Boyle v Commonwealth of Australia - Vexatious Litigation

Original Word Document (141 KB) Federal Court of Australia

Boyle v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2026] FCA 381

| File number: | SAD 78 of 2024 |
| | |
| Judgment of: | CHARLESWORTH J |
| | |
| Date of judgment: | 2 April 2026 |
| | |
| Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – strike out of pleading and summary dismissal – applicant conducting a proceeding in a vexing manner – applicant fabricating medical evidence to obtain an adjournment and to otherwise mislead the Court – applicant’s pleading defective – applicant not availing herself of prior opportunity to replead – applicant alleging serious wrongdoing without sufficient evidentiary basis – applicant sending threatening correspondence to respondent’s solicitor and staff of the Court – role of solicitors and staff in the effective functioning of the Court as an institution – applicant alleging the Court is a co-conspirator in pleaded wrongdoing – applicant’s vexing conduct disentitling her to injunctive relief – originating application dismissed |
| | |
| Legislation: | Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 274.2

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 11, 31, 32, 41, 42, 43

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 37AM,

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39, 39B, 67G

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 9.61, 16.21, 26.01, 26.02, 26.21

Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA)

Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) |
| | |
| Cases cited: | Angelo Mitanis and Helen Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd & Ors [1997] FCA 1040

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Storm Financial Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liq) (No 5) [2012] FCA 954

Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Limited (1990) 169 CLR 279

Boyle v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCA 1310

Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697

Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380

Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock (2007) 232 CLR 245

Corporate Affairs Commission v Solomon [1989] NSWCA 51

Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658

Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) (2022) 294 FCR 346

Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (in liq) (recs and mgrs apptd) [2008] FCA 1920; 252 ALR 41

Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557; 217 ALR 171

Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401

McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101; 165 ALR 409

Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51

Rana v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 189

Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118

Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 109 |
| | |
| Division: | General Division |
| | |
| Registry: | South Australia |
| | |
| National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |
| | |
| Number of paragraphs: | 137 |
| | |
| Date of last submission: | Applicant: 16 March 2026 |
| | |
| Date of hearing: | 28 November 2025, 4 December 2025 |
| | |
| Counsel for the Applicant: | The Applicant appeared in person |
| | |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms S Heidenreich |
| | |
| Solicitor for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS

| | | SAD 78 of 2024 |
| | | |
| BETWEEN: | SHARON BOYLE

Applicant | |
| AND: | COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent | |

| order made by: | CHARLESWORTH J |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 2 APRIL 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The originating application is summarily dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the originating application.

3. Subject to paragraph 5, the respondent’s costs are to be assessed by a Registrar on a lump sum party-party basis.

4. A Registrar assessing costs in accordance with paragraph 3 may vary any order of the Court limiting the mode by which the applicant is to communicate with the Registry.

5. The respondent has liberty to apply for an order that costs be assessed on other than a lump sum party-party basis, such application to be made:

(a) on or before 1 May 2026;

(b) by affidavit accompanied by written submissions (not exceeding five pages) specifying the order sought and the factual basis for the order.

1. In the event that an application is filed in accordance with paragraph 5:

(a) on or before 29 May 2026 the applicant may (if so advised) file and serve an affidavit and written submissions (limited to five pages) in response; and

(b) on or before 12 June 2026 the respondent may (if so advised) file and serve affidavits and written submissions (not exceeding three pages) strictly in reply.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J

1 By her Statement of Claim the applicant, Ms Sharon Boyle, alleges that she has been the target of a criminal network in Australia and other countries, that she has been tortured and subjected to surveillance, that she has been involuntarily detained, and that she has been deliberately harmed by electronic, chemical and biological warfare. The alleged acts are said to form a part of a conspiracy between government agencies and other actors to prevent her from speaking out about the wrongdoing of others. Ms Boyle alleges that agencies of the Commonwealth of Australia have frustrated her attempts to prosecute this proceeding, including by interfering with her electronic devices and by assaulting her with the application of “heat light radiation and energy”. The alleged assaults are said to have caused illness and injuries which have prevented her from amending her Statement of Claim or justified adjournments from time to time. Ms Boyle has at times produced photographs depicting injuries to her face to support her claims of ongoing assaults.

2 Ms Boyle has alleged that the Commonwealth has acted in conjunction with State or other authorities to secure her detention in a mental health facility, resulting in her losing custody of her daughter for a period of time. She claims that the ongoing assaults form part of a plan to return her to detention and to again remove her daughter from her care. More recently, Ms Boyle has alleged that this Court forms a part of that conspiracy.

3 By way of final relief Ms Boyle seeks declarations that she has been the victim of “serious violations of the laws of the Commonwealth” and a victim of “serious human right violations”. In addition, she seeks a declaration that the Commonwealth by its “employees, officers and servants”) engaged in conduct amounting to malfeasance, harassment and defamation including the commission of unlawful acts “constituting torture in contravention of s 274.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Ms Boyle seeks injunctions, a letter of apology and an array of orders facilitating her resettlement to another country. The claims for relief include the following:

That any decision made by any service, tribunal court or other authority that determined the Applicant to be ‘mentally ill or mentally incompetent’ at any time to be set aside and a retraction notice issued to the relevant authority or authorities by the South Australian District Court Registrar.

4 In an interlocutory application Ms Boyle has disclosed that she seeks damages in the amount of $230 million.

5 I have previously dismissed an application for orders recusing myself from presiding in the action: Boyle v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCA 1310 (Boyle No 1). I rejected Ms Boyle’s submission that an apprehension of bias arose by reason of (among other things) her subjective belief that this Court was itself complicit in a conspiracy to cause her harm. Some of the procedural history is set out in Boyle No 1 and these reasons are to be read in conjunction with that judgment.

6 The following interlocutory applications are before the Court:

(1) Ms Boyle’s application for interlocutory injunctions and other relief to restrain the Commonwealth from engaging in conduct of the kind just described pending the resolution of the proceeding (Injunction Application); and

(2) The Commonwealth’s interlocutory application filed on 28 April 2025 seeking summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) or r 26.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Summary Judgment Application) or, alternatively, orders that the whole of the Statement of Claim be struck out pursuant to r 16.21 of the Rules (Strike Out Application).

SUMMARY OF OUTCOME

7 On the Strike Out Application I am satisfied that the Statement of Claim is liable to be struck out in its entirety with no opportunity to replead. I reject Ms Boyle’s contention that she has been unable to prepare an amended statement of claim because of wrongful interference by the Commonwealth. In the course of considering that contention, I have found that Ms Boyle has fabricated evidence in this proceeding for the purpose of misleading the Court. There should be no opportunity to replead, both because Ms Boyle has not availed herself of opportunities to amend, and because the proceeding is an abuse of process in any event.

8 On the Summary Judgment Application, I am satisfied that this action constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes in that it does not enjoy reasonable prospects of success. In addition, I have concluded that the originating application is liable to be dismissed because it has been conducted in a vexing manner.

9 Ms Boyle’s application for an interlocutory injunction will be dismissed because of my rejection of Ms Boyle’s claim that the Commonwealth is engaging in continuing acts of “torture” and because her conduct in fabricating evidence precludes the grant of injunctive relief in any event.

EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS

10 Between them, the parties have relied on a large amount of evidentiary material and transcript. It is not necessary to list the materials here as they are known to the parties. Ms Boyle was granted an extension of time to file additional submissions and those have been read. She was also granted leave to rely on a further affidavit lodged after the conclusion of the hearing. Whilst some of Ms Boyle’s affidavits remain unsworn, neither party suggested that the Court should not act on that material as emanating from her and reflecting the sworn evidence she would give should the matter be permitted to go to trial.

THE STRIKE OUT APPLICATION

11 The function of pleadings it to state with sufficient clarity the case that must be met: Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Limited (1990) 169 CLR 279, Mason CJ and Gaudron J (at 286); Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658 (at 664); Angelo Mitanis and Helen Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd & Ors [1997] FCA 1040 (at 7). They are a means by which procedural fairness is afforded to the parties. They serve to identify those issues that are in dispute and those that are not. Allegations of fact are to be articulated with sufficient particularity to enable a responding party to plead a defence beyond a bare denial, and to prepare an evidentiary case efficiently directed to the issues in dispute. The need for clarity is not only a matter of concern between the parties. The joinder of issues by way of pleadings (or alternative processes) is essential for the effective performance of the Court’s adjudicative function, including to prevent the waste of the Court’s judicial resources: Corporate Affairs Commission v Solomon [1989] NSWCA 51.

12 A pleading may be struck out on an application under r 16.21(1) if it:

(a)    contains scandalous material; or

(b)    contains frivolous or vexatious material; or

(c)    is evasive or ambiguous; or

(d)    is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding; or

(e)    fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or

(f)    is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

13 A statement of claim may be struck out in whole or in part if it does not plead all the material facts necessary to fulfil the elements of each cause of action in respect of which relief is sought: Mitanis; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 (at 712 – 713).

14 It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts:  see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 109 (at 114 – 115). Conclusionary pleadings may be liable to be stuck out if they have the effect of alleging facts at too high a level of generality: Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557; 217 ALR 171. However, as Weinberg J said in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101; 165 ALR 409 (at 415 – 421), the power to strike out a pleading may not necessarily be exercised in each case where there is a failure to plead all material facts. Some restraint may be exercised where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle. There may be cases where a deficiency can be overcome by other procedural methods, such as the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits that make the case to be met clear. The present case is particularly appropriate to proceed on pleadings given the extremely serious allegations directed toward the Commonwealth and the nature of the relief sought.

Content of the Statement of Claim

15 Ms Boyle’s Statement of Claim runs into 55 pages and is divided into five parts. I have had regard to the whole of the document. The following paragraphs are intended to give a broad summary and to extract some illustrative pleas.

16 Part A identifies the source of the Court’s jurisdiction by reference to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

17 Part B introduces the parties in broad terms.

18 Part C is titled “Persons employed or engaged by the Commonwealth responsible for the decision making (‘chain of command’)”. It names 12 agencies of the Commonwealth, their activities and responsibilities, the statutes administered by them, the laws to which they are bound and the relationships between them (including the extent to which they share information). The agencies are: Attorney General’s Department ([4]), Department of Defence ([5]), Department of Home Affairs ([6]), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ([7]), Australian Federal Police ([8]), Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission ([9]), Australian Security and Intelligence Office ([10]), Australian Signals Directorate ([11]), Australian Secret Intelligence Service ([12]), Australian Defence Force ([13]), Defence Intelligence Organisation ([14]), Defence, Science and Technology Group ([15]). Those paragraphs do not name any natural person employee or officer.

19 Part D alleges that the Commonwealth owes obligations under international law by virtue of it being a contracting party to 12 international conventions or statutes ([17]). The United States of America (USA) is alleged to be a party to four of them ([18]).

20 Part E is titled “The Commonwealth’s Violations”. It contains allegations of unlawful acts committed against Ms Boyle as well as allegations of personal and other injury or loss resulting from the alleged acts. It begins with the following:

19.    From early 2017 and continuing (the ‘targeted period’), the Applicant was the target, subject and victim of a transnational criminal network involving individuals and companies in Australia, the UK and the US unlawfully mining, trading and supplying personal information, data, content and intellectual property.

20.    From early 2017, the Applicant complained to Australian and United States federal authorities and submitted evidence to the authorities which identified persons and corporations of interest and outlined the methodology used in relation to the large-scale transnational criminal enterprise referred to in paragraph 19 above (the complaint).

21 What follows is a chronology of allegations occurring in periods defined as the “TORTURE PERIOD” ([21] – [30]), “FIRST DETENTION PERIOD” ([31] – [35]), “CONTINUED TORTURE PERIOD” ([36] – [50]), “SECOND DETENTION” ([51] – [56]), and “SERIOUS ATTEMPTS ON LIFE” ([57] – [72]). A claim founded in defamation appears at [73] – [77]. There is then a summary of the relief sought by Ms Boyle, together with particulars in support of her claims for aggravated exemplary and punitive damages.

22 Part E of the Statement of Claim includes allegations that Ms Boyle has been subjected to a vast array of wrongful acts. The acts alleged to have occurred in the “TORTURE PERIOD” include the following:

23.    During the torture period, the Applicant was:

23.1    the victim of serious violations of the laws of the Commonwealth and international human rights law by the Australian Intelligence Community and the ADF complicit with US federal agencies for a common purpose in that:

23.1.1    she was intentionally placed in a position of vulnerability to create a set of circumstances and conditions to exploit and manipulate the Applicant and subjected to:

(a)    repeated and oppressive enhanced interrogation techniques (directly or indirectly);

(b)    torture by the intentional infliction of harm through the application of sound, heat, light, energy, gas, radiation or other chemical substance causing the Applicant personal injury and severe physical and mental pain and suffering with intent to cause her death (‘ electronic warfare ’);

(c)    torture by the intentional infliction of harm through directed energy to cause neurotoxicity and to activate biological agents in her body including bacteria and viruses to cause serious life threatening injury, illness or disease with intent to cause her death (‘ chemical and biological warfare ’);

(d)    proscribed inhumane acts;

(e)    other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and punishment with the intent to cause psychological injury, mental harm and emotional distress through the intentional infliction of psychological stressors through and involving:

(f)    forced isolation;

(g)    exposure to anxiety provoking stimuli;

(h)    subjection to monopolisation of perception strategies to coerce compliance;

(i)    induced debility and exhaustion;

(j)    intimidation;

(k)    harassment;

(l)    threats of death, indefinite detention, enforced disappearance and other serious harm including continued forced separation from her daughter and further malicious prosecution;

(m)    strategies to enforce the perception of complete control of and over the Applicant’s fate;

(n)    humiliation and degradation;

(o)    the enforcement of trivial demands;

(p)    severe deprivation by denying the necessities of life including the denial of social security benefits, adequate food, housing or appropriate housing, medical treatment and access to reasonable assistance and services;

(q)    intentional deprivation of resources to prevent self-sustenance, self-determination and the ability to take measures to self-protect;

(r)    forced family separation;

(s)    severe deprivation of liberty;

(t)    forced injection of anti-psychotic drugs;

(u)    forced restraint;

(v)    periods of incommunicado;

(w)    malicious prosecution;

(x)    denial of access to justice;

(y)    refusal of natural justice;

(z)    strip search;

(aa)    victimisation;

(bb)    discrimination;

(cc)    exploitation;

(dd)    coercion;

(ee)    false accusation;

(ff)    defamation (‘ information warfare ’);

(gg)    failed inoculation techniques.

23 That conduct is alleged to have been “undertaken by, or at the behest of, persons engaged or employed by the government of the Commonwealth and by, or with the assistance of persons engaged or employed by the government of the United States” ([24]) and “undertaken by a public official, or officials, in an official capacity” or “at the instigation, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person or persons acting in an official capacity”. The persons concerned are not identified. By [26] further wrongful acts are alleged to have been committed by “persons engaged or employed by the government of the Commonwealth of Australia (alone or complicit with another)”. The conduct in that paragraph is alleged to have been committed against Ms Boyle “pursuant to or in furtherance of a government organisational policy, plan or strategy”, which is said to have involved offences against 13 enactments. The allegations of criminal offending include offences against the Criminal Code (including slavery, servitude, debt bondage, harbouring of a victim and computer related offences) ([26.1] – [26.9] and [26.13]), offences under the Crimes Act 1 9 14 (Cth) relating to the administration of justice ([26.10]), as well as offences against the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) ([26.11] – [26.12]).

24 At [24.8.5] and [24.8.6] Ms Boyle alleges that the “torture conduct” constitutes contraventions of ss 5, 6, 11, 31, 32, 41, 42 and 43 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (including victimisation).

25 Paragraph 27 of the Statement of Claim commences with this plea:

Further and additionally, persons engaged or employed by the government of the Commonwealth (alone or complicit with another/s) committed one or more wrongful acts or omissions or a combination of both involving serious offences against a law of the Commonwealth to wit the ICCPR in Schedule 2, Part 3 of the AHRCA (Cth) in that the Respondent

26 In the 13 subparagraphs that follow, Ms Boyle alleges that she has been denied various rights in contravention of Articles 1, 2, 5, 6 7, 8, 9, 10, 17,19, 22 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).

27 By [2.4] Ms Boyle alleges that the Commonwealth owed her a duty of care. No particulars are given as to how the duty of care is said to arise. Then, by [28], Ms Boyle alleges that the Commonwealth failed “to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions that would foreseeably injure” her. There are 32 failures listed.

28 By [29] and [30] it is alleged that the conduct pleaded at [26] – [28] was undertaken as a reprisal for Ms Boyle having made the complaint (assumed to be the complaint pleaded at [20]).

29 The conduct alleged to have occurred in the “FIRST DETENTION PERIOD” begins with this plea:

In June 2019, the Applicant was arrested and involuntary detained for a period of 28 days (‘first detention period’) under the NSW Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) by persons employed or engaged by the NSW Government at the instigation or direction of persons employed or engaged by the Respondent, specifically AFP and ASIO officers.

30 It is alleged that “one or more AFP and ASIO officers” provided misinformation to detain the applicant and keep her detained, including for the purpose interrogating her, eliciting information from her, influencing a public servant to misdiagnose her and to create a public mental health record of admission and diagnosis ([33]).

31 From [31] – [34] there are allegations of mistreatment occurring whilst Ms Boyle was detained, including strip search, forced sedation by injection, physical restraint, denial of medical treatment, oppressive interrogation, exposure to violent and dangerous detainees and confinement.

32 Under the heading “CONTINUED TORTURE PERIOD” Ms Boyle pleads that in 2021 she made complaints to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and the United Nations Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) ([37], [39]) and that she took steps to resolve her dispute with the Commonwealth. She alleges that the AHRC complaint was terminated: [42]. She goes on to allege that the Commonwealth “engaged in conduct to prevent communications” between her and UNCAT including for the purpose of concealing its wrongful acts and omissions: [46]. She then pleads:

47.    After the Applicant’s submission to the United Nations and the AHRC, persons engaged or employed by the government of the Commonwealth, with the assistance of persons engaged or employed by the government of the United States, increased the conduct as pleaded in paragraph 23 in its intensity and regularity with several serious attempts on the Applicant’s life through:

47.1    the intentional infliction of harm to cause serious injury and/or death as pleaded in paragraph 23.1.1(b); and

47.2    the intentional infliction of harm to induce serious life threatening illness or disease as pleaded in paragraph 23.1.1(c).

33 Under the heading “SECOND DETENTION”, Ms Boyle alleges that she attended the Royal Adelaide Hospital with injuries and illnesses “sustained by the intentional infliction of harm by persons engaged or employed by the government of the Commonwealth” and that whilst in the emergency department she was arrested and detained under the Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) “at the instigation or direction of persons employed or engaged by the [Commonwealth], specifically AFP and ASIO officers”: [51] – [52]. She alleges that the detention was done for the purposes including reprisal, interrogation and to “influence a public servant to misdiagnose” her: [53] – [54]. Ms Boyle goes on to allege mistreatment while in detention, including forced injections, refusal of medical treatment, confinement without toilet facilities and deprivation of food: [55].

34 Under the heading “SERIOUS ATTEMPTS ON LIFE”, Ms Boyle makes the following allegations:

57.    From August 2023 and continuing, persons engaged or employed by the government of the Commonwealth, with the assistance of persons engaged or employed by the government of the United States, made multiple serious attempts on the Applicant’s life by the intentional infliction of harm as pleaded in paragraphs 23.1.1(b) , 23.1.1(c) and 47 on the following dates:

57.1    25 August 2023;

57.2    20 September 2023;

57.3    1 November 2023;

57.4    12 November 2023;

57.5    14 November 2023;

57.6    15 November 2023;

57.7    21 November 2023.

…

59.    On 4 December 2023, persons engaged or employed by the government of the Commonwealth, with the assistance of persons engaged or employed by the government of the United States, made a serious attempt on the Applicant’s life by the intentional infliction of heat, light, energy or radiation activating bacterium and virus in the Applicant’s body to induce or cause serious life threatening illness.

35 In that part of the pleading, Ms Boyle also lists the medical tests that she now requires, and a list of illnesses and injuries alleged to have been caused by the assaults inflicted on her.

36 Under the heading “DEFAMATION COUNT”, Ms Boyle alleges that from 2017 the Commonwealth:

… engaged in an information campaign by controlling the narrative around the Applicant through a coordinated and integrated influence operation by sharing information and highly infectious manufactured material with State agencies and industry about the Applicant including to ‘information providers’ such as media companies including online and print publishers with the intent that the information providers would use and publish, broadcast, illustrate or post information which the public would attribute to the Applicant with intent to:

37 There follows a list of intentions, including an intent to defame, humiliate and “gaslight”.

38 Ms Boyle also alleges that there has been a co-ordinated course of conduct by the “intelligence community including the ADF’s information war division” involving the unlawful recording (presumably of her voice or activities) and the unlawful livestreaming or dissemination of the transcripts of the recordings: [76] – [77].

39 The pleading does not contain any date or mode of publication, nor the words used in the publications. By [74], Ms Boyle alleges that the “information shared” conveyed imputations to the effect that she was (among other things) a rat, a drug user, a sex worker with HIV, a bad mother and a flight risk.

40 At [79], Ms Boyle pleads that the wrongful acts and omissions of the Commonwealth amount to malfeasance, harassment and defamation. After setting out the remedies sought, the Statement of Claim lists conduct supporting claims for aggravated, exemplary and punitive damages.

Defects in the pleading

41 For the purposes of what follows the focus is on whether the pleading gives the Commonwealth adequate notice of the case it is to meet if the matter were to proceed to trial and whether the pleading discloses a controversy the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate and remedies the Court has the power to grant.

42 As can be seen, the pleading alleges misconduct that is extreme in its nature, duration and extent. The allegations go so far as to allege that there have been attempts on Ms Boyle’s life and a coordinated effort by multiple actors to inflict grave assaults, deprivations of liberty and the unlawful recording, manipulation and dissemination of information. The conduct is said to form a part of an international conspiracy involving the governments of Australia and the USA.

43 Notwithstanding the length and detail of the pleading, it is impossible to find a reference to a single identifiable human actor. The description “persons engaged or employed by the government of [the Commonwealth or the United States of America]” is inadequate. So too is the description “a public official or officials, in an official capacity”. The lack of particularity in those phrases renders it impossible for the Commonwealth to admit or deny the existence of a wrongdoer, let alone a wrongdoer having the status of a public official (or some other status that could result in liability resting with the Commonwealth for the alleged acts). The phrase “Australian intelligence community” is equally vague.

44 In addition, serious allegations of infliction of harm do not identify with sufficient precision how, where and when an alleged act occurred.

45 Ms Boyle’s allegation that she has been placed in a “position of vulnerability to create a set of circumstances” to enable the “the enforcement of trivial demands” is also vague.

46 The methods of alleged torture are perplexing and should not be permitted to stand in their present form. The reference to “intentional infliction of harm through the application of sound, heat, light, energy, gas, radiation or other chemical substance” amounting to “electronic warfare” is an example. As presently expressed, the allegations are serious and confusing in equal measure. That is not to say that acts of extreme torture cannot be pleaded. It is simply to say that the greater the seriousness of the alleged acts, and the more distant they are from ordinary human experience, the greater the need for particularity so that the issues to be tried can be clearly defined.

47 In considering this aspect of the pleading I have had regard to Ms Boyle’s affidavits in order to better understand the events alleged. The affidavits do not assist. They employ the same language and conclusionary phrases. As they stand, the pleadings amount to bare assertions unaccompanied by objective facts that might be joined for the efficient conduct of a trial.

48 By way of illustration, the allegation that acts of others (such as Ms Boyle’s alleged detention) occurred at the instigation of (for example) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is a bare assertion lacking in sufficient particulars to enable a responding party to understand and respond to it.

49 A further illustration is the allegation that recordings of Ms Boyle have been unlawfully obtained and then livestreamed, and that transcripts have been circulated. How, when, where and to whom those recordings or transcripts were disseminated is unclear.

50 A further illustration relates to the claimed interference with communications passing between Ms Boyle and UNCAT. There is a bare assertion of interference devoid of detail about the communication interfered with, the manner of interference and sufficient facts to enable a finding to be made that the person responsible is a person whose acts or omissions can be attributed to ASIO or any other agency of the Commonwealth.

51 Defects of that kind infiltrate the whole of the Statement of Claim. They are sufficient in and of themselves to warrant an order striking out the whole of the pleading.

52 A second category of defect is that the pleading contains allegations the relevance and purpose of which is not apparent. Three examples may be given.

53 First, the pleading contains a long list of allegations to the effect that the Commonwealth has committed criminal offences. Ms Boyle has acknowledged that this Court does not have jurisdiction to conduct a criminal trial of the pleaded crimes: Judiciary Act s 39B(1A)(c) and s 67G. The purpose of the pleaded criminal offences remains opaque.

54 Secondly, Ms Boyle alleges that the Commonwealth is in breach of its obligations under international law. That plea cannot survive if it is intended to allege that Ms Boyle personally has a cause of action by reference to the obligations breached. It may be that the pleas could be deployed in support of a recognisable cause of action, but that cause of action is presently unclear.

55 Thirdly, there is a reference to a complaint to the AHRC and the termination of that complaint under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 19 86 (Cth) (AHRC Act). The originating application is not accompanied by a certificate of termination of a complaint necessary to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction:  AHRC Act, s 46PO(3). In any event, this action was commenced more than 60 days after 6 December 2021 (being the pleaded date of termination). There has been no application to extend the time by which an action may be commenced in this Court based on the matters referred to in any terminated complaint.

56 Relatedly, the pleaded facts do not disclose a complete cause of action constituted of a contravention of one or more of the multiple provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act referred to at [24] above. Even if such a cause of action were disclosed, the originating application is not accompanied by a certificate of termination of a complaint of that kind: AHRC Act, s 46PO(3).

57 The plea founded in negligence is also defective. The factual foundation for the existence and scope of the alleged duty of care is absent. The alleged duty is said to have been breached by:

failing to declare to the United Nations that it owns or possesses chemical weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control including at the premise of DTSG and its defence industry partners;

58 Ms Boyle does not plead the source of any obligation (owed to her personally) to notify the United Nations of relevant matters and does not adequately plead the circumstances by which any such duty was breached. It also remains oblique as to how such a breach is causally connected to the damages claimed.

59 The defamation plea is lacking in alleged material facts sufficient to enable a defence to be put forward. The pleading does not identify any particular publication or a publication date. The alleged imputations are pleaded in a manner unmoored from any particular publication. The defamation plea suffers from the same lack of precision with respect to the identity of the wrongdoer as publisher (or at least facts from which the identity of the publisher may be inferred).

Opportunity to replead

60 The Statement of Claim is Ms Boyle’s first iteration of a pleading.

61 In the ordinary course, a litigant relying on a deficient pleading ought to be provided with an opportunity to replead, having the benefit of the Court’s ruling: Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock (2007) 232 CLR 245 (at [175]).

62 Ms Boyle is a self-represented litigant. I have had regard to that status when fixing deadlines by which steps are to be taken and in granting adjournments and extensions from time to time. However, Ms Boyle is not a person disadvantaged in the preparation of the pleading by a lack of legal knowledge. She has legal qualifications more extensive than those possessed by many legal practitioners appearing in this Court. The deficiencies in the pleading are not explained by a lack of legal understanding. Even if they were, that would not alter my conclusion that there should be no opportunity to propose an amended statement of claim.

63 Deficiencies in the pleading were the subject of exchanges at the first case management hearing. The Court ordered that the requirement that the Commonwealth file a defence be dispensed with, including to allow the Commonwealth some time to regularise its legal representation. The difficulty with legal representation itself arose because it was not possible to discern from the Statement of Claim which person employed by which agency had committed which of the multitude of wrongful acts alleged by Ms Boyle.

64 At the second case management hearing on 17 February 2025, Ms Boyle confirmed that it was her intention to file an amended originating application and an amended statement of claim. She said that it was also her intention to join additional parties. By that time, the Commonwealth had foreshadowed that it would make an application to strike out the Statement of Claim.

65 As the pleadings are not closed, Ms Boyle does not require leave to file an amended statement of claim. However, leave is required to join additional parties and to amend the originating application and Ms Boyle wanted to do both of those things. Accordingly, the Court ordered that Ms Boyle file an affidavit annexing a proposed amended statement of claim by 21 March 2025. A deadline was fixed by which the Commonwealth was to file its foreshadowed strike out application and summary judgment application. The intent of those orders was that the Commonwealth’s application (if one be filed) could be heard and determined by reference to Ms Boyle’s proposed amended documents and that time would not be wasted assessing a pleading upon which she did not wish to rely. The Court fixed 2 June 2025 for a hearing at which any application for leave to amend and any summary judgment and strike out application would be heard.

66 Ms Boyle did not provide any proposed amended originating application or proposed amended statement of claim by 21 March 2025. In accordance with the Court’s orders, the Commonwealth filed its interlocutory application on 28 April 2025. On the same day, it filed written submissions putting Ms Boyle on notice of multiple defects in the Statement of Claim of the same kind identified earlier in these reasons. The hearing of 2 June 2025 was vacated in circumstances discussed elsewhere in these reasons.

67 At a hearing on 25 October 2025 the Court confirmed that it was proceeding to hear the Commonwealth’s interlocutory application having regard to the Statement of Claim in its present form. Ms Boyle then enquired whether an amended pleading could be filed. She was informed that it may be relevant to consider whether she should be given an opportunity to replead and that it was open to her to provide a proposed amended pleading in answer to the Commonwealth’s application for that purpose. No proposed amended pleading has been put forward in Ms Boyle’s responsive materials.

68 In her affidavits and in her correspondence to the Court Ms Boyle has alleged that she has been prevented from preparing the amended statement of claim because the Commonwealth has continued to inflict extreme acts of torture upon her and has continued to interfere with her electronic accounts and devices. She alleges that the Commonwealth’s conduct forms a part of an attempt to pervert the course of justice in the proceeding by causing her such serious injury and illness that she has been physically incapacitated from preparing documents, attending at hearings and generally prosecuting her case. The allegations include “intervening events” occurring just prior to hearings listed for 30 June 2025 and 28 November 2025.

69 I do not accept Ms Boyle’s explanations for failing to file an amended pleading when afforded the opportunity to do so.

70 Ms Boyle has shown herself to be capable of drafting voluminous written materials and articulating legal concepts. She has prepared eight affidavits (not all of which have been sworn). She has lodged more than 2,000 pages of materials. Her submissions on the present interlocutory applications exceed 30 closely typewritten pages. Ms Boyle’s assertions that she has been impeded in preparing an amended statement of claim is to be scrutinised against her demonstrated ability to prepare, lodge or transmit such a significant amount of material laden with allegations of fact and contentions of law

71 In addition, I find that Ms Boyle has fabricated medical evidence for the purpose of misleading the Court in relation to the alleged acts of continuing “torture” that are said to have impeded her ability to draft amendments, among other things.

72 My finding relating to the fabrication of evidence is set out below. The finding is relevant in the context of the strike out application because it informs the question of whether the Court should accept Ms Boyle’s factual assertion that she has not had a fair opportunity to replead. The fabricated evidence goes to the heart of that procedural question.

73 Ms Boyle referred to and relied upon falsified documents in her affidavits to support a factual narrative of ongoing “torture” as an excuse for her failure to put forward an amended statement of claim and her inability to prepare for a hearing of (among other things) the Strike Out and Summary Judgment Applications. As a consequence, the Court cannot accept her related evidence on that topic at face value and the excuse she has put forward is rejected as untrue.

74 All of that provides a sufficient basis to strike out the Statement of Claim without affording Ms Boyle an opportunity to replead. The originating application may be dismissed on that basis alone.

FABRICATED EVIDENCE

75 I have mentioned that by orders made on 17 February 2025, the Commonwealth’s interlocutory application was originally set down to be heard on 2 June 2025. On 29 May 2025, Ms Boyle filed an interlocutory application seeking orders that (among other things) the hearing be vacated and that the matter be “placed in moratorium”. The hearing was vacated and a case management hearing set down for 30 June 2025.

76 The material relied upon by Ms Boyle in support of those orders made reference to there being an order or arrangement in place for the management of her affairs, apparently on the basis of mental incapacity. It appeared that Ms Boyle sought to have the action stayed whilst questions concerning her “standing” could be resolved.

77 The materials she relied upon included a letter dated 27 May 2025 on the letterhead of a suburban medical clinic and bearing the name and apparent signature of a general practitioner, Dr Ghulam Mustafa (27 May Letter). It reads:

To the Court,

…

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

I have been Ms Sharon Boyle’s general practitioner for over 12 months. Ms Boyle attends my clinic every 3 weeks and she has presented on numerous occasions with visible injuries to her forehead including bruising, swelling and haemorrhaging consistent with what she has described to me as acts of torture. As I understand the situation, the court is aware that this is occurring.

She has persistent pain in the targeted region of her forehead (L/S) and also in her spine, ribs and endometrium with reported metabolic activity, left breast lump and enlarged lymph nodes. I have referred Ms Boyle for several investigations and received multiple reports with incorrect or misleading indications.

Ms Boyle is systemically ill and has not been advised of her diagnosis or treated for her injuries and illness. In my opinion, Ms Boyle has been deliberately incapacitated which involves a physical incapacitation and has caused her emotional distress and psychological harm.

Seeing Ms Boyle regularly, I have assessed that her injuries and illness have not impacted her ability to make decisions about her own life and affairs. Ms Boyle remains competent and I am at a loss to understand why there would be administrative orders in place or supported decision making in this case. Ms Boyle presents as very astute with good insight into her complex clinical picture and robust in her advocacy for the provision of proper medical care.

There appears to be no clinical reason why she has not received appropriate medical treatment or why decisions have been made to withhold information from her around her health status.

It is highly recommended that Ms Boyle’s care team advise her of her diagnosis and treatment pathways and facilitate the appropriate treatment in accordance to her wishes. I am happy for her care team to coordinate with me for her GP care.

Ms Boyle is currently unwell after recent attacks and is not medically fit to attend court on 2 June 2025. The lack of improvement in Ms Boyle’s health is due to the ongoing attacks and decisions made by others to refuse to provide her adequate medical care.

I am concerned about my patient’s health and safety and I hope that in bringing these matters to the courts attention that it prompts urgent action to be taken to ensure Ms Boyle is afforded proper medical treatment and care including lifesaving interventions.

(emphasis added)

78 Ms Boyle annexed the 27 May Letter to her Third Affidavit together with a medical certificate (also dated 27 May 2025) stating that “Ms Sharon Boyle is medically unfit to attend court on 2 June 2025 with likely admission to hospital in the coming days”.

79 Ms Boyle also annexed a document that she described as “a copy of urgent referral made by Dr Ghulam Mustafa to [Associate Professor D Schulz of] the Neurology Clinic at Flinders Medical Centre dated 7 April 2025 for treatment and management of brain and spinal injury, illness or disease”. I will refer to that as the “Schultz Referral”. It bears Dr Mustafa’s name and signature. On its face, it purports to be a referral of Ms Boyle to a specialist in neurology. It describes Ms Boyle as “systemically unwell since 2017 after exposure to unsafe levels of radiation over an enduring period”. It otherwise contains detailed descriptions of Ms Boyle’s health, including “undiagnosed and untreated – Primary or Metastatic cancer” and queried secondary blood cancer.

80 Ms Boyle further deposed that Dr Mustafa had said words to the effect that other people were making decisions about her health care, and that he could not prescribe medication without “approval by a higher authority”, that he could not disclose more details and that it was for Ms Boyle to “follow up with the Court”. She also claimed that other people had interfered with the management of her housing and financial accounts. She alleged that the Commonwealth was at fault for her failure to file an amended statement of claim and for the injuries and illnesses that rendered her unfit to attend the hearing. The following passages are illustrative:

63.    The relentless targeting of me with directed energy since the last court date has in my opinion been with malign intent to obstruct these proceedings and has caused me protracted traumatic experiences and resulted in a significant deterioration in my health exacerbated by the denial of medical treatment so much so that I am medically unfit to appear or participate in any court proceeding on 2 June 2025.

..

67.    I object to any application made by the Commonwealth to dismiss this matter noting the reason for my application to vacate is because the Commonwealth has intentionally made me ill to obstruct and pervert official proceedings and I am too sick to attend court. But for the wrongful acts and omissions of the Commonwealth (alone and in company) including acts of torture, I would not have suffered such serious life changing injuries or life threatening illness or disease or suffered irreparable prejudice.

81 In a further affidavit filed on 27 June 2025 Ms Boyle deposed (at [3]):

On the evening of Saturday, 21 June 2025 whilst watching a movie in bed with my daughter on our smart TV, we were assaulted with directed energy at such frequency and wavelength that the penetration power caused us both head trauma, respiratory distress and acute radiation poisoning.

82 She went on to allege injuries she and her daughter had suffered as a result of the alleged assault. She alleged that as a result of her injuries she could not attend any court hearing for between six and eight weeks. She annexed a copy of a letter dated 24 June 2025 addressed to the Court and apparently from Dr Mustafa (24 June Letter). It reads:

To the Federal Court,

24/06/2025

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

Ms Boyle is unfit to attend or participate in court proceedings on and from 24 th June 2025 to 18 th August 2025.

On Saturday evening the 21 st of June Ms Boyle and her young daughter [redacted] were the victims of a radiation event in their home causing serious illness. Ms Boyle suffered a head injury with acute respiratory distress. Young [redacted] suffered a concussion like injury with dizziness, multiple bouts of vomiting and acute respiratory illness.

Both have been treated this week for acute radiation poisoning and provided a supportive medication regime to manage the symptoms. Ms Boyle is receiving oxygen support and on speaking with her this morning I noticed that she had some difficulties conversing due to the injury to her lungs. She is not fit to attend or participate in any court event even by telephone.

Ms Boyle’s expected recovery is between 6-8 weeks and [redacted] 2-3 weeks. They are currently in isolation as a result of the illness and contamination and will be reviewed as necessary by me and my colleagues.

This case deeply troubles me with the assaults by cyber means now escalating to the targeting of Ms Boyle’s young daughter. I am not a lawyer, I am a doctor but I don’t believe any reasonable doctor would assess this conduct to be legal or necessary. I understand Ms Boyle has reported the matter to the Federal Police without response or assistance which raises serious concerns as to who is responsible for the relentless and unacceptable assaults.

Ms Boyle has advised me today that she intends to continue to pursue the matters in court and I expect a full recovery from the new onset injuries and illness within 6-8 weeks.

Ms Boyle is systemically unwell from the radiation assaults which are well documented by treating physicians and Dr Russell Cooper.

I don’t believe Ms Boyle should suffer any further detriment including the removal of her daughter from her care in circumstances where Ms Boyle has taken reasonable measures to protect herself and her daughter but the government has failed to protect them or address the root cause or those responsible. It is apparent that as a result of Ms Boyle reporting the abuse, both her and her daughter have been inflicted with severe pain and suffering, deprivation and other retaliatory coercive measures.

The situation is totally unacceptable. I am a GP and can only do so much but hope that my reporting assists the court resolve this very serious matter where Ms Boyle and her daughter are afforded protection and medical care as required.

I am soon to go on leave for a period but will be available in August 2025 if the court should require me to attend to provide a more detailed medical opinion about this recent incident and previous incidents where I have noted Ms Boyle’s injuries.

83 Ms Boyle went on to depose that she believed there had been ex parte proceedings conducted elsewhere that affected her standing to proceed in this action and that she sought to prevent the Commonwealth’s interlocutory applications from proceeding to hearing and judgment.

84 In light of that material, the Court of its own initiative raised a question as to whether Ms Boyle was a person who suffered from a mental disability. That occurred because of the references in the 27 May Letter to there being care and protection orders in place, as well as Ms Boyle’s own references to her subjective belief that there may have been a guardianship order made against her that may affect her “standing”.

85 The Commonwealth sought and was granted leave to issue subpoenas for documents to Dr Mustafa and the Public Trustee so as to ascertain whether there was a guardianship order in place under the Guardianship and Administration Act 19 9 3 (SA). The documents returned by Dr Mustafa’s clinic on the two subpoenas did not disclose the existence of a guardianship or like order, nor any form of engagement by Ms Boyle with mental health practitioners.

86 The Court was informed that materials sent to the Court by Ms Boyle in Dr Mustafa’s name were not among the materials returned on the subpoena. I granted leave for the issue of a further subpoena to Dr Mustafa to give evidence relevant to the question of Ms Boyle’s legal capacity.

87 In evidence-in-chief, Dr Mustafa said that he did not author the 27 May Letter, the medical certificate, the 24 June Letter or the Schultz Referral. He appeared shocked when shown the materials bearing his name as the author.

88 Ms Boyle was cautioned that she need not make any submission or adduce any evidence relating to the question of who had authored the documents. The matter has twice been adjourned to enable her to obtain legal advice and consider her position.

89 Ms Boyle cross-examined Dr Mustafa for more than an hour. She was repeatedly reminded that she was entitled to challenge Dr Mustafa on his evidence that he was not the author the materials. Despite those reminders, she did not question him on that topic. She positively confirmed that she did not intend to put to Dr Mustafa that he had authored the materials.

90 I found there to be no evidence that there was a guardianship or like order in place in relation to Ms Boyle. I found that Dr Mustafa did not author the four documents bearing his name. I determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Ms Boyle was a person who had a mental disability with the consequence that the Court should proceed on the presumption that she was not a person to whom r 9.61 of the Rules applied: Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51 (at [32] – [36] and [52]); Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) (2022) 294 FCR 346, Rangiah, Charlesworth and Banks-Smith JJ (at [101]).

91 It was not necessary at that time to make any finding as to who had authored the 27 May Letter, the medical certificate, the 24 June Letter or the Schultz Referral. The Commonwealth now invites a finding that they were authored by Ms Boyle, and I so find.

92 The finding is based on:

(1) the mode by which the documents were put before the Court (via Ms Boyle and only Ms Boyle);

(2) the absence of any copy or record of the documents in the medical file held by Dr Mustafa’s clinic;

(3) Dr Mustafa’s unchallenged evidence (which I accept) that he did not draft the documents bearing his name and signature;

(4) the absence of any evidence tending against the finding; and

(5) the absence of any submission from Ms Boyle providing some basis upon which the finding should not be made.

93 It should be emphasised that the finding is made on the balance of probabilities. The occasion for making the finding is limited to the issues arising on the interlocutory applications presently before the Court. The finding serves different purposes in the context of each of the applications. I have already explained how it informs my discretion not to permit Ms Boyle an opportunity to file an amended statement of claim in the context of the Strike Out Application. In due course I will explain how it bears on the issues arising on the other interlocutory applications.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICATION

94 Section 31A(2) of the FCA Act provides that the Court may give summary judgment against an applicant party if satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. It is not necessary to be satisfied that the proceeding is hopeless or bound to fail: FCA Act, s 31A(3). The discretion to award summary judgment must be exercised with caution: Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118, French CJ and Gummow J (at [24]), Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (at [60]). As Reeves J observed in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256, that is because a trial is the “usual and accepted means” by which disputed questions of fact and law are to be determined. It is also because the discretion to summarily dismiss a claim involves the making of an evaluative judgment in circumstances where the proceeding has not progressed to trial and there is an incomplete picture of the evidence to be relied upon: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401 (at [28]).

95 In Cassimatis, Reeves J said (at [45]) that the determination of a summary dismissal application “does not require a mini-trial based upon incomplete evidence to decide whether the proceedings are likely to succeed or fail at trial”, rather (at [46]):

… it requires a critical examination of the available materials to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact that should be decided at trial. Each application for summary judgment or summary dismissal has to be determined according to its particular circumstances. What is required is a practical judgment of the case at hand. The relevant circumstances will partly depend upon the stage which the proceedings have reached. Among other things, this will affect the materials available to the Court considering the application, for example, whether pleadings have been exchanged, or discovery of documents has occurred.

96 His Honour went on to explain (at [47]) that a summary judgment application will be more likely to succeed if it is shown that the applicant’s success relies on a question of fact that is fanciful, trifling, implausible, improbable, tenuous, or contradicted by all the available documents or evidence.

97 As Finkelstein J said in Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (in liq) (recs and mgrs apptd) [2008] FCA 1920; 252 ALR 41, the power to strike out a pleading under r 26.21 and the power to summarily dismiss a proceeding under s 31A of the FCA Act differ in several important respects. On a strike out application, the focus is on the sufficiency of the pleadings, assessed against the purpose that the pleadings are intended to serve. In making that assessment, the truth of the pleaded facts is to be assumed. In contrast, his Honour said (at [7]), a summary judgment enquiry does not turn on the pleadings, and the truth of the allegations is not to be assumed. His Honour said (at [6]) that an application for summary dismissal:

… not only permits, but requires, a consideration of matters outside the pleadings:  …  The application is, after all, a trial albeit a summary trial. In White Industries Aust Ltd v Cmr of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298; 240 ALR 792; 95 ALD 30; [2007] FCA 511 at [50], Lindgren J said that s 31A ‘is concerned with the bringing and defending of proceedings, not just with pleadings; with substance, not just with form’. That is to say, the ‘no reasonable prospect of success’ standard is designed to test the adequacy of the evidence in support of the allegations, not just the allegations themselves. At the same time, it is important to understand that the court in deciding a motion for summary judgment does not, in testing that evidence, find any facts; rather, the court determines, as a matter of law, whether there are any facts that need to be found such that a trial is required:  ….  To put the point another way (that is in language that perhaps had more resonance in the days when juries were still used in civil cases), the court determines whether there is a real or genuine dispute as to any material fact – whether any reasonable juror could find for the non-moving party on one or more of those material factual issues:  …  If the answer to this question of law is no, then the judge can and must take the case from the jury and enter judgment accordingly.

98 Section 31A of the FCA Act does not limit any other power the Court may have to summarily dismiss a claim. They include the power conferred under r 26.01(1) of the Rules. It provides:

26.01 Summary judgment

(1)    A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:

(a)    the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or

(b)    the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or

(c)    no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or

(d)    the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court; or

(e)    the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding.

99 The circumstances in which a proceeding may be characterised as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are conveniently summarised by Mansfield J in Rana v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 189 as follows:

41    In Pickering v Centrelink [2008] FCA 561, McKerracher J made the following useful observations at [27] about when a proceeding is frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of process:

In NBGZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 434, although the majority (Allsop and Conti JJ) reached a different ultimate conclusion, there is, with respect, a helpful collection of authorities by Gray J on ‘frivolous’ at [16]-[22] from which it may be concluded that if, despite whatever attempts are made to discern a cause of action in a case, it is still not arguable, it is frivolous. A matter is also frivolous when it is without substance or groundless or fanciful: Bullen & Leake Precedents of Pleadings (1975) 12 th ed, p 145. However such matters will only be struck out when it is so obviously frivolous that to put it forward, would be an abuse of the process of the court: Young v Holloway [1895] P 87. The words ‘frivolous’ or ‘vexatious’ are used either separately or in conjunction, or interchangeably with the expression ‘abuse of the process of the court’: Young v Holloway [1895] P 87 at 90-91.

42    Proceedings have been held to be ‘vexatious’ in the past if they are instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they are brought; they are brought for collateral purposes, and are not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise; irrespective of the motive of the litigant, they are so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless; or they are scandalous, disclose no reasonable cause of action, are oppressive, are embarrassing, or are an abuse of the process of the court: see generally Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481.

43    It has also been pointed out that ‘vexatiousness’ is a quality of the proceeding rather than a litigant’s intention so that the ‘question is not whether they have been instituted vexatiously but whether the legal proceedings are in fact vexatious’: Re Vernazza [1960] 1 QB 197 at 208.

44    In Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251, Mason CJ at 256 observed that the concept of ‘abuse of process’ had two aspects, namely:

… first, the aspect of vexation, oppression and unfairness to the other party to the litigation and, secondly, the fact that the matter complained of will bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

45    In Rogers v The Queen at 286, McHugh J relevantly said that an abuse of process usually fell into one of three categories, namely where:

(1)    the Court’s processes are invoked for an illegitimate purpose;

(2)     the use of the Court’s procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one party; or

(3)    the use of the Court’s procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

46    In Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said at 393 that the jurisdiction to stay proceedings that are an abuse of process:

… extends to all those categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the Court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness.

100 That summary reflects the statutory meaning of the expression “vexatious proceeding” as it appears in s 37AM of the FCA Act, which encompasses a proceeding instituted or conducted in a way so as to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment, or to achieve another wrongful purpose.

No reasonable prospect of success

101 For the purposes of what follows it may be assumed that Ms Boyle suffers from some medical illnesses and ailments. So much is acknowledged by the Commonwealth. Dr Mustafa did not accept that Ms Boyle suffers from the full suite of illnesses or ailments Ms Boyle believes that she has. He did not, for example, say that she had a fractured spine or cancer (as she has alleged in this proceeding). Nonetheless, the starting point of what follows is that there is a triable issue as to the complete picture of Ms Boyle’s medical condition. The Court does not have before it the full extent of medical evidence that may bear on that discrete issue.

102 What is missing from the volumes of material filed by Ms Boyle is an independent and verifiable evidentiary foundation for her claims that her illnesses and ailments are the result of the serious and extraordinary course of conduct she alleges against the Commonwealth. Absent some evidentiary foundation for the causal connection, the claims are of such an extreme nature that they are appropriately described as inherently improbable and fanciful, founded on nothing more than her bare assertions. I have therefore asked whether there exists a real and genuine dispute arising on the evidence on the critical factual question of causation, it being essential to all causes of action advanced by Ms Boyle.

103 Putting the fabricated documents aside, on the question of causation Ms Boyle relies on three reports of Dr Russell Cooper. The reports describe him as a preventative medicine specialist from Anubha Mountain Health Retreat.

104 One of those reports relates to Ms Boyle’s capacity to parent. It does not illuminate the question of whether the Commonwealth has committed acts of torture resulting in illness or injury.

105 In a report dated 10 April 2025, there is an opinion that Ms Boyle suffers from radiation poisoning. The report goes on to state that Ms Boyle “has been assaulted by exposure to radiation with deliberate or malicious intent causing life threatening injury, illness and disease.” The report continues:

The impact to Ms Boyle’s brain has occurred through a high intensity beam of light or high intensity beam of radiofrequency energy or pulsed microwave energy which penetrates the eye and vibrates the brain like multiple continuous concussions. Small pulses expand and contract heating the brain and propagating radiation causing injury to the brain and central nervous system.

Different frequencies induce different disorders and illness to cause injury, illness and often death including brain injury, stroke, neurological deficits, heart failure, multi-organ disease/failure including kidney and liver damage, tissue damage, damage to reproductive organs and cancer etc.

The directed energy causes hyper-stimulation of dopamine cells and floods the brain causing an increase in neurotransmitters creating neurotoxicity that incapacitates the targeted person. It causes injury, activates bacterium and viruses in the body to induce life threatening illness and causes chronic disease.

The technology is lethal and prohibited.

Ms Boyle is very symptomatic but at this stage her cognitive decline is nominal and she continues to demonstrate a reasonable level of aptitude and a good understanding of her clinical profile. She reports multiple targeted directed energy attacks recently causing her severe suffering and trauma to her head. I understand prior to a recent court appearance, she had been targeted with directed energy causing head trauma and consequential neurological impairment.  …

106 If the matter were to proceed to trial a real question would arise as to whether some of the documents said by Ms Boyle to have been authored by Dr Cooper are authentic documents in fact authored by him and containing his medical opinion. The Summary Judgment Application may be determined without deciding that question. For present purposes I will assume the documents were authored by him.

107 Dr Cooper does not profess to have witnessed the attacks or other acts of torture complained of in this action. To the extent that he has indirectly or directly referred to the wrongful act of any person accompanied by “deliberate or malicious intent”, there is no assumed factual basis given for that opinion. There is no arguable basis to find that his expertise extends to any such things. Dr Cooper’s evidence is not corroborative of Ms Boyle’s evidence concerning the identity of her alleged assailants (or the existence of an assailant at all) but rather proceeds from assumed facts self-reported by Ms Boyle and not otherwise within his personal knowledge.

108 Ms Boyle cannot succeed in her claims by proving that she suffers from illnesses and injuries that she subjectively believes are the result of the wrongful acts of another person. I consider she has been provided with ample opportunity to file material demonstrating that she has a proper evidentiary basis for making the very serious claims set out in the Statement of Claim. Evidence of the connection between her illnesses or injuries and any act attributable to the Commonwealth rises no higher than her bare assertions that she has been attacked by unnamed persons by the methods described in the same high level way as in her pleading. The nature of the allegations is such that they should not be permitted to go to trial in the absence of evidence capable of lending credible support the asserted connection.

109 Given the absence of evidence on that kind, I am satisfied that Ms Boyle does not have reasonable prospects of success in establishing the requisite objective connection between wrongdoing and injury or loss as a necessary element of her claims.

110 The defamation action is similarly wanting in evidence capable of proving the identity of the publisher. No more need be said on that topic as the pleading itself does not clearly identify the publisher or specify the impugned publications with sufficient particularity in any event.

111 A further consequence of those conclusions is that the allegations may be described as frivolous in the sense that they are made without proper foundation.

112 The originating application should be dismissed on that additional and alternate basis.

Vexatious conduct

113 There exists a further discrete basis to dismiss the originating application under s 31A of the FCA Act and r 26.01 of the Rules: this proceeding is frivolous and vexatious in the sense that it has been conducted in a manner calculated to harass, annoy and vex the Commonwealth and the Court. Conduct meeting that description is summarised under the headings that follow.

Disruption based on false information

114 I have already mentioned Ms Boyle’s conduct in seeking to have hearings in this matter adjourned by reason of ongoing acts of torture inflicted upon her by the Commonwealth.

115 The Court moved on the falsified evidence provided by Ms Boyle in two respects. First, it acted on the statement in the 27 May Letter indicating that a guardianship order (or a like order) may have been made, putting in train a process to enquire into whether Ms Boyle might be a person who could not continue this proceeding other than through a litigation representative. That enquiry was undertaken for the protective purpose underpinning r 9.61 of the Rules. It occurred because the 27 May Letter led the Court to believe that Ms Boyle’s general practitioner may be in possession of information bearing on the question of her mental capacity. The fabrication of the evidence triggered a train of events by which Ms Boyle succeeded in delaying the hearing of the Commonwealth’s application by many months, alluding to matters affecting her “standing” and relying on the fabricated materials to give some objective credibility to her claims.

116 Second, the Court had before it apparent medical evidence relating to Ms Boyle’s fitness to attend at the hearing listed for 2 June 2025 and then the hearing of 30 June 2025. The progress of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory application to a hearing was disrupted by those events alone.

117 Quite apart from its procedural impacts, the fabrication of evidence is conduct that, in and of itself, warrants the summary dismissal of a proceeding on the basis that it constitutes such an egregious abuse of the Court’s processes that the litigant responsible should not be permitted to avail herself of other processes necessary to take her claims to trial. That is especially so in a case where the falsified material bears a close relationship with the subject matter of the pleaded claims.

Allegations directed to the presiding judge

118 As discussed in Boyle No 1, Ms Boyle has directed accusations to the Court itself, going so far as to allege that the Court is involved in a conspiracy directed to ensuring that she is committed to detention on mental health grounds and to ensure that her daughter is removed from her care.

119 Ms Boyle’s more recent submissions contain a number of references to the Court joining with or colluding with the respondent in a “diversionary agenda” to frustrate and defeat her attempts to prosecute her claims. They include a complaint that the Court and the Commonwealth have “employed DARVO tactics throughout the 18 months of litigation (deny, attack, reverse victim and offender); tactics which are often used by government and its institutions to avoid responsibility and used to twist the situation to make the victim appear aggressive or unreasonable, whilst positioning themselves as the victims who are righteous, often citing a lack of respect from the survivor”.

120 No proper evidentiary foundation is put forward to support the allegations directed to the Court. They create an untenable situation in which Ms Boyle assumes that every direction or order that she perceives to be against her interests is further proof that the Court itself is participating in a conspiracy to cause her harm. Justice cannot be administered in a case where the applicant, without proper foundation, alleges that the Court itself is a party to the very conduct that forms the subject matter of her claims for relief.

Vexing correspondence

121 Ms Boyle’s conduct is vexing in the additional sense that she has made threats in correspondence directed to the respondent’s solicitor and more recently to the Registry of the Court. In an email of 5 August 2025 directed to a solicitor employed in the firm acting for the Commonwealth, Ms Boyle said this:

…

I refer to the above matter and note my email to the registry.

I note I am not withdrawing my claim against the Commonwealth and I intend to prosecute it at the ICC for torture and other proscribed inhumane acts. That is the International Criminal Court not the International Cricket Commission.

i will deal with South Australia then come back and fuck the Commonwealth up its arse until it bleeds.

You take any step towards me and my daughter and I’m going to escalate the controversy in a way that Australia regrets its decision for a very long time.

Regards

Sharon Boyle

122 The solicitor to whom that email was directed has responsibilities to attend to the Commonwealth’s defence. In that capacity, the solicitor has no choice but to open and read communications sent by Ms Boyle. Attending to and acknowledging correspondence from an opposing party forms a part of the solicitor’s professional responsibilities, not only to the client but to the Court. No solicitor discharging those responsibilities should be confronted with messages of that kind. It matters not that the threat is directed at a high level to “the Commonwealth” or to “Australia”. Ms Boyle’s entitlement to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction does not come with an entitlement to conduct her proceeding in whatever abusive or degrading manner she thinks fit. There is no explanation for it and no excuse for it. The email is a further instance of vexing conduct, calculated to harass and annoy a solicitor in the discharge of her work.

123 More recently, Ms Boyle has directed a veiled threat in correspondence to the Registry. Her email of 26 February 2026 included this statement:

Dear Registrar,

….

Also I raise with the registry a conversation I had with a third party who advised that she was told by court staff that these proceedings were scam.

I assure this court that this claim is dead serious and if it is being communicated with the public that this is anything other than a claim against the Commonwealth of Australia for torture and other proscribed inhumane acts, there will be consequences.

Regards

Sharon Boyle

Applicant

(emphasis added)

124 A litigant who is dissatisfied or concerned with the conduct of the staff employed within the Registry is of course entitled to raise the issue by way of formal complaint providing sufficient information to enable the issue to be inquired into and dealt with. But that is not what Ms Boyle has done. Rather than invoking complaint procedures, she has alluded to “consequences”.

125 An enquiry into whether a proceeding has been conducted in a vexing manner may extend to a litigant’s conduct in his or her dealings with any member of the staff of the Court. That is because staff of the Court form an integral and indispensable part of its administrative resources, without which the Court cannot effectively function. It is unacceptable that Court staff should be subjected to threatening correspondence in the performance of their work.

126 Even before her email was sent to the Registry Ms Boyle had been cautioned about the unacceptable content of her email to the Commonwealth’s solicitor, and that email had been read in open Court. She was informed that her correspondence may be taken into account on the application for summary judgment and invited to make submissions about it if she wished. I do not accept her contention that the threat in the email directed to the Registry should be interpreted a threat of “procedural” consequences. The vagueness in the threat does not diminish its seriousness. Considered in the context of her correspondence to the solicitor, the later email may fairly be understood as a veiled threat of violence. The email lends further support to my finding that Ms Boyle has conducted this proceeding in a vexing manner.

Impact of vexing conduct on the Court as an institution

127 The dismissal of the originating application on this alternate ground is not undertaken for a punitive purpose. Rather it is to recognise that vexing conduct of the kind just described is wasteful of the Court’s limited judicial and administrative resources and that it otherwise compromises the Court in the performance of its adjudicative functions. Those public interest considerations underpin the power to summarily dismiss an originating application on the ground expressly provided for under r 26.01(1)(d) of the Rules.

128 The waste of resources impacts not only the matter concerned, but other matters in the docket of the affected judge, and hence the Court as an institution. A practical consequence is that litigants in other matters must await their trials and outcomes whilst the resources of the Chambers of the Judge are disproportionately diverted to deal with a disruptive litigant in a single matter.

129 In addition, threats directed toward solicitors in the performance of their duties have the potential to bring the administration of justice into disrepute beyond the particular matter in question. That is especially so when a respondent party is compelled to participate in a proceeding and the solicitor acting for that party is answerable to the Court for failing to read and respond to an applicant’s correspondence. Ms Boyle’s email was not a mere lapse of courtesy, but an act calculated to harass and annoy an officer of the Court in that official capacity. The Court has a supervisory role in connection with the solicitors appearing in the matters before it, reflecting the importance of the legal profession in the administration of justice. In an appropriate case that role may extend to the protection of the legal profession from unwarranted harassment by ensuring that legal proceedings are not used as a forum to harass and annoy them in their professional capacities.

130 Finally, Ms Boyle’s conduct in directing allegations of wrongdoing toward the Court has the effect of erecting the Court as a de facto respondent. It compromises the Court in the performance of its adjudicative functions as between the named parties to the proceeding. Ms Boyle is entitled to seek the disqualification of a particular judge on identifiable grounds, properly founded in evidence and, as I have said, she may also invoke mechanisms for complaint about staff of the Court. However, she is not entitled to make unfounded, vague and diffuse allegations to the general effect the Court itself is participating in the very conduct forming the subject matter of her pleaded claims.

THE INJUNCTION APPLICATION

131 On her Injunction Application, Ms Boyle submitted that an injunction was necessary to restrain the Commonwealth from engaging in continuing acts of torture so that she could prepare her amended statement of claim and diligently prosecute her claim. I have rejected the underlying factual premise for the injunction.

132 In any event, the power to grant an injunction is discretionary and may be informed by equitable principle: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 (at [32] – [33]); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Storm Financial L imi t e d (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liq) (No 5) [2012] FCA 954 (at [12]). Regardless of the outcome of the Strike Out Application and the Summary Judgment Application I would refuse to grant injunctive relief on discretionary grounds in light of Ms Boyle’s unacceptable conduct in the proceeding.

Contempt Proceedings

133 The Commonwealth submits that the matter should be referred to a Registrar for the commencement of proceedings in contempt. I do not consider it appropriate to entertain that submission at this time for three reasons.

134 First, Ms Boyle should have the opportunity to make an application for leave to appeal from this judgment should she seek to do so. The commencement of contempt proceedings may interfere with the appellate process both in terms of Ms Boyle’s own resources and for reasons relating to the overlapping subject matter. For the time being the focus should be on the finalisation of the principal proceeding.

135 Second, I consider the Commonwealth should have the benefit of these reasons in determining the appropriate forum in which a trial having penal consequences should be conducted. This Court’s discretion as to whether or not to proceed in contempt may be exercised having regard to the availability of other mechanisms by which a person may be tried and punished for criminal offences relating to the administration of justice. The existence of offences of that kind has been brought to Ms Boyle’s attention during the course of argument in the context of administering cautions and they need not be listed here.

136 Third, the findings I have made in these reasons would in the ordinary course provide a basis for recusing myself from presiding further in the action, had it remained on foot, other than in relation to costs. That, too, is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the discretion to invoke the Court’s contempt procedures in light of the availability of other procedural avenues.

137 That is not to preclude the Commonwealth for applying for relief of the kind referred to in its written submissions. However, it should do so by way of a formal application, upon first giving notice to Ms Boyle and having due regard to the matters just raised.

| I certify that the preceding one hundred and thirty-seven (137) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Charlesworth. |
Associate:

Dated: 2 April 2026

Top