Flock camera data upheld on appeal

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April 7, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Eddie Eugene Robinson v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Court of Appeals of Virginia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1912241

• Disposition: Trial court did not err denying motion to suppress warrantless data obtained from Flock system; images of vehicles captured are already publicly viewable; as Flock system took pictures of vehicle license plate and exterior on public street no reasonable expectation of privacy and not a search; police not required under Fourth Amendment to obtain search warrant to access system

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (33.5K)

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Disposition

Trial court did not err denying motion to suppress warrantless data obtained from Flock system; images of vehicles captured are already publicly viewable; as Flock system took pictures of vehicle license plate and exterior on public street no reasonable expectation of privacy and not a search; police not required under Fourth Amendment to obtain search warrant to access system

Combined Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 1912-24-1

EDDIE EUGENE ROBINSON
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Beales, Malveaux and Frucci
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
Opinion Issued April 7, 2026

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Jamilah D. LeCruise, Judge1

J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Israel-David J.J. Healy, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,2 Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.

PUBLISHED OPINION BY
JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES

Eddie Eugene Robinson entered conditional guilty pleas to three felony charges of

statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91, one felony charge of larceny of lottery tickets

in violation of Code § 58.1-4018.1(A), one charge of grand larceny in violation of Code

§ 18.2-95(ii), and one charge of being a nonviolent felon in possession of a firearm in violation

of Code § 18.2-308.2(A). On appeal, Robinson contends that the circuit court erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence from automatic license plate reader cameras made by Flock

1
Judge David W. Lannetti denied Robinson’s motion to suppress, which is the issue
before the Court in this appeal.
2
Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026.
Safety (“Flock cameras”), arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

I. BACKGROUND3

In 2023, the City of Norfolk installed a system of 172 cameras at intersections on public

roadways throughout Norfolk. They capture still images of cars and their license plates and store

the information—the license plate number, the color, manufacturer, and model of the car, as well

as any identifying characteristics such as roof racks or bumper stickers—on servers for 30 days.

Norfolk Police detectives have access to the database, and they can use it to search for particular

vehicles in particular places. Police can narrow their search of the Flock database by location or

timeframe but generally cannot track a vehicle in real time.

Over the course of three weeks in November 2023, several commercial storefronts in

Norfolk were broken into and a number of items stolen, all in the early hours of the morning.

The first of these occurred on November 5, 2023, at around 3:50 a.m., when someone broke into

Nu Beauty Supply. The owner reported that money and merchandise had been stolen.

Surveillance footage of the burglary showed that the perpetrator was wearing a hoodie, a head

covering, a medical mask, and duck boots.

On November 12, 2023, at around 3:00 a.m., someone broke into George’s Seafood. The

owner reported that money and an iPad had been stolen. Surveillance footage of the burglary

showed that the perpetrator was wearing a hoodie, a backpack, a face mask, and duck boots.

On November 29, 2023, at around 4:00 a.m., someone broke into Quick Serve. The

owner reported that money and lottery tickets had been stolen. Surveillance footage of the

burglary showed a black male wearing a hoodie, a backpack, and duck boots.

3
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we ‘consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)).
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Adam Hankins, an investigator at Virginia Lottery, entered the numbers of the stolen

lottery tickets into a database that alerts investigators if someone attempts to cash them in. At

9:15 a.m. on November 29, 2023, the same day that Quick Serve was broken into, the database

notified Investigator Hankins that someone had attempted to cash in one of the stolen tickets at

Miller’s Store, a gas station in Norfolk. Investigator Hankins accessed the surveillance footage

from Miller’s and, believing the person depicted at Miller’s to match the description of the

person who broke into Quick Serve, shared still photographs from the footage with the Norfolk

Police Department. One of the photographs showed a white BMW SUV with black rims but did

not show the car’s license plate.

Knowing that there were two Flock cameras near Miller’s, Norfolk Police Detective

Kevin Gross entered the make and model of the vehicle into the Flock system, limiting his search

to the two hours surrounding the burglary. The Flock system returned one image of a white

BMW with black rims, and its license plate.4 Detective Gross then looked up the license plate

number in a Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles database, which revealed Robinson as the

car’s registered owner. The DMV search also yielded a photo of Robinson, whom Detective

Gross determined to be the same person depicted in the footage of the burglary at Quick Serve.

Detective Gross obtained an arrest warrant for Robinson, and Robinson was arrested on

December 4, 2023. Detective Gross also obtained a search warrant for Robinson’s home, in

which officers found lottery tickets stolen from Quick Serve, checks made out to George’s

Seafood, and beauty products sold by Nu Beauty Supply. Officers also found a firearm in

4
Detective Gross could not recall how many white BMW SUVs the Flock system
returned but was able to identify Robinson’s vehicle because of its “distinctive black rims.” He
testified, “Not many pictures that I [had] seen while looking at that data had black rims.”
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Robinson’s home. Robinson was charged with felony burglary, grand larceny, and larceny of

lottery tickets.5

Robinson moved to suppress, arguing that the warrantless search of the Flock database

violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence obtained as a result of the Flock search—

the stolen property and weapon found in his home—should be suppressed. After a hearing, the

circuit court denied Robinson’s motion to suppress.

Robinson entered conditional guilty pleas to three felony charges of statutory burglary,

one felony charge of larceny of lottery tickets, one charge of grand larceny, and one charge of

being a nonviolent felon in possession of a firearm. Robinson now appeals to this Court.

II. ANALYSIS

Robinson argues,

The trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to
suppress the warrantless obtaining of location and movement data
of the Appellant’s vehicle by police from the collection and storage
of license plate and location information by means of the Flock
System which constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment requiring a warrant.

A. Standard of Review

“The law regarding appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is

well settled. The appellant bears the burden of establishing that reversible error occurred.”

Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 474 (2020) (quoting Glenn v. Commonwealth, 275

Va. 123, 130 (2008)). “A defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth

Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171,

5
Robinson was indicted for several other commercial burglaries: T&T Seafood Market,
Cajun Seafood, Golden City Chinese Food, Mina Seafood, and Latiendita Costa Del Mar. The
Commonwealth later nolle prossed several of these charges in exchange for Robinson’s
conditional guilty plea. Robinson stipulated to the burglaries of Nu Beauty Supply, George’s
Seafood, and Quick Serve.
-4-
177 (2009) (quoting McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 551-52 (2008)). “We are bound

by the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are plainly wrong or unsupported by the

evidence.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 273-74 (2010) (quoting Whitehead v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 300, 306-07 (2009)). This “Court reviews de novo the overarching

question of whether a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.” Williams, 71 Va. App.

at 475 (citing Glenn, 275 Va. at 130). “Whether a particular governmental intrusion is

reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the particular facts and

circumstances of the case.” Bennett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 863, 865 (1972) (citing Cabbler

v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 522 (1971)).

B. The Flock System and the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The “basic purpose of this Amendment . . . is to safeguard

the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”

Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).

Therefore, a search without a warrant is “presumptively unreasonable.” Bryant v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 179, 187-88 (2020) (quoting Glenn, 275 Va. at 130).

“Since Katz v. United States, the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been

the question whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of

privacy.’” Rideout v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 779, 786 (2014) (alteration in original)

(citation omitted) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984)). In other words, a

search violates the Fourth Amendment if it invades a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

New technology often “does not fit neatly under existing precedents.” Carpenter v.

United States, 585 U.S. 296, 306 (2018). “[A]s technology continues to enhance the

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‘Government’s ability to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes,’ courts

must assure that individuals maintain the ‘degree of privacy against government that existed

when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454, 462

(E.D. Va. 2024) (quoting Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 305). See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.

27, 34 (2001).

In Knotts, police installed a beeper in a container of chloroform that allowed them to

track the container’s location as it was driven on public highways. United States v. Knotts, 460

U.S. 276, 278-79 (1983). The United States Supreme Court held that the warrantless use of the

beeper was constitutional because “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police

from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as

science and technology afforded them in this case.” Id. at 282 (citing United States v. Lee, 274

U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).

In Carpenter, the United States Supreme Court held that accessing a person’s cell-site

location information (“CSLI”) required a search warrant because CSLI “provides an all-

encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.” 585 U.S. at 311. In that case, the CSLI

captured 127 days of Carpenter’s movements, with an average of 101 data points per day. Id. at

302. The United States Supreme Court stated that CSLI “provides an intimate window into a

person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial,

political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’” because “[a] cell phone faithfully

follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices,

political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” Id. at 310-11 (quoting United

States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)). “Accordingly, when the Government tracks the

location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle

monitor to the phone’s user.” Id. at 311-12. The Court held that using CSLI to create and

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maintain a comprehensive chronicle of a person’s movements for a period of over 100 days

invaded that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 311, 313. Thus, the Supreme

Court held, accessing the data was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and

required a search warrant. Id. at 316.

Finally, in Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that an aerial surveillance program that tracked the

movements of people and vehicles in Baltimore violated the Fourth Amendment because its

extensive tracking of city residents revealed “intimate details through habits and patterns.”

Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department, 2 F.4th 330, 341 (4th Cir. 2021)

(en banc). The cameras were operated from the air twelve hours a day—only during daylight—

and covered ninety percent of the city. Id. at 334. The data was retained for 45 days. Id. The

court applied Carpenter in holding that a search warrant was required to access the system. Id.

at 341-42.

These precedents guide our review. As our Supreme Court has instructed, “Whether a

particular governmental intrusion is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case.” Bennett, 212 Va. at 865 (citing

Cabbler, 212 Va. at 522). We find that the use of the Flock system in this case is similar to

Knotts, but significantly factually distinguishable from both Carpenter and Leaders of a

Beautiful Struggle.

As a threshold matter, Robinson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the physical

characteristics of his vehicle as he drove it down a public street. In the case now before us, as in

Knotts, the use of the Flock cameras did not constitute a search because “the movements of the

vehicle . . . had been ‘voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.’” Carpenter, 585

U.S. at 306 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281). Indeed, as this Court has recently stated, “A

-7-
person driving his vehicle on a public street with his license plate in plain view has no reasonable

expectation of privacy that his vehicle and license plate will not be seen by other persons,

including law enforcement officers.” Commonwealth v. Church, No. 0737-25-1, slip op. at 4,

2025 Va. App. LEXIS 627, at *5 (Oct. 14, 2025) (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).

Moreover, it simply cannot be said that the City of Norfolk’s system of Flock cameras

amounted to “near perfect surveillance.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 312. The 172 Flock cameras

situated throughout Norfolk are not as intrusive as the cell towers in Carpenter that monitor the

movement of cell phones both inside and outside of homes and buildings—or the surveillance of

a city from the air in Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle. The images captured by the Flock cameras

are of vehicles, not persons, and the only pieces of information collected—license plates and

physical characteristics of the vehicle—are already publicly viewable to anyone who sees the

vehicle on the street. The search of the Flock system yielded a photo of Robinson’s car as it

passed down a public highway. The cameras did not continuously monitor all of his travels

around the city and did not create an “intimate window” of Robinson’s overall movements and

associations. See, e.g., Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, ___ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (E.D. Va. 2026)

(noting that the Flock cameras appear intermittently “across the many miles of Norfolk roadways

such that they are incapable of cataloging the whole of vehicles’ movements”). Unlike in

Carpenter and Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, the Flock system takes only still images of a

vehicle’s exterior as it passes down public thoroughfares—not of the person. It is not “a detailed

chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several

years.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 315.

Thus, Detective Gross did not have to obtain a search warrant to access the Flock system

because he was merely requesting information that showed still images of a vehicle in which

Robinson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In addition, the Flock cameras did

-8-
not augment police officers’ sensory faculties to an impermissible degree. The cameras

interspersed along public roads throughout the City of Norfolk are hardly analogous to the 127

days of cell-site location information at issue in Carpenter, and the images are only stored on

servers for 30 days. The scope and scale of the information captured by the Flock cameras are

also not analogous to the aerial surveillance of every movement of virtually every resident of

Baltimore for twelve hours a day that the Fourth Circuit considered in Leaders of a Beautiful

Struggle. For all of these reasons, we therefore hold that the use of the Flock system in this case

did not constitute a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.

We are also persuaded by recent federal cases that have already addressed the Flock

systems in Richmond and Norfolk. See United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va.

2024) (Richmond); Schmidt, ___ F. Supp. 3d at ___ (Norfolk). While not binding on this Court,

we find these federal district court decisions instructive as they concern the same system of

cameras as in the case now before this Court. In Martin, the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia held that police officers in Richmond and Chesterfield County did

not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy by using information obtained from the Flock

system in their investigation of the defendant, Martin. 753 F. Supp. 3d at 476. In that case, out

of 2,500 photographs taken of vehicles in a 30-day period, only three were of the defendant’s

vehicle. Id. at 472. In Schmidt, the court held that the City of Norfolk’s system of Flock

cameras—the very same system at issue in the case now before this Court—did not violate the

plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights and awarded summary judgment to the City of Norfolk.6

___ F. Supp. 3d at ___. Both Martin and Schmidt distinguished Carpenter and Leaders of a

6
In Schmidt, the plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
-9-
Beautiful Struggle, finding that those cases involved much more invasive searches. Martin, 753

F. Supp. 3d at 471-73; Schmidt, ___ F. Supp. 3d at ___.

The Virginia Supreme Court has stated that an assessment of whether a new technology

runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment is a fact-based inquiry. See Bennett, 212 Va. at 865. See

also Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (“This Court must rule on the facts as they are and may not

speculate about what the future may hold for Flock’s capabilities.”). We must decide each case

on its facts and therefore our decision is based on the current system of Flock cameras in the City

of Norfolk. We decline to speculate as to when—or if—the Flock cameras could create such “a

comprehensive chronicle” of a person’s movements where that person would then have a

reasonable expectation of privacy. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 300. The search of the Flock database

in this case was not an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

III. CONCLUSION

In short, because the Flock system simply took pictures of the license plate of Robinson’s

vehicle and the exterior of his vehicle as he drove it down public thoroughfares in the City of

Norfolk, the police were not required under the Fourth Amendment to obtain a search warrant in

order to access the Flock system. Consequently, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

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