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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Donald Youngblood v. Sheila Wright

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2023-001001

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Donald Youngblood, Respondent,

v.

Sheila Wright, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001001

Appeal From Hampton County
Walter H. Sanders, Jr., Special Referee

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-120
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Filed March 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

John Arthur Jones and Emily White, both of Gallivan,
White & Boyd, PA, of Charleston; and Forrest Truett
Nettles, II, of Nettles Law Firm, of Greenville, all for
Appellant.

John E. Parker and John Elliott Parker, Jr., both of Parker
Law Group, LLP, of Hampton, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Sheila Wright appeals the special referee's order denying her
motion to set aside the order of default and awarding permanent injury damages to
Donald Youngblood for injuries he sustained in a slip and fall on Wright's
property. On appeal, Wright argues the special referee abused its discretion when
it concluded she did not show good cause to set aside the default under Rule 55(c)
of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure because the affidavit explaining
why Wright was in default contained inadmissible hearsay. Wright also contends
the special referee abused its discretion when it awarded Youngblood permanent
injury damages because a medical expert did not testify to the permanence of
Youngblood's injuries. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the special referee did not abuse its discretion in concluding Wright
   did not produce evidence of good cause to set aside the entry of default. See Rule
   53(b), SCRCP ("[I]n a default case, . . . some or all of the causes of action in a case
   may be referred to a master or special referee by order of a circuit judge . . . .");
   Rule 53(c), SCRCP ("Once referred, the master or special referee shall exercise all
   power and authority which a circuit judge sitting without a jury would have in a
   similar matter."); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601,
   606, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of
   default or a default judgment lies solely within the sound discretion of the [special
   referee]."); id. ("The [special referee's] decision will not be disturbed on appeal
   absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion."); id. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at
   888 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the [special referee] issuing the order
   was controlled by some error of law or when the order, based upon factual, as
   distinguished from legal conclusions, is without evidentiary support."). Even if all
   statements in Wright's affidavit were admissible, Wright failed to provide a
   "satisfactory explanation" for her default. See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251,
   258-59, 495 S.E.2d 454, 458 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Under Rule 12(a) of the South
   Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP), a defendant must serve an answer
   within thirty days after service of the complaint."); Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v.
   Restoration Specialists, LLC, 444 S.C. 328, 339, 907 S.E.2d 129, 135 (Ct. App.
   2024) ("Rule 55(a) [of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure] provides that
   when a party fails to respond to a complaint, the clerk shall record an entry of
   default." (quoting Sundown, 383 S.C. at 606, 681 S.E.2d at 888)); Sundown, 383
   S.C. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("However, Rule 55(c) [of the South Carolina Rules
   of Civil Procedure] permits a party to move to set aside the entry of default.");
   Rule 55(c), SCRCP ("For good cause shown the [special referee] may set aside an
   entry of default . . . ."); Sundown, 383 S.C. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("This
   standard requires a party seeking relief from an entry of default under Rule 55(c) to
   provide an explanation for the default and give reasons why vacation of the default
   entry would serve the interests of justice."); id. at 607-08, 681 S.E.2d at 888
   ("Once a party has put forth a satisfactory explanation for the default, the trial court
   must also consider: (1) the timing of the motion for relief; (2) whether the
   defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff
   if relief is granted."). Wright's failure to notify her insurer of the pending lawsuit,
   the insurer's failure to pursue the matter once it was aware of the lawsuit, and
   Wright's counsel's failure to appear or move to set aside default until March 24,
   2023—fourteen months after Youngblood filed suit, nearly three months after
   default was entered, and approximately one month after counsel was made aware
   of the default order—is not good cause to set aside the entry of default. See
   Sundown, 383 S.C. at 609, 681 S.E.2d at 889 (declining to set aside default
   because good cause did not exist when "[p]etitioner did not forward the summons
   and complaint to the insurance agent until approximately two weeks after initially
   notifying the agent of the lawsuit and several days after the time to answer
   expired"); Campbell v. City of North Charleston, 431 S.C. 454, 462, 848 S.E.2d
   788, 792 (Ct. App. 2020) ("We hold the master did not abuse its discretion by
   [determining] the failure to forward or open an e-mail did not satisfy the good
   cause standard . . . ."). Accordingly, we hold that the affidavit did not contain
   evidence sufficient for the special referee to set aside the entry of default.

2. We hold the matter of permanent damages is not preserved for appellate review.
   See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is
   axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal . . . ."); S.C.
   Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301-02, 641 S.E.2d
   903, 907 (2007) ("There are four basic requirements to preserving issues at trial for
   appellate review. The issue must have been (1) raised to and ruled upon by the
   [special referee], (2) raised by the appellant, (3) raised in a timely manner, and (4)
   raised to the [special referee] with sufficient specificity." (quoting Jean Hoefer
   Toal et al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 57 (2d ed. 2002))). Wright argues
   that special damages were not asserted at the hearing and first appeared in the
   special referee's order; however, Wright failed to raise the matter in a Rule 59(e) of
   the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure motion and now raises this issue for
   the first time on appeal. See Stanley v. S. States Police Benevolent Ass'n, 435 S.C.
   524, 527, 868 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ct. App. 2021) ("When a party receives an order
   containing relief that was not requested or contemplated, the party must present its
   objections to the issue to the [special referee] in a Rule 59(e) [of the South
   Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure] motion to preserve the issue for appeal."); id. at
   528, 868 S.E.2d at 414 ("This gives the [special referee] the opportunity to
   consider and rule upon the issue in the trial setting after it has been refined by
   fact-finding and sharpened by argument."); id. ("This in turn allows us to provide
   the meaningful consideration only a complete record provides."); id. ("As an
   appellate court, 'we are a court of review, not of first view.'" (quoting Cutter v.
   Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005))).
   AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.