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Joseph Omar Sabir v. NaphCare Inc - Motion to Dismiss Medical Malpractice Claims

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Filed March 3rd, 2026
Detected March 24th, 2026
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Summary

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington ruled on a motion to dismiss medical malpractice claims filed by Joseph Omar Sabir against NaphCare Inc. and several county officials. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion.

What changed

This court order addresses the motion to dismiss filed by NaphCare Inc. and various county defendants in the case brought by Joseph Omar Sabir. The court has ruled on specific claims within the medical malpractice lawsuit, granting some dismissals while denying others. The specific claims affected and the reasoning behind the court's decisions are detailed within the order, impacting the ongoing litigation.

For regulated entities, particularly healthcare providers operating within correctional facilities or similar environments, this ruling signifies that certain medical malpractice claims against NaphCare and county employees will proceed. Compliance officers should review the specific claims that were allowed to proceed to understand potential liabilities and ensure adherence to medical standards and protocols. The outcome of this motion will shape the subsequent stages of the litigation, potentially leading to further discovery or settlement discussions.

What to do next

  1. Review the specific claims that were dismissed and those that were allowed to proceed.
  2. Assess current medical malpractice and patient care protocols against the claims raised in the lawsuit.
  3. Consult with legal counsel regarding potential implications for ongoing litigation or operational adjustments.

Source document (simplified)

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Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Joseph Omar Sabir v. NaphCare Inc, Amanda Spayde, Michelle Johnson, Spokane County, SGT Robert BrittOS, Officer Thomas, Officer Phillips, Officer Moser, Officer Rasmussen, Officer Howard, and Officer Epley

District Court, E.D. Washington

Trial Court Document

1 U.S. FDILISETDR IINC TT HCEO URT
2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
Mar 03, 2026

3

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

4

5

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

8

9 JOSEPH OMAR SABIR, No. 2:24-CV-00034-SAB

10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 NAPHCARE INC, a for-profit Alabama ORDER GRANTING IN PART,

13 corporation, AMANDA SPAYDE, an DENYING IN PART,

14 individual and NaphCare Employee, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

15 MICHELLE JOHNSON, an individual DISMISS

16 and NaphCare Employee, SPOKANE

17 COUNTY, a Washington municipal

18 entity, SGT ROBERT BRITTOS,

19 OFFICER THOMAS, OFFICER

20 PHILLIPS, OFFICER MOSER,

21 OFFICER RASMUSSEN, OFFICER

22 HOWARD, and OFFICER EPLEY,

23 Defendant.

24

25 Before the Court is Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Amanda Spayde, and

26 Michelle Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, ECF
27 No. 65. Plaintiff is represented by Colin G. Prince and John B. McEntire, IV.
28 Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Amanda Spayde, and Michelle Johnson are

1 represented by Ross C. Taylor, Jonathan D. Ballard, and Jakub L. Kocztorz. The
2 Spokane County Defendants are represented by John E. Justice and Jakub L.
3 Kocztorz. The Motion was considered without oral argument.

4 Background

5 On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed this action against
6 Spokane County and “NaphCare Staff,” asserting claims of medical malpractice.
7 The Court dismissed his complaint with leave to amend due to pleading

8 deficiencies.

9 Plaintiff moved to amend his Complaint on August 23, 2024. The proposed
10 Second Amended Complaint included NaphCare, Inc. as a Defendant and added a
11 § 1983 claim against “AMANDA, NaphCare Nurse” and NaphCare. The Court

12 determined that NaphCare received notice of the initial Complaint by virtue of
13 being the employer of “NaphCare Staff,” and ordered Plaintiff to file a Second
14 Amended Complaint by December 2, 2024, ECF No. 33.

15 Before filing the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed motions for
16 leave to file a third amended complaint on November 8, 2024, and November 15,
17 2024. The second motion was granted, making the proposed complaint the

18 operative Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint included
19 “NaphCare Inc.” and “NaphCare Nurse ‘Amanda’ Spayde” as Defendants.

20 Counsel appeared on behalf of Plaintiff on November 22, 2024. Plaintiff’s
21 Counsel moved to amend the complaint again on October 17, 2025, to correct the
22 listed Defendants, plead proper constitutional claims for a pretrial detainee, and to
23 plead additional facts to support his claims. In relevant part, the proposed pleading
24 included NaphCare and Nurse Spayde as Defendants and introduced Michelle
25 Johnson as a Defendant. Plaintiff’s Motion was granted. The Third Amended
26 Complaint was filed on November 25, 2025, and summons were issued for

27 NaphCare, Nurse Johnson, and Nurse Spayde between November 17 and 25, 2025.
28 //

1 Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint

2 Plaintiff was detained at Spokane County Jail beginning on January 24,
3 2021. He asserts that, upon arrival, he had a prescription for Warfarin (an anti-
4 coagulant/blood thinner) on his person. He claims his Warfarin was not replaced
5 and his medical screening upon booking should have been indicative of the need
6 for him to be prescribed blood thinners. Plaintiff asserts his requests for Warfarin
7 were ignored by Nurses Spayde and Johnson, and Defendants failed to

8 meaningfully investigate his medical history.

9 On January 30, 2021, Plaintiff reported difficulty breathing, chest pain,
10 facial numbness, and vision loss in one eye and was placed on medical watch. He
11 states that Defendants ignored him and refused care. On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff
12 made an additional complaint regarding his medical concerns, to which a

13 Correctional Officer and Nurse Johnson responded and subsequently dismissed.
14 On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff covered his cell window in what he asserts
15 was a plea for medical attention. This resulted in an extraction team of six officers
16 removing him from his cell using force and pepper spray. Plaintiff was admitted to
17 the hospital the next day due to swelling of his eye and underwent an MRI which
18 revealed he sustained two acute infarcts in the frontal lobes.

19 Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983 against Nurse
20 Spayde, Nurse Johnson, and NaphCare. He further asserts claims of medical
21 negligence, negligence, and gross negligence against all Defendants.

22 Defendants NaphCare, Amanda Spayde, and Michelle Johnson now request
23 the Court dismiss the Complaint as to them, arguing that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
24 are time barred, do not relate back, and the Third Amended Complaint fails to state
25 a claim against the three defendants. Defendants assert Plaintiff fails to allege
26 sufficient facts to meet the standard for a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff’s medical
27 negligence claim fails as a matter of law as NaphCare is not a hospital and is not
28 subject to liability under this theory, and Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to
1 establish that Amanda Spayde and Michelle Johnson breached the relevant

2 standard of care.

3 Relation-Back Standard

4 Under Fed. R. Civ. P 15(c)(1), an amended complaint relates back to the
5 original complaint for the purposes of satisfying statutes of limitation when: (1) the
6 basic claim arises out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party
7 to be brought in received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining
8 its defense; (3) that party knows or should have known that, but for a mistake
9 concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it; and (4) the
10 second and third requirements have been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations
11 period. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986).

12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Dismissal Standard

13 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a plaintiff has
14 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A
15 pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
16 pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Generally,
17 complaints must be pled with enough specificity to provide the defendant fair
18 notice of what the plaintiff is claiming and the grounds upon which those claims
19 rest. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While the Court adopts
20 the factual allegations as true on a motion to dismiss, conclusory allegations or
21 formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim are insufficient. In re Gilead Scis.
22 Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2008).

23 Legal Framework

24 1. § 1983 Claims

25 To establish a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must
26 allege facts supporting “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence
27 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
28 106 (1975). A serious medical need exists where a failure to treat an inmate for
1 that medical need could result in significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton
2 infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

3 To establish § 1983 liability against an entity, a plaintiff must show that (1)
4 he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity has a custom or policy; (3)
5 that amounted to a deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and
6 (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Id. at 694.
7 If the policy or custom in question is an unwritten one, a plaintiff must show that it
8 is so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a permanent and well settled
9 practice. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The
10 deliberate indifference standard is met when a plaintiff demonstrates: (1) a
11 defendant made an intentional decision with respect to conditions under which the
12 plaintiff was confined; (2) the conditions put plaintiff at substantial risk of
13 suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable measures to
14 reduce the risk of harm knowing or having reason to know of the high degree of
15 risk; and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused plaintiff injury.
16 Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018).

17 2. Medical Negligence, Negligence, and Gross Negligence Claims

18 In Washington State, when an injury occurs in the healthcare context, an
19 action for damages for that injury is governed exclusively by Wash. Rev. Code §
20 7.70. Branom v. State, 94 Wash. App. 964, 969 (1999). Accordingly, to make a
21 claim of medical negligence under Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70, Plaintiff must show
22 one of the following: (1) injury resulted from the failure of a health care provider
23 to follow the accepted standard of care; (2) a health care provider promised the
24 patient that the injury suffered would not occur; or (3) the injury resulted from care
25 to which the patient did not consent. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.030. A “health care
26 provider” is defined to include nurses and the entities that employ them. Wash.
27 Rev. Code § 7.70.020(1), (3).

28 //

1 Analysis

2 1. Statute of Limitations

3 As § 1983 lacks its own statute of limitations, courts apply the applicable
4 state statute of limitations (3 years in Washington State) and any relevant tolling
5 provisions to such claims. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760
6 (9th Cir. 1991); Lockett v. Cnty. of L.A., 977 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2020).
7 Plaintiff asserts he was a pretrial detainee for 145 days during the period he could
8 have brought his § 1983 claim. Defendant argues Plaintiff is barred from making
9 this argument as there are no allegations supporting it in the operative complaint.
10 However, Defendant cites to no authority to support this conclusion. Accordingly,
11 the applicable limitations period is extended by 145 days, and it expired on June
12 29, 2024. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.190. As Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on
13 February 2, 2024, his § 1983 claims are not time barred.

14 2. Relation-back, Service, and Timing of Complaints

15 a. NaphCare, Inc.

16 The facts from the initial Complaint through the Third Amended Complaint
17 are substantially similar and arise out of the same course of conduct. This Court
18 already determined that NaphCare, Inc. was on notice of the lawsuit from the
19 initial Complaint as “NaphCare Staff” were listed as Defendants. Although
20 NaphCare was not formally added as a Defendant until the Second Amended

21 Complaint, the inclusion of “NaphCare Staff” in the initial Complaint and
22 “NaphCare Nurse ‘Amanda’” in the First Amended Complaint are enough to have
23 put NaphCare on notice that it would be a party to this litigation but for a mistake
24 on Plaintiff’s end.

25 b. Nurse Amanda Spayde

26 Similarly, Nurse Amanda Spayde was named as a Defendant in the initial
27 Complaint. Although there have been several variations of her name, she has been
28 included in this lawsuit as a Defendant from the start. Nurse Amanda Spayde was
1 served with the original complaint within the 90-day service period, and the Third
2 Amended Complaint accordingly relates back.

3 c. Nurse Michelle Johnson

4 The Third Amended Complaint is the first time Nurse Michelle Johnson is
5 named as a Defendant in this matter. Although she was allegedly involved in the
6 conduct discussed in the original complaint, she was added after the statute of
7 limitations expired and there is no evidence that she should have been on notice of
8 her being a party to this litigation but for a mistake on Plaintiff’s part. See
9 Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29. As such, the claims as to Nurse Michelle Johnson are
10 time barred.

11 3. Motion to Dismiss

12 a. § 1983 Claims

13 Plaintiff has alleged several facts to support a § 1983 claim, which requires
14 him to show “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
15 indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Plaintiff’s Third
16 Amended Complaint provides a timeline of requests, denials, and other actions that
17 are relevant to such a claim, and these allegations are sufficient to put Defendants
18 on notice of the claim and the facts Plaintiff intends to use to support it.
19 b. Negligence Claims

20 Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to put Defendants on notice of his claims of
21 medical negligence, and Defendants are individuals and entities subject to liability
22 under the relevant statute. However, as Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70 provides the
23 exclusive remedy for injuries arising in the healthcare context, Plaintiff’s common
24 law claims of negligence and gross negligence against NaphCare, Inc., Amanda
25 Spayde, and Michelle Johnson are dismissed.

26 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

27 1. Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Amanda Spayde, and Michelle Johnson’s
28 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 65, is

1|| GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
2. The Court directs the Clerks Office to terminate Michelle Johnson as
3||a Defendant from the above-captioned matter.
3. Plaintiff's negligence and gross negligence claims against NaphCare,
5|| Inc. and Amanda Spayde are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to file
this Order and provide copies to counsel.
8 DATED this this 3rd day of March 2026.

10 AY A) □

1 fee Cus tar
12 Chief United States District Judge
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART, DEFENDANTS’
RAATTTIART TIN TAITOCRATOG & 0

Named provisions

ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Source

Analysis generated by AI. Source diff and links are from the original.

Classification

Agency
E.D. Washington
Filed
March 3rd, 2026
Instrument
Enforcement
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Substantive
Document ID
No. 2:24-cv-00034-SAB
Docket
2:24-cv-00034-SAB

Who this affects

Applies to
Healthcare providers Employers
Industry sector
6211 Healthcare Providers
Activity scope
Medical Malpractice Claims Patient Care
Geographic scope
Washington US-WA

Taxonomy

Primary area
Healthcare
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Medical Malpractice Civil Procedure

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