Dharambir Singh v. Markwayne Mullin, et al.

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Dharambir Singh v. Markwayne Mullin, et al.

District Court, N.D. Iowa

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:26-cv-00053

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

DHARAMBIR SINGH,

Petitioner, No. C26-00053-LTS-KEM
vs.
MEMORANDUM
MARKWAYNE MULLIN∗, et al.,
OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before me on petitioner Dharambir Singh’s petition (Doc. 1) for
habeas corpus under 28 U.C.S. § 2241. Singh is an alien who previously encountered
Border Patrol and was released on his own recognizance. See Doc. 1. Respondents
(collectively, the Government)1 have now re-detained him. Singh claims his re-detention
violates his due process rights. In an initial review order (Doc. 5), I directed the
Government to respond to the petition, which it has (Doc. 9). Singh has replied (Doc.
15). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).

II. BACKGROUND
The facts and procedural background are not disputed. Singh is an Indian national
who initially entered the United States on or around June 28, 2019. Doc. 12-1 at 3. He
encountered Border Patrol that same day and on August 28, 2019, the Department of

∗ Markwayne Mullin was confirmed as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on
March 23, 2026, and is substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).

1 Though the Government’s reply was filed only on behalf of the federal respondents and not the
state employees (Doc. 9 at 1 n.1), this order will apply to all respondents with equal force.
Homeland Security (DHS) issued Singh a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings. Doc.
9 at 2; Docs. 12-1, 12-2. He was released on his own recognizance and enrolled in the
Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program. Id. On April 23, 2025, Singh violated his
reporting requirements but was not terminated from the ATD program at the time. Doc.
12-1.
On or about November 19, 2025, Singh allegedly ran an open weigh station in
Jasper County, Iowa. Doc. 12-3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ran
immigration checks and determined that Singh was unlawfully in the United States. Id.
Singh was arrested and detained in the Hardin County Jail (Doc. 9 at 2). He was
terminated from the ATD program due to arrest by other law enforcement agency. Doc.
12-1 at 4. Singh requested a custody redetermination, which an Immigration Judge (IJ)
denied on December 11, 2025, due to lack of jurisdiction. Doc. 12-4. On January 22,
2026, the IJ denied his request to reconsider the decision on the same grounds. Doc. 12-
5.
On January 3, 2026, Singh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion
for preliminary injunction in this court. See Case No. C26-0003 (N.D. Iowa). On
February 10, 2026, I entered an order directing respondents to provide Singh a bond
redetermination hearing within 14 days. The immigration court held a bond hearing two
days later and denied bond. On February 17, 2026, Singh filed a motion to enforce
judgment, arguing the respondents had violated the spirit of the court’s February 10 order
and asked the court to reconsider his primary request for relief, which was immediate
release. I denied Singh’s motion, noting that Singh had not previously argued why
immediate release was a more appropriate remedy over a bond redetermination hearing
and I could not consider such arguments on a motion to reconsider. Doc. 24 in Case No.
C26-0003 (N.D. Iowa). I concluded Singh had “received exactly what this court ordered:
a bond redetermination hearing” and noted that Singh “simply does not like the outcome
of that hearing.” Singh then filed this second petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to § 2241 on March 11, 2026.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Habeas corpus relief is available to those “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3). To
receive relief, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
detention is unlawful. Aditya W. H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn.
2025).

IV. ANALYSIS
The Government justifies Singh’s civil detention without a bond hearing based on
the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2). The Eighth Circuit has
found that similarly situated petitioners qualify under that provision. See Avila v. Bondi,
___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). As Singh does not dispute
Avila’s relevance, I will treat § 1225(b)(2) as being the applicable statute governing
Singh’s detention. While § 1225(b)(2) provides no statutory right to a bond hearing, see
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018), Avila does not foreclose a petitioner
from raising an as-applied due process challenge. Avila, 2026 WL 819258 at *8 & n.8
(Erickson, J., dissenting). That is the challenge Singh asserts.

A. Process Due to Those Detained Under § 1225(b)(2)
The fact that an alien is facing removal proceedings does not mean the Government
may deprive the alien of due process of law. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese
Immigration Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903).2 Singh demands an individualized bond

2 To the extent the Government suggests that an alien has no more due process rights beyond
what is statutorily provided, it overreads cases such as DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
140 (2020), and strips the precedent of meaningful context. Although the political branches
enjoy nearly plenary authority to set the procedures for “determining whether an alien should be
admitted” when “at the threshold of initial entry,” id. at 107, 139, it has long been recognized
hearing that would require the Government prove his dangerousness and flight risk. The
parties, however, disagree on the appropriate framework for evaluating his demand.
Singh advocates the Mathews3 factors, under which the court must balance “the interest
at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the
procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures rather than
additional or different procedures.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35). The Government counters that binding precedent
forecloses any interest-balancing for aliens detained pending their removal proceedings.
Relying on Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024) and Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510 (2003), the Government argues that, barring dilatory tactics, an alien’s
indiscriminate detention while removal proceedings are ongoing poses no constitutional
problem. Doc. 9 at 6-7.
Demore and Banyee both hold that it is constitutionally permissible to detain a
criminal alien without a bond hearing under § 1226(c) while their removal proceedings
remain ongoing. As both cases recognized, the political branches have wide latitude in
restricting some subclasses of aliens undergoing removal proceedings from receiving an
individualized bond hearing. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)
(unaccompanied minors); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (communists). After
all, “Congress regularly makes rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).

that those who have crossed that threshold have greater constitutional protections. See Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (collecting cases). I therefore reject what would be the
Government’s widest-reaching contention, which is that all aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)
can claim only those due process protections that have been statutorily provided. For reasons I
will discuss further, infra, Singh has greater due process protections than his counterparts who
are initially arriving into the United States.

3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
The Government seeks to expand the foregoing logic to an even broader class of
aliens: all those who unlawfully entered the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(1)
(defining an “applicant for admission” as all aliens who unlawfully entered the country);
Avila, 2026 WL 819258, at *3 (all applicants for admission are properly detained under
§ 1225(b)(2), which does not confer a statutory right to a bond proceeding). The broad
language in Demore and Banyee seemingly support its objective. See Demore, 538 U.S.
at 523 (“[T]his Court has recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”); Banyee, 115 F.4th at 931 (“The rule has been clear for decades: detention during deportation proceedings is
constitutionally valid.” (cleaned up)); Banyee, 115 F.4th at 933 (“[Zadvydas] and
[Demore] leave no room for a multi-factor ‘reasonableness’ test.”).
Singh asks that these precedents be read in context. Demore justified its holding
in part on congressional findings that criminal aliens had a high rate of recidivism and
abscondence. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518–19. Banyee simply reaffirmed that the span of
a removal proceeding did not change the due process dimension of the alien’s detention.
Banyee, 115 F.4th 934. Similarly, Carlson rested on congressional findings that
communists were categorically a “menace to the security of the United States,” and even
then, the majority pointed out that “[t]here is no evidence or contention that all persons
arrested as deportable . . . for Communist membership are denied bail.” Carlson, 342
U.S. at 541–42. Reno was a facial challenge in which the unaccompanied minors had an
opportunity to request a bond redetermination hearing. Reno, 507 U.S. at 308–09.4 In
sum, Singh argues, the broad language that the courts have used in upholding civil
detentions without individualized findings is limited by the circumstances of each case
and does not support the Government’s position here. As there are no attending

4 In fact, Reno appears to rely on each juvenile’s opportunity for a bond redetermination hearing
in rejecting the procedural due process challenge. Reno, 507 U.S. at 309 (“At least insofar as
this facial challenge is concerned, due process is satisfied by giving the detained alien juveniles
the right to a hearing before an immigration judge.”).
congressional findings to justify mandatory detention for all aliens who are applicants for
admission, it falls back on the courts to perform the necessary balancing.
Mathews was never intended as “an all-embracing test for deciding due process
claims.” Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002). Indeed, in the
immigration-detention context, it has not been the lead framework for measuring what
process is due. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1214 (9th Cir. 2022)
(Bumatay, J., concurring) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 521–31; Reno, 507 U.S. at 299–
315)); but see Landon, 459 U.S. at 35 (applying the Mathews test for determining whether
a returning resident-alien was entitled to a deportation hearing). Instead, the Court
generally recognizes a spectrum of protections to aliens “depending upon status and
circumstance,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694 (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 32–34); in which
status and circumstance is generalized to the class an alien finds themselves within. See,
e.g., Landon, 459 U.S. at 35 (re-entry of permanent resident aliens); Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 690 (aliens found to be removeable but who remain detained). I adopt that
framework—an examination of Singh’s status and circumstances for the class of aliens he
is in—for this case.5
Regarding the class of aliens held under § 1225(b)(2) who have previously affected
entry and have remained in the United States for a significant period of time, I find no
constitutional right to a bond hearing during the pendency of removal proceedings.
Despite this group having some enhanced due process protections because they have
gained a foothold in the United States, the political branches’ power remains potent.
Courts have approved of civil detentions for aliens “pending the inquiry into [the alien’s]
true character, and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.” Wong

5 Some courts disagree. See, e.g., U.H.A. v. Bondi, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 558824,
at *13–15 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2026); Zafra v. Noem, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 3239526, at *4
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2025). The proper framework for evaluating Singh’s claim is not
well-settled. If Mathews is determined to be the appropriate test, I would find that Singh’s
individual circumstances would warrant a bond hearing.
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); accord Jennings, 583 U.S. 286 (“Congress has authorized immigration officials to detain some classes of aliens during
. . . certain immigration proceedings. Detention during those proceedings gives
immigration officials time to determine an alien’s status without running the risk of the
alien’s either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final decision can be
made.”). This justification translates to this class of aliens who, even though many have
been in the United States for decades without incident, the Government may still wish to
detain as their removal proceedings are ongoing. The constitutional procedure that this
class of aliens is due is the removal proceeding itself. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950) (recognizing a constitutional need for a deportation hearing
“at least for aliens who had not entered clandestinely and who had been here some time
even if illegally”), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in, Ardestani v.
I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1991). Congress might not have intended to sweep in so
many people into its mandatory detention scheme.6 In addition, past precedent approved
of more measured Executive action. Neither point, though, changes what is the
constitutional floor for due process protections. Analogous to Demore and Banyee, aliens
detained under the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) who had nonetheless
affected entry into the country are not constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing. Cf.

6 Avila confirms that § 1225(b)(2) applies to a larger group of aliens than what past practice
suggested, causing some to argue that the new formulation sweeps in many that Congress never
intended to be bound to the mandatory detention provision. See Avila, 2026 WL 819258, at *8
(Erickson, J., dissenting) (“All three branches of government understood the IIRIRA to maintain
the distinction between unadmitted noncitizens in the interior and those arriving at the border for
detention purposes. Five presidential administrations . . . and most immigration judges
interpreted § 1225 to apply only to those arriving at the border.”); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 508 (5th Cir. 2026) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Congress that passed IIRIRA
would be surprised to learn it had also required the detention without bond of two million people.
For almost thirty years there was no sign anyone thought it had done so, and nothing in the
congressional record or the history of the statute’s enforcement suggests that it did.”). I must,
however, presume that the legislature says in the statute what it meant, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62 (2002), and am bound by Avila in construing the statute.
Boubacar v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-59, 2026 WL 972708, at 3 (D. Neb. Apr. 10, 2026)
(“While Avila does not foreclose Boubacar’s procedural due process claim, other
Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent does.”).

B. Those Voluntarily Released Before Their Re-Detention
Singh alternatively contends that his previous release on his own recognizance
places him in a different class of aliens with greater protections. Doc. 1 at 6-7; Doc. 15
at 19. He claims that ICE’s past decision to voluntarily release him on his own
recognizance conferred an independent liberty interest that he can fall back on.
The Government fails to respond to this point, relying entirely on its overarching
argument that no alien detained under § 1225(b)(2) is entitled to a bond hearing. But
when the Government decides to release an individual on bond or his own recognizance,
it “creates ‘an implicit promise’ . . . that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if they fail
to live up to the conditions of release.’” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032
(N.D. Cal. 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972));
see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (due process clause applies “even
when the liberty itself is a . . . creation of the State”).
Aside from the minor traffic violation that tipped ICE to Singh’s status, and an
April 2025 reporting violation that did not result in any change to his ATD enrollment,
the Government offers nothing to suggest that Singh failed to abide by the conditions of
his release. Instead, Singh appears to be enmeshed in a nationwide policy shift that is
forcing a blanket detention scheme. A change in administration, however, cannot justify
the Government reneging on its past promise. See Dambreville v. Noem, No. 25-cv-514, 2026 WL 602174 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 12, 2026). “To revoke that promise arbitrarily—
without process and with no allegation of changed circumstances or violation by
Petitioner—is fundamentally unfair.” Betancourth v. Tate, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026
WL 638482, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2026) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558). To remedy
this breach, Singh must be released and put in the same position he was in before his
re-detention.
Of course, if the Government believes that Singh’s circumstances have changed to
warrant his re-detention under the terms of his previous bond, it is entitled to pursue that
outcome. However, the Government must conform itself to the promises it made and
justify the change based on Singh’s individual circumstances.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein:
1. Dharambir Singh’s petition (Doc. 1) for a writ of habeas corpus is granted.
Respondents are ordered to release Singh immediately, subject to those conditions (if
any) with which he was required to comply immediately prior to his re-detention.
2. If the Government wishes to again re-detain Singh pending his removal
proceedings, it must provide Singh with sufficient notice and a hearing before an
immigration judge. At such a hearing, the Government will be required to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Singh poses a flight risk or danger to the community.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of April, 2026.
ty
Leonard T. Strand
United States District Judge