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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Robbie S. v. Frank Bisignano, Social Security Commissioner

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-11615

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (22.2K)

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Trial Court Document

‘IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBBIE S. )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 24 C 11615

)

) Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman
FRANK BISIGNANO, Social Security )

Commissioner, )

Defendants. )

        MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                             

Robbie S. appeals the Commissioner’s decision finding him not disabled. For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [19] is denied, and Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment [23]1 is granted. The Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. Civil case
terminated.

                   Background                                    

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) found Plaintiff disabled as of December 14,
1996 based on HIV disease and toxoplasmosis. On July 30, 2018, SSA found, pursuant to a
continuing disability review (“CDR”), that Plaintiff’s medical conditions had improved and he was
no longer disabled as of July 1, 2018. (R. 157-159.) SSA concluded the “current medical evidence
shows that there is no longer signs of toxoplasmosis, and the HIV, low back pain is stable and
controlled on medications. There are no signs of significant limitations. The claimant’s
impairments are now non-severe. Therefore, medical improvement has occurred.” (R. 71.)

Plaintiff requested reconsideration, which was denied on April 9, 2019. (R. 130-133.) Plaintiff
then requested an ALJ hearing, which was held on September 6, 2023. (R. 12.) On October 4,
2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable notice of decision. (R. 9-27.) Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s
conclusion.

                     Analysis                                    

A claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he is unable to
perform “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (a). Where, as here,
a claimant has been deemed disabled, the SSA “must periodically conduct a continuing disability
review to determine if the benefits recipient remains eligible.” Fitschen v. Kijakazi, 86 F.4th 797,

1 Although Defendant did not separately file a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes
Defendant’s memorandum in support of summary judgment [23] as including a motion.

803 (7th Cir. 2023); 20 C.F.R. § 416.989. A claimant is no longer eligible for benefits if there has
been “medical improvement,” meaning “any decrease in the medical severity of [the]
impairment(s) which was present at the time of the most recent . . . decision [in the claimant’s
favor].” 20 C.F.R. § 416.994 (b)(1); Kimberly T. v. Saul, No. 19 C 487, 2019 WL 6310016, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2019). In conducting a CDR, the SSA compares the “severity of the individual’s
current medical condition(s) to the severity of the most recent favorable medical decision (i.e.,
comparison point decision (CPD)).” SSA Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) DI
28035.00. Here, the parties agree that prior to the CDR, the most recent decision in Plaintiff’s
favor was on January 31, 1997, and thus is the proper CPD.

In assessing medical improvement, the SSA considers an eight-part test: “(1) whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of an impairment
listed in Appendix 1; (3) if not, whether there has been medical improvement (as defined above);
(4) if there has been medical improvement, is it related to the claimant's ability to do work (i.e.,
has it caused an increase in his residual functional capacity (RFC)); (5) if there has not been
medical improvement or if the medical improvement is not related to the claimant's ability to work,
whether any exceptions to medical improvement apply; (6) if the medical improvement is related
to the claimant's ability to do work or if certain exceptions apply, are his current impairments in
combination severe; (7) if the claimant's impairment is severe, does he have the RFC to do past
relevant work; and (8) if the claimant cannot do past relevant work, does his RFC enable him to
do other work.” Milton B. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 C 5482, 2023 WL 4134812, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 22,
2023). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.994 (f).

In addition, the Court notes that “ALJs are ‘subject to only the most minimal of articulation
requirements’— an obligation that extends no further than grounding a decision in substantial
evidence.” Morales v. O'Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Warnell v. O'Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 2024)). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d
893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “[W]hatever
the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not
high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). It is not the job of a reviewing court to
“reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment
for that of the Commissioner.” Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff first asserts that a portion of his prior file finding him disabled was missing when
the CDR was conducted. According to Plaintiff, “[w]hen a claimant’s folder cannot be found
during a CDR, and Social Security is unable or chooses not to reconstruct the missing records,
benefits must be continued.” (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. # 19, at 3) (citing 20 C.F.R.
404.1594(c)(3)(v); 20 C.F.R. 416(994(b)(2)(iv)(E) (“If relevant parts of the prior record are not
reconstructed either because it is determined not to attempt reconstruction or because such efforts
fail, medical improvement cannot be found.”) (emphasis added).2 Plaintiff contends that while the

2 Plaintiff further pointed to the following language in the regulations:

ALJ stated in his decision that “the file is complete,” the ALJ in fact did not review the January
30, 1997 Medical Advice Form from Dr. Kumar.3 Because this form was part of the original CDP
and it was missing from Plaintiff’s file at the time of the CDR, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ was
required to continue Plaintiff’s benefits and erred in discontinuing them.

As the Commissioner notes, “both the regulations and agency policy contemplate scenarios
in which the original CPD is missing but the CDR analysis may nevertheless proceed.” (Def.’s
Sur-Reply, Dkt. # 27, at 2.) For example, if a CPD is missing an RFC, and the RFC was the basis
for originally finding the claimant disabled, the ALJ can analyze whether medical improvement
has occurred by reconstructing the RFC from the medical evidence and comparing it to the
claimant’s current functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 404.159 (c)(3)(iii). And POMS DI 28035.020(E) states
that “[i]n order to apply the [medical improvement review standard] to reconstructed evidence,
there should be adequate evidence from the time of the CPD so that the basis for the CPD is clear.”
Also, if a CPD is unclear, POMS4 allows an adjudicator to “review the available evidence to
determine the correct basis” for the CPD and “determine if medical improvement has occurred.”

POMS DI 28010.020(B)(5). And “[w]hen CPD evidence is adequate[] but is incomplete on points
emphasized in current available evidence,” an adjudicator can “carefully examine all the prior
documentation for related information that may have been present at the CPD but is not
immediately evident.” POMS DI 28010.015(E)(3). The Court agrees with the Commissioner that
certain circumstances allow an ALJ to fill the gaps with appropriate medical evidence when
necessary in conducting a CDR.

Continuance of benefits is not called for here because the ALJ reconstructed the necessary
portions of the record. As the Commissioner sets forth:

If the prior file cannot be located . . . If you are able to engage in substantial
gainful activity, we will determine whether an attempt should be made to
reconstruct those portions of the missing file that were relevant to our most
recent favorable medical decision (e.g., work history, medical evidence, and
the results of consultative examinations). This determination will consider
the potential availability of old records in light of their age, whether the
source of the evidence is still in operation; and whether reconstruction
efforts will yield a complete record of the basis for the most recent favorable
medical decision. If relevant parts of the prior record are not reconstructed
either because it is determined not to attempt reconstruction or because such
efforts fail, medical improvement cannot be found.” 20 CFR § 404.1594 (c)(3)(v); 20 CFR § 404.994 (b)(iv)(E).

3 The Commissioner agrees that state agency medical consultant Dr. Kumar found Plaintiff
disabled in 1997 and that Dr. Kumar’s initial determination is missing from the administrative
record.

4 POMS is the Program Operations Manual System, which is the “primary source of inform-
ation used by Social Security employees to process claims for Social Security benefits.” See
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/Home?readform (last visited 10/21/25).

. . . [T]he agency reconstructed the original medical evidence from Wake
Medical Center and Raleigh Infectious Disease Associates. R. 398.
Records from Wake Medical Center in December 1996 consisted of

emergency room treatment, consultation, and brain imaging
documenting a brain mass. See R. 489, 821-22. Records from Raleigh
Infectious Disease Associates from January 1997 confirm that [P]laintiff
began treatment for an HIV infection, CNS large mass lesion and
toxoplasmosis. R. 491- 92. The agency also developed treatment from
these facilities through 2002. R 823-53. The reconstructed medical
evidence demonstrates that [P]aintiff met listing 14.08(C)(4). At the
time of the CPD, listing 14.08(C)(4) was met if the claimant was
diagnosed with an HIV infection as well as with toxoplasmosis of an
organ other than the liver, spleen, or lymph nodes. See POMS DI
34134.003 (Immune Listings from 1993 through 2002). The

reconstructed medical evidence demonstrated that [P]laintiff was
diagnosed with both an HIV infection and central nervous system (CNS)
toxoplasmosis—thus meeting the listing. R. 491-92.5 . . . Because the
medical records confirm that [P]laintiff’s impairments met listing
14.08(C)(4) and queries confirm that the CPD found [P]laintiff disabled
because his HIV met a listing, the reconstructed file supports the
Disability Hearing Officer’s report that state agency medical consultant
Dr. Kumar found plaintiff disabled in 1997 because his impairments met
listing 14.08(C)(4). R. 149. For these reasons, the CDR record contained
“adequate evidence from the time of the CPD so that the basis for the
CPD [was] clear” and therefore, the ALJ could properly analyze the
issue of medical improvement. POMS DI 28035.020(E); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.159.

(Def.’s Sur-Reply, Dkt. # 27, at 4.)

Thus, while Dr. Kumar’s initial determination is missing from the record, the basis for his
determination is reflected in the relevant medical records, which were reconstructed. To the
extent Plaintiff implies an RFC assessment may be missing from the record, the implication is
unavailing as Plaintiff was found disabled because his impairments met a listing at step three, but
an RFC is not assessed until step four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4).

Finally, the cases cited by Plaintiff are either not controlling authority or distinguishable
on the facts, including that in those cases, the ALJ did not rely on a reconstructed record or explain
how medical improvement was assessed. Hallaron v. Colvin, 578 F. App’x 350, 353 (5th Cir.

5 Queries performed by SSA may be relied upon to help determine the basis for the CPD. See
POMS DI 28010.020(B)(5), POMS DI 28035.015(B). According to the Commissioner, queries
confirm that Plaintiff was found disabled in 1997 because his impairments met a listing. R. 320-
21; see POMS DI 26510.045(B) (basis code A61 indicates impairment meets level of severity of
listings). Queries further confirmed that the CPD listed symptomatic HIV infection as the primary
diagnosis code and bacterial infections as the secondary diagnosis code. R. 322.

2014) (“The ALJ did not consider whether there was any medical improvement since the most
recent favorable decision in 1997 or whether an attempt should be made to reconstruct the file
pertaining to the 1997 CDR.”); Bryan S. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-cv-11145, 2022 WL 2916072, at
*6-7 (D. N.J. July 5, 2022) (“[T]he ALJ never cited to the CPD and the CPD itself is not included
in the exhibits that were presumably considered by the ALJ,” and “[t]o the extent that the CPD
and related evidence was lost or was missing at the time of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ had the
duty to reconstruct the file.”); Bruno v. SSA, No. 6:19-CV-00886, 2020 WL 5269741, at *5 (W.D.
La. Aug. 6, 2020) (“Neither the March 12, 2004 favorable medical decision finding that the
claimant was disabled as of January 1, 2004, the CPD, nor any medical evidence relating to the
award of disability—including claimant’s original hearing test—are in the administrative
record.”); Daniel C. v. Berryhill, No. 5:17-cv-00074, 2018 WL 7051034, at *9 (W.D. Va. Dec. 28,
2018) (“ALJ Erwin's decision did not address the effect of these lost records on Daniel C.’s
possible entitlement to continuing disability” and noting that “that medical records and any other
opinions or findings relied upon in reaching the November 8, 2010 CPD will need to be located
and included in any future administrative record in order to make an adequate comparison
between those records and the medical evidence of Daniel C.’s medical conditions at the time the
agency terminated his disability benefits.”); Smith v. Berryhill, No. 16 CV 9976, 2018 WL
2846363, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2018) (“But without the benefit of the actual records and
previous opinion, it is difficult to determine whether the ALJ made a proper comparison of the
previous records and the current records.”).

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination failed to account for Plaintiff’s
tremor. The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform less than the full range of light work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), with the ability to occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and
frequently lift and carry 10 pounds; sit, stand, and walk for six hours in a typical eight-hour
workday; push and pull as much as he can lift and carry; frequently climb ramps and stairs but
not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Further,
the ALJ found Plaintiff cannot work at unprotected heights or operate moving mechanical parts,
and he cannot handle objects that vibrate. (R. 16.) In reaching his RFC, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff’s hand tremors were controlled by medication (R. 18-19); while Plaintiff exhibited some
right-arm weakness, it was not replicated elsewhere (R. 18); when a neurologist, Dr. Prasad
Chappidi, changed Plaintif’s medication, his tremors improved and at a subsequent examination,
Dr. Chappidi did not observe a tremor (R. 18); examinations in 2020 and 2021 indicated that
Plaintiff was doing well and had normal strength and coordination (R. 18). The ALJ further noted
that while Plaintiff reported in February 2022 that he thought his tremor was increasing, at his
next appointment, Plaintiff stated he was feeling well and that his tremors were being managed
well (R. 18.) A March 2024 treatment note indicated that while Plaintiff had Parkinson’s, there
was “no tremor now.” (R. 19.) Moreover, a vocational expert testified that even if Plaintiff were
limited to frequent reaching, handling, and fingering with both upper extremities, Plaintiff could
still perform the jobs listed at step five. (R. 56, 58.) The Court finds the ALJ properly accounted
for Plaintiff’s in formulating an RFC.

Notably, Plaintiff fails to identify what his specific RFC limitations should have been.

Morales v. O’Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2024) (stating that plaintiff must “explain how
the RFC determination should have been different”); see also Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492,
498 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that, even if the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment had contained flaws,
any error was harmless, as the claimant failed to “hypothesize[ ]” the kinds of work restrictions
that would have addressed their limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace). While Plaintiff
asserts that the jobs listed at step five would “require a worker to regularly and reliably have full
use of two steady hands, for a full shift,” (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. # 19, at 12), this assertion
fails to acknowledge that a vocational expert testified that even if Plaintiff were limited to frequent
reaching, handling, and fingering with both upper extremities, Plaintiff could still perform the
jobs listed at step five. (R. 56, 58.) Plaintiff’s speculative statement as to the level of hand use
an individual would need for the step-five jobs is unavailing. Aubrey v. O’Malley, No. 24 C 7055, 2025 WL 461437, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2025) (“Guessing or speculating isn’t good enough;
it’s up to the plaintiff to show how his medically determinable impairments cause any limitations
beyond those the ALJ found.”). Plaintiff points to no evidence supporting a greater functional
limitation than that found by the ALJ. Ultimately, Plaintiff’s attempts to have this Court reweigh
evidence are improper and do not support remand. Id. at *5 (“The plaintiff, in essence, wants the
court to reweigh the evidence and reach the result the plaintiff prefers; but that is not how
‘substantial evidence’ review works.”).

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to adequately incorporate “time on benefits”
as a factor in determining the RFC. The regulations provide that

 if you are age 50 or over and have been receiving disability benefits 
 for a considerable period of time, we will consider this factor along 
 with your age in assessing your residual functional capacity. This 
 will ensure that the disadvantages resulting from inactivity and the 
 aging process during a long period of disability will be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 (b)(4)(iii); see also 20 C.F.R. 416.994(b)(1)(iv)(C); POMS DI 

28015.310.

As the Commissioner notes, the ALJ expressly acknowledged that Plaintiff “was born on
September 7, 1972, and was 45 years old on July 1, 2018,” and that he “is currently 51 years old[]
and is an individual closely approaching advanced age.” (R. 20.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff
initially was determined disabled on January 31, 1997. (R. 12.) Plaintiff acknowledges the ALJ
identified these facts but faults the ALJ for “completely fail[ing] to analyze the implications of
those facts.” (Pl.’s Reply, Dkt. # 25, at 3.) But an ALJ need not articulate how he considered
“every proposition or chain of reasoning.” Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1053 (“An ALJ need not address
every piece or category of evidence identified by a claimant, fully summarize the record, or cite
support for every proposition or chain of reasoning.”). In any event, as with Plaintiff’s second
argument, his failure to identify any additional restrictions that should have been included in the
RFC based on his time on benefits renders any error harmless. Morales, 103 F.4th at 471 (stating
that the plaintiff must “explain how the RFC determination should have been different”).

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.

Date: February 25, 2026
WA Llane’ Le ccdverier]
M. David Weisman
United States Magistrate Judge