Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Danielle W. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, E.D. Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-03191

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (30)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

1

2 FILED IN THE

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
3 Mar 03, 2026

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

4

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

7 DANIELLE W.,1 No. 1:24-CV-03191-MKD

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING AND

REMANDING DECISION OF

9 v. COMMISSIONER

10 FRANK BISIGNANO, ECF Nos. 6, 8

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

11 SECURITY,2

12 Defendant.

13

14

15 1 To protect the privacy of plaintiffs in social security cases, the Court identifies
16 them by only their first names and the initial of their last names. See LCivR 5.2(c).

17 2 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,

18 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank
19 Bisignano is substituted for Martin O’Malley as the defendant in this suit. No
20 further action need be taken to continue this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).
21

1 Before the Court are the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 6, 8. D. James Tree
2 represents Plaintiff. Special Assistant United States Attorney Ryan Lu represents

3 Defendant. The Court, having reviewed the administrative record and the parties’
4 briefing, is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court reverses the
5 Commissioner’s decision and remands the case for additional administrative

6 proceeding pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).

7 JURISDICTION

8 Plaintiff applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI
9 supplemental security income benefits on September 5, 2017, alleging a disability

10 onset date of September 1, 2017. Tr. 71-72, 216-28. The applications were denied
11 initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 73-136. Plaintiff appeared before an
12 administrative law judge (ALJ) on March 5, 2019. Tr. 33-70. On May 1, 2019,

13 the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. Tr. 12-32. This Court subsequently remanded
14 the matter on April 2, 2021. Tr. 921-39. The ALJ held a second hearing on
15 November 2, 2021. Tr. 872-88. On March 23, 2022, 2022, the ALJ denied

16 Plaintiff’s claim. Tr. 847-65. This Court again remanded the matter on March 23,

17 2023. Tr. 1716-18. The ALJ held a third hearing on January 5, 2024. Tr. 1695-
18 1705. On August 28, 2024, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. Tr. 1748-78. The
19 ALJ’s decision following this Court’s prior remand became the Commissioner’s

20 final decision for purposes of judicial review. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1484. Plaintiff
21

1 appealed this final decision on November 21, 2024. ECF No. 1. The Court has
2 jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (c)(3).

3 STANDARD OF REVIEW

4 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
5 Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is

6 limited; the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported
7 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153,
8 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means “relevant evidence that a
9 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1159

10 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to
11 “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and
12 citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a

13 reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching
14 for supporting evidence in isolation. Id. 15 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its
16 judgment for that of the Commissioner. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152,

17 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one
18 rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are
19 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 20 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. §§
21 1 404.1502(a), 416.902(a). Further, a district court “may not reverse an ALJ’s
2 decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Id. An error is harmless “where

3 it is inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at
4 1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s decision
5 generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders,

6 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).

7 FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS

8 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within
9 the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to

10 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
11 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
12 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

13 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s
14 impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
15 work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
16 any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”

17 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

18 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to

19 determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§

20 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner
21

1 considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(i),
2 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the

3 Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

4 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

5 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis

6 proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the
7 claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the
8 claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of impairments which
9 significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work

10 activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (c),
11 416.920(c). If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold,
12 however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. 13 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to
14 severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude
15 a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§

16 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more

17 severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the
18 claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (d), 416.920(d).
19 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the

20 severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess
21

1 the claimant’s “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC),
2 defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental work

3 activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, 20 C.F.R. §§
4 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the
5 analysis.

6 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s
7 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in
8 the past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

9 If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner

10 must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (f), 416.920(f).

11 If the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step
12 five.

13 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s
14 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy.

15 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination,
16 the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant’s age,

17 education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(v),

18 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the
19 Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

20 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other
21

1 work, the analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is
2 therefore entitled to benefits. Id. 3 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above.

4 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to
5 step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that 1) the claimant is

6 capable of performing other work; and 2) such work “exists in significant numbers
7 in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560 (c)(2), 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v.
8 Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).

9 ALJ’S FINDINGS

10 At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff has
11 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2017, the alleged
12 onset date. Tr. 1755.

13 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe

14 impairments: anxiety disorder; depressive disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity
15 disorder (ADHD); substance abuse; spine disorder; hypermobility syndrome;
16 migraines; and left ankle disorder. Tr. 1756.

17 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
18 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed
19 impairment. Tr. 1756.

20

21

1 The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work
2 with the following limitations:

3 She can stand/walk for a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday. She
can sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. She can frequently push/pull
4 with lower extremities, including operating of foot controls. She can never
climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. She can perform all other postural activities
5 occasionally. She can have occasional exposure to hazards, such as moving
mechanical parts, unprotected heights, operating a motor vehicle. She can
6 have occasional exposure to temperature extremes, pulmonary irritants, and
vibration. She should have no greater than moderate1 noise in her work
7 environment. She is limited to understanding and remembering simple
instructions. She can perform simple routine tasks, and make simple work-
8 related decisions. She can have occasional interaction with the public and
coworkers. She can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting.
9

Tr. 1759.

10

At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 1767.

11

At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
12

experience, RFC, and testimony from the vocational expert, there were jobs that
13

existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform,
14

such as parking lot attendant, assembler of small products, and collator operator.

15

Tr. 1768. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability, as
16

defined in the Social Security Act, from September 1, 2017, through the date of the
17

decision. Tr. 1768.

18

ISSUES

19

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying
20

her benefits. Plaintiff raises the following issues for review:

21

1 1. Whether the ALJ properly assed the medical opinion evidence; and
2 2. Whether the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s testimony.

3 ECF No. 6 at 2.

4 DISCUSSION

5 A. Medical Opinion Evidence

6 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, new regulations apply that
7 change the framework for how an ALJ must evaluate medical opinion evidence.

8 Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL
9 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 -01 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c.

10 The new regulations provide that the ALJ will no longer “give any specific
11 evidentiary weight . . . to any medical opinion(s) . . . .” Revisions to Rules, 2017 12 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867-68; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a),

13 416.920c(a). Instead, an ALJ must consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all
14 medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings from medical sources.

15 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(b), 416.920c(a)-(b).

16 The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior

17 administrative medical findings include supportability, consistency, relationship
18 with the claimant (including length of the treatment, frequency of examinations,
19 purpose of the treatment, extent of the treatment, and the existence of an

20 examination), specialization, and “other factors that tend to support or contradict a
21

1 medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but not
2 limited to, “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other

3 evidence in the claim or an understanding of our disability program’s policies and
4 evidentiary requirements”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).

5 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and therefore the

6 ALJ is required to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§
7 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). Supportability and consistency are explained in
8 the regulations:

9 Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and

10 supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or
11 her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more
12 persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s)

13 will be.

14 Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior

15 administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical
16 sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the

17 medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.
18 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). The ALJ may, but is not
19 required to, explain how the other factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§

20 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). However, when two or more medical opinions
21

1 or prior administrative findings “about the same issue are both equally well-
2 supported . . . and consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same,” the

3 ALJ is required to explain how “the other most persuasive factors in paragraphs
4 (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3),

5 416.920c(b)(3).

6 The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the changes to the

7 regulations displace the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide specific
8 and legitimate reasons to reject an examining provider’s opinion. Woods v.
9 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court held that the new

10 regulations eliminate any hierarchy of medical opinions, and the specific and
11 legitimate standard no longer applies. Id. The Court reasoned the “relationship
12 factors” remain relevant under the new regulations, and thus the ALJ can still

13 consider the length and purpose of the treatment relationship, the frequency of
14 examinations, the kinds and extent of examinations that the medical source has
15 performed or ordered from specialists, and whether the medical source has
16 examined the claimant or merely reviewed the claimant's records. Id. at 792.

17 However, the ALJ is not required to make specific findings regarding the
18 relationship factors. Id. Even under the new regulations, an ALJ must provide an
19 explanation supported by substantial evidence when rejecting an examining or

20 treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent. Id. 21

1 Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly discounted six sets of medical opinions.

2 Because the Court determines the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of Dr.

3 Bruner, Dr. Gardner, and Dr. Nelson, as described below, it need not determine
4 whether the ALJ improperly the remaining three sets of medical opinions. See
5 Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case

6 to the ALJ for further proceedings, we do not reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground
7 for remand.”). On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate all six sets of medical
8 opinions.

9 1. Dr. Bruner

10 Dr. Bruner examined Plaintiff on December 20, 2017, and opined, as

11 relevant here, Plaintiff would have difficulty “performing work activities without
12 special instructions.” Tr. 377-78. The ALJ found the opinion “unpersuasive.” Tr.

13 1765.

14 The ALJ first discounted the opinion as unsupported by Dr. Bruner’s

15 examination report. Tr. 1765. An ALJ may discount a doctor’s opinions when
16 they are inconsistent with or unsupported by the doctor’s own clinical findings.

17 See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, however,
18 Dr. Bruner explicitly found Plaintiff “had difficulty with tasks involving abstract
19 thought,” and noted Plaintiff “could not remember three words after five minutes.”

20 Tr. 377-78. This finding thus lacks substantial evidentiary support.

21

1 The ALJ also discounted the opinion as inconsistent with “the medical
2 evidence of record,” specifically pointing to instances where Plaintiff “denied

3 difficulty concentrating and thinking on several occasions” and noting Plaintiff

4 “reported being able to manage her finances independently, preparing meals, and
5 cleaning her home.” Tr. 1765. The ALJ did not, however, reconcile the

6 longitudinal notes reflecting distractibility, racing thoughts, and severe symptom
7 scores. See, e.g., Tr. 1618, 1627, 1630, 1634-35, 1638, 1646, 1650, 1659, 2042.

8 ALJs “cannot simply pick out a few isolated instances” of medical health that
9 support their conclusion, but must consider those instances in the broader context

10 “with an understanding of the patient’s overall well-being and the nature of her
11 symptoms.” Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Jones
12 v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting courts “may not affirm

13 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence[,]” but must review
14 the record as a whole). Further, Dr. Bruner explicitly opined that Plaintiff “is able
15 to manage funds in her own interest.” Tr. 377. This is thus not a reasonably
16 inconsistency. Finally, to the extent the ALJ discounted the opinion based on

17 Plaintiff’s ability to shop and prepare meals, these minimal activities are neither
18 reasonably inconsistent with nor a valid reason to discount the doctor’s opined
19 limitations. Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 643 (9th Cir. 2017) (“House

20 chores, cooking simple meals, self-grooming, paying bills, writing checks, and
21

1 caring for a cat in one’s own home, as well as occasional shopping outside the
2 home, are not similar to typical work responsibilities.”). The ALJ accordingly

3 erred by discounting Dr. Bruner’s opinion.

4 2. Drs. Gardner and Nelson

5 Drs. Gardner and Nelson opined, as relevant here, that Plaintiff would

6 require “close supervision.” Tr. 83, 116. The ALJ found this opined limitation
7 “vague.” Tr. 1764. Plaintiff argues the meaning of “close supervision” is “clear.”

8 ECF No. 6 at 19. In response, Defendant argues “the ALJ explained” that this
9 opined limitation was vague “because [the doctors] qualified the limitation as

10 something Plaintiff ‘[w]ould do best’ with, rather than an unqualified finding that
11 Plaintiff required close supervision.” ECF No. 8 at 18 (quoting Tr. 83, 97).

12 However, the ALJ never proffered this explanation—or any explanation at all. The

13 Court may only affirm an ALJ’s decision based on the reasons actually given, “not
14 post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been
15 thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir.
16 2009) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); Connett v.

17 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are constrained to review the
18 reasons the ALJ asserts.”) (citations omitted). Defendant offers no further
19 evidentiary or legal support for the ALJ’s finding. The Court thus concludes the

20 ALJ failed to validly assess the doctors’ opined limitation.

21

1 B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

2 Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to rely on reasons that were clear and

3 convincing in discrediting her symptom claims. ECF No. 6 at 4-15. An ALJ
4 engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether to discount a claimant’s
5 testimony regarding subjective symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2.

6 “First, the ALJ must determine whether there is objective medical evidence of an
7 underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or
8 other symptoms alleged.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (quotation marks omitted).

9 “The claimant is not required to show that [the claimant’s] impairment could

10 reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [the claimant] has
11 alleged; [the claimant] need only show that it could reasonably have caused some
12 degree of the symptom.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009).

13 Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of
14 malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of
15 the symptoms if [the ALJ] gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the
16 rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations

17 omitted). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what
18 symptom claims are being discounted and what evidence undermines these claims.

19 Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); Thomas v.

20 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring the ALJ to sufficiently
21

1 explain why it discounted claimant’s symptom claims)). “The clear and

2 convincing [evidence] standard is the most demanding required in Social Security

3 cases.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v.
4 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)).

5 Factors to be considered in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting

6 effects of a claimant’s symptoms include: 1) daily activities; 2) the location,
7 duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 3) factors that
8 precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and
9 side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or

10 other symptoms; 5) treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has
11 received for relief of pain or other symptoms; 6) any measures other than treatment
12 an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and 7) any other

13 factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to
14 pain or other symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7; 20 C.F.R. §

15 416.929(c). The ALJ is instructed to “consider all of the evidence in an
16 individual’s record,” to “determine how symptoms limit ability to perform work-

17 related activities.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2.

18 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
19 reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s

20

21

1 statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his
2 symptoms were not entirely consistent with the evidence. Tr. 1760.

3 The ALJ first discounted Plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent with the
4 medical record.3 Tr. 1760, 1761-62. However, because the ALJ erred by

5 discounting three medical opinions, and necessarily failed to properly evaluate the

6 medical evidence, as discussed above, this is not a valid ground to discount
7 Plaintiff’s testimony.

8 The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent with her
9 activities, specifically noting Plaintiff “cares for her daughter on the weekends, she

10 makes meals that take over an hour to prepare, she manages her finances, she
11

12

13 3 The ALJ also discussed certain of Plaintiff’s impairments—i.e., hypermobility,
14 left ankle disorder, migraines, and substance abuse—but failed to sufficiently
15 identify which testimony was discounted and explain what evidence undermined it.

16 See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ must

17 also evaluate the testimony in light of the longitudinal record and contextual
18 factors such as access to care. SSR 16-3p. The ALJ failed to grapple with
19 Plaintiff’s circumstances of homelessness and domestic instability, which impeded

20 consistent treatment and follow-up. See, e.g., Tr. 1681, 1896.

21

1 does crossword puzzles, and she attends church once a week.” Tr. 1760.

2 Plaintiff’s minimal activities are neither inconsistent with nor a valid reason to

3 discount her allegations. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.
4 2001) (“This court has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has
5 carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or

6 limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to
7 her overall disability. One does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be
8 disabled.”) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded
9 on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (a)); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,

10 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Several courts, including this one, have recognized that
11 disability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in
12 the face of their limitations.”); Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987)

13 (noting that a disability claimant need not “vegetate in a dark room” in order to be
14 deemed eligible for benefits); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016 (“We have
15 repeatedly warned that ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily
16 activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that

17 would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace

18 environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all
19 day.”). Similarly, Plaintiff’s activities do not “meet the threshold for transferable

20

21

1 work skills.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Fair, 885
2 F.2d at 603).

3 The ALJ accordingly failed to proffer specific, clear and convincing reasons,
4 supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.
5 C. Scope of Remand

6 When the ALJ commits legal error in denying a claim for benefits, as here,
7 the Court “ordinarily must remand to the agency for further proceedings before
8 directing an award of benefits.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
9 2017). The Social Security Act, however, grants district courts flexibility in

10 certain circumstances to reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for an immediate
11 award of benefits rather than further administrative proceedings. Treichler v.
12 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff seeks

13 such a remedy. ECF No. 6 at 2.

14 Remand for an immediate award of benefits is allowed only when three
15 requirements (collectively referred to as the “credit-as-true” rule) are satisfied: (1)
16 the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether

17 that evidence is claimant testimony or a medical opinion; (2) there are no
18 outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be
19 made, the record is fully developed, and further administrative proceedings would

20 serve no useful purpose; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were
21

1 credited as true, the record as a whole would require the ALJ to find the claimant
2 disabled on remand. Leon, 880 F.3d at 1045; Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even if

3 all three requirements are met, the decision whether to remand a case for further
4 proceedings or simply award benefits is in the Court’s discretion. Washington v.
5 Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 1029, 1041 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may still remand for

6 further proceedings “when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to
7 whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021.
8 Here, the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s testimony must be reweighed, and
9 this is a function the Court cannot perform in the first instance on appeal. Further

10 proceedings are thus not only helpful but necessary. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
11 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting a remand for an immediate award of
12 benefits is an “extreme remedy,” appropriate “only in ‘rare circumstances’”)

13 (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099).

14 However, mindful that Plaintiff first filed her applications for benefits in
15 2017, the Court imposes the following time limits on further administrative
16 proceedings: the ALJ must complete further proceedings within 120 days and, if

17 the ALJ denies benefits and Plaintiff appeals, the Commissioner’s final decision
18 shall be rendered within 60 days of the appeal. See Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d
19 101, 103-06 (2d Cir. 2005) (imposing 120-day limit for proceedings before the

20 ALJ and a 60-day limit for administrative appeal); Baldree v. Colvin, 2015 WL
21 1 5568611, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) (collecting cases recognizing the
2 authority to impose time limits); see also HALLEX 1-2-1-55.D.2 (articulating

3 agency procedures following a time-limited court remand).

4 CONCLUSION

5 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court concludes the

6 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal
7 error. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

8 1. The District Court Executive is directed to substitute Frank Bisignano as
9 Defendant and update the docket sheet.

10 2. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED.

11 3. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 8, is DENIED.

12 4. The Clerk’s Office shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff

13 REVERSING and REMANDING the matter to the Commissioner of Social

14 Security for further proceedings consistent with this Order pursuant to sentence
15 four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).

16 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to

17 counsel, and CLOSE THE FILE.

18 DATED March 3, 2026.

19 s/Mary K. Dimke

MARY K. DIMKE

20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

21