Donkin v. Federizo - Trustee Fees

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Donkin v. Federizo CA2/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B348369

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (61)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/26/26 Donkin v. Federizo CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

RODNEY E. DONKIN, JR., et al., B348369

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BP109463)
v.

AILEEN FEDERIZO, as Interim
Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ana Maria Luna, Judge. Affirmed.
Rodney E. Donkin, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant Rodney E. Donkin, Jr.
Vicki R. Donkin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant
Vicki R. Donkin.
Rodnunsky & Associates and Yevgeny L. Belous for
Defendant and Respondent.
Appellants Rodney E. Donkin, Jr. (Rodney Jr.) and his
wife Vicki R. Donkin appeal from a probate court order regarding
Rodney Jr.’s parents’ trust. The order approves the most recent
accounting (the third account current)1 filed by the interim
trustee, respondent Aileen Federizo. We affirm.

SELECTED FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
The instant probate litigation spans multiple decades,
multiple Court of Appeal decisions, and one California Supreme
Court decision. A summary of the trust provisions and the
tortuous procedural history of litigation regarding the trust
can be found in prior opinions. (See, e.g., Donkin v. Federizo
(May 30, 2024, B323043) [nonpub. opn.], opn. mod. June 27,
2024 (Donkin 2024); Donkin v. Donkin (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
469; Donkin v. Donkin (Mar. 29, 2017, B266036) [nonpub. opn.].)
On March 21, 2024, the interim trustee filed the
third account current, providing an accounting for the period
of November 1, 2021 through December 31, 2023. In it,
she requested the court: (1) approve use of trust funds for
maintenance of real property in the trust during the accounting
period; (2) order payment of fees for work she and her attorney
performed during the accounting period; and (3) secure payment

1 The document’s full caption is: “Third Account Current
and Report of Trustee and: ¶ Petition for Approval Thereof;
¶ Petition for Allowance of Trustee’s Fees and for Approval
of Payment Thereof; and ¶ Petition for Allowance of
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and for Approval of Payment Thereof.”
(Boldface & full capitalization omitted.)
2 We provide additional factual background as necessary in
the Discussion section below.

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of the requested fees with a lien on real property in the trust.
The third account current seeks $34,720 in trustee fees and
$61,730.90 in attorney fees. It reports that, at the conclusion of
the accounting period, less than $13,000 remained in the trust’s
“liquid reserves” and the market value of real property in the
trust was approximately $1,635,000.
In July 2024, appellants filed objections to the third
account current, disputing the fee requests and arguing the
interim trustee breached her fiduciary duties, causing financial
losses to the trust.
On February 10, 2025, the court held an evidentiary
hearing. Appellants, their son Christopher Donkin, and the
interim trustee testified. The hearing was not transcribed.
On April 14, 2025, in a seven-page written order, the court
addressed and overruled appellants’ objections and approved the
third account current, awarding all fees requested and imposing
the requested lien. Appellants appealed.

DISCUSSION
Appellants challenge the order approving the third account
current on the following bases: (1) The order is void for lack
of proper notice; (2) The court proceeded with the evidentiary
hearing while appeals from related orders of the probate court
were pending; (3) The court violated appellants’ due process
rights by declining to hear their request for reinstatement as
trustees before approving the third account current; (4) The court
abused its discretion in denying their request for a discovery
continuance and conducting the hearing without a court reporter;
and (5) The court reversibly erred in overruling appellants’
objections.

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We disagree that the court reversibly erred in any of these
ways, each of which we address in turn below.

A. Notice
Appellants argue the interim trustee failed to give April
and Laura Kim, grandchildren of the trustors and contingent
beneficiaries of the trust, proper notice of the third account
current. Appellants contend the order approving it is therefore
void. In Donkin 2024, supra, B323043, we held that, given the
terms of the trust, contingent beneficiaries like April and Laura
Kim are not entitled to notice of all actions in the trust litigation.
Only when their rights are “inevitably affected, they are entitled
to notice.” (Estate of Reed (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 14, 21.) This
was not the case with the petitions at issue in Donkin 2024,
because “[r]egardless of how the court ruled on the petitions, [the
continent beneficiary’s] rights under the trust would remain . . .
unchanged: If certain circumstances outlined in the trust
come to pass, [he] will be entitled to distribution per those trust
provisions. The challenged orders granting the petitions do not
alter how those provisions are applied or what they require.”
(Donkin 2024, supra, B323043.) The same is true of the third
account current’s effects on contingent beneficiaries like April
and Laura Kim, whose rights under the trust are the same as
those of the contingent beneficiary grandchild at issue in Donkin
2024.
Appellants argue the reasoning in Donkin 2024 does not
apply here, because that decision “addressed sale orders, not
accountings.” They argue “[a]n accounting is fundamentally
different” (italics omitted) because “[e]very dollar approved in
trustee fees, attorney fees, and questionable disbursements is
a dollar that will never reach the remainder beneficiaries.” In

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Donkin 2024, we rejected that a reduction in the value of the
trust is an effect sufficient to require notice to the contingent
beneficiary. We recognized that the order at issue in that appeal,
which required the sale of real property in the trust, “might
change the amount or value of what [the contingent beneficiary]
stands to collect, should the circumstances come to pass that
trigger his right to collect directly from the trust, because the
[sale of the real property at issue] may reduce the value of the
trust corpus. But this [did not] justify requiring notice to [him]
as an element of due process.” (Donkin 2024, supra, B323043.)
The same is true here. Appellants further argue that Estate of
Lacy (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 172 warrants a different result. But
in Donkin 2024, we disagreed with that decision to the extent it
conflicts with our opinion. (Donkin 2024, supra, B323043.) We
stand by our opinion.

B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 916 Stay
“[T]he perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the
trial court upon the . . . order appealed from or upon the matters
embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of
the . . . order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a).) Nevertheless,
“the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in
the action and not affected by the [appealed from] judgment or
order.” (Ibid.; see also id., subd. (b) [providing for jurisdiction to
address such unaffected matters].)
When the court approved the third account current on
April 14, 2025, two appeals from orders in the trust litigation
were pending: one from an order approving the sale of real
property known as the Baker property (Baker sale order) and

5
one from a Probate Code section 1310, subdivision (b)3 order
permitting the interim trustee to act on the Baker sale order
despite the pending appeal therefrom.4 Appellants argue
the third account current presents matters “affected by” these
appeals (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a)), triggering a Code
of Civil Procedure section 916 stay and depriving the probate
court of jurisdiction to approve the account. According to
appellants, if the appeal from the Baker sale order had resulted
in reversal, the interim trustee would not be entitled to fees for
her efforts to sell the Baker property—fees she requested in the
third account current.
Appellants are incorrect. A section 1310, subdivision (b)
order authorized the interim trustee’s efforts to sell the Baker
property. “All acts of [a] fiduciary pursuant to the directions of
the court made under [section 1310, subdivision (b)] are valid,

3 Unless otherwise noted, further statutory references are
to the Probate Code.
4 Appellants appealed the Baker sale order in case
No. B321793. On July 3, 2024, the probate court authorized
the interim trustee, under section 1310, subdivision (b), to sell
the Baker property, notwithstanding the pendency of that appeal.
Appellants also appealed the section 1310, subdivision (b) order.
We affirmed the Baker sale order on April 28, 2025. (See Donkin
v. Federizo (April 28, 2025, B321793) [nonpub. opn.], opn. mod.
on denial of rehg. May 23, 2025 (Donkin 2025).) Appellants filed
a petition for review of that decision with the California Supreme
Court, which the high court did not deny until July 23, 2025,
three months after the probate court approved the third account
current. In a September 2025 unpublished opinion, we dismissed
appellants’ appeal from the section 1310, subdivision (b) order
as moot, based on the conclusion of the Baker sale order appeal.

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irrespective of the result of the appeal.” (§ 1310, subd. (b).)
That the section 1310, subdivision (b) order was itself the
subject of a pending appeal does not change this. (See ibid.
[“[a]n appeal of the directions made by the court under
[section 1310, subdivision (b)] shall not stay these directions”].)
The appeals pending at the time of the evidentiary hearing thus
did not “affect[ ]” the third account current. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 916, subd. (a).) The court did not lack jurisdiction under Code
of Civil Procedure section 916 to approve it.

C. Discovery Continuance and Lack of Transcript
Appellants served the interim trustee with discovery
requests on November 25, 2024. The interim trustee provided
approximately 2,400 pages of responses “15 days late” on
January 9, 2025. At 8:00 a.m. on February 10, 2025—the
day of the evidentiary hearing—appellants filed a request for
a continuance to allow for additional discovery. Appellants
argue the court abused its discretion in denying this continuance.
Because appellants waited a full month to make the request and
did so less than an hour before the hearing began, we cannot say
the court acted outside the scope of its discretion.
Further, the court did not abuse its discretion because
it proceeded with the hearing in the absence of a court reporter.
Appellants did not file a statement requesting a court-appointed
reporter. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(3).) Nor did
the court prevent appellants from using a private reporter to
transcribe the proceedings. Appellants argue on reply that the
court nevertheless should have continued the hearing because
their counsel “[made] a request . . . for electronic recording
(FTR) of the proceedings due to there being no court reporter”
but “[t]he FTR [did] not work, and the proceedings remain[ed]

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unreported and unrecorded.” But they cite no authority for the
proposition that appellants were entitled to expect electronic
recording of the proceedings. Nor does the record suggest they
requested a continuance to provide for transcription of the
proceedings.

D. Appellants’ Pending Request to be Reinstated
as Trustees
Appellants argue the court violated their due process rights
by approving the third account current without first deciding
their separate request to be reinstated as trustees. Appellants
have challenged other probate court orders on this same basis.
We reject the argument now for the same reason we have
previously rejected it. (See Donkin 2025, supra, B321793.)
Namely, as we explained in rejecting the argument as a basis for
reversing other orders: “[A]ppellants have not sought review of
the court’s orders continuing the hearing on their reinstatement
request or suspending them as trustees in this or any other
appeal or writ proceeding; . . . [¶] [a]ppellants are arguing
that the court’s decision to continue the reinstatement request
affected the outcome of [matters decided in the orders on appeal].
Even if this is true, we cannot reach outside the scope of our
jurisdiction simply because a ruling appellants have not appealed
from may have had some effect on the rulings appellants have
appealed from. Thus, we need not address appellants’ due
process arguments regarding their reinstatement request and/or
their suspension as trustees, because these arguments do not
provide a basis for reversing the orders on appeal.” (Italics
omitted.)

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E. Appellants’ Objections
Appellants objected to the third account current on
the basis that the interim trustee had breached her fiduciary
duties during the accounting period and requested improper
fees. The interim trustee had the initial burden below to
establish the correctness of her accounting with supporting
documentation (Neel v. Barnard (1944) 24 Cal.2d 406, 420),
something appellants do not dispute she did. Having done so,
“[t]he trustee is entitled to the benefit of the presumptions of
regularity and good faith” (id. at p. 421), meaning the appellants
bore the burden below of establishing any alleged failure to
perform a fiduciary duty. (LaMonte v. Sanwa Bank California
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 509, 517.)
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
to approve an accounting. We review that overall decision, as
well as decisions regarding fee requests, for abuse of discretion.
(See Estate of Hershel (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 658, 660; Estate
of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1088–1090 (Nicholas).)
We review factual findings following a hearing on a contested
accounting for substantial evidence. (Manson v. Shepherd (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1264; Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
973, 987 (Fain).) In reviewing for substantial evidence, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and
affirm if any evidence in the record, contradicted or not, supports
it. (Fain, supra, at p. 987.) When the court below determines a
party has not met his or her burden of proof on an issue, however,
substantial evidence review of that determination requires us to
examine “ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law.’ ” (Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v.
County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838 (Dreyer’s).)

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With these principles in mind, we address appellants’
arguments.

1. Gardening and Trash Expenses Appellants contend the court erred in approving, over appellants’ objections, the interim trustee’s expenditure of $10,000 for gardening and trash services on real property known as the Comerico property, and $7,800 in expenditures to clear brush from the Baker property. They argue the leases for these properties, which appellants attached to their objections, require the tenants pay these expenses. According to appellants, by paying “expenses that the leases assigned to tenants, [the interim trustee] failed to enforce the trust’s contractual rights under the leases” and “depleted trust assets” unnecessarily. (Capitalization omitted.) This, they contend, breached her fiduciary duties to administer the trust with “reasonable care, skill, and caution” under the circumstances then prevailing (§ 16047, subd. (a)) and “solely in the interest of the beneficiaries” (§ 16002). The court found there was “no evidence” the tenants were responsible for the work the interim trustee commissioned. Appellants argue the lease agreements “conclusively establish tenant responsibility.” We disagree that these leases alone compel a finding that the tenants were responsible for gardening, brush clearance, and/or trash. (See Dreyer’s, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.) In the Comerico property leases, some of the provisions appellants identify address unrelated tenant responsibilities, such as the responsibility to pay for “utilities and services directly billed to tenant” and “water, sewer, gas, electricity and any other telecom services/internet services.” (Capitalization omitted.) Appellants argue that the tenants were

10
separately billed for trash services, but cite nothing in the record
to support this. Other provisions appear to state the tenant is
not responsible for things like gardening and brush clearance.5
Still other provisions are ambiguous.6 And all Comerico property
lease agreements include a provision allowing the landlord to pay
for maintenance services assigned to the tenant if the tenant fails
to perform or commission such services, and to thereafter seek
reimbursement from the tenant. The lease on the Baker property
does require the tenant (Christopher Donkin) to “maintain the
garden, landscaping, trees and shrubs,” but further provides

5 For example, one lease contains the following, in which
the box for option “B” is checked: “Property Operating Expenses:”
(A) “Tenant agrees to pay its proportionate share of landlord’s
estimated monthly property operating expenses, including
but not limited to, common area maintenance, . . . based on the
ratio of the square footage of the premises to the total square
footage of the rentable space in the entire property” or (B) “□
(if checked) paragraph 14 does not apply.” (Boldface &
capitalization omitted.)
6 For example, one provision governing “maintenance”
notes following an itemized list of duties assigned to landlord
that the list “excludes landscaping and plants.” (Boldface &
capitalization omitted.) The itemized list of duties assigned
to the tenant earlier in that provision, however, does not
include landscaping and plants. Specifically, the provision
reads: (A) “Tenant □ (if checked, landlord) shall professionally
maintain the premises including heating, air conditioning,
electrical, plumbing and water systems, if any, and keep glass,
windows and doors in operable and safe condition.” (B) “Landlord
OR □ (if checked, tenant) shall maintain the roof, foundation,
exterior walls, common areas and (excludes landscaping and
plants).” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.)

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that the “tenant’s failure to maintain any item for which tenant
is responsible shall give landlord the right to hire someone to
perform such maintenance and charge tenant to cover the cost
of such maintenance.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The terms of the leases on the Baker and Comerico
properties thus do not support that the interim trustee could
never seek payment for services at issue from the trust. To the
contrary, they reflect that, under certain circumstances, she may
or even must do so. Appellants identify no other evidence on this
point. And in the absence of a transcript from the hearing, we
must assume the testimony provided at the hearing described
circumstances supporting the court’s implicit finding that the
trust could be charged for these expenses. (See Fain, supra,
75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [“[w]here no reporter’s transcript has
been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing
appellate record . . . it is presumed that the unreported trial
testimony would demonstrate the absence of error”].)

1. Baker Property Rent and Lien Appellants contend the court erred in overruling their objections that the interim trustee breached her duties to keep the Baker property productive. (See § 16007.) They point specifically to (1) her not increasing the rent to be charged to Christopher as a holdover tenant on the Baker property, and (2) not accepting an offer to reduce the interest rate on a loan from Vicki’s parents, the Yarbers, secured by a lien on that property. Appellants contest the court’s finding that there was “no evidence” of these facts, citing their unsupported representations in a surreply that “[t]he rent is due to be increased to $3,300 per month beginning February 2022” and that “Vicki has spoken with her parents, the Yarbers, and they

12
are willing to reduce the interest rate on their second mortgage
to 5 [percent] if it will help keep the home from being sold
at this time.” Representations in a pleading are not evidence.
The record does not support—let alone compel—the options
appellants fault the interim trustee for not pursuing.
Moreover, we must assume that the testimony the court
heard at the unreported hearing supports that it was either
not feasible or not advisable for the interim trustee to pursue
the hypothetical avenues for reducing costs appellants identify.
(See Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.)

1. Kivik Property
   Appellants argue the interim trustee breached her
   fiduciary duties by selling a real property known as the Kivik
   property as a “fixer-upper” in 2020, obtaining a below-market
   price. They argue the Yarbers, who were lienholders on that
   property as well, had offered in 2018 to pay for improvements
   on the property so that it would garner a higher price. This
   transaction is not within the time period covered by the third
   account current and thus not the proper subject of this appeal.

2. Award of All Requested Fees
   Appellants argue the court erred in that it “rubber-
   stamp[ed]” the interim trustee’s fee requests. According
   to appellants, because the court approved the requested fee
   amount in full over appellants’ numerous objections, the court
   must not have conducted a meaningful, itemized review. We are
   not persuaded. Nor does the authority appellants cite support
   their argument or even address the issue. (See Nicholas, supra,
   177 Cal.App.3d at p. 1089 [accepting “the trustee’s bare assertion
   that he believes it is in the best interest of the trust” to sell trust

13
property as proof the decision was reasonable “would simply
ratify the unexamined decision of the trustee”]; Estate of Vokal
(1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 252, 261 [“[b]ecause the litigation for
which appellant demands compensation was of no benefit to the
trust and was caused by no fault of the beneficiaries, the expense
thereof must be borne personally by appellant who caused the
controversy and incurred the debt”].)

1. Fees for Litigation Finally, appellants contend the court abused its discretion by approving fees the interim trustee and her attorney incurred in pursuing what appellants characterize as duplicative and unnecessary litigation. Many of their arguments as to why the litigation was unnecessary are derivative of arguments we reject above, which we will not address again. Appellants also contend the fees were improper because the interim trustee’s “own billing records confirm that a substantial percentage of the compensation approved in the . . . third account[ ] is attributable to unnecessary, partisan, and stay-violating Baker Canyon sale litigation and its appeals.” (Capitalization omitted.) As discussed, no litigation before the probate court violated a stay Code of Civil Procedure section 916 requires. And the interim trustee has prevailed in all appeals from that litigation. Appellants cite a purported overlap between the interim trustee’s 2021 petition seeking court approval to sell the Baker property and Annemarie Donkin’s 2016 petition seeking, inter alia, the same relief. They argue this reflects the interim trustee aligning herself with one beneficiary (Annemarie) over others (appellants, who opposed Annemarie’s petition), and that the interim trustee’s petition was unnecessary and wasteful. But Annemarie filed the 2016 petition in her capacity as then-interim trustee; before the

14
court ruled thereon, it appointed the current interim trustee
to replace Annemarie. (Donkin 2024, supra, B321793.) Given
this context, the overlap appellants identify does not suggest
the interim trustee proceeded in a wasteful or partisan manner.
It was well within the court’s broad discretion with respect to
fees to reject this and appellants’ other criticism of the litigation
below and award the interim trustee fees for her work thereon.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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