Eurton v. Thomas - Affirmed

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April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Mark Eurton, Jr. v. Parker Thomas

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-5733
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Panel: David William McKeague, Joan Louise Larsen

• Judges: David W. McKeague; Joan L. Larsen; Kevin G. Ritz

• Opinion

• Authorities (30)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (25.8K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0184n.06

Case No. 25-5733

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Apr 23, 2026
MARK W. EURTON, JR. and LAUREN E.
) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
WHISMAN,
)
Plaintiffs - Appellants, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
) WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PARKER THOMAS, et al., )
Defendants - Appellees. ) OPINION
)

Before: McKEAGUE, LARSEN, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

RITZ, Circuit Judge. Police officers conducted a welfare check on Mark Eurton after

Eurton called family members, threatening self-harm. Equipped with a dispatch warning that

Eurton was intoxicated, possibly armed, and likely to become violent, the officers encountered

Eurton at the entrance to his home, along with his visibly upset wife. The officers drew their

weapons and forcibly entered the home after Eurton refused to engage with them.

Eurton and his wife sued the officers and Oldham County, Kentucky. The district court

dismissed their claims against Oldham County and later granted summary judgment to the officers

based on qualified immunity. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

On February 11, 2022, Mark Eurton contacted his mother and estranged sister to tell them

that he loved them and that “he [was] going to sleep because he ha[d] taken so many things.”
No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

RE 38-1, Dispatch Report, PageID 415-16. Understanding this as a suicide attempt, Eurton’s

family called 911 and asked police to conduct a welfare check. Eurton’s family also told the

dispatcher that Eurton had just gotten into a fight with his wife Lauren Whisman, who had

separated from him a month before; neglected his medication for bipolar disorder; and likely had

a gun at home.

Dispatch sent police officers Parker Thomas and Kimberly Gunsett to Eurton’s home, and

officer Tyler Covington also responded to the call. As the officers were on the way, dispatch

relayed the information from the 911 call, adding that Eurton likely had been drinking and

“possibly took two bottles of unknown prescription pills.” RE 35-6, Covington Report, PageID

1. Additionally, dispatch warned that there was an “alert on the residence” because “Eurton

[did] not like police” and was likely to become violent. RE 35-4, Covington Dep., PageID 337.

When Thomas arrived at Eurton’s residence, he found Eurton standing in the doorframe

smoking a cigarette. Thomas explained why he was checking on Eurton, and Eurton replied he

had called his family because it was Valentine’s Day weekend and he wanted to tell them that he

loved them. When Thomas asked if Eurton had any thoughts of hurting himself, Eurton responded,

“Hell no.” RE 38-3, Thomas Bodycam, 1:20-28. Whisman then came out of the home, speaking

to someone on her cell phone and holding up her finger in a “wait” gesture. Whisman asked

Eurton, “Your sister’s on the phone right now, who did you call?” Id. 1:43-55. When Thomas

asked Whisman if she was okay, she started crying and said “no” before turning quickly back to

Eurton and asking, “What did you do?” Id. 1:55-2:07.

Thomas and Covington, who had arrived during this interaction, walked toward the house.

At once, Eurton began backing into the house and closing the door in front of him while keeping

a hand in the pocket of his pants. Thomas said, “No, no, we’re not doing that,” “we’re gonna talk.”

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No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

Id. 2:19-22. Whisman reached out to prevent the door from closing and gasped as Eurton

forcefully shut the door. Thomas immediately forced the door back open with his shoulder,

damaging the latch, and he and Covington drew their weapons (a gun and a taser, respectively),

yelling for Eurton to put his hands up. Eurton complied, calmly raising his hands and asking the

officers what he had done. The officers’ weapons were pointed at Eurton for a total of about

seventeen seconds, during which Whisman became increasingly distraught.

Thomas and Covington then asked Eurton to turn around, at which point he became

agitated, demanding to know if the officers had a warrant. Eurton did not comply with the officers’

instructions and instead began to reach in his pocket again, at which point Thomas repeated his

command for Eurton to take his hand out of his pocket. Eurton said, “Kill me, then,” to which

Covington replied, “We’re not here to do that, we’re trying to make sure you’re okay.” Id. 3:00-

1. Eurton asked for his lawyer and said he wanted to reach into his pocket to call his attorney,

but he continued to disregard the officers’ requests that he approach them to be patted down.

Thomas and Covington stepped into Eurton’s home and he ordered them to leave, yelling

that their actions were unconstitutional. Thomas asked why Whisman was crying, to which Eurton

responded, “Because she thinks that I did something stupid because I drank three beers.” Id. 3:44-

1. As Thomas and Covington stood in place, Eurton became increasingly aggressive, swearing

at the officers and threatening them with lawsuits, ordering them to leave, and slurring his speech.

Eurton began rummaging in his pockets, prompting the officers to command him again to keep his

hands out of his pockets, to which Eurton shouted, “Shoot me, then!” Id. 4:20-30. Eurton retreated

further into his house and the officers followed him at a distance, still asking to talk as Eurton

shouted angrily and repeatedly challenged the officers to assault him. Thomas told Eurton that he

and Covington would leave once he spoke with them; they also reassured Eurton that he was not

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No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

under arrest. As Eurton yelled at Thomas and Covington to leave, they explained that they were

acting for their own safety in addition to his.

This pattern continued for about twelve minutes. Eventually, Thomas and Covington’s

supervisor, Sergeant Jared Ellison, arrived. Ellison largely “fail[ed] to communicate” with the

“irate” and “hostile” Eurton. RE 38, Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ MSJ, PageID 395. After Eurton

disappeared into another room in the house, Ellison asked Thomas if he “ha[d] anything.” RE 38-

3, Thomas Bodycam, 15:20-24. Thomas responded, “No,” and the officers left. Id. 15:23-40.

II. Procedural history

Eurton and Whisman sued Thomas, Covington, and Oldham County under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for unlawful warrantless entry, excessive force, and improper arrest or detainment. They

also levied a variety of state law claims, including assault, false arrest or imprisonment, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, trespass to land, and negligence per se. Upon the defendants’

motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against

Thomas and Covington and all claims against Oldham County but declined to dismiss the

individual capacity and state law claims.

After discovery, Thomas and Covington moved for summary judgment, which the district

court granted. The court found that, based on the information provided to Thomas and Covington

by 911 dispatch, Whisman’s distraught behavior, and Eurton’s own actions, the defendants were

entitled to qualified immunity on each of the federal claims. The court also concluded as to the

state claims that Thomas and Covington’s actions were protected by qualified official immunity

under Kentucky law.

Eurton and Whisman now appeal. For brevity, from this point on, we refer to Eurton and

Whisman’s joint suit using only Eurton’s name.

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No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

ANALYSIS
I. Standard of review

This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity

grounds de novo. Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is

appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party “is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view all evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, but “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a

judge.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986).

II. Eurton’s federal claims

Qualified immunity shields public officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). So recovery under § 1983 requires Eurton to show that

(1) Thomas and Covington violated one of his constitutional rights, and (2) the right was clearly

established when it was violated. Jones v. Byrnes, 585 F.3d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

When the “contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right,” the right is clearly established. Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Usually, this requires a plaintiff to “point to a case showing that

reasonable officers would have known their actions were unconstitutional under the specific

circumstances they encountered.” Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2022).

And “courts of appeals [are] permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the

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No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the

circumstances” at hand. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

Eurton argues that Thomas and Covington violated his Fourth Amendment rights when

they entered his home without a warrant, used excessive force against him, and arrested him

without probable cause. We reject his arguments and affirm as to all three claims.

A. Warrantless home entry

Eurton argues that Thomas and Covington unlawfully entered his home. He also argues

that the district court disregarded relevant facts related to the presence of exigent circumstances

during the incident. Eurton’s arguments are unavailing.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court warns that “physical entry of the home is

the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,” making warrantless

home entries “presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980)

(citation modified). But the presumption is not absolute. Warrantless entries are permissible if

“exigent circumstances” justify the entry. Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1375 (6th Cir.

1992).

One recognized exigency, known as the “emergency aid exception,” permits police to

“enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect

an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402-03 (2006).

Relatedly, exigent circumstances exist where a suspect poses “an immediate threat to the arresting

officers and public” such that “immediate and serious consequences” would occur if police left to

get a warrant before acting. Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 948 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).

-6-
No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Brigham City in the suicide-prevention context, explaining

that a warrantless entry to prevent a suicide does not require probable cause, because “[t]he

probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and derives its meaning from, the criminal” investigation

context. Case v. Montana, 146 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2026). Officers therefore need only “an objectively

reasonable basis for believing” that the “homeowner intended to take his own life.” Id. (quoting

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400).

Here, Eurton alleges that no exigency justified Thomas and Covington’s entry into his

home, and he takes issue with the district court’s factual description of the incident. Eurton claims

that, contrary to the district court’s description, Whisman was not outside the home until a few

minutes after the officers arrived, and she was “not in evident distress until some time after the

officers had arrived.” CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br., at 30. Eurton believes that jurors “could

determine that [his] answers to Thomas’s questions objectively allayed any suspicion of self-harm,

and that a single utterance from [Whisman] . . . afforded the officers no probable cause or exigent

circumstance[s]” for their warrantless entry. Id. at 31-32.1

Again, suicide prevention is an exigency under the emergency aid exception. See Case,

146 S. Ct. at 508-09. And we have found such an exigency even where a subject did not clearly

appear suicidal to officers. To illustrate, in Monday v. Oullette, we held that a police officer had

1
Eurton also argues that the district court erred by failing to consider the report of his expert,
David Jude. But, as Thomas and Covington explain, Jude’s report failed to incorporate crucial
evidence into its analysis. According to Jude, “Police Officers responded to home of Mark Eurton
and Lauren Whisman for a ‘welfare check.’ No other information was provided to the officers
suggesting the call for service was in any way criminal in nature.” RE 38-13, Jude Report, PageID
475 (citation modified). Jude’s statement omitted the information that dispatch provided to
Thomas and Covington about Eurton’s history with the police and his actions on the night of the
incident. Because Jude’s conclusions were based on incomplete information, the district court did
not err in omitting the report from its analysis. See DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 F. App’x
418, 427 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a district court does not err where it declines to consider
expert reports that “refus[e] to acknowledge the uncontroverted facts”).
-7-
No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

probable cause to conduct a warrantless seizure where the plaintiff had “telephoned a mental health

worker and stated that he . . . had ingested some pills and was drinking alcohol in an effort to

commit suicide.” 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the plaintiff “appeared coherent

and denied that he was attempting to commit suicide” when the officer arrived, the officer testified

that “based upon his experience in responding to suicide attempts, people who have overdosed

exhibit no typical behavior, the absence or presence of which will indicate reliably [his] true

condition.” Id. We concluded that “given [the officer’s] information and the great potential harm

at issue, an unacceptable risk remained that [the] plaintiff was deceiving him in order to attain his”

goal. Id. at 1103.

Case, Brigham City, and Monday support the district court’s finding of qualified immunity

here. The cases counsel that preventing self-harm is a cognizable exigency. They also insinuate

that a plaintiff’s apparent initial coherence or absence of immediately obvious, dangerous behavior

does not preclude an exigency finding, particularly when police have other relevant information

about the plaintiff’s condition. In Eurton’s brief initial interaction with Thomas and Covington,

he did not immediately appear distressed. But, as in Monday, the officers had information about

Eurton’s condition and threats of suicide from his family members, and the officers heard Eurton’s

wife ask what he had done. On these facts, the police had an “objectively reasonable basis for

believing” that he posed a danger to himself. Case, 146 S. Ct. at 503.

Eurton points out that, contrary to the district court’s opinion, Whisman was inside the

house when the officers arrived and was “not in evident distress” until after their arrival. CA6 R.

15, Appellant Br., at 30 (citing RE 41, Mem. Op. & Order, PageID 527-28). Additionally, Eurton

claims that the district court “discount[ed]” the fact that he answered Thomas’s questions in a

“measured, non-threatening tone” for nearly two minutes. Id.

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No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

But Eurton’s factual clarifications do not move the needle. Although we read the facts in

Eurton’s favor on summary judgment review, Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606,

611 (6th Cir. 2009), the officer’s perspective still guides the qualified immunity analysis, see

Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, Thomas and Covington

responded to a welfare check on a possible suicide victim who had been drinking and apparently

ingested two bottles of unknown pills, neglected his mental health medication, was likely to

become violent with police, and might be armed. When Thomas arrived, Eurton stood alone in his

doorframe, smoking a cigarette, and calmly reassured Thomas that he was okay. As Covington

arrived, Whisman came out of the house, asking her husband what he had done. When asked if

she was okay, Whisman began to cry and responded that she was not. And as soon as the officers

tried to speak to the couple further, Eurton backed into his house and forcefully closed the door

while putting his hand into his pocket. All of this occurred before the officers’ entry into Eurton’s

home. The “totality” of these circumstances suffices for Thomas and Covington to receive

qualified immunity for their warrantless entry. Case, 146 S. Ct. at 508 (citation modified).

Our decision in Reed v. Campbell County is instructive. 80 F.4th 734 (6th Cir. 2023).

There, we affirmed a denial of qualified immunity where officers made a warrantless entry after a

neighbor called 911 to report that he might have heard a domestic dispute. Id. at 740-41. But the

officers “did not see or hear anything amiss” when they arrived at Reed’s home, and when Reed

answered the officer’s knock, the woman standing behind him “was not crying” or injured. Id. at

740. Reed eventually closed the door after learning that the officers had no warrant. Id. at 741.

An officer then kicked down Reed’s door, drew his firearm on Reed, and patted him down. Id.

This court held that a “911 call alone is insufficient to justify . . . warrantless entry,” particularly

where officers “heard nothing and saw nothing amiss” and “saw no one who appeared to be injured

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No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

or upset.” Id. at 744. We distinguished the entry in Reed from cases in which “the 911 caller made

a significantly more detailed report” or where “there were other indications” of an emergency. Id.

Although Eurton asks this court to rely on his initial calm during the incident to deny

qualified immunity to the officers, Reed instructs otherwise. Thomas and Covington responded to

a detailed 911 call from Eurton’s own family, combined with a dispatch warning that Eurton was

likely intoxicated, possibly armed, and expected to react violently to police presence. Furthermore,

when the officers arrived, Whisman was emotional, told the officers that she was not okay, and

asked her husband what he had done. Reed makes clear that officers need not see “outward

manifestations of violence” to find exigency where other circumstances are at play. Id. at 745

(citation modified). And although Eurton is correct that “the mere presence of firearms does not

create exigent circumstances,” CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br., at 33 (quoting United States v. Johnson,

22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1994)), a showing “that the police possessed information that the suspect

was armed and likely to use a weapon or become violent” suffices, Barton, 949 F.3d at 948-49

(citation modified). Here, the officers’ dispatch report explicitly satisfies that qualification.

Finally, Eurton alleges that Thomas and Covington violated Oldham County Police

Department Standard Operating Procedures (“OCPD SOPs”) regarding domestic-violence related

home entries. Eurton specifically cites OCPD SOP 28.02, which provides that officers responding

to domestic violence calls “may make a warrantless entry and search of a location when there is

probable cause to believe that a victim may be in danger.” RE 38-11, Domestic Violence SOPs,

PageID 457. But Eurton’s argument improperly attempts to establish a constitutional violation

piecemeal, seemingly suggesting that every potential exigency had to independently justify the

entry. The officers needed only a single exigency to enter the home—in this case, emergency aid.

See Case, 146 S. Ct. at 505. Besides, police department policy violations do not independently

• 10 - No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

demonstrate constitutional violations. Coitrone v. Murray, 642 F. App’x 517, 522 (6th Cir. 2016)

(“[T]he Supreme Court has been cautious to draw a distinction between behavior that violates a

statutory or constitutional right and behavior that violates an administrative procedure of the

agency for which the officials work.” (alteration in original) (quoting Cass v. City of Dayton, 770

F.3d 368, 377 (6th Cir. 2014))).

Viewing the facts from a reasonable officer’s perspective and drawing inferences in favor

of Eurton, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity on Eurton’s warrantless entry

claim at the first step of the analysis.

B. Excessive force

Eurton next claims that Thomas and Covington violated his constitutional rights when they

drew a gun and a taser on him after forcing his door open. “A law enforcement officer uses force

against another when he or she aims a firearm at an individual.” Brown v. City of Wyoming, No.

23-1285, 2024 WL 5040781, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2024) (per curiam) (citing Kent v. Oakland

County, 810 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 2016)). And “all claims that law enforcement officers have

used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free

citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Courts analyze uses of force “from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene,” making “allowance[s] for the fact that police officers are

often forced to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.” Id. at 396-97.

Graham further counsels courts to assess “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether

the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he

[was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. This court

• 11 - No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

“review[s] the actions of each officer separately” because each “can be held liable only for his own

wrongdoing,” even where the officers acted together and arrived just minutes apart. Reed, 80 F.4th

at 748 (citing Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010)).

1. Officer Thomas

Officer Thomas claims that he forced Eurton’s front door open and raised his service

firearm because he feared for both Eurton’s safety and his own. Indeed, Thomas had information

that Eurton was possibly armed, unstable, and likely to become violent, and saw Eurton’s hand in

his pocket as the door closed. Thomas’s gun was pointed at Eurton for seventeen seconds total,

just enough time to see that Eurton was not in immediate possession of a weapon.

Thomas’s use of force was reasonable under Graham. The first Graham factor (severity

of the crime) is inconclusive because there is no specific crime to guide the analysis. Eurton claims

that the only relevant “crime” is “basic domestic violence,” which he describes as a misdemeanor.

CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br., at 40. That is incorrect; domestic violence can be a misdemeanor or

felony in Kentucky. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.720(2)(A). But here, without knowing more about

any potential domestic violence against Whisman, it would have been impossible for Thomas to

rely on any specific domestic violence offense.

The second Graham factor (theat to safety) “clearly favors” Thomas. RE 41, Mem. Op. &

Order, PageID 540. Thomas and Covington do not dispute that they forced their way into Eurton’s

house and drew a gun and taser, respectively, on Eurton. But they persuasively argue that their

show of force was reasonable under Graham because of the possibility of domestic violence

against Whisman; because Eurton was “uncooperative” and ignoring commands; because they

were aware that Eurton was intoxicated and possibly suicidal, likely had a weapon, and kept

moving his hands to his pockets; and because they had credible information that he was likely to

• 12 - No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

become violent. CA6 R. 17, Appellee Br., at 43, 46-47. This evidence supports Thomas’s

reasonable fear that Eurton might quickly and unpredictably become violent toward the officers,

Whisman, or himself. And the facts considered in a light favorable to Eurton do not erase the

context of the encounter and Thomas’s awareness about Eurton’s intoxication, potential suicide

attempt, and documented inclination to become violent; his family’s warning that he was likely

armed; and Whisman’s response that she was not okay. In light of all the relevant circumstances,

Thomas was justified in his belief that Eurton posed an “immediate threat” to merit qualified

immunity on Eurton’s excessive force claim.

The third and final Graham factor asks whether a plaintiff was “actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 490 U.S. at 396. This factor likely favors Eurton; although

Eurton ignored the officers and retreated quickly and unexpectedly into his home, that cannot aptly

be characterized as active resistance. See Reed, 80 F.4th at 749.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the grant of qualified immunity to

Thomas.

1. Officer Covington

The analysis of Covington’s actions is largely identical to the analysis of Thomas’s actions,

if not even more favorable to Covington. Covington arrived at Eurton’s home a few minutes after

Thomas and in time to hear Thomas’s entire interaction with Whisman. But his delayed arrival

meant that he also missed Eurton telling Thomas that he had no plans to hurt himself. Covington,

then, was aware of all the information relayed by 911 dispatch and saw that Whisman was

distraught, but he had no indication that Eurton was safe. Covington watched as Eurton backed

into the house while reaching into his pocket. Thomas, not Covington, forced the front door open,

• 13 - No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

and Covington pointed his taser at Eurton for about seventeen seconds. For the reasons set forth

above, Covington should also receive qualified immunity on Eurton’s excessive force claim.

Because Thomas and Covington’s force against Eurton did not violate his constitutional

rights, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

C. Improper seizure

After their initial entry, Thomas and Covington followed Eurton a short distance into his

home for about twelve minutes, repeatedly asking him to talk to them and to show his hands, and

assuring Eurton that he was not under arrest. Eurton appears to argue that the officers’ investigative

stop was unreasonable and ripened into an arrest for which they lacked probable cause. But Eurton

fails to state a specific constitutional violation or explain how Thomas and Covington’s alleged

seizure violated clearly established law. That is problematic because “[t]he burden falls on the

plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Mockeridge v. Harvey,

149 F.4th 826, 833 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

We begin and end our analysis with the clearly established prong. A police officer’s

conduct “violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours

of [the] right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what

he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citation modified).

“The ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the

officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

U.S. 48, 63 (2018). The specific question at issue is whether it was clearly established, at the time

of the incident between Eurton and the officers, that a 12-minute home entry to determine whether

Eurton posed an immediate threat to himself or others was an unconstitutional seizure.

• 14 - No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

But Eurton does not point to any “existing precedent [that] placed th[is] . . . constitutional

question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Eurton first cites Fisher v. Harden, where we

held that “[a]bsent suspected criminal activity, in this circuit a law enforcement official may not

physically restrain an individual merely to assess his mental health.” 398 F.3d 837, 842 (6th Cir.

2005). Instead, “an officer must have probable cause to believe that the person seized poses a

danger to himself or others.” Id. (citation modified). But in Fisher, officers responded to a suicide

dispatch from a passerby’s 911 call by laying Fisher face down on the road at gunpoint and

handcuffing him even though he showed no outward signs of distress. Id. at 839-40. Here, by

contrast, the officers had articulable reasons to believe that Eurton might be armed, violent, or

imminently suicidal. And the officers did not restrain Eurton in any way but stood in the front hall

of his house asking to speak with him out of concern for their safety, Whisman’s, and Eurton’s

own.

Eurton’s reliance on Monday is similarly unavailing. Monday held that no unlawful seizure

occurred even when officers responded to a suicide prevention dispatch, pepper-sprayed the

plaintiff when he refused to accompany them to the hospital for a mental health assessment, and

took him to the hospital in a stretcher, where he had to stay for five days because of his severe

reaction to the spray. 118 F.3d at 1101-02. Thomas and Covington’s attempts to speak with Eurton

are a far cry from the aggressive events of Monday, and do not constitute a seizure “specifically

for purposes of a professional psychiatric evaluation,” as we have later read Monday. Fisher, 398

F.3d at 846 (citing Monday, 118 F.3d at 1102).

Because Eurton cannot show that a reasonable officer in Thomas and Covington’s position

would have believed a twelve-minute home entry to assess Eurton’s wellness violated his

constitutional rights, qualified immunity is appropriate.

• 15 - No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

III. Eurton’s state claims

Next, Eurton argues that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to the

officers on his state tort claims. In Kentucky, police officers are entitled to “qualified immunity

from tort liability . . . for ‘(1) discretionary acts or functions . . .; (2) in good faith; and (3) within

the scope of the employee’s authority.’” Howell v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir. 2012)

(second alteration in original) (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001)).

A. Discretionary duties

Eurton first contends that Thomas and Covington were performing ministerial, not

discretionary, duties during their encounter with Eurton, making qualified immunity inapplicable

under Yanero. Eurton notes that this court “has observed that police department SOPs can be a

source of ministerial duties when they set clear constraints on an officer’s discretion.” CA6 R. 15,

Appellant Br., at 44 (citing Browning v. Edmonson County, 18 F.4th 516, 533 (6th Cir. 2021)). But

Browning defines a ministerial act as one which “requires only obedience to the orders of others,

or when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a

specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” 18 F.4th at 531 -32 (quoting Yanero, 65

S.W.3d at 522). By contrast, a discretionary act is “the exercise of discretion and judgment, or

personal deliberation, decision, and judgment.” Id. at 532 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522).

Eurton unpersuasively argues that the SOP guidelines covering warrantless home entry for

domestic violence situations (28.02) and use of physical force (21.00) render those duties entirely

ministerial in nature. CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br., at 44-45. But Eurton’s two discrete SOPs do not

control because they do not bear upon the totality of the circumstances facing the officers. And

under Browning, Thomas and Covington were clearly performing discretionary actions, which

required them to assess the circumstances at Eurton’s residence and make quick decisions about

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their own safety, Eurton’s, and Whisman’s. See Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 254

(6th Cir. 2003). The officers’ encounter cannot reasonably be described as “involving merely

execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Browning, 18 F.4th at 536

(quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522).

B. Bad faith

Next, Eurton argues that even if Thomas and Eurton acted within their discretion, their

“subjective good faith is a disputable question of fact.” CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br., at 46. Bad faith

can be predicated on a violation of a clearly established right which an officer “presumptively

would have known was afforded to a person in the plaintiff’s position.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.

Evidence that an officer’s action “willfully or maliciously intended to harm the plaintiff” also

supports a finding of bad faith. Id. As discussed above, Thomas and Covington did not violate

Eurton’s clearly established constitutional rights. Moreover, Eurton provides no evidence of

Thomas and Covington’s subjective bad faith that would allow us to find that the officers acted

with an intent to harm him.

For these reasons, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the officers on

Eurton’s state law claims.

III. Claims against Oldham County

Finally, Eurton attempts to resurrect his § 1983 claims against Oldham County pursuant to

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Eurton argues that the municipality

acquiesced in Thomas and Covington’s alleged unconstitutional conduct and that “inadequate

supervision and training exists as a de facto policy” within the Oldham County police department.

CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br., at 48. But where “no constitutional violation by the individual

defendants is established, the municipal defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983.”

• 17 - No. 25-5733, Eurton v. Thomas

Westmoreland v. Butler County, 29 F.4th 721, 731 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Because

Thomas and Covington did not violate Eurton’s clearly established constitutional rights, his Monell

claim must fail.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Eurton’s

constitutional and state law claims and its dismissal of Eurton’s Monell claims.

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