Martin v. Thomas Chevrolet - Wrongful Termination Appeal Affirmed

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April 21, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Martin, S. v. Thomas Chevrolet

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: 2026 Pa. Super. 78
• Docket Number: 302 WDA 2025

• Judges: Olson

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.4K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

by Judith Ference Olson

J-A29016-25

2026 PA Super 78

SCOTT MARTIN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
THOMAS CHEVROLET : No. 302 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 24, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 892 of 2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED: April 21, 2026

Appellant, Scott Martin, appeals from the April 24, 2025 judgment

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County after a jury found in

favor of Thomas Chevrolet on Appellant’s wrongful termination claim. We

affirm.

The record reveals that, on November 29, 2021, Appellant filed a

complaint against Thomas Chevrolet setting forth one count for wrongful

termination. In the complaint, Appellant alleged that his employment with

Thomas Chevrolet was terminated “in retaliation for his refusal to participate

in insurance fraud at [his supervisor’s] instruction.”1 Complaint, 11/29/21, at

---

1 At the time of his termination, Appellant was employed by Thomas Chevrolet

as a senior auto body technician. Complaint, 11/29/21, at ¶3. Appellant’s
supervisor, prior to his termination, was William Maust (“Mr. Maust”), who was
the manager of the auto body shop at Thomas Chevrolet. Id. at ¶4.
J-A29016-25

¶23. On September 19, 2024, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Thomas

Chevrolet, finding that Appellant was not wrongfully terminated from his

employment. Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief on September 27,

2024, which the trial court denied on February 12, 2025. On March 10, 2025,

Appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court order that denied

his post-trial motion. On April 24, 2025, judgment was entered in favor of

Thomas Chevrolet and against Appellant in the amount of $0.00.2

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the trial court err in failing to charge the jury on the
Cat’s Paw theory?

[2.] Did the trial court err in failing to strike Juror [# 4,] who
failed to respond truthfully during voir dire?

[3.] Did the trial court err in failing to strike [Juror # 4] due to
her close relationship with Christopher Carpenter [(“Mr.
Carpenter”)], one of [Thomas Chevrolet’s] owners?

---

2 We treat Appellant’s notice of appeal as having been filed on April 24, 2025,

upon entry of judgment. See Am. and Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport
Ctr., Inc., 948 A.2d 834, 842 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d, 2 A.3d 526 (Pa.
2010); see also Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating, “[a] notice of appeal filed after
the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable
order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof”);
Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp, 657 A.2d 511, 514
(Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (stating, entry of judgment is a prerequisite to
the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction); Funk v. Empfield, 281 A.3d 315,
319 (Pa. Super. 2022) (stating, “[i]n civil matters, an appeal to this Court can
only lie from judgments entered subsequent to the trial court’s disposition of
post-trial motions, not from the order denying post-trial motions” (citation,
original quotation marks, and original brackets omitted)).

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J-A29016-25

[4.] Did the trial court err by excluding the extensive evidence
that [Mr. Maust] directed [Thomas Chevrolet’s] other [auto]
body shop technicians to commit fraudulent acts?

[5.] Did the trial court err by excluding the January 5, 2022
[electronic mail (“email”)] from Trisha Gill, [Esquire
(“Attorney Gill”)] to Brooke Jones [(“Ms. Jones”)] and
Kenneth Salem [(“Mr. Salem”)]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the trial court’s denial of a jury

instruction on the Cat’s Paw theory of recovery.3 Id. at 18-29.

Our standard of review regarding jury instructions is limited to
determining whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of
discretion or error of law which controlled the outcome of the case.
Error in a charge occurs when the charge as a whole is inadequate
or not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse rather than

---

3 “Under the Cat’s Paw theory, if a supervisor performs an act motivated by

discriminatory animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse
employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate
[adverse] employment action, then the employer is liable[.]” Barbosa v.
Chatham Acres Healthcare Grp., Inc., 2019 WL 6329386, at *4 (Pa. Super.
filed Nov. 26, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (original quotation marks
and original brackets omitted), citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411,
422 (2011).

The term “cat’s paw” derives from a fable conceived by Aesop, put
into verse by La Fontaine in 1679, and injected into United States
employment discrimination law by Judge [Richard] Posner in
1990. In the fable, a monkey induces a cat by flattery to extract
roasting chestnuts from the fire. After the cat has done so,
burning its paws in the process, the monkey makes off with the
chestnuts and leaves the cat with nothing. A coda to the fable
(relevant only marginally, if at all, to employment law) observes
that the cat is similar to princes who, flattered by the king,
perform services on the king’s behalf and receive no reward.

Staub, 562 U.S. at 415 n.1 (citation omitted).

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J-A29016-25

clarify a material issue. Conversely, a jury instruction will be
upheld if it accurately reflects the law and is sufficient to guide the
jury in its deliberations.

The proper test is not whether certain portions or isolated
excerpts taken out of context appear erroneous. We look to
the charge in its entirety, against the background of the
evidence in the particular case, to determine whether or not
error was committed and whether that error was prejudicial
to the complaining party.

In other words, there is no right to have any particular form of
instruction given; it is enough that the charge clearly and
accurately explains the relevant law.

James v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 170 A.3d 1156, 1163-1164 (Pa. Super.

2017) (citation omitted); see also Hagans v. Hosp. of the Univ. of

Pennsylvania, 343 A.3d 251, 271 (Pa. Super. 2025).

Appellant asserts that the trial court permitted him to proceed under the

Cat’s Paw theory during the litigation of his cause of action by denying Thomas

Chevrolet’s motion for summary judgment and a motion for compulsory

nonsuit. Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. The trial court, however, denied

Appellant’s request for a jury instruction on the Cat’s Paw theory marking a

break from its prior rulings. Id. at 20. Appellant avers that “[n]o standard

jury instruction exists in Pennsylvania for the Cat’s Paw theory.” Id. at 22.

Appellant contends that the trial court’s strict adherence to use of only

standard jury instructions was “not the appropriate method for properly

instructing a jury and avoiding prejudice.” Id. at 21. Appellant argues that

“[i]f the trial court is correct that the Cat’s Paw theory cannot be explained to

a jury without bias or confusion then the theory, as a matter of law, ceases to

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J-A29016-25

exist in practice[, which] is contrary to [the precedent set forth in Staub,

supra.]” Id. at 23. Appellant asserts that, although the trial court permitted

him to argue the Cat’s Paw theory during his closing argument, this was not

the equivalent of providing a jury instruction on the theory. Id. Appellant

contends that the trial court’s jury instruction on factual cause, which,

according to Appellant, included the instruction that “[c]onduct is a factual

cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred, absent the

defendant’s conduct[”] places emphasis on the conduct of Thomas Chevrolet

as an entity “as opposed to the potential for a supervisor’s malignant

influence.” Id. at 27. Appellant asserts that without the Cat’s Paw theory

jury instruction, the jury lacked “an essential tool to make an informed

decision based on correct and complete legal principles relevant to its verdict.”

Id. at 27-28.

The trial court explained its reasoning for excluding the Cat’s Paw theory

from its jury instruction as follows:

In sum, we found it most appropriate and helpful for the jury to
[receive] the general instructions regarding causation, while also
permitting [Appellant] to argue his [Cat’s Paw] theory in closing.
As we stated on the record, [Appellant’s] theory of causation was
dependent on the jury accepting a particular set of facts
advantageous to [Appellant], and we did not want our instructions
to unnecessarily interfere with the jury’s role as the fact-finder.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/25, at 2.

In his amended proposed points of charge, Appellant asked the trial

court to provide, inter alia, the following jury instruction:

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J-A29016-25

1. Agency - General Instruction

In this case, [Appellant] seeks damages from Thomas Chevrolet
for harm caused by [Mr.] Maust’s wrongful conduct. [Appellant]
claims that [Mr.] Maust acted as Thomas Chevrolet’s agent. An
agent is someone who agrees to act for someone else, in this
case - the business, under the business’s control. A business may
be legally responsible for harm caused by its agent’s wrongful
conduct. For example, a business is held responsible when a
supervisor is motivated by a wrongful reason, and that supervisor
influences the termination.

Appellant’s Amended Proposed Points of Charge, 9/16/24, at 13 (formatting

modified), citing Barbosa, supra, and Staub, supra. The trial court denied

Appellant’s request for this instruction, stating,

I mean, I’m not going to instruct them on that. I’ll give the
general instruction on factual causation and I think that’s the
proper thing to do. If I think they can get any further on that,
then I’m highlighting the evidence in favor of one party over the
other and I don’t like doing that. You can argue that, but I’m
going to give the – and I think the general instruction includes, it
has to be a factual cause of the damages or of the termination.
But I think it is correct that if they have – if there’s another
legitimate reason for termination, then there’s – then there isn’t
causation. So that’s a thing for the jury, I think, to take up in
their factfinding.

N.T., 9/17/24, at 13-14. During its charge, the trial court provided the

following, pertinent instructions:

All right. So that concludes how you are to assess the evidence in
the case. I’ll now give you the definition of the burden of proof
here and then I’ll give you further instructions on what the claim
is and any defenses in the case. Now, under the law, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the
evidence. Also, the defendant, if you get to this point in the
verdict slip, has a burden of proving the defense of mitigation of
damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

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J-A29016-25

Now, as I said before, this is a civil case, not a criminal case. The
burden of proof in a civil case is different from the burden of proof
in a criminal one. In a civil case, the plaintiff must prove their
claims by a legal standard called a preponderance of the evidence.
Preponderance of the evidence means that a fact is more likely
true than not.

Think about the scales of justice or an old fashioned balanced scale
with a pan on each side to hold the objects. Imagine using this
scale as you deliberate in the jury room. Place all the believable
evidence favorable to the plaintiff in one pan, place all the
believable evidence favorable to the defendant in the other. If the
scales tip even slightly to the plaintiff or the person that has the
burden of proof on that particular issue, then the plaintiff or that
party has met their burden of proving that fact. If, however, the
scales tip even slightly to the other person’s side or if the two sides
of the scale balance equally, then that burden of proof has not
been met.

Now, in this case, the plaintiff seeks damages from the
defendant for harm caused by the defendant’s agent or
employee from that employee’s wrongful conduct. Now,
the plaintiff claims that the employee or agent acted as the
defendant’s agent or employee. An agent is someone who
agrees to act for someone else called the principal, in this
case the employer, under the principal’s control. A
principal may be legally responsible for harm caused by the
agent's wrongful conduct.

Now, under Pennsylvania law, an employer may terminate an
employee for any reason or no reason, unless the plaintiff proves
in this case that the termination violated the law. In this case,
the plaintiff claims that his employer wrongfully terminated his
employment for refusing to commit the crime of insurance fraud.

It is a violation of the law for an employer to terminate an
employee for refusing to commit an illegal act at the request of
the employer. If you find the plaintiff’s refusal to commit an illegal
act at the request of their employer was a factual cause for the
termination, then the plaintiff has established a violation of the
law.

Now, let me talk a little bit about causation. So here the plaintiff
has to prove the wrongful termination [as] I just defined that to
you and that that was a causation of the termination or that

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J-A29016-25

caused the termination. I’ll now define to you what causation
means. In order for the plaintiff to recover in this case, the
defendant’s conduct must have been a factual cause in bringing
about the harm.

Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have
occurred, absent the defendant’s conduct. To be a factual cause,
the conduct must have been an actual real factor in causing the
harm, even if the result is unusual or unexpected. A factual cause
cannot be an imaginary or fanciful factor having no connection or
only an insignificant connection with the harm.

Now, in this case, the plaintiff claims that the illegal action that
was requested by the employer was that he commit insurance
fraud. I’ll define [for] you that statute as it’s defined in the crimes
code in Pennsylvania. So this is, there’s two versions of insurance
fraud that are relied upon here. So first, that the defendant
assisted, solicited or conspired with another to prepare any
statement intended to be presented to any insurer or self insurer.

Second, that the statement was intended to be presented to any
insurer or self insured in connection with or in support of any
insurance claim. Third, that the statement contained false,
incomplete or misleading information concerning any fact or thing
material to the claim, including but not limited to information that
documents or supports an amount claimed in excess of the actual
loss sustained by the claimant. Material information means,
information the agency would regularly rely upon in making [its]
official determinations or findings. And fourth, that the defendant
did so and made the statement that was intended to defraud any
insured or self insured.

Now, this second version of insurance fraud here would be first,
that the defendant must derive some benefit, either directly or
indirectly from the proceeds of an act of insurance fraud. And
second, that the benefits were obtained through the assistance,
conspiracy or urging of any person involved in the fraudulent
insurance claim. And third, that the defendant did so knowingly.
So that is a definition [of] what the plaintiff must prove in the
case.

Id. at 165-169 (emphasis added). At the conclusion of the charge, the trial

court asked counsel for both parties if they had any objection to the

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J-A29016-25

instructions. Counsel for Thomas Chevrolet did not lodge an objection to the

instructions, and counsel for Appellant stated, “No. I think my prior objections

are already on the record.” Id. at 179.

Upon review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s order that denied Appellant’s request to provide a jury instruction

on agency or the Cat’s Paw theory of recovery, as described supra. The Cat’s

Paw theory is based upon agency principles whereby an employer-principal

may be liable for the animus actions of its employee-agent when those actions

are unlawful and the causal factor in an adverse employment decision

affecting the terminated employee. Here, the trial court, as emphasized

supra, explained the theory of agency liability to the jury in a clear, neutral,

and succinct way so as to explain the relevant law without invading the

province of the jury as fact-finder. Thus, Appellant’s first issue merits no

relief.

In his second and third issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s

denial of his request to discharge seated Juror # 4 on the grounds that Juror

4 had, what Appellant described as, a close familial relationship to Mr.

Carpenter, who was a partial owner of Thomas Chevrolet and a witness during

the trial. Appellant’s Brief at 30-37.

“[T]he right to a trial by an impartial jury is enshrined in the

Pennsylvania Constitution, see PA. CONST. art. I, § 6, which guarantees that

‘trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.’”

Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hosp. of City of Philadelphia, 58 A.3d 102, 108

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J-A29016-25

(Pa. 2012); see also Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 438 (Pa. 2017)

(reiterating that, “[o]ne of the most essential elements of a successful jury

trial is an impartial jury” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)).

“[T]he fairness and impartiality of a jury are as scrupulously protected in a

civil case as in a criminal case.” Bruckshaw, 58 A.3d at 109. “Importantly,

it is not simply the fact of partiality, but also the appearance of partiality or

bias that the trial court must consider” and guard against. Shinal, 162 A.3d

at 438. “Challenges for cause are essential means by which to obtain a jury

that in all respects is impartial, unbiased, free from prejudice, and capable of

judging a case based solely upon the facts presented and the governing law.”

Id.

Appellant asserts that Juror # 4’s “relationship with Mr. Carpenter

create[d] a perception of bias or prejudice, which the trial court failed to

address by refusing to strike [Juror # 4] for cause.” Appellant’s Brief at 32.

Appellant avers that Juror # 4 is Mr. Carpenter’s second cousin through

marriage. Id. at 33. Appellant argues that, when questioned about their

relationship by the trial court, Juror # 4 referred to Mr. Carpenter by his first

name, which “indicate[d] a close connection in support of a strike for cause.”

Id. Appellant contends that Juror # 4 had “regular contact” with Mr.

Carpenter at a convenience store where Juror # 4 worked and Juror # 4

“provided inconsistent testimony on whether, or not, she wait[ed] on [Mr.

Carpenter] when he visit[ed] her workplace and when she last saw him[.]”

Id. at 34. Appellant argues that the ”familiarity of the parties, regular contact,

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and inconsistent answers are further evidence of the potential for prejudice.”

Id.

Generally, the test for determining whether, or not, a juror should be

disqualified is “whether he or she is willing and able to eliminate the influence

of any scruples and render a verdict according to the evidence, and this is to

be determined on the basis of answers to questions and demeanor.” Shinal,

162 A.3d at 440 (citation omitted). In other words, whether the juror will be

impartial and unbiased at trial. Typically, “the decision on whether to

disqualify [a juror] is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be

reversed in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation and

original brackets omitted). Appellate courts, however, “have required the trial

court to grant a challenge for cause in two scenarios: when the [] juror has

such a close relationship, familial, financial, or situational, with the parties,

counsel, victims, or witnesses or, alternatively, when the juror demonstrates

a likelihood of prejudice by his or her conduct and answers to questions.” Id.

(original quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Cordes v. Assocs.

of Internal Med., 87 A.3d 829, 834 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (plurality

opinion), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 986 (Pa. 2014). When it is established that

a juror has a “close relationship” with a party, counsel, a victim, or a witness,

prejudice or bias is implied per se and evidence of actual prejudice or bias

need not be proven. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 440-441 (stating, “[i]mplied bias

[or prejudice] is presumed as a matter of law based upon special

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circumstances and is attributable in law to the [] juror regardless of actual

partiality” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)).

When a determination regarding a challenge to a juror is based upon

allegations of a close relationship, whether it be familial, financial, or

situational closeness, or a combination thereof, we review a trial court’s

determination de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. at 441. When

the relationship is not sufficiently close to constitute per se prejudice, then a

determination of whether, or not, the juror’s indirect relationship with a party,

counsel, a victim, or a witness will inhibit the juror’s ability to be impartial

turns on the answers and explanations provided by the juror regarding the

relationship and an assessment of the juror’s expressed ability to remain

impartial, as brought forth in the examination of the juror by the trial court.

Id. at 440-442; see also Commonwealth v. Koehler, 737 A.2d 225, 238

(Pa. 1999) (stating, “[t]he test for determining whether a [] juror should be

disqualified is whether he [or she] is willing and able to eliminate the influence

of any scruples and render a verdict according to the evidence, and this is to

be determined on the basis of answers to questions and demeanor”), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000). In this instance, the trial court “retains

discretion to explore and assess the relevant relationship presented” and to

determine the juror’s ability, in light of that relationship, to remain impartial,

and we review the trial court’s determinations for an abuse of discretion.

Shinal, 162 A.3d at 442; see also Bruckshaw, 58 A.3d at 110 (stating,

“[t]he decision to remove a juror because of inability to perform the usual

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functions and to seat an alternate juror is within the sound discretion of the

trial court”). “It is imperative that any doubt the [trial] court may have

regarding the impartiality of a juror must be resolved in favor of the party

seeking to [discharge] the juror.” Lockley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 5 A.3d 383,

393 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 34 A.3d 831 (Pa. 2011).

“The mere existence of some familial, financial, or situational

relationship does not require dismissal [of a juror] in every case.” Shinal,

162 A.3d at 443 (emphasis added). Case law, however, has been less than a

model of clarity as to what level of familial relationship constitutes a “close

relationship” for purpose of finding per se prejudice or bias. By way of

example, in Cordes, then-Judge, now-Justice Wecht authored an opinion in

support of reversal, which held that per se prejudice existed when it was

disclosed that one juror’s parents and another juror’s wife were patients of

the defendant-physician. Cordes, 87 A.3d at 842 (Wecht, J.) (stating that,

“the clinical relationships of [the two jurors’] close family members with [the

defendant-physician] were sufficiently close and real to warrant a finding of

per se prejudice”). This author disagreed, finding that a direct relationship

between the juror and a party, counsel, a victim, or a witness must exist for

a finding of per se prejudice and that the relationships at issue in Cordes were

indirect, such that and the potential disqualification of the jurors hinged on

the answers and explanations they provided to the trial court regarding their

ability to remain impartial. Cordes, 87 A.3d at 847-863 (Olson, J. dissenting).

Furthermore, then-Judge, now-Justice Donahue authored an opinion in

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support of reversal in which she, inter alia, agreed that the juror’s wife’s

treatment by the defendant-physician was a close familial relationship

warranting a finding of per se prejudice but that the juror’s parents’ treatment

by the defendant-physician was not a close familial relationship warranting a

finding of per se prejudice. Cordes, 87 A.3d at 867-869 (Donahue, J.).

In the case sub judice, counsel for Thomas Chevrolet raised a concern

regarding Juror # 4 prior to the start of the third day of trial. N.T., 9/16/24,

at 3. Mr. Carpenter stated that his wife and Juror # 4’s mother were first

cousins, thus making Mr. Carpenter’s wife and Juror # 4 second cousins. Id.

at 3. Mr. Carpenter further stated that he did not know the current surname

of Juror # 4, only her maiden name, and that he, his wife, and Juror # 4 did

not “get together for family [events] or anything like that.” Id. Mr. Carpenter

knew Juror # 4 worked at a local convenience store and that she would wait

on him when he stopped at the convenience store to make a purchase. Id.

at 4. Based upon the representations made by Mr. Carpenter, the trial court

questioned Juror # 4 as follows:

[Trial Court:] Okay. [Juror # 4], you can sit in the seat in the
first row. That's fine. So, [Juror # 4], you are
not in trouble in anyway. I just have a couple
questions for you. It was brought up that you
may be somehow related to the witness that
testified Friday, Mr. Carpenter.

[Juror # 4:] Distantly, my second cousin is married to him.

[Trial Court:] Okay. So you believe it to be second cousin.
What do you think the relationship is, familial
relationship through?

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[Juror # 4:] I just know him because he’s married to my
second cousin. My mother’s cousins with her.
That makes me her second cousin.

[Trial Court:] Okay. How often do you see him, if you do?

[Juror # 4:] I don’t.

[Trial Court:] Do you remember the last time you saw him?

[Juror # 4:] I work at [a convenience store] and every now
and then he’ll stop in there, but I don’t know
when the last time he was in there.

[Trial Court:] So you just have occasion -

[Juror # 4:] I don't wait on him. I am back in the kitchen
and say, there’s Chris.

[Trial Court:] Obviously, you remember when we talked at
jury selection, the key thing is, you would sit on
the jury as a fact[-]finder in the case. The
important thing is that you can assess people’s
credibility and apply those standards evenly
across all the witnesses. Given that you have a
technical familial relationship with him, could
you fairly hear his testimony the same as you’ll
hear all evidence?

[Juror # 4:] Yes. That’s why I - I don’t have no - you know,
no opinion one way or the other.

[Trial Court:] Okay. So when I asked you if you have any
relationship by blood, marriage or have a close
association, I don’t have notes that you
answered that. But that, whether or not you
have any relationship to him, that doesn’t
[affect] your ability to fairly hear his testimony
in anyway?

[Juror # 4:] No.

[Trial Court:] Okay. And you - given your contact with him,
you don’t know anything about the case
whatsoever?

[Juror # 4:] No.

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[Trial Court:] Before you came into the Courtroom?

[Juror # 4:] No.

[Trial Court:] Okay. All right. Ma’am, I’m going to have you
back in with the jurors.

Id. at 6-8. The trial court described Juror # 4’s relationship with Mr.

Carpenter as “very detached,” having previously noted that there is “a high

degree of [familial] relationships in [Bedford County].” Id. at 4, 10. The trial

court credited the responses provided by Juror # 4, stating that her

“relationship” with Mr. Carpenter would not affect her decision making or

cause her to be partial. Id. at 10-11. Having found Juror # 4 to be credible,

the trial court, thereupon, denied Appellant’s request to discharge Juror # 4.

Id. at 11.

The familial connection between Mr. Carpenter and Juror # 4 is

technically first cousin once removed by virtue of marriage because, as

described by Juror # 4 and Mr. Carpenter, the juror’s mother and Mr.

Carpenter’s wife are first cousins.4 As such, we find as a matter of law that

the connection between Juror # 4 and Mr. Carpenter is indirect and does not

constitute a close, familial relationship requiring the application of the per se

prejudice rule. See Shinal, supra; see also Cordes, supra. Therefore, we

---

4 In order for Juror # 4 and Mr. Carpenter’s wife to be second cousins, Juror

4’s mother and Mr. Carpenter’s wife’s mother would have to be first cousins.

See https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/second-cousin
(last visited Mar. 25, 2026) (defining second cousin as “any person who is a
child of a cousin of your mother or father”).

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turn to a review of whether, or not, the trial court abused its discretion in

denying Appellant’s request to discharge Juror # 4 based upon the inquiry it

undertook. Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record

supports, that Juror # 4’s connection to Mr. Carpenter is “very detached.”

Both Juror # 4 and Mr. Carpenter described their interaction as occasional and

occurring only when Mr. Carpenter happened to frequent a convenience store

where Juror # 4 worked. The two individuals did not attend family functions

together. Moreover, the trial court found Juror # 4 credible in her response

that she could remain impartial. See Koehler, 737 A.2d at 238 (stating that,

the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of a juror).

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of

Appellant’s request to discharge Juror # 4.5

---

5 To the extent that Appellant asserts that Juror # 4’s failure to identify her

connection to Mr. Carpenter during the voir dire process warrants the grant of
a new trial, we find this assertion to be of no avail under the circumstances of
the case sub judice. To obtain a new trial, Appellant was required to first
demonstrate that Juror # 4 failed to answer a material question honestly
during voir dire and second that a correct response would have provided a
valid basis for a challenge for cause. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc.
v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (stating, “to obtain a new trial in
such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The
motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that
affect a juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.”).
Here, the trial court stated that, based upon the detached connection between
Juror # 4 and Mr. Carpenter and Juror # 4’s ability to remain impartial, the
trial court would not have struck Juror # 4 for cause during the jury selection
process. N.T., 9/16/24, at 11. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to a new

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In his fourth and fifth issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s

decision to exclude certain evidence. First, Appellant alleges that the trial

court erred in excluding evidence of post-termination allegations against Mr.

Maust lodged by other auto body technicians, including an email

correspondence between defense counsel, Attorney Gill, and Thomas

Chevrolet employees, Ms. Jones and Mr. Salem. More specifically, these

---

trial based upon Juror # 4’s failure to identify her connection to a potential
witness during the jury selection process.

Moreover, we find Appellant’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Rosario, 182
A.2d 75 (Pa. Super. 1962) for the proposition that Juror # 4’s failure to
disclose her connection to Mr. Carpenter warrants the grant of a new trial to
be misplaced. Appellant asserts that Juror # 4’s failure to disclose her
connection to Mr. Carpenter “deprived Appellant of the fully informed use of
his peremptory challenges.” Appellant’s Brief at 31, citing Rosario, 182 A.2d
at 76. In Rosario, this Court held that a juror’s specific action of providing a
negative answer to a question posed during voir dire, which amounted to an
incorrect answer, misled counsel and “prevented an intelligent exercise of the
defendant’s right of peremptory challenge.” Id. Here, Juror # 4 did not
answer whether, or not, she was “related by blood, marriage or [had] a close
association to” any of the individuals identified as potential witnesses at trial.
See generally, N.T., 9/16/24, at 5-16. While Juror # 4’s silence, arguably,
could be viewed as a “negative answer,” the record demonstrates that
Appellant did not exercise a peremptory challenge to strike a different juror
who confirmed that she also knew a potential witness, Mark Thomas, the
representative for Thomas Chevrolet who was seated at counsel table during
the voir dire process. The fact that Appellant did not exercise a peremptory
challenge to strike a similarly situated juror who also knew a potential witness
strongly suggests that Appellant evaluated the pool of potential jurors and
chose to exercise peremptory challenges on other jurors that it deemed less
qualified than a juror having a connection to a potential witness. As such,
Appellant failed to show that he would have exercised a peremptory challenge
had he known about Juror # 4’s connection to Mr. Carpenter. It is
well-established that a litigant is entitled to a fair trial not a perfect trial. See
Commonwealth v. Thornton, 431 A.2d 248, 252 (Pa. 1981), citing Lutwak
v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).

• 18 - J-A29016-25

allegations suggested that other auto body technicians reported fraud claims

against Mr. Maust, and the email correspondence characterized these

allegations as “problematic” for the defense. Appellant’s Brief at 37-45.

Second, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in excluding the proffered

testimony of another auto body technician employed by Thomas Chevrolet

who alleged that Mr. Maust directed him to commit insurance fraud. Id.

The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the
admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial
court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed
an error of law. To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary
ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial
to the complaining party.

Rissi v. Cappella, 918 A.2d 131, 138 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

The trial court excluded the evidence described supra because it was

irrelevant and because its prejudicial effects outweighed its probative value.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence define “relevant evidence” as evidence

that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be

without the evidence[ and] the fact is of consequence in determining the

action.” Pa.R.Evid. 401. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”

Pa.R.Evid. 402. A trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative

value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair

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prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting

time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.Evid. 403. In sum,

[f]or evidence to be admissible, it must be competent and
relevant. Evidence is competent if it is material to the issue to be
determined at trial. Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or
disprove a material fact. Relevant evidence is admissible if its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact.

Est. of Hicks v. Dana Cos., LLC, 984 A.2d 943, 961 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 19 A.3d 1051 (Pa. 2011). Evidence that a

person committed another crime, wrong, or act may be admissible to show,

inter alia, a common plan or scheme, if “the probative value of the evidence

outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.Evid. 404(b)(2). “Though

a witness’s credibility is always important in a trial, a witness may not be

impeached on collateral matters.” Valentine v. Acme Markets, Inc., 687

A.2d 1157, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1997).

Appellant asserts that evidence showing Mr. Maust asked another auto

body technician to commit fraud “undermine[d] the multiple claims made at

trial that Appellant’s bad attitude and performance, and not his refusal to

commit fraud, led to his termination [and, thus Mr. Maust’s alleged requests

of the other auto body technician pertained] directly to causation.” Appellant’s

Brief at 39 (footnote omitted). Appellant argues that the evidence was

relevant to

impeach the credibility of Mr. Maust, who claims that he never
directed Appellant to commit insurance fraud[,] rebut [Thomas
Chevrolet’s] attempts to bolter Mr. Maust’s credibility by pointing
to his religious affiliation and trustworthiness[,] demonstrate that

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Mr. Maust had a routine practice of engaging in insurance fraud[,]
impeach [Thomas Chevrolet’s] claims that its investigation into
[Appellant’s] allegations yielded no evidence of wrongdoing[, and]
demonstrate that while Mr. Maust directed [] three [auto] body
technicians to commit fraud, Appellant was the only one to refuse
and lost his job as a result.

Id. at 38 (record citations omitted). Appellant argues that “if Mr. Maust has

a routine practice of requesting his subordinates to commit insurance fraud,

then that makes it more likely that Mr. Maust acted in conformity with that

practice and requested Appellant to commit insurance fraud on the three

vehicles.” Id. at 40-41. Appellant also contends that “by presenting evidence

of Mr. Maust’s character, [Thomas Chevrolet] opened the door to character

evidence.” Id. at 41.

Appellant further asserts that the trial court erred in excluding questions

concerning the email correspondence between Attorney Gill, Ms. Jones, and

Mr. Salem. Appellant contends that the email was “relevant to undermining

the credibility of [Ms. Jones].” Id. at 45. Appellant argues that he sought to

introduce the emails “to rebut [Ms. Jones’] testimony by showing that [she]

was put on notice by [defense] counsel that the other auto body technician’s

statements were problematic to [the defense].” Id. Appellant further

contends that the emails undermine Thomas Chevrolet’s claims that “its

investigations turned up no evidence of fraudulent conduct by Mr. Maust.” Id.

The issue raised, collectively, in Appellant’s fourth and fifth issues,

pertains to whether, or not, the trial court erred in excluding evidence that

Mr. Maust requested other auto body technicians to commit insurance fraud.

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Appellant’s objections come in the form of two challenges to the trial court’s

rulings. First, as discussed in greater detail infra, Appellant challenges the

exclusion of evidence of other auto body technician’s interactions with Mr.

Maust, which Appellant sought to introduce during his examinations of certain

Thomas Chevrolet employees. The trial court reasoned that Thomas

Chevrolet’s post-termination discovery of allegations raised by other

auto-body technicians was not probative of the causes of Appellant’s

termination. Appellant further challenges the trial court’s decision to exclude

certain testimonial evidence from one of the auto body technicians unless the

testimony directly related to the same circumstances, namely the same

request to commit fraud on the same vehicle, that Appellant relied on as the

basis of his wrongful termination case. Here, the trial court held that the

evidence was irrelevant because it did not relate to the same instance of fraud

and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

We begin by examining the trial court’s ruling to exclude the evidence

based on relevancy and the fact Thomas Chevrolet allegedly learned of the

evidence of Mr. Maust’s interaction with other auto body technicians

post-termination and, therefore, the evidence could not form the basis of

Appellant’s termination. At trial, Appellant’s counsel asked Stephanie Martz

(“Ms. Martz”), the president of Thomas Automotive Family, which operates

Thomas Chevrolet, “Now, after [Appellant’s] termination, you’re aware

that [another auto body technician] made similar allegations against [Mr.]

Maust as those made by [Appellant]?” N.T., 9/13/24, at 15 (emphasis added).

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Defense counsel objected, arguing, inter alia, that “we don’t believe that any

information they gathered [] from other employees about their perception of

[Mr.] Maust is admissible – is relevant to the decision to terminate [Appellant]

because it occurred post[-]termination.” Id. at 17. Appellant’s counsel

asserted that evidence of another auto body technician’s statements regarding

Mr. Maust’s unlawful requests was relevant “to show that [Thomas Chevrolet

was] put on notice that another [auto body technician] had issues similar to

[Appellant, which] undermine[d] the credibility of [Thomas Chevrolet’s]

post[-]termination investigation.” Id. at 18. In sustaining the objection, the

trial court stated,

I don’t know that this trial should be solely about what we believe
the character of [Mr.] Maust to be, because that is largely
irrelevant, unless it fits into why [Appellant] was terminated.

Id. at 23.6

---

6 In issuing its ruling, the trial court further stated:

[Appellant does not] necessarily need to prove that insurance
fraud was in fact happening or did in fact happen. You [merely]
need - you just need to prove that he was fired because he
wouldn’t commit insurance fraud. So really what - or commit a
crime. So what - what I don’t think we can get into is making the
trial about, proving that a crime happened, because that - that
gets less - that’s less probative and that just - I think then we get
into the rule of evidence of, the prejudicial effects substantially
outweighing the probative value of that point. Because, then we
are just trying to show that something illegal was going on at
[Thomas Chevrolet] rather than how that actually ties into the
termination of [Appellant’s employment].

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Later, during the cross-examination of Mr. Salem, Thomas Chevrolet’s

vice president of organizational development, Appellant’s counsel asked Mr.

Salem if the other auto body technician “made allegations about [Mr.] Maust”

during a telephone conversation between Mr. Salem, Ms. Jones, and the other

auto body technician. N.T., 9/16/24, at 135. In response to defense counsel’s

objection, Appellant asserted that defense counsel “opened the door” to his

line of questioning because defense counsel asked Mr. Salem about his

investigation regarding Appellant’s allegations and that it was implied, through

Mr. Salem’s testimony, that Thomas Chevrolet did not find any allegations of

wrongdoing. Id. at 135-136. Appellant contends that an email between Mr.

Salem and Ms. Jones contains a summary of the other auto body technician’s

---

...

What I don’t want this trial to devolve in to is we are trying a case
about whether or not insurance fraud happened on other vehicles,
because that’s largely irrelevant to [Appellant’s] case. What you
need to prove is that [Appellant] would not commit those acts as
directed on those three vehicles and that because of that, he was
terminated.

Getting into what happened on other vehicles, what other
employees said happened, that’s too far field and I think we are
just getting into more impugning the character of the business,
rather than actually getting to the heart of the matter. So, I think
in that way, the prejudicial effect of that substantially outweighs
the probative value.

N.T., 9/13/24, at 25-27. In explaining its ruling, the trial court seemly
anticipated additional evidentiary issues arising, later in the trial, relating to
potential testimony proffered by the other auto body technician regarding
separate requests made by Mr. Maust to commit insurance fraud.

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allegations against Mr. Maust in which the other auto body technician “stated

that [Mr.] Maust asked him to do many questionable things that [he] refused

to do.” Id. at 137. The trial court responded,

I don’t think they opened the door to that. The only allegations
of fraud that are relevant to this case that the jury knows
about are what’s in the complaint [(referring to Appellant’s
allegations that Mr. Maust asked him to commit insurance
fraud with regard to the repair of three specific vehicles)]
and that’s what we are here to litigate.

If we go – and I don’t think I’m strapping your case at all, because
for it to come in that – now it’s just overly confusing for the jury
if they start hearing about other people saying this when there’s
no context for it. I don’t think its relevant, because this is
post-termination and [the other auto body technician] wasn’t even
complaining about the same allegations [as Appellant.] It’s just
very confusing for the jury, I think, and [its] prejudicial effects []
outweighs the probative values. Substantially outweighs the
probative value of it.

And I don’t think they opened the door. I think they were very
careful in doing that. Grant you, they were general questions
about the investigation but again, the jury only knows about
these three allegations.

Id. at 140 (emphasis added). As the trial court previously explained,

What [Appellant] need[s] to prove is that [he] would not commit
those acts as directed on those three vehicles and that because of
that, he was terminated. Getting into what happened on other
vehicles, what other employees said happened, that’s too far field
and I think we are just getting into more impugning the character
of the business, rather than actually getting to the heart of the
matter. So, I think in that way, the prejudicial effect of that
substantially outweighs the probative value.

N.T., 9/13/24, at 26-27 (formatting modified).

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Initially, we note that “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, employment is

presumed to be at-will unless it is shown that the parties contracted to restrict

the right to terminate employment.” Deal v. Children’s Hosp. of

Philadelphia, 223 A.3d 705, 711 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “An

at-will employment relationship may be terminated by either the employer or

the employee at any time, for any reason, or for no reason.” Id. (citation

omitted). “As a general rule, an at-will employee has no common law cause

of action for wrongful discharge against her [or his] employer.” Id. at

711-712. (citations omitted). “A limited exception to this rule exists and an

action for wrongful discharge can be brought only where the termination of

employment implicates a clear mandate of Pennsylvania public policy.” Id. at

712 (citations omitted). “This public policy exception applies and permits a

cause of action for wrongful discharge where the employer discharges an

employee for[, inter alia,] refusing to commit a crime[.]” Id.

In his complaint, Appellant alleged that “[Thomas Chevrolet] terminated

his employment in retaliation for his refusal to participate in insurance fraud

at [Mr.] Maust’s instruction.” Complaint, 11/29/21, at ¶23. A person commits

insurance fraud if, inter alia, he or she

Knowingly and with the intent to defraud any insurer or
self-insured, presents or causes to be presented to any insurer or
self-insured any statement forming a part of, or in support of, a
claim that contains any false, incomplete or misleading
information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim.

[or]

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Knowingly and with the intent to defraud any insurer or
self-insured, assists, abets, solicits or conspires with another to
prepare or make any statement that is intended to be presented
to any insurer or self-insured in connection with, or in support of,
a claim that contains any false, incomplete or misleading
information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim,
including information which documents or supports an amount
claimed in excess of the actual loss sustained by the claimant.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4117(a)(2) and (a)(3). Thus, to prove a claim for wrongful

termination, Appellant was required to demonstrate that Thomas Chevrolet,

vis-à-vis Appellant’s supervisor Mr. Maust, asked Appellant to commit

insurance fraud, that he refused to commit insurance fraud, and in retaliation

for his refusal, Thomas Chevrolet terminated his employment.

In both his questioning of Ms. Martz and Mr. Salem, Appellant sought to

introduce evidence that Thomas Chevrolet allegedly learned of additional

allegations against Mr. Maust after Appellant’s termination in which Mr. Maust

asked other employees to commit insurance fraud. Upon review, we discern

no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s ruling that evidence

consisting of statements made by other employees regarding their interaction

with Mr. Maust that Thomas Chevrolet learned about after the termination of

Appellant’s employment was not relevant to the issue of whether, or not,

Appellant was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act at the

request of Mr. Maust. Even if the allegations were true, namely that Mr. Maust

engaged in a common practice or scheme of asking the auto body technicians

to commit insurance fraud, Thomas Chevrolet learned about these allegations

after it terminated Appellant’s employment. Thus, Appellant cannot rely upon

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such evidence to establish the reason Thomas Chevrolet terminated his

employment.

Regarding the exclusion of certain aspects of the other auto body

technician’s testimony, on the third day of trial, the trial court preemptively

reiterated its evidentiary ruling regarding evidence of statements made to

Thomas Chevrolet by other employees regarding Mr. Maust as follows:

So my ruling was that, if a statement was made post-termination,
but it dealt with – it related back to the instances on these three
vehicles, that could be admissible. So at the time – well, at the
time the statement was made, it could be post-termination, but
it’s got to relate back to those three vehicles that we are talking
about[. If] there’s a vehicle that was worked on post-termination,
that doesn’t come in, because that’s coming in to prove whether
or not insurance fraud was committed post-termination. That’s
irrelevant in my mind.

N.T., 9/16/24, at 12. A discussion then occurred as to whether, or not, the

other auto body technician would be permitted to testify about his being asked

to complete repair work on a Nissan Rogue vehicle that was originally assigned

to Appellant prior to his termination. Id. at 12-17. The trial court held that

the other auto body technician’s complaint of fraud, namely his being asked

by Mr. Maust to replace a Nissan Rogue vehicle part with the wrong part,

was “wholly separate” from Appellant’s claim of fraud, which was based on his

being asked by Mr. Maust to replace a Nissan Rogue vehicle part that was

not damaged. Id. at 17. The trial court explained that

If the testimony from [the other auto body technician] was [Mr.]
Maust comes to [the other auto body technician] and says, you
are now doing the work that [Appellant] refused to do, replace
this bumper bar and absorber. And[, the other auto body

• 28 - J-A29016-25

technician] says, I don’t think they are damaged. I’m not going
to replace them. That’s the same claim [Appellant] had and I’d
let that in because that’s the same vehicle and it’s the same
claim [Appellant] made.

[The other auto body technician is] making a different claim,
because there’s no testimony here that [Appellant] examined the
bumper bar and said it’s the wrong part. That wasn’t [Appellant’s]
argument. [Appellant’s] argument and the reason you are linking
that to the wrongful termination is that he’s saying the original
[vehicle part] wasn’t broken, so it didn’t need replaced. That’s
not what [the other auto body technician] is saying.

So, it’s coming in to prove that [Mr.] Maust committed insurance
fraud on another occasion and post-termination. So, I think
for those two reasons, it doesn’t come in.

Id. at 19 (emphasis added).

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the

trial court’s determination that the other auto body technician’s proffered

testimony that he was asked by Mr. Maust to replace a vehicle part with the

wrong part was not relevant to proving Appellant’s claim for wrongful

termination and that the prejudicial effect of the proffered testimony

substantially outweighed the probative value. Evidence that the other auto

body technician was allegedly asked by Mr. Maust to replace a part on a Nissan

Rogue vehicle with an incorrect part is not relevant to establishing the

necessary elements to support Appellant’s claim for wrongful termination,

namely that he was asked to replace an undamaged part on a Nissan Rogue

vehicle and, because he refused to do so, he was terminated. The trial court

narrowly tailored its evidentiary ruling to permit evidence from the other auto

body technician if his interaction directly mirrored Appellant’s interaction with

• 29 - J-A29016-25

Mr. Maust, namely that the other auto body technician was asked to commit

the same act of fraud on the same vehicle that was asked of Appellant,

because such evidence would be potentially probative to establish Appellant’s

claim of wrongful discharge. Evidence unrelated to Appellant’s claim, as the

trial court explained, was both irrelevant and prejudicial and, therefore, was

inadmissible. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s evidentiary ruling.

In sum, as discussed supra, we discern no abuse of discretion or error

of law in the trial court’s evidentiary ruling that Appellant was permitted to

introduce evidence that Mr. Maust asked the other auto body technician to

replace a vehicle part on a Nissan Rogue vehicle that was, in fact, not

damaged, because that allegation, in part, supported Appellant’s claim for

wrongful termination. We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the

trial court’s ruling that Appellant was precluded from introducing evidence of

what Thomas Chevrolet learned after Appellant was terminated because this

knowledge could not have formed the basis for his termination or evidence

that Mr. Maust asked other auto body technicians to commit insurance fraud

on vehicles, other than the vehicles alleged in Appellant’s complaint. As the

trial court correctly determined, such evidence was irrelevant to establishing

the elements of Appellant’s cause of action and the prejudicial effect of such

evidence outweighed its probative value.

Judgment affirmed.

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DATE: 4/21/2026

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