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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Frost, M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 464 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.2K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by Murray

J-A06016-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MIMI ANN FROST :
:
Appellant : No. 464 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 12, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0000323-2024

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: March 18, 2026

Mimi Ann Frost (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following her guilty pleas to one count each of unlawful restraint of a

minor by a parent (involuntary servitude), harassment (subject another to

physical contact), harassment (course of conduct), aggravated assault

(causes/attempts to cause serious bodily injury), aggravated assault (victim

less than 13), corruption of minors, recklessly endangering another person,

endangering the welfare of children, and simple assault; 29 counts of

conspiracy to commit false imprisonment of a minor by a parent; 30 counts of

false imprisonment of a minor by a parent; 43 counts of conspiracy to commit

unlawful restraint of a minor by a parent; and 44 counts of unlawful restraint
J-A06016-26

of a minor by a parent (risk of serious bodily injury); and her no contest plea

to one count of strangulation.1 After careful review, we affirm.

On February 6, 2024, law enforcement filed a criminal complaint alleging

Appellant engaged in the repeated and protracted abuse of her six-year-old

daughter (the victim). See generally Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/6/24.

The criminal complaint alleged, in part, the following: On the morning

of January 7, 2024, police responded to a residence on Sheridan Avenue in

Fayette County, Pennsylvania (the residence), after receiving a report that the

victim was unresponsive and in need of emergency medical treatment. Id. at

1. Upon arriving, police noted a strong odor of urine and feces pervaded the

residence, and various surfaces were smeared with excrement. Id. First

responders advised law enforcement that the victim appeared to be

malnourished, and that she bore numerous bruises and marks. Id. at 3.

Hospital staff eventually told police that, upon her arrival at the hospital, the

victim’s internal body temperature was 88.7 degrees Fahrenheit. Id.

Police learned that the victim resided with her biological father, Jacob

Weight (Weight);2 her 16- and 8-year-old brothers; her 5-year-old sister; her

---

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2902(c)(2), 2709(a)(1), (3), 2702(a)(1), (9), 6301(a)(1)(i),

2705, 4304(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 903, 2903(c), 2902(c)(1), 2718(a)(1).

2 It is unclear from the record whether Appellant and Weight were married.

-2-
J-A06016-26

17-year-old male cousin, D.C.; and Appellant. Id. at 2. Also in the residence

were eight dogs and two cats. Id.

Police interviewed Weight, who related that when he awoke that

morning, the interior of the residence (which did not have a working heating

system) was so cold that “he could see his breath[.]” Id. at 3. Weight

indicated that the victim was “acting funny” that morning. Id. Weight drove

Appellant to her job as a home care aid and, upon his return to the residence,

the victim’s sister advised Weight that the victim “was not acting right.” Id.

at 2-3. Weight went to check on the victim in the bathroom, whereupon the

victim collapsed, displaying symptoms of a seizure. Id. Weight called 911.

Id.

That same date, police interviewed D.C., who described Appellant’s and

Weight’s abusive treatment of the victim. Id. at 4. D.C. related that Appellant

treated the victim “particularly [] poorly.” Id. D.C. explained that Appellant

“would hit the [v]ictim with anything she could get her hands on.” Id. D.C.

stated that Appellant would confine the victim to a dog crate, naked, and

would often bind the victim’s hands and feet with zip ties. Id. According to

D.C., the victim would urinate and defecate while inside the dog crate, and

neither Appellant nor Weight ever cleaned the crate. Id. D.C. speculated that

the victim collapsed because “she was always freezing cold with no clothes

on,” and when the victim took a warm shower, it “was too much for her.” Id.

-3-
J-A06016-26

On January 12, 2024, the victim submitted to a forensic interview,

during which she related that Appellant and Weight had previously struck her

with their hands, a dog leash, and a lighter. Id. at 6-7. The victim

subsequently advised her therapist that Appellant and Weight forced the

victim to sleep in a dog crate every night, and made her eat dog food. Id. at

7-8.

The victim’s medical records detailed the numerous injuries and

ailments the victim was suffering from upon her admission to the hospital.

Id. at 8. These included abrasions, bruising, and open sores on the victim’s

entire body; cellulitis; hypothermia; rotten and broken teeth; malnutrition;

and swollen feet that, at the time of her hospital admission, rendered the

victim unable to walk. Id.

On March 25, 2024, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information

charging Appellant with twelve related offenses. The Commonwealth filed an

amended criminal information on November 27, 2024, charging Appellant with

the 156 offenses described above. The amended criminal information alleged

that Appellant engaged in the following criminal conduct against the victim:

(1) striking the victim on her face, neck, abdomen, back, buttocks, genitals,

and extremities; (2) choking the victim; (3) zip-tying the victim’s hands and

feet, and confining the victim to a dog crate; and (4) failing to arrange medical

care or education for the victim. See generally, Amended Criminal

Information, 11/27/24. The Commonwealth further alleged that Appellant

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J-A06016-26

conspired with Weight3 to restrain the victim with zip-ties, and to force the

victim to remain in a dog crate. Id.

On December 2, 2024, the matter proceeded to a guilty plea hearing.

Appellant was, and remains on appeal, represented by Attorney Gregory

Kunkel, Esquire (Attorney Kunkel), of the Fayette County Public Defender’s

Office. The trial court summarized the factual basis for Appellant’s pleas as

follows:

[T]he Commonwealth is indicating to the [c]ourt that [Appellant]
kept … [the victim] locked in a dog crate, [and] zip[-]tied [the
victim’s] hands and feet together. That would constitute the
unlawful restraint. Hit, struck the [victim] causing bruising and
open sores along the jawline, neck, chest, abdomen, back, arms,
legs. … Essentially, that’s the basis of it. Kept [the victim] in a
dog crate, zip[-]tied, injured the [victim], failed to provide care,
withheld the [victim] from school. … For several months[,] kept
[the victim] locked in a dog crate without [] food, water, and other
care[.]

N.T., 12/2/24, at 12 (paragraph breaks omitted); see also id. (the trial court

stating, as part of the factual basis for Appellant’s plea, that Appellant

conspired with Weight to commit several of the previously mentioned criminal

acts).

Attorney Kunkel clarified that Appellant was “not pleading that [her

criminal conduct] was 24/7.” Id. at 13. In response to the trial court’s

---

3 At CR-000327-2024, the Commonwealth separately charged Weight with the

same offenses as Appellant, excluding strangulation. The Commonwealth filed
notice of consolidation of Appellant’s and Weight’s cases on April 9, 2024. On
February 14, 2025, after Weight pled guilty to all counts, a different trial court
judge sentenced him to an aggregate term of 118 to 290 months in prison.

-5-
J-A06016-26

questioning, Appellant testified that she confined the victim to a dog crate

approximately two to three times a week, for a day at a time. Id. Appellant

acknowledged that, at times, she would zip-tie the victim’s hands and feet,

because the victim “was breaking out while I was at work.” Id. Appellant

further agreed that there were times when she would not regularly provide

the victim with food, and that Appellant did not arrange for medical care or

education for the victim. Id. at 14. Appellant indicated she could not recall

choking the victim, but did not “contest[] that the Commonwealth has

evidence of [the victim] being choked.” Id. at 15.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant entered her pleas as

described above. The trial court deferred sentencing, and ordered a

presentence investigation (PSI) report.

The matter proceeded to sentencing on December 10, 2024. The

victim’s foster mother offered the following victim impact testimony (without

objection) concerning the lasting impact of Appellant’s crimes on the victim:

[The victim] is not here because she has already suffered enough
mental and physical abuse at the hands of [Appellant]. Not
another second of [the victim’s] precious … life will ever again be
spent experiencing the living hell that [the victim] was put
through. This [abuse occurred] … on a daily basis. … It never
ended. The [victim] speaks of this. [The victim’s siblings and
D.C.] all speak to this.

… [Appellant] used a six[-]year[-]old little girl as an
example to the rest of the children in [her] home of what could
happen to them if they did not listen to [her] …. [Appellant] kept
[the victim] in a dog cage in the middle of the living room[,]
naked[,] laying in her own urine and feces. That was [the victim’s]
living quarters.

-6-
J-A06016-26

[The victim] was often hog[]tied with zip[-]ties around her
wrists and ankles to the point [that] she was found with open
wounds that not only covered those areas, but also covered her
buttocks and upper thighs[. The victim] still has scars to these
areas today, as she will [for] the rest of her life. [The victim’s]
legs, specifically, are covered in scars. We have come to find out
[the victim’s scars] are from the level of physical abuse that no
human or even animal ever deserves to endure. And yet, [the
victim] did daily endure the torture. The beatings with broom
handles, shots by a BB gun for pure enjoyment. The other
children were instructed to partake in the abuse. The level of
mental abuse that occurred in this hell house is shocking and
disturbing to hear and we, sitting in this room, are adults. We are
just hearing it. These children lived it.

….

… The therapeutic professionals described the level of
bruising as “something out of a horror movie.” The physical
damage to this little girl required sedation and pediatric
reconstructive dental surgery in attempts to save what baby teeth
were savable. [The victim] describe[d] being fed dog food and
state[d] it was hard, and it hurt [her] teeth. … [Unlike the victim,
Appellant] will have a flush toilet and not be forced to lay in [her]
own feces or forced to drink [her] own urine, as was often the
punishment for [the victim]. [Appellant] won’t have ice cold water
dumped on [her] head for pure enjoyment, while hog[]tied with
open wounds. [Appellant’s] body won’t be medically declared
hypothermic at eighty-eight degrees, while unresponsive. ….

N.T., 12/10/24, at 3-6 (punctuation modified; some paragraph breaks

omitted).

Next, Appellant presented her sentencing argument. Attorney Kunkel

explained that Appellant “regrets the treatment of the children, in particular

[the victim].” Id. at 7. Attorney Kunkel indicated that, while “there’s no

question the [victim] suffered physical problems[,] none of them are of a

lasting nature….” Id.; see also id. (Attorney Kunkel acknowledging that, “at

-7-
J-A06016-26

the hospital, [the victim] had flea bites on her body …. Cellulitis. [The victim]

was hospitalized for less than a week and discharged.”). Attorney Kunkel

conceded that the victim had suffered from hypothermia, but pointed out that

Appellant had left the residence several hours before emergency services

arrived on the date of the victim’s seizure. Id.; see also id. (Attorney Kunkel

arguing that Weight “was at the [residence] with the children that day[,] and

was there when the [victim] became hypothermic.”); id. at 9 (exercising her

right to allocution, Appellant stating, “I’m sorry I put drugs and money before

[the victim].”).

Pertinently, the Commonwealth offered the following in support of its

argument for a lengthy prison sentence:

I disagree that [the victim] is not going to suffer adverse effects,
that [the victim] hasn’t suffered lasting injury. [The victim] was
discharged from the hospital after a week. I can tell you that I’ve
seen [the victim,] in April[ of 2024], and she still wasn’t walking
right, and I can tell you that I saw her yesterday and she’s
beautiful, she’s happy, she’s healthy. It’s wonderful.

But the lasting effects of having a six-year-old consume her
own urine and feces and live in a cage to be hogtied with her
hands behind her back, with her feet bound to her hands. ….
[W]e’re lucky, we are fortunate that this was not a homicide.
Because it was close. Eighty-eight-degree body temperature,
when [the victim] was at the hospital covered in sores, blood
infection. What a doctor was going to come testify [to] at trial
was nothing short of torture. Torture. Not mistakes. Not, not
being able to ask for help. Torture.

And the Commonwealth’s position is that this [c]ourt should
give a sentence commensurate with[ Appellant’s conduct]; this
[c]ourt should give a sentence that would put [Appellant] in prison
for the rest of her natural life. ….

-8-
J-A06016-26

Id. at 9-10 (punctuation modified; some paragraph breaks omitted).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court purported to sentence

Appellant to an aggregate 35 to 70 years in prison.4, 5 On December 12, 2024,

the trial court amended its sentencing order to include a consecutive 12

months’ probation. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion,

challenging, inter alia, the discretionary aspects of her sentence. On March

14, 2025, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion, in part, and corrected its

sentencing order to reflect that it imposed an aggregate sentence of 30 to 60

years in prison, followed by 12 months’ probation. Appellant timely filed a

notice of appeal.6 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

---

4 The trial court announced at the sentencing hearing that it was consecutively

imposing the following prison terms: (1) five to ten years for unlawful restraint
of a minor by a parent (involuntary servitude); (2) ten to twenty years for
aggravated assault (causes/attempts to cause serious bodily injury); (3) ten
to twenty years for aggravated assault (victim less than 13); (4) five to ten
years for strangulation; and (5) no further penalty for the remaining charges.
Thus, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 30 to 60 years in prison.

5 The sentencing court noted that the seventh edition of the sentencing
guidelines applied to Appellant’s offenses committed in 2023, and the eighth
edition applied to the offenses committed in 2024. N.T., 12/10/24, at 11.
Appellant and the Commonwealth agreed with the trial court’s recitation of
the applicable guideline ranges. Id. at 12. The trial court acknowledged that
the sentences it imposed constituted upward departures from the sentencing
guidelines. Id. at 14.

6 Appellant purported to appeal from the original, December 10, 2024,
sentencing order. Notice of Appeal, 4/14/25. However, where a trial court
amends a judgment of sentence during the period it maintains jurisdiction
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-9-
J-A06016-26

Appellant raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court’s sentence was unduly harsh where
   the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty (30) to sixty (60)
   years[’] incarceration[,] where the [trial court’s] sentence was not
   only outside of [the] Sentencing Guidelines[,] but the maximum
   sentences permitted by law?

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused
   

   its discretion in imposing a sentence of thirty (30) years to not
   more than sixty (60) years[’] incarceration[,] where the trial court
   failed to consider and apply all of the sentencing factors under 42
   Pa.[]C.S.[A.] § 9721(b), failed to thoroughly examine Appellant’s
   background and character, and considered evidence of conduct for
   which [] Appellant was never charged?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.7

---

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (permitting a court to modify any order within
30 days after its entry), the direct appeal lies from the amended judgment of
sentence. We further note that the trial court’s March 14, 2025, order,
correcting a patent and obvious clerical error in the original sentencing order,
did not constitute a resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d
466, 471 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[A] trial court has the inherent, common-law
authority to correct ‘clear clerical errors’ in its orders. A trial court maintains
this authority even after the expiration of the 30[-]day time limitation set forth
in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 for the modification of orders.” (citations and footnote
omitted)); see also Commonwealth v. Harris, 248 A.3d 498, 20 WDA 2020
(Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 6-7) (concluding the trial
court, in correcting a clear clerical error, “did not resentence [the a]ppellant”);
Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that we may consider nonprecedential decisions
of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value). Accordingly,
our docket reflects that this appeal lies from the December 12, 2024, amended
judgment of sentence.

7 Appellant abandons on appeal her claim that her sentence violated the
double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
See Concise Statement, 5/5/25, at 1-3. We additionally note that, despite
claiming in her statement of questions involved that her sentence exceeded
“the maximum sentences permitted by law[,]” Appellant’s Brief at 4, each of
Appellant’s sentences were within the statutory limits. Further, Appellant does
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 10 - J-A06016-26

We consider Appellant’s claims together, as they both challenge the

discretionary aspects of her sentence. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 863

A.2d 1172, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2004) (excessiveness claims implicate the

discretionary aspects of sentencing); see also Commonwealth v. Davis,

341 A.3d 808, 812 (Pa. Super. 2025) (observing “that a claim [that] a

sentencing court relied on impermissible factors in imposing a sentence

presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” (citation

omitted)). “It is well settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing, there is no automatic right to appeal.” Commonwealth v.

Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). An

appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of her sentence must first

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code.

---

not challenge, in the argument section of her appellate brief, the legality of
her sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-19 (Appellant arguing the trial court
abused its sentencing discretion), 17-18 (Appellant accurately noting that “[a]
sentence within the statutory limit constitutes an abuse of discretion where
the sentence is so manifestly excessive as to constitute to[o] severe a
punishment.” (citation omitted)).

• 11 - J-A06016-26

Commonwealth v. Glawinski, 310 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(citation omitted).

Here, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, preserved the issues in

her timely post-sentence motion, and included the requisite Rule 2119(f)

statement of reasons for allowance of appeal in her brief. See Appellant’s

Brief at 10-12.

We next consider whether Appellant presents a substantial question. It

is well established that a “substantial question exists only when the appellant

advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were

either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or

(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Commonwealth v. McLendon, 293 A.3d 658, 670 (Pa. Super.

2023) (quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a substantial

question exists, we do not

examine the merits of whether the sentence is actually excessive.
Rather, we look to whether the appellant has forwarded a
plausible argument that the sentence, when it is within the
guideline ranges, is clearly unreasonable. Concomitantly, the
substantial question determination does not require the court to
decide the merits of whether the sentence is clearly unreasonable.

Glawinski, 310 A.3d at 325 (citation omitted).

In her Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant contends that the trial court

“failed to carefully consider all relevant sentencing factors required by 42

Pa.[]C.S.[A.] § 9721(b).” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant further argues

that, in imposing sentence, the trial court “impermissibly based its punitive

• 12 - J-A06016-26

sentence on the Commonwealth’s inflammatory arguments at sentencing[,]

and alleged factors and conduct that were never alleged in the criminal

charges that were filed against [Appellant].” Id. at 12. We conclude Appellant

raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

992 (Pa. Super. 2016) (observing that “[a]n averment that the trial court

failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria… as [Section] 9721(b) requires,

presents a substantial question for our review in typical cases.” (citation,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted)); Commonwealth v. Smithton, 631

A.2d 1053, 1055 (Pa. Super. 1993) (concluding the appellant raised a

substantial question where he asserted the trial court relied on an

impermissible sentencing factor, i.e., victim impact testimony from alleged

victims for crimes of which the appellant was acquitted).

In asserting the trial court’s sentence, which departed from the

sentencing guidelines,8 was unduly harsh and excessive, Appellant argues that

---

8 Appellant and the Commonwealth agreed that the relevant, applicable
standard-range minimum sentences, under the eighth edition of the
sentencing guidelines, were as follows:

• Unlawful restraint of a minor by a parent (involuntary servitude) –
20 to 26 months in prison;
• Aggravated assault (causes/attempts to cause serious bodily injury)
– 72 to 84 months in prison;
• Aggravated assault (victim less than 13) – 84 to 96 months in prison;
• Strangulation – 24 to 30 months in prison.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 13 - J-A06016-26

“the trial court focused entirely on punishing [Appellant] without adequately

considering her remorsefulness or her need for rehabilitation[.]” Appellant’s

Brief at 18. Appellant insists that “the trial court failed to consider

[Appellant’s] genuine remorsefulness[,] and appears to have been swayed by

the Commonwealth’s unsubstantiated claims regarding the extent of [the

victim’s] injuries ….” Id. Appellant concludes that “there is no logical way to

reconcile the extreme sentence imposed on [Appellant] when compared to the

significantly lesser sentence that a different trial judge imposed on … Weight

for the same conduct.” Id. at 19.9

---

See N.T., 12/10/24, at 10-12. The trial court’s sentences exceeded the
aggravated-range guideline recommendations. See 204 Pa. Code § 303a.14
(Sentencing matrix).
9 We observe that because Weight was not sentenced until February 14, 2025,

Appellant could not preserve this alleged sentencing disparity argument in her
December 20, 2024, post-sentence motion. This claim is nevertheless waived
based on Appellant’s failure to support her argument with pertinent legal
authority. See Appellant’s Brief at 19 (without citation to legal authority,
Appellant arguing that, “[w]hile [Appellant] acknowledges that the sentences
imposed on co-defendant[]s need not be the same, the extreme difference in
the sentencing underscores that [Appellant’s] sentence is unduly harsh and
excessive ….”); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 212 A.3d 1114, 1131
(Pa. Super. 2019) (“This Court will not become counsel for an appellant and
develop arguments on an appellant’s behalf[.]” (citation omitted)); Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (requiring argument to be “followed by such discussion and citation
of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”).

Even if preserved, this claim would merit no relief. See Commonwealth v.
Szcesniewski, 591 A.2d 1055, 1057 (Pa. Super. 1991) (concluding a trial
court “was not required to explain the alleged disparity in sentencing[,]” where
a different judge imposed sentence on a co-defendant (citation omitted)).

• 14 - J-A06016-26

Concerning her claim that the trial court relied on impermissible

sentencing factors, Appellant argues the Commonwealth referred to several

facts that were “not in the [amended c]riminal [i]nformation filed against

[Appellant].” Id. at 13. Specifically, Appellant takes issue with the following

statements made by the Commonwealth at sentencing: (1) Appellant forced

the victim to consume her own urine and feces, as well as dog food; (2) “we

are fortunate that this was not a homicide[,]” noting the victim’s 88-degree

body temperature and blood infection; and (3) “I s[aw the victim] in April and

she still wasn’t walking right.” Id. at 13-14.

Appellant emphasizes that, on the date the victim was hospitalized, she

“left the residence at approximately 7:00 a.m. …, and was at work providing

the only means of financial support for the family when the ambulance arrived

approximately four hours later ….” Id. at 14. Appellant argues that she

was not charged in this case with attempted homicide[,] nor was
she charged with causing [the victim] to experience hypothermia.
Similarly, [Appellant] was not charged with, and did not plead
guilty to, forcing [the victim] to eat dog food as stated by the
Commonwealth [at sentencing]. N.T., 12/10/24, at 10. Nor was
[Appellant] charged with[,] and did not plead guilty to[,] forcing
[the victim] to eat her own feces or drink her urine as the
Commonwealth claims. As [a] result, these alleged factors should
have no bearing whatsoever on [Appellant’s] sentencing.

Id. at 14-15 (citation modified).

Appellant concludes that “the trial court failed to consider [Appellant’s]

genuine remorsefulness[,] and appears to have been swayed by the

• 15 - J-A06016-26

Commonwealth’s unsubstantiated claims regarding the extent of [the victim’s]

injuries that were attributable to [Appellant’s] conduct.” Id. at 18-19.

“The standard employed when reviewing the discretionary aspects of

sentencing is very narrow.” Commonwealth v. King, 182 A.3d 449, 454

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court

has stated that the proper standard of review when considering
whether to affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse
of discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised
was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court [] offered: An
abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate
court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a
result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,
or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper
penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
individual circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing
court sentences flesh-and-blood defendants[,] and the nuances of
sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court
enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to
its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should
not be lightly disturbed. Even with the advent of the sentencing
guidelines, the power of sentencing is a function to be performed
by the sentencing court.

Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64 A.3d 690, 701-02 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(brackets omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961-

62 (Pa. 2007)); see also Commonwealth v. Rominger, 199 A.3d 964, 970

(Pa. Super. 2018) (“The trial court has discretion within legal limits when

• 16 - J-A06016-26

sentencing a defendant, and absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not

disturb its sentence.”).

We have explained that

[t]he sentencing court may, in an appropriate case, deviate from
the guidelines by fashioning a sentence which takes into account
the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant, and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates to
the impact on the life of the victim and the community. In doing
so, the sentencing judge must state of record the factual basis
and specific reasons which compelled him or her to deviate from
the guideline ranges. When evaluating a claim of this type, it is
necessary to remember that the sentencing guidelines are
advisory only.

Commonwealth v. McLaine, 150 A.3d 70, 76-77 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

“When reviewing a sentence outside of the guidelines, the essential

question is whether the sentence imposed was reasonable.” Commonwealth

v. Durazo, 210 A.3d 316, 321 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “A

sentence may be found unreasonable if it fails to properly account for the four

statutory factors of [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 9781(d).”10 Commonwealth v.

Pisarchuk, 306 A.3d 872, 881 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

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10 Section 9781(d) directs appellate courts reviewing sentencing
determinations to “have regard for:”

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Moreover,

[i]n deciding whether a trial judge considered only permissible
factors in sentencing a defendant, an appellate court must, of
necessity, review all of the judge’s comments. [I]n making this
determination it is not necessary that an appellate court be
convinced that the trial judge[,] in fact[,] relied upon an erroneous
consideration; it is sufficient to render a sentence invalid if it
reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in
whole or in part upon such a factor.

Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations

omitted).

Sentencing Code Section 9721(b) directs trial courts to adhere to the

general principle that the sentence imposed should call for total confinement

consistent with “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “The weighing

of factors under [Section] 9721(b) is exclusively for the sentencing court, and

an appellate court may not substitute its own weight of those factors.”

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 593 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 876 (Pa. Super. 2012)). Further,

“[i]n imposing a sentence, the trial judge may determine whether, given the

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(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).

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facts of a particular case, a sentence should run consecutive to or concurrent

with another sentence being imposed.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d

599, 603 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).

Instantly, at Appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court detailed its

rationale for imposing sentence as follows:

We’ve considered the nature of the offense. We’ve considered the
extent and the duration of the crime[s]. We’ve considered the
number of offenses. We’ve considered the [PSI report],
[Appellant’s] prior record, the gravity of these offenses, the
impact on the victim, the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant,] as
well as the sentencing guidelines. We feel any lesser sentence
would depreciate from the seriousness of th[ese] crime[s].

We’ve also considered the significance of the young age of
the victim[,] and that the victim is the child of [Appellant,] in
departing from the guidelines and sentencing above the
guidelines. We’ve considered all of these factors, and we have
placed substantial weight on the fact that [Appellant was] in a
parental position of trust[. Y]ou owed a duty of care to your
child[,] and you violated that duty in a particularly cruel manner.

N.T., 12/10/24, at 14.

In its opinion, citing the above on-the-record justification for its

sentencing, the trial court explained that

it is evident that we considered the sentencing guidelines, the
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense[s] in relation to
[their] impact on the victim and the community; the rehabilitative
needs of [Appellant]; [Appellant’s] lack of remorse; the nature
and circumstances of the crime[s]; [and] the history, character,
and condition of [Appellant] and her parental relationship to [the]
victim. We have complied with 42 Pa.C.S.A. §[ ]9721(b) …, there
has been no abuse of our broad sentencing discretion, and we
respectfully submit that the appeal is without merit and our
sentence should not be disturbed.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/25, at 1 (punctuation modified; citation omitted).

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We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in imposing a sentence

outside of the sentencing guidelines. Harvard, 64 A.3d at 701-02;

Pisarchuk, 306 A.3d at 881. The trial court demonstrated its awareness of

the applicable sentencing guidelines, indicated its sentence was informed by

the PSI report,11 and explained that it had considered the sentencing factors

set forth in Section 9721(b). Having considered the nature and circumstances

of the offenses, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, the trial court specifically

noted that it was departing from the sentencing guidelines based on (1) the

victim’s age; and (2) the fact that Appellant betrayed and abused her position

of parental trust in “a particularly cruel manner.” N.T., 12/10/24, at 14.

Further, having reviewed all of the trial court’s comments, we can

identify no improper or erroneous consideration in its imposition of Appellant’s

sentence. Roden, 730 A.2d at 997. Appellant asks that we infer that the trial

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11 A trial court imposing a sentence outside of the guidelines is not presumed

to have considered all relevant information concerning a defendant’s character
by virtue of its review of a PSI report. See Commonwealth v. Dutter, 617
A.2d 330, 332 (Pa. Super. 1992). Nevertheless, here, the trial court’s stated
review of the PSI report, in conjunction with its on-the-record explanation of
its sentencing considerations, demonstrates the trial court’s conscientiousness
in imposing sentence. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 197 A.3d 742, 763 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (“[T]he essential inquiry is whether the sentencing court was
apprised of comprehensive information to make the punishment fit not only
the crime but also the person who committed it.” (citation and ellipsis
omitted)); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d)(2) (requiring appellate courts to
“have regard for” the trial court’s review of “any presentence investigation.”).

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court was swayed by allegedly improper arguments from the prosecutor,12 but

she cites no record support for this inference. See Appellant’s Brief at 18

(arguing the trial court “appears to have been swayed by the

Commonwealth’s unsubstantiated claims regarding the extent of [the victim’s]

injuries ….” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the record belies Appellant’s claim,

as the trial court’s rationale set forth its consideration of only appropriate

sentencing factors. See Smithton, 631 A.2d at 1057 (observing that “[a]

court is ordinarily presumed to be capable of identifying and properly

disregarding all but the most prejudicial and inflammatory evidence”

(quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Accordingly, we discern no basis for concluding the trial court’s sentence

was manifestly harsh or unreasonable, or premised on impermissible

sentencing considerations. Appellant is entitled to no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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12 We note that prosecutors are permitted to “make fair comment on the
admitted evidence ….” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 249 A.3d 1046, 1067
(Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). Instantly, the prosecutor’s comments largely
reiterated the victim’s foster mother’s testimony (quoted at length above), to
which Appellant did not contemporaneously object or challenge in her post-
sentence motion.

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DATE: 3/18/2026

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