Copeland v. Brown - Debt Non-Dischargeable Ruling

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July 31, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Copeland v. Brown

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-07006

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (37.6K)

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Trial Court Document

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A y rm fe
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SIGNED THIS 31st day of July, 2025
THIS MEMORANDUM OPINION HAS BEEN ENTERED fled I (Kae
ON THE DOCKET. PLEASE SEE DOCKET FOR Paul M. Black
ENTRY DATE. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
In re: )
) Chapter 13
ERIC HOYT BROWN and )
MILDRED SADIE BROWN )
) Case No. 24-70942
Debtors. )
LEE COPELAND )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) A.P. No. 25-07006
)
ERIC BROWN and )
MILDRED BROWN )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This adversary proceeding was initiated by the Plaintiff, Lee Copeland (“the Plaintiff”),
against the Debtors, Eric Hoyt Brown and Mildred Sadie Brown (“the Debtors”). The Plaintiff
filed a complaint to determine dischargeability of debt (“Complaint”) seeking a declaration that
the debt owed to the Plaintiff by the Debtors is not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a)(4)
because the Debtors willfully and maliciously caused the Plaintiff personal injury. In response to

the Complaint, the Debtors filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Motion to Dismiss”), urging the Court to hold that allegations
of physical harm are needed for a claim to be non-dischargeable under Section 1328(a)(4). The
Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss (“Response”). The Court held a hearing on the

Motion to Dismiss and Response on July 23, 2025 and took the matter under advisement. The
parties fully briefed the issues and the matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons stated below,
the Motion to Dismiss will be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Even though this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, it appears the material
facts in this case are not in dispute. The Plaintiff was employed by the Town of Branchville,
Virginia as a zoning administrator. ECF No. 1, ¶ 4. The Plaintiff was instructed to inspect
property the Debtors recently purchased. Id. at ¶ 5. The Plaintiff went to the property to perform
inspections in his official capacity on a few different occasions. Id. at ¶¶ 5-7. When the Plaintiff
went to the property, the Debtors accused the Plaintiff of being a child predator, making child

pornography, stalking them, peeping, and trespassing, among other things. Id. at ¶¶ 7-9. The
accusations made by the Debtors were shared publicly on the social media platform Facebook. Id. at ¶ 8. The Debtors also filed police reports containing these allegations and attempted to
have the Plaintiff prosecuted. Id. at ¶ 9. The Southampton County, Virginia Sheriff’s Department
investigated the Plaintiff and found all the allegations to be unfounded. Id. The Debtors also filed
criminal charges against the Plaintiff, all of which were either dismissed by the Court or nolle
prossed. Id. The Plaintiff brought suit against the Debtors for defamation, malicious prosecution, and
unlawful dissemination of the Plaintiff’s social security number, date of birth, and home address
on the internet in Southampton County, Virginia General District Court. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. The case
was tried on May 31, 2024, and the general district court heard evidence from both the Plaintiff
and the Debtors. Id. at ¶ 14. At the conclusion of the trial, the court awarded judgment to the
Plaintiff against the Debtors in the amount of $25,000.00, together with $1,500.00 in attorney’s

fees. Id. The Plaintiff attached a Warrant in Debt to the Complaint providing that judgment was
entered against the Debtors in the above amounts, plus costs. Id. at Exhibit A.
The Debtors subsequently filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on December 12, 2024.
This adversary proceeding was initiated on March 4, 2025. In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges
that the debt owed to the Plaintiff arising out of the judgment obtained in state court should be
excepted from discharge in the bankruptcy case because the Debtors willfully and maliciously
caused personal injury to the Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 16. Section 1328(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides, in pertinent part, that “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan . . . except any debt . . . (4) for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil action
against the debtor as a result of willful or malicious injury by the debtor that caused personal

injury to an individual or the death of an individual.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a)(4). The Plaintiff
contends he suffered serious personal injuries as a result of the Debtors’ actions with permanent
ramifications, pain and suffering, emotional distress, mental anguish, and reputational
destruction amongst the community. Id. at ¶ 11.
In response, the Debtors filed the Motion to Dismiss. The Debtors argue that the Plaintiff
merely states conclusory allegations that he suffered personal injury, but that these allegations do
not establish that the Debtors caused actual personal injury as required by Section 1328(a)(4). In
support of this argument, the Debtors argue that the Court should interpret Section 1328(a)(4)
narrowly, as only applying to claims where physical harm is alleged, particularly in light of the
principle that “[w]hen considering the applicability of an exception to discharge, [courts]
construe the exception narrowly ‘to protect the purpose of providing debtors a fresh start.’”
Nunnery v. Rountree, 478 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Foley & Lardner v. Biondo, 180 F.3d 126, 130 (4th Cir. 1999). Motion to Dismiss, at p. 3. Thus, the primary issue before the

Court is what constitutes “personal injury” within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a)(4).
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and the referral
made to this Court by Order from the District Court on December 6, 1994 and Rule 3 of the
Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. This
adversary proceeding is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(I).
DISCUSSION
I. The Applicable Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), made applicable to adversary
proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b), a defendant may move to

dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When
determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court
accepts the complaint’s well pleaded allegations as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The allegations of the Complaint are more than
threadbare. They have substance.
In the Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the judgment awarded to him

against the Debtors is non-dischargeable under the Section 1328(a)(4) exception to discharge. To
successfully bring a claim on non-dischargeability of a debt under Section 1328(a)(4), the
Plaintiff must show three requirements are met: 1) restitution or damages were awarded in a civil
action, 2) against the debtors as a result of willful or malicious injury by the debtors, 3) that
caused personal injury or death to an individual. See e.g., In re Adams, 478 B.R. 476 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2012).
The Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint sufficiently demonstrate the
Plaintiff was awarded damages in a civil action against the Debtors, satisfying the first
requirement. The Court notes that the Debtors do not claim their actions were not willful or
malicious, nor do they contest any of the facts as they are laid out in the Complaint.1 They also

do not argue that they had any valid reasons for making these accusations against the Plaintiff or
that they did not intend to cause injury to the Plaintiff in making the accusations. The Court
therefore finds that the allegations in the Complaint also are sufficient to demonstrate the
Debtors’ actions were willful or malicious, satisfying the second requirement.
The only remaining issue to be resolved is whether the Plaintiff has plausibly pled facts
showing that the actions of the Debtors caused him personal injury.

1 The Warrant in Debt imposing judgment from the state court, attached as an Exhibit to the Complaint, specifically
provides the Debtors allegedly acted with malice. The Bill of Particulars referenced in the Complaint is not in the
record.
II. Section 1328(a)(4) Definition of Personal Injury
The term “personal injury” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Neither the Supreme
Court of the United States nor the Fourth Circuit have decided on how the term “personal injury”
in Section 1328(a)(4) should be interpreted. This is an issue of first impression for this Court and

the Western District of Virginia.
There are three schools of thought on how “personal injury” is defined for purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code, including Section 1328(a)(4). The first is the narrow approach, which
limits discharge exceptions to apply only to personal injuries where there was physical or bodily
harm. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 657 B.R. 836 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2024). The second is the
intermediate or hybrid approach, which allows both physical and non-physical harm to be
excepted from discharge, but excludes business or financial harms. See, e.g., In re Adams, 478
B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012); see also In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc., 281 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002). Finally, there is the broad approach, which allows business and
financial injuries to be excepted from discharge if they are defined as personal injury torts under

non-bankruptcy law. See, e.g., In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd., 198 B.R. 616 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1996).
The Debtors argue the Court should follow In re Johnson and adopt a narrow reading of
Section 1328(a)(4) that requires a showing of physical injury. In support of their position, the
Debtors cite Rountree as construing discharge exceptions narrowly, so debtors are provided with
a fresh start. The Debtors also reference Massey Energy Co. v. W. Virginia Consumers for
Justice, where the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia interpreted the
term “personal injury tort” in 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(5) to only include claims involving actual
physical injury. Massey Energy Co. v. W. Virginia Consumers for Just., 351 B.R. 348 (E.D. Va.
2006).
The Plaintiff argues in favor of the intermediate approach, citing In re Adams. At the July
23, 2025 hearing, the Plaintiff argued that Section 1328(a)(4) does not say a physical injury is

required, so the term “personal injury” should be defined as it is at common law and in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. At common law and in Virginia, personal injuries typically include
non-physical injuries caused by defamation, such as reputational damage and emotional harm.
See Massey Energy, 351 B.R. at 351: “defamation is considered a tort in this jurisdiction.” In
further support of his position, the Plaintiff argues that the policy concerns cited in Rountree are
meant to protect honest but unfortunate debtors, and the Debtors in the present case acted in a
way that caused extreme and intentional harm. The Plaintiff also cites case law from this Court
where the term “personal injury” under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(5) was construed broadly.2
III. Analysis and Application
This Court agrees with and adopts the intermediate approach. There is no language in the

Bankruptcy Code or Section 1328(a)(4) suggesting that the term “personal injury” was intended
to be limited to claims alleging physical harm. Property damage is a different issue. As stated in
In re Bailey, 555 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2016):
It is well-settled that § 1328(a)(4) excludes debts “arising from injuries to property
from the scope of the statute.” Seubert v. Deluty (In re Deluty), 540 B.R. 41, 47 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2015). By limiting the particular discharge exception to personal
injuries and death, Congress created an important distinction between a personal
injury and injuries to property. This distinction is reinforced by § 1328(a)(2), where
§ 523(a)(6) debts (for willful and malicious injury to the property of another) are
left off the list of debts excepted from discharge in a chapter 13 case. By excluding
§ 523(a)(6), Congress has allowed certain debts arising from injuries to property to
be discharged in chapter 13 cases.

2 See In re Ayers, 581 B.R. 168 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2018).
Bailey, 555 B.R. at 561. The intermediate approach reads “personal injury” to include some non-
physical injuries such as defamation, sexual harassment, age discrimination, and emotional
distress, but not business or financial injuries. Id. at 561-62 and cases cited therein. Under the
intermediate approach, the court looks to the underlying cause of action that led to the injury to

determine whether the injury was in fact personal or was simply injury to property. Adams, 478
B.R. at 487. The state court litigation supports the contention that the Debtors caused a personal
injury and not merely an injury to a property interest.
Further, the term “personal injury” should be given its plain meaning. The definition of
“personal injury” in Black’s Law Dictionary includes the following: “[a]ny invasion of a
personal right, including mental suffering and false imprisonment. — Also termed private
injury.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 12th ed. (2024). Indeed, although exemption statutes are
liberally construed in favor of the debtor, former Chief Judge Krumm of this Court ruled
consistent with that plain meaning in holding that libel falls within the scope of a personal injury
claim, even though such a claim does not require allegations of personal bodily injury to

succeed. In re Walters, 339 B.R. 607, 609 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006). Therefore, the Court holds
that Section 1328(a)(4) can include both physical and non-physical injuries suffered by an
individual, but not property damage. Moreover, in drafting Section 522(d)(11)(D) of the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress referred to “personal bodily injury” (emphasis added). See 11
U.S.C.§ 522(d)(11)(D). Thus, Congress knows how to use, and presumably would have used, the
same or similar language to limit Section 1328(a)(4) to torts involving bodily injury if it was
their intention to limit the scope of Section 1328(a)(4) to certain kinds of personal injury. See
e.g., In re Nifong, No. 08-80034C-7D, 2008 WL 2203149 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. May 27, 2008). See
also Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 1310, 212 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2022): “‘[W]hen
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act,’ this Court generally takes the choice to be deliberate.” (quoting Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 210 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2021)).
In applying this holding to the present facts, the Court finds that the Complaint, when

taken as true, pleads facts that show the Plaintiff suffered reputational damage and emotional
harm as a result of the Debtors’ willful or malicious actions. Therefore, the Plaintiff has pled
sufficient facts, more than plausible, that give rise to a claim that the debt owed to the Plaintiff
by the Debtors should not be discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a)(4).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Debtors’ Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. A
separate order will follow.