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Routine Enforcement Amended Final

Donegal County Council v Quinn - Supreme Court Costs Ruling

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Filed March 6th, 2026
Detected March 20th, 2026
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Summary

The Supreme Court of Ireland has issued a costs ruling in the case of Donegal County Council v Quinn. This ruling follows a previous judgment clarifying the process for issuing summonses in planning enforcement cases, specifically that a firm of solicitors may apply to issue a summons on behalf of an authorized prosecutor.

What changed

This document is a costs ruling delivered by Mr. Justice Peter Charleton on March 6, 2026, in the case of Donegal County Council v Conor Quinn. It follows a Supreme Court judgment from May 13, 2025, which addressed the issue of whether a firm of solicitors could apply to a clerk of the District Court to issue a summons on behalf of a body authorized to prosecute an offense. The Supreme Court overturned a High Court decision, ruling that a firm of solicitors can indeed apply for the issuance of a summons, as a person in the context of the statute can include an individual, a corporation, or an unincorporated association acting on behalf of an authorized prosecutor.

This ruling clarifies a procedural point fundamental to the daily functioning of the District Court in Ireland, particularly concerning planning enforcement. While the primary judgment established the legal principle, this costs ruling addresses the financial implications arising from the appeal. Legal professionals and government agencies involved in similar enforcement actions should note the confirmation that solicitor firms are authorized to initiate summonses, potentially streamlining the process and avoiding challenges based on procedural technicalities.

What to do next

  1. Review the Supreme Court's costs ruling and prior judgment for understanding of summons issuance procedures in planning enforcement.

Source document (simplified)

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  Donegal County Council v Quinn & anor (Approved) [2026] IESC 15 (06 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2026/2026IESC15.html
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[2026] IESC 15 | | |
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An Ch?irt Uachtarach

The Supreme Court

Supreme Court appeal number: S:AP:IE:2024:000145

[2026] IESC 15

High Court record number: 2022/586 SS

[2024] IEHC 160

O'Donnell CJ

Charleton J

Murray J

Collins J

Donnelly J

Between


Donegal County Council

Prosecutor/Appellant


?- and -


?Conor Quinn

Accused/Respondent

- and ?


The Attorney General

Notice Party




Costs ruling delivered by Mr Justice Peter Charleton on 6 March 2026


  1. This ruling as to costs should be read together with the judgment of 13 May 2025; [2025] IESC 19. There, the issue was as to the issue of a summons in planning enforcement against Conor Quinn, being: can a firm of solicitors apply to a clerk of the District Court to issue a summons on behalf of a body authorised to prosecute an offence?

  2. In essence, it had been argued on behalf of Conor Quinn that the summons issued against him had not been issued by a person, legal or artificial, so authorised by law. Hence, it was claimed that the summons had been issued contrary to law and should be quashed by Judge Sandra Murphy and that the case should not proceed to any hearing on the merits. A case was stated for the opinion of the High Court. Section 1 of the Courts (No 3) Act, 1986, as substituted by section 49 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, was the key provision on the case stated. This provides for the issuing of a summons in criminal proceedings "by or on behalf of the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, a member of the Garda S?och?na or any person authorised by or under an enactment to bring and prosecute proceedings for the offence concerned." Among the entities authorised are local authorities where the litigation is on enforcement notices under s 154 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 left unrectified.

  3. The ostensibly simple principles in the legislation, which expressly embrace a solicitors firm were subject to inventive argument. In the High Court, this succeeded; the opinion given to the District Court was that an individual could apply for the issue of a summons but that individual had to be a real person. It was necessary for the County Council to appeal to this Court. The result on the appeal from an appeal was that a firm of solicitors may apply for the issue of a summons since, whether a partnership, a limited liability partnership, a sole-practitioner or whether named as the individual doing the final task, either in person or electronically, or by reference to the title of a firm, a person in terms of the statute can be an individual, a corporation or an unincorporated association, and the action is that of a person acting on behalf of an authorised prosecutor.

  4. Submissions on costs have now been received. It is argued by Conor Quinn that benefits of legal clarification and the necessity to decide a point fundamental to the daily functioning of the District Court in respect of the most usual form of proceeding can enable this Court to award costs to him. On the other hand, the County Council assert success on the appeal and claim an entitlement to costs both before the High Court and this Court by way of direct appeal.

  5. The principles upon which this Court will decide costs where leave to appeal has been granted either on a direct appeal from the High Court or otherwise are set out in the judgment of Murray J in Little v Chief Appeals Officer [2024] 53. This does not need to be repeated save for the principle that the grant of leave to appeal is an important factor bearing on the award of costs due to the general public importance of deciding a point of law that enables a further appeal from the Court of Appeal or otherwise a direct appeal from the High Court. While it may be argued that a decision before this Court almost by definition results in the clarification of an important point of law that impacts the legal system generally, it remains the case that only exceptionally may a party loosing on an appeal be awarded costs notwithstanding the issue being decided against that party.

  6. This case turned on straightforward analysis of the wording of the summons and its conformity to the legislation. It is only because of the very wide impact of the decision that the Court has made and the public interest in the proceedings in the context of a criminal prosecution that no order for costs should be made against Conor Quinn. He cannot be awarded costs as there was no overriding importance beyond his own situation and the case in terms of analysis cannot come close to the exceptional circumstance where a losing party may be awarded costs. In addition, he seeks costs against the Attorney General. He is not entitled to those costs. The position is very clear as regards the Attorney General who had written to the parties at the time he applied to join the case stating that he intended to come in on the basis that he would neither seek costs on the basis that no party would seek costs against him. That was an important statement made openly by letter and there was no reply. Furthermore the Attorney General was before the Court to assist the interpretation of the law in the public interest and not as representing the State as a litigant. There cannot be an award of costs against the Attorney General. As to the High Court, there Conor Quinn must be characterised as persuading Judge Murphy that there was a sufficient issue of law to require a case stated and urged a position in law that was incorrect on the High Court. The award in the High Court of Costs must be reversed. It difficult to see how an award of costs against Conor Quinn should not follow on him inventing this point, urging a case stated and following through by advocating for it at the High Court hearing.? In cases stated in the High Court from criminal matters the usual rules of costs following the event must generally be applicable. This was a point urged by Conor Quinn. An additional consideration might be applicable if the point was not one raised ?by him, such as where the prosecution or the judge raised the point and perhaps pressed the idea of stating a case. There, it might be said that a person defending a summons was put to additional and unwarranted expense that should not result in an award of costs even though they participated in the High Court hearing. That did not apply here.

  7. Hence, the order of the Court is: no order as to costs in the Supreme Court appeal; costs against Conor Quinn in the High Court.

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URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2026/2026IESC15.html

Named provisions

Costs ruling

Source

Analysis generated by AI. Source diff and links are from the original.

Classification

Agency
GP
Filed
March 6th, 2026
Instrument
Enforcement
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Minor
Document ID
[2026] IESC 15
Docket
S:AP:IE:2024:000145 2022/586 SS
Supersedes
[2025] IESC 19

Who this affects

Applies to
Legal professionals Government agencies
Industry sector
9211 Government & Public Administration 5411 Legal Services
Activity scope
Planning Enforcement Prosecution
Geographic scope
ie ie

Taxonomy

Primary area
Judicial Administration
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Planning Law Civil Procedure

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