Jump To

Top Caption Disposition [Lead Opinion

                  by Judge Dale N. Atkins](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10809245/candice-henderson-chandler-v-city-of-new-orleans-and-the-new-orleans-city/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Candice Henderson-Chandler v. City of New Orleans and the New Orleans City Council

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0648
• Judges: Judge Rosemary Ledet; Judge Dale N. Atkins; Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott

• Disposition: Reversed

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (928)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed

Lead Opinion

                        by Judge Dale N. Atkins

CANDICE HENDERSON- * NO. 2025-CA-0648
CHANDLER
*
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
*
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND FOURTH CIRCUIT
THE NEW ORLEANS CITY *
COUNCIL STATE OF LOUISIANA

---

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2024-10656, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M. Medley, Judge

---

Judge Dale N. Atkins

---

(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Nakisha
Ervin-Knott)

William D. Aaron, Jr.
DeWayne L. Williams
AARON & GIANNA, PLC
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3800
New Orleans, LA 70170

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, Candice Henderson-Chandler

Shawn Lindsay, Deputy City Attorney
Donesia D. Turner, City Attorney
1300 Perdido Street
City Hall - Room 5E03
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS, City of New Orleans and
New Orleans City Council

REVERSED
MARCH 13, 2026
DNA

RML

NEK

This is a zoning matter. Appellants, the City of New Orleans (“City”) and

the New Orleans City Council (“Council”), seek review of the trial court’s August

11, 2025 judgment. In that judgment, the trial court granted the “Petition for

Judicial Review of Adjudication of City Council Action (Writ of

Review/Certiorari)” (“Petition for Judicial Review”) filed by Appellee, Candice

Henderson-Chandler (“Ms. Henderson-Chandler”); ruled the Council’s denial of

Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s “Land-Use Request Application” (“Application”) for a

conditional use permit was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, without

consideration, and in complete disregard of the facts and circumstances of her

Application; ruled the Council exceeded its authority, jurisdiction, purview, and

discretion in violation of the Louisiana Constitution, Louisiana Revised Statutes,

the Home Rule Charter, and City Ordinances in denying Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s Application; reversed the Council’s denial of Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s Application; ordered the Council to effectuate an ordinance granting

her a conditional use permit; and assessed the costs of the proceedings against the

Council. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2021, Ms. Henderson-Chandler purchased the property located at

917-919 N. Tonti Street (“N. Tonti”), a double shotgun-style house in New

Orleans’ Treme neighborhood. In terms of zoning, the subject property is located

in a HU-RD2 Historic Urban Two-Family Residential District. Oretha Castle

Haley, who co-founded and served as the president of the New Orleans chapter of

the Congress of Racial Equality (“CORE”) in 1961, grew up in the home located at

917 N. Tonti. Additionally, during the Civil Rights era, the home housed Freedom

Riders who protested the segregation of interstate transportation. In light of the

property’s history, Ms. Henderson-Chandler sought to convert 917 N. Tonti into a

civil rights museum named the Freedom House Museum.

In April 2024, Ms. Henderson-Chandler submitted her Application in

pursuance of same. Therein, Ms. Henderson-Chandler listed the specific zoning

request as: “Requesting a Conditional Use Permit to operate 917 N. Tonti . . . as a

cultural facility.” In the “Description of Project” section of her Application, Ms.

Henderson-Chandler wrote:

The building on this property is a double shotgun constructed in 1924.
The project requires no changes to the physical structure of this
building. The building is notable for its historic role in the Civil
Rights Movement, when it was a ‘safe house’ or ‘freedom house’
hosting visiting civil rights activists, advocates and artists. The owner
proposes to operate the building as a cultural facility, in the form of a
house museum honoring and teaching these histories, with events only
within the hours of operations specified in the [Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance (“CZO”)], 20.3.R (8 AM-10 AM Monday-
Thursday, 8 AM-midnight Friday, Saturday and Sunday).

The City Planning Commission (“CPC”) docketed Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s

Application as Zoning Docket (“ZD”) 050/24.

2
As a peripheral issue in the court system, the family of Oretha Castle Haley

sued to prevent Ms. Henderson-Chandler from using Oretha Castle Haley’s name,

image, likeness, and legacy in the Freedom House Museum. The family contended

that doing so constituted a violation of the Allen Toussaint Legacy Act, which is

codified at La. R.S. 51:470.1 - 470.6. In pertinent part, La. R.S. 51:470.4(A)

provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of this Subpart for any person to use an

individual’s identity for a commercial purpose in Louisiana without having first

obtained consent from the individual or the individual’s authorized representative.”

Ultimately, the Haley family received a temporary restraining order and

subsequent preliminary injunction against Ms. Henderson-Chandler, which

prevented her from using the name, image, and/or likeness of Oretha Castle Haley

and from representing the legacy of Oretha Castle Haley.

CPC Staff Report

In August 2024, CPC staff issued their report to the CPC regarding ZD

050/24. Therein, the CPC Staff provided the following description of Ms.

Henderson-Chandler’s application:

The subject property, located at 917 N. Tonti . . . in the HU-RD2
Historic Urban Two-Family Residential District, and the Tremé
neighborhood, is developed with a historic shotgun double
constructed in 1925. The site consists of one lot of record 31 feet wide
and 110 feet long, with 3,875 square feet of area. The property is
being used as a two-family residence, but the applicant is seeking to
convert one side into a museum space called The Freedom House
Museum. The house historically served as a “safe-house” or
“freedom-house,” hosting visiting civil rights activists, advocates and
artists. The applicant is seeking a conditional use for a cultural facility
. . . to utilize one side of the double as a museum dedicated to the
site’s civil rights history. The Museum will display memorabilia and
information about the owners who housed over 375 Freedom Workers
during the Civil Rights movements. This museum will also showcase
historical interviews; intergenerational conversations; CORE’s work
to desegregate lunch counters, New Orleans CORE Chapter; the
African American stories of the Civil Rights Movement connected

3
with the Freedom House and other important information to honor the
Freedom Ride. The facility will be open to the public for tours,
meetings or events by appointment only during normal business hours
and no later than 9:00 pm on weekends. The applicant expects no
more than 25 individuals for any booking.

The CPC staff next explained that because a “cultural facility is an institutional

use,” this “triggers the need for the site to comply with the lot requirements for

non-residential uses.”

The CPC staff addressed the “[a]nticipated impact on surrounding land uses”

as follows:

The proposed use is compatible with the generally residential but
mixed-use character of the surrounding neighborhood. . . . [W]hile the
neighborhood is largely developed with two-family and single-family
structures, more intense uses are scattered throughout the
neighborhood . . . . The block for which the Freedom House sits is
developed entirely with two-family structures, however across the
street sits another institutional use, Metropolitan Baptist Church. The
neighboring square across St. Philip Street includes a large senior
housing complex and on the other side of the block, the neighboring
square across Dumaine Street houses the Phillis Wheatley Community
School. Willie Mae’s Scotch House Restaurant is one block from the
site (currently being redeveloped), and Dooky Chase Restaurant is just
two blocks away from the site. While the area was developed
primarily as residential, various restaurants, schools and larger
housing developments exist in close proximity. The site’s impact as a
museum will be more intense than the existing residential use but is
consistent with and complimentary to the surrounding neighborhood.
The limited square footage of the proposed museum (approximately
900 square feet) would greatly limit negative impacts on surrounding
properties.

The nature of the structure as a residential structure, and within a
residential neighborhood, underlies its significance as a place of
refuge during the Civil Rights Movement. It is because of its design
and its location that it has such historical value and should be
preserved and commemorated.

Then, the CPC staff delineated the ways in which the property did not meet

the requirements for non-residential use in that district. First, the CPC staff noted

the site was deficient in the number of square feet and the width of the lot. Second,

4
the CPC staff explained the side yards were also deficient in size. Third, the CPC

staff pointed out that the property did not have the required vehicle parking spaces

(three vehicle parking spaces were required based on the square footage). The CPC

staff explained that Ms. Henderson-Chandler “has provided a commitment letter

from Metropolitan Baptist Church to allow visitors of the Freedom House

[Museum] to utilize the church parking area[s].” Regarding the church’s parking

areas, the CPC staff explained, they “are not developed as parking [lots] but are

utilized for parking vehicles.” The CPC staff further explained “there is at least one

street parking space in front of the subject site which can be used for guests,” but

“the site still requires a waiver of the parking requirement to allow the use without

vehicle parking spaces.” Similarly, the CPC staff explained the site did not have

the two required bicycle spots and spaces for electric vehicle (“EV”) charging

stations.

The CPC staff concluded that the proposed use met the approval standards in

the CZO and that any required variances met the nine criteria for CPC approval for

same. Ultimately, the CPC staff recommended approval of Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s Application subject to four waivers and two provisos. The four waivers

related to the lot’s insufficient minimum area for non-residential uses; the lot’s

insufficient width for non-residential uses; the lack of the required three off-street

vehicle parking spaces and two bicycle parking spots required for cultural

facilities; and the lack of an EV charging station/parking space required for

cultural facilities. One of the provisos related to the hours of operation, and the

other stated, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Department of Safety and Permits shall

issue no building permits or licenses for this project until final development plans

are approved by the [CPC] and recorded with the Office of Conveyances.”

5
CPC Hearing and Recommendation

On August 27, 2024, the CPC considered ZD 050/24. At the outset, a CPC

staff member informed the CPC that the CPC staff recommended approval subject

to the above-mentioned two provisos and four waivers. During the hearing, Ms.

Henderson-Chandler spoke in favor of her application. In pertinent part, Ms.

Henderson-Chandler stated she would work with “neighbors at Metropolitan

Baptist Church . . . at 943 N. Tonti . . . to use the space for parking when necessary

so that the [Freedom House Museum does not] inconvenience its [other]

neighbors.” Ms. Henderson-Chandler pointed out that she lives at the property,

such that she was “[r]eally committed to being a . . . good neighbor” and that “[a]

lot of the issues that [the] neighbors have [were her] issues” too. One of the CPC

members asked Ms. Henderson-Chandler whether the issues with using Oretha

Castle Haley’s name, image, and likeness had been resolved, and she responded in

the affirmative. Two public commenters spoke in favor of approval in light of the

site providing a space where visitors can learn about New Orleans history.

Thereafter, the CPC voted (5-0) in favor of Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application

subject to the four waivers and two provisos as outlined in the CPC Staff Report,

thereby recommending that the Council approve same.

City Council Meetings

In October 2024, the City Council held two public hearings on Ms.

Henderson-Chandler’s Application.

October 10, 2024 Meeting

At the Council’s October 10, 2024 meeting, Councilmember Eugene Green

(“Councilmember Green”) moved to approve Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s

Application subject to the aforementioned four waivers and two provisos.

6
Thereafter, a representative for the CPC spoke, noting the CPC’s recommended

approval of Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application subject to the four waivers and

two provisos. Councilmember Green then explained that the CPC had received

overwhelming support in favor of Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application, with no

comments in opposition at a neighborhood participation meeting and twenty-four

comments in support submitted in writing.

Councilmember Green then opened the floor for public comments. Sundiata

Haley, Oretha Castle Haley’s son, spoke about the legacy issue and urged the

Council to vote against Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application. Like Sundiata

Haley’s statements, many of the online comments against Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s Application were about the legacy issue and the opposition from the

Haley family. However, seven online comments stated general opposition to Ms.

Henderson-Chandler’s Application. Additionally, John Castle, Oretha Castle

Haley’s brother, spoke to the Council and explained he was in support of the

Freedom House Museum. The other public comments in favor of the Application,

including Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s, were about the importance of having a space

for people to learn about the history and culture of New Orleans.

After hearing from the public, Councilmember Green moved for a deferral,

whereupon the following colloquy occurred:

[Councilmember-At-Large JP Morrell (“Councilmember-At-
Large Morrell”):] I think that [it is] important to note for the record
that there is a tremendous feeling in our community [that] people who
are third parties com[e] . . . to profit off our culture. . . . I do not know
what is the cultural significance of this location other than the person
who lived there. And I [do not] know how you have a museum at a
location and not reference or talk about the person who lived there,
which is the sole historical significance of that location. Further, the
united opposition of [Oretha Castle Haley’s] family to [her] name
being used and her legacy being used to profit is very problematic. . . .

7
[Councilmember Green:] In the application itself, . . . the name
Oretha Castle Haley was not mentioned, but [I am] not naïve.
Obviously this was [her] former residence, but [that is] not what [we
are] deciding on today. [It is] not based on the use of the name Oretha
Castle Haley. [It is] based on a request for a cultural center called the
[F]reedom [H]ouse [M]useum which in its application does not
mention [Oretha Castle Haley’s] name. . . .

[Councilmember-At-Large Morrell:] How we treat this property
sends a message to all the people in the city about that underlying rage
people feel about people who are not from here profiting off the
legacy of people that are here. And the only historic significance of
this property is the person that lived there. . . .

....

[Councilmember Lesli Harris (“Councilmember Harris):] I [do
not] think this [F]reedom [House] [M]useum can exist without
profiting [from] or using [Oretha Castle Haley’s] image or likeness
since she was so integral in the movement. For that reason, I would
stand with denial if we go forward. . . .

Eventually, the Council voted to defer the matter.

October 24, 2024 Council Meeting

The Council took the matter up again at its October 24, 2024 meeting. At the

outset, Councilmember Green cautioned Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application

needed to be viewed “as a land use matter, not a civil legal matter.” In this latter

regard, executive counsel for the Council explained that there was a preliminary

injunction in place preventing Ms. Henderson-Chandler from using Oretha Castle

Haley’s name, image, and likeness. Councilmember Green further explained that

he was recommending that the Council include a proviso enforcing any permanent

injunctions issued by the court system. Executive counsel for the Council

described this proviso as “an attempt to try and balance the interests” of Ms.

Henderson-Chandler and Oretha Castle Haley’s family. The executive counsel

explained that with the proviso in place, if the judicial branch determined Ms.

8
Henderson-Chandler were to violate any injunctions in place, then this would

constitute grounds for revocation of the conditional use permit.

The Council then heard public comments. Again, many of the in-person and

online comments against Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application were based on

the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue and the fact that the Haley family opposed

Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application. However, one person who publicly

commented was Twila Franklin-Vining (“Ms. Franklin-Vining”), who explained

she resides at 923 N. Tonti. Ms. Franklin-Vining stated that on June 3, 2024, she

wrote a letter to the CPC expressing her opposition to Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s

Application. Therein and to the Council, Ms. Franklin-Vining expressed concern

that the granting of Mr. Henderson-Chandler’s Application would be detrimental to

the area by intensifying traffic; minimizing parking space; and interfering with the

right to peace and safety of the residents of the 900 block of N. Tonti. Regarding

her first concern, Ms. Franklin-Vining explained the block already experiences

high volumes of traffic due to a school and senior citizen housing facility. Turning

to her second concern, Ms. Franklin-Vining stated she had already begun

experiencing difficulty parking when she returned home in the evening after Ms.

Henderson-Chandler began operating 917-919 N. Tonti as a historic landmark and

rental property. Ms. Franklin-Vining further expressed concern about “stragglers”

and recounted a break-in incident on the block. Ms. Franklin-Vining asked the

Council to vote no on behalf of her and her children. Multiple commenters spoke

in favor of the Council granting Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application; and Ms.

Henderson-Chandler also spoke to the Council once more in favor of her

Application. Again, these comments largely noted the benefit of a facility where

people could learn about the Civil Rights Movement.

9
Following, Councilmember Green moved to adopt the proviso, but none of

the other councilmembers seconded this action. Councilmember-At-Large Morrell

then recalled Ms. Franklin-Vining’s concerns. With regard to Ms. Franklin-

Vining’s concern about parking, Councilmember-At-Large Morrell noted that

while Ms. Henderson-Chandler had an agreement with the church for parking,

“that [area is not] even developed as a parking lot yet.” Councilmember-At-Large

Morrell stated, “[A] consideration we have to have is when neighbors say” they

have concerns. Councilmember Morrell concluded his discussion on this issue by

saying that “[i]f we as a Council [do not] feel like those issues can be addressed

through provisos then we [cannot] support a zoning ordinance.” Then,

Councilmember-At-Large Morell reiterated his concern about the Oretha Castle

Haley legacy issue; but he explained this was his personal opinion and emphasized

it was “not the reason” for how he planned to vote on Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s

Application. Then-Councilmember Oliver Thomas (“Councilmember Thomas”)

also spoke and expressed concern about the legacy issue.

Then, Councilmember Green moved to vote on ZD 050/40. Councilmember

Green voted in favor of ZD 050/40. Then-Councilmember Joe Giarrusso

(“Councilmember Giarrusso”), Councilmember Freddie King (“Councilmember

King”), and Councilmember Thomas voted against it. Likewise, then-

Councilmember-At-Large Helena Moreno (“Councilmember-At-Large Moreno”)

and Councilmember-At-Large Morrell voted against it. Councilmember Harris was

not present and did not vote. Thus, Councilmember Green was the only vote in

favor of Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application. Councilmember-At-Large

Moreno then moved to deny ZD 050/40, and Councilmembers Giarrusso, King,

10
and Morrell voted in approval of same. Councilmember Green voted against

denial.

Petition for Judicial Review

Following the Council’s decision, on November 21, 2024, Ms. Henderson-

Chandler filed her Petition for Judicial Review, naming the City and the Council as

defendants. Therein, Ms. Henderson-Chandler alleged the Council violated the

doctrine of separation of powers because its decision was based on concerns about

a violation of the Allen Toussaint Legacy Act (i.e., a matter of statutory

interpretation vested with the judicial branch rather than an executive branch

action) rather than the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Ms. Henderson-

Chandler asserted prejudice in that Councilmember Harris previously represented

the Haleys as an attorney in trademarking “the Richard and Oretha Castle Haley

Foundation for Education and the Arts” but did not disclose her relationship with

the Haleys; did not recuse herself; and stated her position against Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s Application at the Council’s October 10, 2025 meeting. Further, Ms.

Henderson-Chandler contended the comments by Councilmember-At-Large

Morrell and Councilmember Thomas about the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue

during the October 24, 2025 meeting evidenced their lack of fairness and

impartiality. Ms. Henderson-Chandler also argued there was no evidence to

support a denial of her Application, with the Council instead basing its decision on

the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue.

Trial Court Judgment and Reasons

The trial court held a hearing on Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Petition for

Judicial Review in July 2025. Following the hearing, the trial court took the matter

11
under advisement. On August 11, 2025, the trial court issued its judgment, which

stated, in pertinent part:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that [Ms.
Henderson-Chandler’s] Petition for Judicial Review . . . is hereby
GRANTED.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Judgment be entered in favor of . . . [Ms.] Henderson-Chandler[] and
against . . . the City . . . and the . . . Council, finding that the October
24, 2024[] motion and denial of [ZD] 050/24[] by . . . the City . . . and
the . . . Council was arbitrary and capricious, was an abuse of
discretion, and was without consideration and was in complete
disregard of the facts and circumstances of the application related to
[ZD] 050/24.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that Judgment be entered in favor of . . . [Ms.]
Henderson-Chandler[] and against . . . the City . . . and the . . .
Council, finding that the October 24, 2024[] motion and denial of
[ZD] 050/24[] [by] . . . the City . . . and the . . . Council exceeded
[their] authority, jurisdiction, purview, and permitted discretion in
violation of the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Revised
Statutes, the Home Rule Charter and City Ordinances.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that Judgment be entered in favor of . . . [Ms.]
Henderson-Chandler, and against . . . the City . . . and the . . . Council,
ordering that [ZD] 050/24 is REVERSED and . . . the City . . . and
the . . . Council [are] to effectuate an ordinance granting the
conditional use permit of . . . [Ms.] Henderson Chandler.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that . . . the City . . . and the . . . Council are cast with the
costs of these proceedings.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court concluded the Council failed to

apply the relevant zoning criteria outlined in the CZO; acted arbitrarily and

capriciously; and rendered its denial in a manner that was not neutral, fair, and

impartial. The trial court reasoned the Council improperly denied Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s Application because of the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue. The trial

court found that “[e]ven considering the opposition letter read into the record by

12
[Ms. Franklin-Vining], denial of the . . . [A]pplication was clearly not done for the

purpose of the public health, safety, and welfare of the community.” The City and

the Council’s timely suspensive appeal to this Court followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, the City and the Council (collectively “Appellants”) assert three

assignments of error:

A. The [trial] court erred in granting the Petition for Judicial
Review, mandating the affirmative vote of a majority of all
Councilmembers to adopt an Ordinance to effectuate the conditional
use request, because the Council’s decision to not grant the
conditional use application is well within its legislative discretion.

B. The [trial] court erred in granting [Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s]
Petition for Judicial Review because the Councilmembers’ decision
not to grant the conditional use request is supported by the
administrative record and is neither arbitrary nor capricious.

C. The [trial] court erred in ordering the . . . Council to pay the
costs of the proceedings sua sponte.

After delineating the standard of review, we discuss each of these in turn.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

As this Court has previously explained:

“A challenge to a zoning decision in Louisiana is a de novo
proceeding on the issue of whether the result of the legislation is
arbitrary and capricious, and therefore a taking of property without
due process of law.” An appellate court reviews questions of law in a
zoning matter under the de novo standard of review. Regarding factual
findings in a zoning matter, this Court has explained that “[a]
reviewing court does not consider whether the [trial] court manifestly
erred in its findings, but whether the zoning board acted arbitrarily,
capriciously or with any calculated or prejudicial lack of discretion.”

3000-3032 St. Claude Ave., LLC v. City of New Orleans, 2022-0813, pp. 7-8 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 6/22/23), 368 So.3d 1160, 1168 (alterations in original) (internal

citations omitted).

13
Assignment of Error Number One: Whether the Council’s Decision Was
Within Its Legislative Discretion

In their first assignment of error, Appellants assert: “The [trial] court erred in

granting the Petition for Judicial Review, mandating the affirmative vote of a

majority of all Councilmembers to adopt an Ordinance to effectuate the conditional

use request, because the Council’s decision to not grant the conditional use

application is well within its legislative discretion.” They then frame the issues as

“whether the decision of the Councilmembers to adopt or not to adopt an ordinance

falls within their discretionary legislative authority.”

In her Application, Ms. Henderson-Chandler sought a conditional use

permit. Section 4.3A of the CZO delineates the purpose of conditional use permits

as follows:

Within each zoning district, the use of land and structures are
substantially uniform. However there are certain uses that, because of
their unique characteristics, cannot be properly classified in certain
districts without consideration, in each case, of the impact of those
uses upon neighboring land and of the public need for the particular
use at the particular location. These uses are allowed as conditional
uses within the zoning districts.

Section 4.3B of the CZO explains one of the processes by which a conditional use

application is initiated: “[a] property owner in the city . . . may file an application

for a Conditional Use for the area of land for which the Conditional Use is

requested.”

In pertinent part, Section 3-101(1) of the New Orleans Home Rule Charter

vests “[a]ll legislative powers of the City . . . in the Council.” Thus, regarding the

approval or denial of a conditional use application, Section 2.4 of the CZO

provides that the Council has the power “[t]o make final decisions on conditional

use applications (Section 4.3).” Additionally, Section 4.3C of the CZO states: “The

14
. . . Council, after receiving a recommendation from the [CPC], shall take formal

action on requests for conditional uses, in accordance with Sections 5-406 and 5-

407 of the City Charter.” (Sections 5-406 and 5-407 of the New Orleans Home

Rule Charter provide that the Council is to refer all proposed zoning ordinances to

the CPC for its recommendation.)

Section 4.3.D.4 of the CZO delineates the subsequent “Action by the . . .

Council”:

a. The . . . Council shall hold a public hearing in accordance
with its rules and take action by motion of approval, modified
approval, or denial sixty (60) days from receipt of a [CPC]
recommendation. The . . . Council may not take official action upon
any application requiring a recommendation of the [CPC] until the
report of the [CPC] has been received or, if the [CPC] has failed to act
by a vote of the majority of the [CPC] members, once the application
has been forwarded to the . . . Council without recommendation.

....

c. If the . . . Council takes action by motion of approval or
modified approval, the . . . Council may forward the motion to the
City Law Department for preparation of an ordinance. If the
ordinance is then introduced by the . . . Council, the ordinance shall
lay over for a minimum of twenty (20) days following introduction
before the . . . Council may adopt it. The . . . Council’s adoption of a
motion shall not be construed as an approval of a zoning matter unless
and until an ordinance is introduced and adopted in accordance with
the Charter; introduction of an ordinance does not indicate the . . .
Council’s approval of a zoning matter. Failure by the . . . Council to
take action on a zoning ordinance within ninety (90) days of the date
the . . . Council took action by motion shall mean the application is
denied.

Regarding ordinances, Section 3-111 of the New Orleans Home Rule Charter is

titled “Legislation by Ordinance” and provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very act of

the Council which is to become law shall be by ordinance . . . .” Then, Section 3-

112(10) of the New Orleans Home Rule Charter states that “[n]o proposed

ordinance shall be adopted except by the affirmative vote of a majority of all

15
members of the Council.” In terms of the voting, Section 3-112(9) provides that

“[v]otes at final passage shall be taken by ayes and nays and the names of the

councilmembers voting for and against each proposed ordinance or amendment.”

Likewise, Rule 23 of the “Rules and Regulations of the Council” provides that

“[n]o proposed ordinance . . . shall be adopted except by the affirmative vote of a

majority of all members of the Council at a Council meeting.”

As the foregoing demonstrate, the Council is vested with the legislative

authority to enact ordinances affecting zoning. The process by which this occurs is:

1) the CPC makes a recommendation to the Council; 2) if the Council moves for

approval, the Council forwards its motion to the City Law Department for

preparation of an ordinance; 3) the Council can then introduce the ordinance; 4) the

ordinance must lay over for a minimum of twenty (20) days following introduction

before the Council can adopt it; and 5) then, a majority of the Councilmembers

must vote in favor of the ordinance for it to be enacted. The Council is correct that

“the decision of the Councilmembers to adopt or not to adopt an ordinance falls

within their discretionary legislative authority.” As the above-cited authorities

demonstrate, neither the Council’s motion to adopt an ordinance nor introduction

of an ordinance constitutes approval of a zoning change. That only occurs once a

majority of the Council approves the ordinance. See Commodore v. City of New

Orleans, 2019-0127, pp. 14-15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/20/19), 275 So.3d 457, 469

(holding “[a] vote to adopt or deny a proposed ordinance . . . is within the . . .

Council’s discretion” and explaining that Sections 3-112(9) and (10) of the New

Orleans Home Rule Charter “demonstrate the . . . Council’s authority to accept or

deny a proposed ordinance. The [New Orleans] Home Rule Charter does not

mandate the . . . Council affirmatively vote in favor of an ordinance”); De Latour

16
v. Morrison, 213 La. 292, 297, 34 So.2d 783, 784 (1948) (stating that a reading of

zoning law makes it “apparent that the adoption of an ordinance changing or

amending the zoning law by a Yea and Nay vote constitutes final action on the part

of the . . . [C]ouncil”).

Moreover, all of this presupposes that the Council moves for approval and

preparation of an ordinance in the first place. By contrast, in the matter sub judice,

Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application did not even make it past the first step in

the process: the majority of the Councilmembers voted against the motion for

preparation of an ordinance to effectuate her requested zoning change. In sum, the

Council is correct that it had legislative discretion to accept or reject Ms.

Henderson-Chandler’s Application. Though the Council had discretion to reject

Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application, we must next consider whether the

Council’s decision was arbitrary or capricious.

Assignment of Error Number Two: Whether the Council’s Decision was
Arbitrary or Capricious

In their second assignment of error, Appellants assert “[t]he [trial] court

erred in granting [Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s] Petition for Judicial Review because

the Councilmembers’ decision not to grant the conditional use request is supported

by the administrative record and is neither arbitrary nor capricious.” This Court has

explained that “[z]oning is a legislative function,” with “[t]he authority to enact

zoning regulations flow[ing] from the police power of the various governmental

bodies.” 3000-3032 St. Claude Ave., 2022-0813, p. 13, 368 So.3d at 1171 (quoting

Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Par., 561 So.2d 482, 491

(La. 1990)). Because zoning is a legislative function and “legislative action

[constitutes] a manifestation of the will of the people,” courts are to grant “every

17
presumption of law and fact . . . in favor of [the] constitutionality” of a zoning

decision. Id. at p. 14, 368 So.3d at 1171 (quoting Four States Realty Co. v. City of

Baton Rouge, 309 So.2d 659, 666 (La. 1974)). Thus, “[c]ourts will not and cannot

substitute their judgment for that of the legislative authority” because they are

merely to serve “as a check on this legislative power . . . to ensure that there is no

abuse of the power.” Id. (quoting Palermo Land Co., 561 So.2d at 492).

Additionally, “Louisiana jurisprudence provides that a ‘presumption of

validity attaches to all zoning decisions’” with the challenger bearing the burden of

“overcom[ing] this presumption.” Id. at p. 8, 368 So.3d at 1168 (quoting Palermo

Land Co., 561 So.2d at 490). Specifically, “the challenger must show an arbitrary[,

capricious,] and unreasonable exercise of legislative authority in that ‘a real or

substantial relationship to the general welfare is lacking.’” Id. at p. 9, 368 So.3d at

1168 (quoting Palermo Land Co., 561 So.2d at 490, 493). The Council’s

“legislative action is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” if the challenger

demonstrates “that there was no room for a reasonable difference of opinion, and

that there was no substantial evidence upon which the legislative action could have

been justified.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Four States Realty Co., 309 So.2d at

665-66). This Court has defined “capriciously” as a legislative “conclusion reached

with no substantial evidence to support it or a conclusion contrary to substantial

competent evidence” and has defined “arbitrary” as the “disregard or failure to

give proper weight to the evidence.” Id. at p. 14, 368 So.3d at 1172 (quoting

Neighbors First for Bywater, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 2017-0256, p. 11 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 12/13/17), 2017 WL 6350339, at *5). Only if the challenger

demonstrated the foregoing, as well as the merits of her proposed zoning change,

should “a court [subsequently] . . . substitute its judgment in place of the legislative

18
entity’s decision in a zoning matter . . . .” Id. at p. 9, 368 So.3d at 1168-69 (first

quoting Terrytown Props., Inc. v. Jefferson Par., 416 So.2d 323, 325 (La. App. 5th

Cir. 1982); and then citing Kirk v. Town of Westlake, 373 So.2d 601, 604 (La. App.

3d Cir. 1979)). Nonetheless, if “the propriety of a zoning decision is debatable, it

will be upheld.” Id. at p. 15, 368 So.3d at 1172 (quoting Palermo Land Co., 561

So.2d at 493).

When considering a legislative zoning decision, the courts should not

invalidate a decision simply because the Council did not include an explanation for

its decision. Id. at p. 9, 368 So.3d at 1169. This is true when “the findings and

reasons therefor are necessarily implicit in the record and the administrative

determination is supported and sustainable by . . . the evidence,” such that the

Council need not “explicitly articulate that which is self-evident.” Id. at p. 10, 368

So.3d at 1169 (quoting Chaumont v. City of New Orleans, 2020-0017, p. 12 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 6/3/20), 302 So.3d 39, 50). Thus, concerning whether the legislative

body’s decision bore any relation to the health, safety, and welfare of the public,

“[i]t is sufficient that the . . . [C]ouncil could reasonably have had such

considerations in mind” even if the Council did not specify the same. Id. at p. 15,

368 So.3d at 1172 (emphasis removed) (quoting Palermo Land Co., 561 So.2d at

491). In contemplating the health, safety, and welfare of the public, “the concerns

of citizens and neighbors are an appropriate consideration” for the Council because

“the decision-making process . . . exists for their benefit” and constitutes “a

manner by which the legislative body learns the will of the people and determines

what benefits the public good.” Id. at p. 18, 368 So.3d at 1173-74 (first quoting

Palermo Land Co., 561 So.2d at 494-95; and then quoting Toups v. City of

Shreveport, 2010-1559, p. 5 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1215, 1218). The question of

19
whether the Council’s decision “bears the requisite relationship to the health,

safety[,] and welfare of the public is a factual question which must be determined

from the evidence in the record.” Id. at p. 15, 368 So.3d at 1172 (quoting Palermo

Land Co., 561 So.2d at 492).

Turning to the evidence in the record, the focus of much of the public and

even the Councilmembers’ commentary at the October 2024 Council meetings was

certainly on the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue. However, Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s contention that this was the sole basis for the Council’s decision is not

supported by the record. Multiple of the online comments read into the record

during the October 10, 2024 hearing were comments speaking generally against

Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application and without any reference to the legacy

issue. Further, as summarized previously, Ms. Franklin-Vining voiced her concerns

for the residents of 900 N. Tonti about traffic intensifying; parking space being

reduced; and for their right to peace and safety. After the close of public

comments, Councilmember-At-Large Morrell reminded his fellow

Councilmembers about Ms. Franklin-Vining’s concerns and contended the Council

should not approve Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application if it could not address

these concerns. Further, with regard to the parking issue raised by Ms. Franklin-

Vining, Appellants correctly observe in their brief that Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s

parking agreement with the church does not account for what will happen if

visitors to her museum cannot park in the church parking lot because the church

itself is holding services or hosting an event, an issue that is likely to arise. As

delineated previously, the Council can and should consider the opinions of

members of the public when deciding a zoning issue.

20
Additionally, while we recognize that Councilmember-At-Large Morrell

spoke about the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue, he emphasized that was “not the

reason” for how he planned to vote on Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application,

instead merely constituting his personal feelings about her proposed project. Three

of the other four councilmembers who voted against Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s

Application moving forward (Councilmember-At-Large Moreno and

Councilmembers Giarrusso and King) did not express any reasons on the record

for their vote. Jurisprudence is clear that the Councilmembers’ failure to articulate

their reasons does not constitute a basis for this Court to invalidate the decision.

Moreover, because these Councilmembers did not state their reasoning, this Court

certainly cannot attribute the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue as the basis for their

vote. To do so—as the trial court seemingly did—is to take a big leap analytically

that is not supported by the record. Those councilmembers could reasonably have

had such considerations as the health, safety, and welfare of the public in mind,

especially based on Ms. Franklin-Vining’s comments, for all the trial court and this

Court knows. The only councilmember whose comments would lead one to

reasonably believe he voted solely on the basis of the legacy issue was

Councilmember Thomas. Even if one were to discount Councilmember Thomas’

vote (so to speak) for that reason, the majority of the councilmembers present still

voted against moving forward with Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application

(Councilmembers-At-Large Moreno and Morrell and Councilmembers Giarrusso

and King), and this Court has no specific basis to discount their vote.

A presumption of validity attached to the Council’s decision not to move

forward with Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application, and the record contains

support that the Council could have had concerns for the public health, safety, and

21
welfare in mind. Accordingly, we conclude Ms. Henderson-Chandler failed to

demonstrate the Council’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an unreasonable

exercise of legislative authority and thus did not overcome that presumption of

validity. Ms. Henderson-Chandler did not show that there was no room for a

reasonable difference of opinion and that there was no substantial evidence upon

which the legislative action could have been justified. The fact that Ms. Franklin-

Vining expressed her concerns and Councilmember-At-Large Morrell reiterated

her concerns means there was room for a difference of opinion about the propriety

of Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s zoning request. As stated previously, when the

propriety of a zoning decision is debatable, it will be upheld. Therefore, we reverse

the trial court’s judgment insofar as it found the Council acted arbitrarily and

capriciously, abused its discretion, acted without consideration, and acted with

complete disregard of the facts and circumstances of Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s

Application; ruled the Council exceeded its authority, jurisdiction, purview, and

permitted discretion in violation of the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana

Revised Statutes, the Home Rule Charter and City Ordinances; and ordered the

Council to effectuate an ordinance granting a conditional use permit to Ms.

Henderson Chandler.

Assignment of Error Number Three: The Assessment of Costs Against the
Council

Finally, Appellants contend the trial “court erred in ordering the City

Council to pay the costs of the proceedings sua sponte.” Appellants base their

argument on La. R.S. 33:4727.

22
Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4727 is titled “Board of adjustment;

membership; powers and procedures; appeals from decisions.” It provides, in

pertinent part:

E. (1) Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by
any decision by the board of adjustment of any officer, department,
board, or bureau of the municipality, may present to the district court
of the parish or city in which the property affected is located a
petition, duly verified, setting forth that the decision is illegal, in
whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality. The petition
shall be presented to the court within thirty days after the filing of the
decision in the office of the board.

....

(5) The court may reverse or confirm, wholly or in part, or may
modify the decision brought up for review. Costs shall not be allowed
against the board unless it appears to the court that it acted with gross
negligence, in bad faith, or with malice in making the decision
appealed from.

By its plain language, La. R.S. 33:4727 applies to the Board of Zoning

Adjustment, not the Council.

Nonetheless, based on our foregoing analysis and reversal of the trial court’s

ruling that the Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding not to approve

Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s Application, we also necessarily reverse the trial

court’s assessment of costs. That is, the trial court assessed costs against the

Council on the basis that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously, but we have

determined this conclusion was not supported by the record. Thus, the trial court’s

basis for assessing costs also lacks support. Moreover, La. C.C.P. art. 2164

provides that “[t]he appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal,

and proper upon the record on appeal.” The just, legal, and proper action for this

Court to take is to reverse the trial court’s assessment of costs because the record

does not support a finding that the Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

23
Councilmember Harris’ Participation in the October 10, 2024 Meeting and
Discussion

Lastly, we address an issue Ms. Henderson-Chandler raised before the trial

court and in her brief to this Court. Specifically, Ms. Henderson-Chandler contends

Councilmember Harris’ participation in the October 10, 2024 meeting and

discussion tainted the proceeding and prejudiced her because Councilmember

Harris failed to disclose her relationship with the Haley family. (According to the

record, Councilmember Harris helped them with a legal matter a decade ago.)

Appellants counter that because Councilmember Harris was not present at the

subsequent October 24, 2024 meeting and did not vote on Ms. Henderson-

Chandler’s conditional use request, there was no violation of Council rules.

Appellants specify: “a councilmember is required to recuse themselves prior to a

vote on the subject of discussion but is not precluded from discussion or debate on

the matter.” The Council further argues that “there is no evidence that

demonstrates the consideration was not fair and impartial.”

One of the Council’s rules—Rule 12.B—is titled “Recusal,” and it states:

Every member present when a question is stated shall vote unless the
member asks to be recused because of a personal interest in the
question or otherwise as required by state law, in which case the
member shall not vote. That member is not prohibited from
participating in discussion and debate concerning the matter, provided
that disclosure of the conflict or potential conflict is made part of the
record in public prior to participation in the discussion or debate, and
prior to the vote that is the subject of discussion or debate.

(Emphasis added.) In light of the emphasized portion of the Rule, we find

Appellants’ stance is misguided. Based on our reading of the Rule, a

councilmember can participate in the discussion and debate if the councilmember

has already disclosed the conflict or potential conflict prior to same. The record

24
does not demonstrate that Councilmember Harris disclosed her potential conflict

prior to the October 10, 2024 discussion of Ms. Henderson-Chandler’s application.

Nonetheless, Councilmember Harris spoke only briefly at the October 10,

2024 meeting, and her comments focused on the Oretha Castle Haley legacy issue.

We have already outlined that, based on the record, the other councilmembers

could have had concerns for public health, safety, and welfare in mind when

making their decision, not simply the legacy issue. Further, Councilmember

Harris’ comments were analogous to those from Councilmember Thomas (who

had no conflict according to the record and spoke on the legacy issue) and to those

of Councilmember-At-Large Morrell (who also had no conflict according to the

record and spoke on the legacy issue but clarified his vote was not based on that

issue). Thus, Councilmember Harris’ comments were merely repetitive of the

legacy concerns voiced by other councilmembers who did not have a conflict. If

Councilmember Harris did not comport with Council Rule 12.B, her action did not

rise to such a level so as to render the entire Council’s decision arbitrary,

capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s August 11, 2025

judgment.

REVERSED

25