Teran et al. v. Lawn Enforcement Inc. - FLSA Overtime Settlement $137,500

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Alfredo Teran, Eliberto Perez Ambrosio, Baltazar Calderon, Jr., Ismael Guel, Patricio Martinez, Ricardo Teran, Trinidad Teran, Xavier Teran v. Lawn Enforcement, Inc., Jamie Walker, individually, and Jason Braden, individually

District Court, W.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-02338

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (944)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
ALFREDO TERAN, ELIBERTO PEREZ )
AMBROSIO, BALTAZAR CALDERON, )
JR., ISMAEL GUEL, PATRICIO )
MARTINEZ, RICARDO TERAN, )
TRINIDAD TERAN, XAVIER TERAN, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
No. 2:22-cv-02338-SHL-tmp
v. )
)
LAWN ENFORCEMENT, INC., JAMIE )
WALKER, individually, and JASON )
BRADEN, individually, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Alfredo Teran, Eliberto Perez Ambrosio, Baltazar Calderon,
Jr., Ismael Guel, Patricio Martinez, Ricardo Teran, Trinidad Teran, and Xavier Teran’s Motion
for Entry of Judgment, filed April 6, 2026. (ECF No. 162.) Counsel for Plaintiffs and for
Defendants Lawn Enforcement, Inc., Jamie Walker, and Jason Braden, appeared for a status
conference on March 31, 2026, at which the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a Motion for
Approval of Settlement or a Motion for Judgment by April 7, 2026, if no joint motion to approve
the settlement had been filed by that date. (EFC No. 161.)
The Parties represented to the Court at the status conference that they had agreed to settle
this matter for $137,500.00, but that the payment schedule had not been finalized. The Motion
for Entry of Judgment now before the Court details the terms of an agreement between the
Parties and, pursuant to that agreement, Plaintiffs seek an entry of judgment of $137,500.00.
(ECF No. 162 at PageID 2079.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendants declined to join in the
motion (see ECF No. 164), but Defendants have not filed any opposition to the motion, and their
time to do so has passed. For the reasons outlined below, the Motion for Entry of Judgment is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND

On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff Alfredo Teran initiated this action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., alleging that Defendants failed to pay him overtime
compensation. (ECF No. 1.) Teran filed an amended complaint on June 8, 2022, adding the
other Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 7.) In the amended complaint, Teran alleged that the landscaping
company Lawn Enforcement, Inc., and its owners, Braden and Walker, failed to pay Plaintiffs
overtime during the weeks that they worked in excess of forty hours, as is required under the
FLSA for non-exempt employees.
Over the past nearly four years, the Parties have litigated the case and eventually, based
on arm’s length negotiations, reached an agreement as to a settlement to compensate Plaintiffs
for the overtime wages that they were entitled to. The $137,500 settlement includes $40,001.66

in attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 162 at PageID 2080.) Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that counsel has
expended more than $92,000.00 in attorney time litigating this matter, significantly more than
the amount counsel would be receiving pursuant to the settlement. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Congress enacted the FLSA to protect employees “who sacrifice a full measure of their
freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.” Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Loc.
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944). An employer who engages in certain prohibited practices,
like failing to pay overtime, is liable to a covered employee for back wages and liquidated
damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). Because of the unequal bargaining power between the
parties, they can only settle a claim for back wages if (1) the Secretary of Labor supervises the
payment of back wages or (2) the district court approves the proposed settlement agreement.
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States ex rel. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 679 F.2.d 1350, 1352–53
(11th Cir. 1982). Here, the parties have agreed on a settlement.

A district court must scrutinize a proposed FLSA settlement to determine whether it is a
“fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.” Nutting v.
Unilever Mfg. (U.S.) Inc., No. 2:14-cv-02239, 2014 WL 2959481, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 13,
2014) (quoting Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355). The court looks to both the process of achieving
the settlement and its substance. See Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1354. A fair and reasonable
process is one in which the plaintiff is protected by attorneys who preserved her rights in an
adversarial context. Id. To determine whether the compromise itself is fair and reasonable, the
court looks to:
(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and
the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiff's success on the
merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of the counsel.

Nutting, 2014 WL 2959481, at *3 (quoting Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2010)).
ANALYSIS
Based on a review of the Motion, which addresses the bulk of the Nutting factors, the
Court finds that the proposed agreement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide FLSA
dispute. During the settlement negotiation process, the Parties engaged the assistance of a well-
respected mediator (ECF No. 119), were protected by attorneys who preserved their rights, and
settled the claims in an adversarial context, as is evidenced by the extensive motion practice the
Parties engaged in, the length of time the matter has been pending, and the experienced wage-
and-hour counsel engaged by both sides.
The proposed agreement also represents a fair and reasonable compromise of the disputed
issues. Indeed, Plaintiffs assert that the records of Defendants that they evaluated actually

understate the number of hours that Plaintiffs worked and thus the payments that they would be
entitled to. (See ECF No. 162 at PageID 2079.) Moreover, after deducting attorney’s fees and
costs, the net recovery is $97,498.34. which “exceeds the damages supported by Defendants’
records when analyzed under Plaintiffs’ theory of the case and reflects a negotiated, risk-adjusted
resolution of the claims at issue.” (Id. at PageID 2080.) Plaintiffs also accurately assert that
there are risks and costs associated with continued litigation that can be avoided through the
settlement. (Id.)
The Court also finds no evidence of fraud or collusion. See Nutting, 2014 WL 2959481,
at *3. Moreover, the parties have already exchanged discovery, and settlement now will avoid
additional expenditures of time and resources in this case, which is long past due to be resolved,

and, as the Motion explains, has already seen “substantial time, expense, and resources required
to litigate this matter to its current posture.” (ECF No. 162 at PageID 2080.) The range of
possible recovery is relatively fixed and defined by statute, so there is little risk that the proposed
settlement will deprive Plaintiffs of a fair result. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). The terms of the
agreement, as articulated by the Parties throughout this litigation, are fair and reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Entry of Judgment.
Plaintiffs are awarded $137,500. Plaintiffs’ request for an award of post-judgment interest
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is premature, and is therefore DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. To the extent Plaintiffs seek their costs of enforcement and reasonable attorneys’
fees incurred in enforcing the judgment, that request is also premature and is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of April, 2026.

s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE