interference with a business
relationship (with Lake Metropolitan Housing Authority) (Claim 3); tortious
interference with a business relationship (with Fannie Mae) (Claim 4); malicious
prosecution (Claim 5); abuse of process (Claim 6); defamation (Claim 7); and civil
conspiracy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Claim 8). Defendants argue that it is
unclear whether Plaintiffs are bringing the claim for malicious prosecution under

federal or State law. (ECF No. 27-1, PageID #198.) In their response, Plaintiffs
clarify that they are bringing this claim under State law. (ECF No. 29, PageID #239–
40.) The Court reads the complaint as bringing Claims 1 and 8 under federal law and
Claims 2–7 under State law. The Court notes that, in their response, Plaintiffs
include facts that they did not allege in the complaint. The Court cannot and does
not consider those facts in its analysis.
I. Defendants Vanni, Landgraf, Gwirtz, Martin, Kidd, and Brunson
As an initial matter, the Court dismisses the following Defendants: Michael
Vanni; Stephanie Landgraf; Mandy Gwirtz; Eric Martin; Patricia Kidd; and Michelle

Brunson. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege any wrongdoing by these
Defendants. (ECF No. 27-1, PageID #190.) Mr. Vanni, Ms. Landgraf, Ms. Gwirtz,
and Mr. Martin appear only in the complaint’s caption and in the section identifying
the parties. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2–5.) But there are no other allegations against
them. The only allegation against Ms. Kidd and Ms. Brunson is that they “regularly
attended hearings and other court appointments regarding STNS, Getachew and
Indale.” (Id., ¶ 105, PageID #17–18.) Plaintiffs do not address these arguments in

their brief. Therefore, the Court finds that they have abandoned their claims, if any,
against these Defendants. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES these Defendants.
II. Federal Claims (Claims 1 and 8)
Plaintiffs bring two federal claims for “violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983” (Claim 1) and civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Claim 8). The Court
reads the complaint as bringing Claim1 against the Willowick Defendants (other than
Ms. Gwirtz, Ms. Landgraf, and Mr. Vanni—leaving the City of Willowick,

Mr. Brennan, Mr. Ferritto, Mr. Malovrh, and Mr. Vanni) and Claim 8 against all
remaining Defendants.
II.A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim 1)
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) “a right
secured by the United States Constitution”; and (2) “the deprivation of that right”
(3) “by a person acting under color of state law.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t
of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) (abrogated on other grounds)). Defendants argue
that the complaint “leaves the Willowick Defendants and this Court speculating as to

what kind of violation allegedly occurred, how such a violation occurred, and what
right or protection is implicated.” (ECF No. 27-1, PageID #191.) Defendants argue
that the complaint is “too murky and ambiguous to sufficiently put the Willowick
Defendants on notice of what they must defend against”. (Id.) In their response,
Plaintiffs argue that they alleged a claim for selective enforcement. (ECF No. 29,
PageID #231.)

The Court determines that the complaint does not make clear the theory
Plaintiffs assert. It could be a claim for racial discrimination. But Plaintiffs do not
say that. It could be a claim for deprivation of property. But Plaintiffs do not say
that either. Because Plaintiffs fail to identify the type of claim in their complaint,
Plaintiffs fail to provide fair notice to the Willowick Defendants of the claim against
which they must defend. Doing so in a brief opposing a motion to dismiss does not
provide the notice the Rules require. To clarify their claim, Plaintiffs could have

amended their complaint as of right in response to Defendants’ motion, but they did
not do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Nor do they so much as suggest any where in
their papers that they want to seek leave to amend. In any event, at this point, doing
so would not be proper. See Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 214 F.3d 776, 783–84
(6th Cir. 2000).
Rule 8 requires more than alleging numerous facts and saying, in effect, there
must be a violation of a constitutional right in there somewhere. That is what this
complaint does. Plaintiffs do not even point to anything that allows the Court to infer

that such a violation occurred. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Section
1983 claim.
II.B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Claim 8)
Though Plaintiffs do not specify under which subsection of Section 1985 they
proceed, the Court reads the complaint as bringing a claim for conspiracy under
Section 1985(3). To establish a claim under Section 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege
facts showing:

(1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of
depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons the equal
protection of the laws[,] and (3) an act in furtherance of that conspiracy
(4) that causes injury to person or property, or a deprivation of a right
or privilege of a United States citizen.

Brown v. Cioffi, No. 24-1168, 2024 WL 5440982, at *16 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2024)
(quoting Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 233 (6th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff “must plead
conspiracy claims ‘with some degree of specificity and. . . vague and conclusory
allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a claim.’”
Arsan v. Keller, 784 F. App’x 900, 913–14 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987)).
As with Claim 1, the Court determines that Plaintiffs fail to identify the
federally protected right that is the subject of Defendants’ alleged conspiracy.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to provide notice to the Defendants. Therefore, the Court
DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Section 1985 claim.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ Section 1985 claim was the only claim brought
against the LMHA Defendants. Accordingly, the Court’s dismissal of this claim has
the effect of dismissing the LMHA Defendants from the action.

III. State-Law Claims (Claims 2 through 7)
Plaintiffs assert six State-law claims against the remaining Defendants. (ECF
No. 1, PageID #14–18.) The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these State-
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under federal law “the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). This grant of jurisdiction brings

all claims arising from a common nucleus of operative fact before the Court. Soehnlen
v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2016).
Even then, a court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” in
certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c). Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine
of discretion.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
To determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should

consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.]” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see also James v. Hampton, 592 F. App’x 449, 462-
63 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1882 (6th Cir. 1993)). Section 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex
issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court may, in
its discretion, either retain jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ State-law claims and proceed
on the merits, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639-40 (2009), or
decline jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ right to
pursue the remaining claims in State court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). “[G]enerally
‘when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations

usually will point to dismissing the state law claims.” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Columbus, 423 F. App’x 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Musson Theatrical v. Fed.
Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Juergensen v. Midland
Funding, LLC, No. 5:18-cv-1825, 2018 WL 5923707, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2018).
Based on its review of the record and because the case remains in its early
stages, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ State-law claims against the remaining Defendants. Therefore, the Court

DISMISSES these claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings on all claims against Defendants Michael Vanni,
Stephanie Landgraf, Mandy Gwirtz, Eric Martin, Patricia Kidd, and Michelle
Brunson and the federal claims against the remaining Defendants (Claims 1 and 8).
Further, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
State-law claims (Claims 2—7) and DISMISSES them WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 27, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio

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