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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Brooks, C.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 459 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.4K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Murray

J-S02019-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CURTIS T. BROOKS III : No. 459 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 9, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0005968-2017

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2026

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order granting the

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) 1 petition filed by the defendant, Curtis T.

Brooks, III (Brooks), vacating Brooks’s judgment of sentence, and

resentencing Brooks. After careful review, we vacate the PCRA court’s order

and reinstate Brooks’s judgment of sentence entered as part of his May 6,

2019, plea agreement.

The PCRA court described the relevant history underlying this appeal as

follows:

On August 5, 2017, [Brooks] went to the apartment of his former
girlfriend, Erica Bailey [(Ms. Bailey)], who lived in Darby Borough,
Delaware County, Pennsylvania. A fight broke out between
[Brooks] and Ms. Bailey’s new boyfriend, Mario Garrett [(Mr.

---

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S02019-26

Garrett)]. As a result of the fight, [Brooks] stabbed and ultimately
killed Mr. Garrett….

Relevant to these proceedings, on August 7, 2018, a status
hearing was scheduled by the trial court. At this hearing, stand-
in counsel appeared on behalf of [Brooks’s] counsel of record[,
Tracie Burns, Esquire (Attorney Burns or plea counsel)]. Also on
August 7, 2018, the guilty plea offer from the
Commonwealth to murder of the third degree, in exchange
for a sentence of 9-18 years[’ imprisonment,] expired, and
[Brooks] rejected the offer. Subsequently on May 6, 2019,
[Brooks], under a new negotiated offer, pleaded guilty to murder
of the third degree and was sentenced … to confinement for a
minimum term of 20 years to a maximum term of 40 years to be
served in a State Correctional Institution. [See] May 6, 2019,
Notes of Testimony []. On July 7, 2019, [Brooks] filed a pro se
Notice of Appeal; on November [15], 2019, the Superior Court
quashed as untimely [Brooks’s] appeal.2 [Commonwealth v.
Brooks, 2151 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 15, 2019) (order).]

On May 6, 2020, [Brooks timely] filed a Petition for [PCRA] relief. 3
On June 3, 2020, [Brooks] filed an amended petition. … On
September 29, 2023, November 2, 2023, and November 3, 2023,
a PCRA hearing was held. …. On December 16, 2024, [the PCRA]
court entered an order [granting Brooks’s petition,] and on
January 9, 2025, having discovered a clerical error, [the] court
entered an order making clear the [PCRA] court’s intention was to
vacate [the] judgment of sentence for [Brooks’s] case involving
murder and related charges, and to dismiss [Brooks’s] claims
concerning the burglary case.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/22/25, at 1-3 (punctuation modified; emphasis added;

footnote in original omitted; two footnotes added).

---

2 Brooks’s pro se notice of appeal, mailed from prison, was hand-dated July

8, 2019, and docketed on July 18, 2019.

3 Brooks filed his PCRA petition at two docket numbers:
CP-23-CR-5968-2017
(the instant murder case) and CP-23-CR5969-2017 (a burglary case). This
appeal only involves the murder case.

-2-
J-S02019-26

The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal. The Commonwealth

and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The Commonwealth presents the following issues:

1. Did the [PCRA] court err in concluding that plea counsel was
   ineffective for failing to adequately prepare stand-in counsel to
   represent [Brooks] at a status hearing, where counsel knew
   the Commonwealth’s plea offer would expire, and are the
   court’s factual findings [not] supported by the record?

2. Did the [PCRA] court err in concluding—for the first time in its
   memorandum opinion—that [Brooks] proved, by a
   preponderance of the evidence, that his guilty plea was not
   knowing, voluntary, or intelligent, and that relief for an
   involuntary plea could be granted through the PCRA without a
   finding of ineffective assistance?

3. Where the [PCRA] court found that plea counsel was ineffective
   during plea negotiations, did the [PCRA] court err by vacating
   [Brooks’s] sentence, but not his conviction, without first
   ordering the Commonwealth to reoffer the plea that was
   rejected on August 7, 2018, as required under Lafler v.
   Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012)?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered).

Our standard of review of an order granting “relief under the PCRA calls

upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted). “[W]e defer to the factual findings of the post-conviction

court, which is tasked with hearing the evidence and assessing

credibility.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979 (Pa. 2023).

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J-S02019-26

Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s legal conclusions, however, is de

novo. Id.

Instantly, the PCRA court granted relief on Brooks’s claim of ineffective

assistance of Attorney Burns. When reviewing a claim of ineffective counsel,

“[c]ounsel is presumed effective, and [the PCRA petitioner] bears the burden

of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa.

2014). To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA petitioner must

establish that

(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3)
[appellant] suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error such
that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different absent such error.

Id. (citations omitted). Failure to prove any prong of the test will defeat an

ineffectiveness claim, and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to

raise a meritless claim. Id.

“[C]laims of counsel’s ineffectiveness in connection with a guilty plea

will provide a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness

caused an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Yager, 685

A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc). The “voluntariness of [the]

plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820

A.2d 728, 733 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “The law does not require

that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of

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J-S02019-26

guilty[.]” Commonwealth v. Diaz, 913 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citation omitted). “All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to plead

guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.” Yager, 685 A.2d at

1004 (citation omitted) (alteration in Yager).

In the context of a plea offer rejected by a defendant, to show the

requisite prejudice, the defendant “must show the outcome of the plea process

would have been different with competent advice.” Commonwealth v.

Rizor, 304 A.3d 1034, 1054 (Pa. 2023) (citing Lafler, 566 U.S. at 1054).

Where ineffective advice led to the rejection of a plea offer,

a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice
of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea
offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the
defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution
would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances),
that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms
would have been less severe than under the judgment and
sentence that in fact were imposed.

Id. (quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added)). With this in mind,

we consider the Commonwealth’s issues.

The Commonwealth first argues that the PCRA court’s determination

that Attorney Burns rendered ineffective assistance at the August 7, 2018,

status hearing, by relying on stand-in counsel, is unsupported by the record

and legally erroneous. Commonwealth’s Brief at 19. The Commonwealth

asserts that

(1) [Brooks] consistently communicated to plea counsel[,
Attorney Burns,] his desire to proceed to trial prior to August 7,

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J-S02019-26

2018; (2) [Attorney Burns] took reasonable steps to ensure that
[Brooks] made a fully informed decision regarding whether to
accept or reject the Commonwealth’s plea offer prior to its
expiration; (3) [Attorney Burns] met with [Brooks] the weekend
prior to August 7, 2018, to confirm his rejection of the offer[,]
because [Attorney Burns] was unable to personally appear in
court on that date; and (4) [Attorney Burns] communicated
[Brooks’s] rejection of the offer to the prosecutor in advance of
the court appearance….

Id.

The Commonwealth disputes the PCRA court’s “very specific finding of

[plea] counsel’s ineffectiveness for not appearing in court” on August 7, 2018.

Id. at 22 (quoting PCRA Court Opinion, 3/22/25, at 8). The Commonwealth

further disputes the PCRA court’s finding that Brooks would have accepted the

initial plea absent the alleged ineffectiveness; the Commonwealth would not

have withdrawn the plea due to intervening circumstances; the trial court

would have accepted its terms; and Brooks’s sentence would have been less

severe. Id.

In support, the Commonwealth points to record evidence that Attorney

Burns communicated the offer to Brooks; Brooks rejected the offer; and

Attorney Burns communicated Brooks’s rejection of the offer to the

Commonwealth prior to the August 7, 2018, status hearing. Id. The

Commonwealth directs our attention to Attorney Burns’s testimony, at the

PCRA hearing, that Brooks consistently stated, both before and after the plea

offer, that he wanted to go to trial. Id. at 23 (citing N.T., 11/2/23, at 52).

Further, when Attorney Burns visited Brooks in jail the weekend prior to the

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J-S02019-26

August 7, 2018, status hearing, Brooks confirmed he wanted to reject the plea

offer. Id. The Commonwealth argues,

[b]ecause [Brooks’s] decision regarding the offer had already
been conveyed to the prosecutor prior to stand-in counsel’s
appearance, there was nothing for [stand-in counsel] to negotiate
or advise [Brooks] on regarding the offer. Stand-in counsel
appeared for the sole purpose of obtaining a trial date, not to
revisit or influence a plea decision that had already been made.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 4/22/25, at 9. Thus, the
underlying premise of the [PCRA] court’s finding of
ineffectiveness—that [Attorney Burns’s] failure resulted in a lost
plea opportunity—is unsupported by the record….

Id. at 24-25. The Commonwealth emphasizes the lack of any evidence

showing that Attorney Burns failed to communicate the plea offer to Brooks.

Id. at 25. The Commonwealth further asserts that stand-in counsel likewise

“took reasonable, prudent steps to ensure that [Brooks] understood the

situation.” Id.

The Commonwealth further argues that Brooks established no prejudice

resulting from the alleged ineffectiveness. Id. at 26. According to the

Commonwealth,

[t]he [PCRA] court’s opinion assumes, without any citation to the
record, that had [Attorney Burns] appeared with [Brooks] instead
of stand-in counsel on the day the offer was set to expire, [Brooks]
would have changed his mind and accepted [the offer]. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 4/22/25, at 10. However, there is no
evidence in the record that [Brooks] wanted to accept the offer on
that day, and [Attorney Burns] was not constitutionally required
to appear in court and pressure [Brooks] to accept an offer he
clearly did not want at the time. The record refutes any claim of
prejudice ….

-7-
J-S02019-26

Id. at 27. The Commonwealth directs our attention to Brooks’s testimony, at

the PCRA hearing, that when the offer of 9 to 20 years was tendered, he did

not want to accept the offer. Id. (citing N.T., 9/29/23, at 95). The

Commonwealth acknowledges that, after rejecting the August 7, 2018, plea

offer, Brooks informed Attorney Burns that he was willing to accept a plea,

but did not indicate what plea he would accept. Id. at 28. The Commonwealth

contends this testimony falls short of establishing the prejudice required to

sustain Brooks’s ineffectiveness claim. Id.

In its opinion, the PCRA court opined that

[Brooks] proved by a preponderance of the evidence … [that
Attorney Burns] was ineffective for inadequately preparing stand-
in counsel for the August 7, 2018, status hearing knowing a crucial
event for the case — expiration of a guilty plea offer — would take
place, and established by a preponderance of the evidence the
error so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place….

….

Based on the record, [the PCRA] court determined on August 7,
2018, a perfect storm was created resulting in the very specific
finding of [Attorney Burns’s] ineffectiveness for not appearing in
court when she was fully aware the offer was set to expire, and
for sending stand-in counsel, who was ultimately ill-equipped and
without adequate information concerning the offer and its looming
expiration. The record shows: on August 7, 2018, [Attorney
Burns] did not appear in court, but “stand-in” counsel appeared
on behalf of [Attorney Burns] for the sole purpose of obtaining a
trial date in the case; and “stand-in” counsel, caught unawares,
but upon learning of the information concerning the guilty plea
offer and its imminent expiration, stated on the record: “Your
Honor, as I’m standing in, and this … was not made obvious to me
[prior to] walking in here, if I could have a moment to step back
and talk to [Brooks] to make sure [the plea offer has] been
conveyed to him so this isn’t a blindside” and “I just wanted to

-8-
J-S02019-26

make clear I had not met [] Brooks prior to this morning. He did
indicate to me [that Attorney Burns] and himself had the
opportunity to speak this past weekend. He was aware of
the offer coming in to today. So, I just wanted to confirm that
with him before we move forward.” As a result of the information
in the record from August 7, 2018, [the PCRA] court concluded
[Attorney Burns] was ineffective for sending stand-in counsel to
get a trial date and for not making stand-in counsel aware of the
particular posture of the case and its expiring offer. … [The PCRA]
court concluded under the history of this case, [Attorney
Burns] was ineffective when she did not properly advise
and prepare stand-in counsel for the status hearing and it
is evident from the record there was an imminent deadline
concerning the offer. Additionally, and of importance to note,
[Attorney Burns’s] ineffectiveness in this case led, not to
the offer’s acceptance, but to its rejection. Having to
endure a sentence more than two times the offer (20-40
years [versus] 9-18 years), absolutely prejudiced [Brooks].

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/22/25, at 8-10 (citations omitted; punctuation

modified; emphasis added).

Thus, the PCRA court found Attorney Burns rendered ineffective

assistance, regarding the Commonwealth’s plea offer, by not appearing for

the August 7, 2018, status hearing, and by not preparing and advising stand-

in counsel regarding the expiring plea offer. See generally id. Our review

of the record, however, discloses no support for the PCRA court’s

determination.

Our review discloses that on March 8, 2018, the Commonwealth and

Brooks, represented by Attorney Burns, appeared before the trial court for a

status hearing. N.T., 3/8/18, at 3. At that time, Attorney Burns explained

that

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J-S02019-26

this is a status listing. We’re going to ask the [c]ourt to give us
another status listing …. I think about two weeks, and then we
should have an answer [regarding a potential plea deal]. We’ve
got some negotiations that are in place. … [W]e’re not at an
impasse and … I think that there is going to be a resolution to this
matter, non-trial, sir. It’s something we’ll certainly be able to
work out in the next two weeks. Otherwise, then we’ll know for
certain this is a trial….

Id. at 3. For this reason, Attorney Burns requested that on the date scheduled

for trial, the matter be listed for a status hearing. Id.

At a June 15, 2018, status hearing, the Commonwealth placed the plea

offer at issue on the record:

[The Commonwealth:] Your Honor, we’re here today for purposes
of a status hearing. … It’s my understanding that there had been
a previously conveyed offer to the defense as it related to the
Homicide case and as it related to the Burglary case. I would like
to put that information on the record. …

….

… [A]s it relates to [docket number] 5968 of 2017, the
Commonwealth conveyed an offer of murder in the 3 rd
degree with a sentence of 9 to 18 years being the
negotiated plea. Additionally, there was a conversation
that, as it related to [docket number] 5969 of [2017], that
the Commonwealth would be offering a concurrent
sentence in that matter. I just want everyone to be clear
that this offer will only be left open until the first week of
August, which was the originally scheduled trial date in this
matter. Additionally, I want the defense to be aware of the fact
that it is my intention to file essentially a [Pa.R.E.] 404(b) motion
and a joinder motion. There [were] allegations and pending
cases, Your Honor, that [Brooks] burglarized the same victims and
witnesses involved in the homicide in the burglary case in front of
Your Honor, and there is a robbery case in Philadelphia involving
the same victims and witnesses. And it would be my intention to
file [a Pa.R.E. 404(b) motion] on the robbery so that the
Commonwealth’s permitted to tell the jury about the existence of
that case and the facts of that case. And it would be my intention

• 10 - J-S02019-26

to file a joinder on the burglary and ask the court to try the
burglary and the homicide together in this matter. Obviously, I
don’t have any more information with me today as those motions
will be forthcoming. But, I want the defense to understand that
in thinking about the offer in this case. That those matters will be
coming and won’t be litigated until after the expiration of the offer,
so they should factor that into the decision making.

Additionally, I wanted to put on the record that, looking at the
homicide guidelines in this matter, … the offer was for [Brooks to
plead guilty to] murder of the third degree, which carries an
offense gravity score of 14. … [A]ssuming that [Brooks] even has
a zero prior record score, on the deadly weapon enhancement
used matrix, because that’s what would apply, it would not be the
standard sentencing matrix because the allegation here is that the
victim was stabbed to death. [Thus, Brooks’s] standard range
guidelines is 90 months to the statutory maximum in this case,
which would be 20 years. So, he would be looking at 90 to 240
months as a minimum sentence if he were to go to trial and be
convicted of just third[-]degree murder or if he were to go and
plead open, they would be the sentencing guidelines, but … as of
now, there’s no agreement to just an open plea, but I want him
to understand that that’s what he’s looking at.

N.T., 6/15/18, at 3-6 (emphasis and paragraph break added; punctuation and

capitalization modified).

Immediately thereafter, Brooks’s counsel, Attorney Burns, indicated

that she and Brooks have not “been able to have enough conversations as of

yet for [] Brooks to fully understand” the plea offer, and what would be

admitted at trial if the court granted the Commonwealth’s suggested Pa.R.E.

404(b) motion. Id. at 6. The parties requested, and the trial court granted,

a continuance. Id. at 6-7. The trial court, however, designated the August

6, 2018, trial date as a status hearing, and not a jury trial. Id. at 7. The trial

court stated, “That’s when the [plea] offer expires.” Id.

• 11 - J-S02019-26

On August 7, 2018,4 Kevin O’Neill, Esquire (Attorney O’Neill), standing

in for Attorney Burns, appeared as counsel for Brooks at a scheduled status

hearing. N.T., 8/7/18, at 3. At that time, the prosecutor stated the following:

Your Honor, we’re here today essentially on what was to be a trial
date; however, after the last listing in discussing it with Your
Honor, we changed it to a status date. [The status hearing was]
supposed to be [on August] 6th, but when [Brooks] wasn’t
transported yesterday, we passed it until today. The significance
of that date was that the Commonwealth had conveyed [a plea
deal] offer to [] Brooks that he had until this listing to accept. It
is my understanding in speaking to [Attorney] Burns[,] that
[Brooks] is, in fact, rejecting that offer and requesting a
trial date in this matter….

Id. (emphasis added). At that time, the prosecutor asked the trial court’s

permission to

put the offer on the record, with the understanding that it is being
taken off the table today, as per the last listing, and I don’t want
to have any time in the future that [Brooks] come[s] back and
say[s] he did not know what the offer was, and if he had known,
he would have taken it.

Id. at 3-4.

Attorney O’Neill responded as follows:

[A]s I’m standing in [for Attorney Burns], and this … was not made
obvious to me [prior to] walking in here, if I could have a
moment to step back and talk to [Brooks] to make sure [the
offer has] been conveyed to him[?]

---

4 The record reflects that the August 6, 2018, status hearing was rescheduled

to the following day, because of the inability to transport Brooks to the
courtroom.

• 12 - J-S02019-26

Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Following a private discussion with Brooks,

Attorney O’Neill informed the trial court of the following:

I just wanted to make clear that I had not met [] Brooks prior to
this morning. [Brooks] did indicate to me that [Attorney]
Burns and himself had the opportunity to speak this past
weekend. He was aware of the offer coming in to today.
So, I just wanted to confirm that with him before we move
forward.

Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).

The trial court then informed Brooks that “the Commonwealth is going

to put on the record the offer to you so that … if it’s reviewed by the Superior

Court, they’ll know what the offer was.” Id. at 5-6. The following discussion

then transpired, on-the-record:

THE COURT: … [T]he reason, … Mr. Brooks, that we put this on
the record, … the most important one is that there are certain
guidelines that we live by in this court. Generally speaking, if a
person … is tried and convicted by a jury, the court sentences
them in accordance with the guidelines. I generally sentence
within the standard range. … [T]here are times when I not only
sentence in the standard range, but run additional charges
consecutively. That being said, the reason we put the offer on the
record, and my position with regards to sentencing on the record,
is so that if, in fact, you go to trial and are convicted, and
sentenced to something that you’re not satisfied with, you can’t
come back to the [c]ourt and say you didn’t know about the offer
that was made by the Commonwealth. So, right now, the
Commonwealth is going to put on the record the offer to you so
that the whole world knows it, and if it’s reviewed by the Superior
Court, they’ll know what the offer was. And the record will be
clear for future reference, all right? ….

[The Commonwealth:] … As conveyed last time, the offer [for
docket number] 5968 of 2017 was for murder in the third
degree. That sentence would have been 9 to 18 years on
that charge. [Brooks] has a second case, [No.] 5969 of [2017],
where he’s facing related offenses, and he was offered the charge

• 13 - J-S02019-26

of burglary with a concurrent three-to-six-year sentence.
Obviously, … there were other conditions, being a DNA sample,
restitution to the family of the victim …. But that is the general
gist of the sentence.

THE COURT: [(To Brooks)] You’re aware of that?

[Brooks]: Yes, sir.

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added; capitalization and punctuation modified). Brooks

indicated he had no questions regarding the plea offer. Id. at 7. Interestingly,

the trial court did not expressly inquire as to whether Brooks accepted or

rejected the plea offer. See id. Rather, the Commonwealth immediately

made clear that the offer was being taken “off the table” as of that date. Id.

at 8. Thus, the notes of testimony make clear that a plea offer was conveyed

to Brooks, and he understood the offer.

At the PCRA hearing, Brooks testified that he “wanted to go to trial with

a self-defense theory.” N.T. (PCRA Hearing), 9/29/23, at 32. Brooks testified

that after the June 15, 2018, status hearing, when the Commonwealth offered

a plea deal of 9-20 years in prison, he discussed the offer with Attorney Burns.

Id. at 30. According to Brooks, Attorney Burns advised that “she felt like …

we could proceed to trial and still get a better outcome.” Id. Brooks

confirmed his understanding that the plea offer was for 9-20 years. Id. at 31.

Following his rejection of the plea offer, Brooks testified that he and Attorney

Burns prepared for trial. Id. at 33.

Brooks expressly testified that he discussed the Commonwealth’s 9-20-

year plea offer with Attorney Burns. Id. at 41; N.T. (PCRA Hearing), 11/2/23,

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at 7. Brooks further acknowledged discussing the plea offer with Attorney

Burns in jail, immediately prior to the August 7, 2018, status hearing. N.T.

(PCRA Hearing), 9/29/23, at 42, 48. Brooks testified to his belief that the

offer had been discussed in court prior to the August 7, 2018, status hearing.

Id. at 41.

In discussing the offer with Attorney Burns, Brooks testified,

[Attorney] Burns said that she could do better. So she thought
that it was better for us to proceed to trial[,] because she believed
that I could get a lower number at trial. Then the day of [the
August 7, 2018, status hearing], with [Attorney] O’Neill, … it really
was not a conversation. He just told me to go with whatever
[Attorney Burns] said and trust your gut.

N.T. (PCRA Hearing), 11/2/23, at 7. Brooks testified he “rejected [the offer]

thinking that we were going to trial[,] based off what [Attorney] Burns told

me[.]” Id. at 22. Brooks further acknowledged he rejected the offer

of 9-20 years because he did not want the deal. Id. He stated, “I

rejected it because I thought [Attorney Burns] – she said she could do better.”

Id. Brooks continued, “At the point in time, I thought we were going to

proceed to trial.”5 Id. at 23.

Brooks testified that on May 6, 2019, the scheduled trial date, he

received the Commonwealth’s final plea offer of 20-40 years in prison. Id. at

1. According to Brooks, that was the first time he had heard of the offer. Id.

---

5 Brooks acknowledged that previously, in March 2018, he had rejected a
similar plea deal that offered 9-20 years in prison. N.T. (PCRA Hearing),
11/2/23, at 26.

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Brooks testified that Attorney Burns advised him it was a “good deal, that 20

to 40 years is not that much of a long time.” Id. at 11.

Brooks further indicated that character witnesses were present at court

on this date. Id. at 19. Brooks indicated that Attorney Burns indicated that

these witnesses would help establish his character, but he was not advised

that they could be helpful in determining his guilt or innocence. Id.

Brooks indicated that after entering the plea, he discussed withdrawing

the plea with Attorney Burns. Id. at 16. However, Attorney Burns told Brooks

he “would just be back at square one.” Id. Although Brooks still wanted to

withdraw the plea, Brooks testified that no motion was filed. Id. at 17.

Attorney Burns testified that she has practiced law for 29 years, and has

been a member of the Pennsylvania Bar since 1994. Id. at 43. Regarding

Brooks’s murder case, Attorney Burns testified as follows:

I always told [] Brooks that it was up to him. … [W]e had an
imperfect self-defense case. … [T]he issue that we had was that
there was no other weapons, at least that were, you know, that
had been recovered at the scene. That doesn’t mean that nobody
didn’t pick one up, but there was nothing else recovered at the
scene. So I had an imperfect self-defense. I’ve done these in
Delaware County for many years. … What I know from my
experience, is that jurors have a very hard time letting people
walk out of here with nothing when someone is dead. … [And] I
remember explaining that to [Brooks]. You know, that’s the
problem that we have here. And it’s an imperfect self-defense
case. The offer was nine [years’ imprisonment] to something. I
don’t remember the high number. I know the low was nine. I
didn’t think nine was a bad offer. I presented it to [] Brooks.
[] Brooks had always represented to me, always very
consistent, that he was going to trial in this matter. That
was even before the offer was extended. That was after

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the offer was extended. His position was always that he
was going to trial.

Id. at 49-50 (punctuation modified; emphasis added). Attorney Burns

testified that she informed Brooks

that I was very confident that had I gone to trial on the matter,
our worst case scenario was that he was going to be convicted of
third[-]degree [murder] and that we would then be looking to the
court for sentencing. And I honestly believed that, based upon
that representation to [] Brooks, he decided well then, it’s worth
my while to go to trial and see if I can be found not guilty …. And
that’s … what we talked about. And that was my position. Worst
case scenario….

Id. at 51. According to Attorney Burns, Brooks “was always confident that he

wanted to go to trial. [Brooks] did not … want that nine to 20 [plea offer]

until the day … he ultimately pled to the 20 to 40. “ Id. at 52. Attorney Burns

confirmed that she told Brooks they could always try to negotiate a lower

sentence than 9 to 20 years. Id. at 52-53. Although Attorney Burns tried to

negotiate a sentence of 7½ years to 20 years, the Commonwealth would not

agree to that sentence. Id. at 52-53.

Attorney Burns explained that when Assistant District Attorney Mann

(ADA Mann) took over the case for the Commonwealth,

the offer of nine to 20 was on the table. We had a listing before
[the trial court]. … [ADA Mann] indicated that she had done some
subpoena work, that she was getting some phone records,
Instagram records, and I think text messages. [ADA] Mann
indicated that if those records show what [the] victim says they’re
going to show, then this offer is going to go up.

….

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And I believe that was actually on the record. That if these records
show what … [the] victim says they’re going to show, then the
offer is going to go up. So yeah, we knew about it.

Id. at 53-54. Attorney Burns testified that she conveyed this information to

Brooks and discussed the matter with him. Id. at 54.

Attorney Burns testified that, after discussing the plea deal offer of 9-

20 years in prison,

Brooks was adamant. [] Brooks always wanted to go to trial in
this matter. And I talked about it. Because at that point, I truly
have to rely on my client. Because clearly I’d not seen, I had not
yet seen what was in Instagram, 6 what was in the text messages.
… [A]nd I … said to [] Brooks, that listen, we have to rely on what
you know is in these records. But … I know for a fact that I told
him that [ADA] Mann was not one that when she said something,
that she didn’t go back on it. So that if she said that the offer was
going to go up, it was most certainly going to go up. And we didn’t
know exactly what that number was, but she did indicate that it
was going to go up. … [W]e talked about it and I asked [] Brooks
to recall what he thought we were going to be looking at from
[the] Instagram post, on text messages. And based upon what
it is he told me, … he still made a decision that he wanted
to go to trial.

Id. at 54-55 (emphasis added; punctuation modified).

Attorney Burns testified that the day before the August 7, 2018, status

hearing, she discussed the Commonwealth’s plea offer with Brooks. Id. at

1. According to Attorney Burns,

[Brooks] was very adamant. He wanted to go to trial. And
I remember because the offer was to be revoked the following
day. It was the day before. … So I knew for sure. So I knew
from prior conversations that … happened like a week or so before

---

6 The Commonwealth purportedly later discovered posts that placed Appellant

in a less-than-favorable light.

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that, that the last time I spoke to [Brooks], maybe two weeks
prior, a week, two weeks prior, that he still wanted to go to trial.
I went out to the prison on that weekend. It was a
weekend, just to make sure that his position had not
changed, because I needed to get coverage for that
Monday.

Id. at 56-57 (emphasis added). Attorney Burns testified that Brooks did not

change his mind after the August 7, 2018, status hearing. Id. at 57.

Following that status hearing, Attorney Burns and Brooks prepared for trial.

Id. at 58.

Attorney Burns explained that when the Commonwealth increased the

plea offer from a minimum of 9 years to a minimum of 20 years in prison,

Brooks still “was going to trial.” Id. Attorney Burns explained that “at that

point, … we can get convicted of the third[-degree-murder charge] and take

our chances with the [trial court judge] on sentencing versus [ADA] Mann.”

Id. at 58-59. However, upon obtaining the Instagram and text records,

Attorney Burns’s view altered:

The Instagram records and text messages … were bad. … They
were bad. They shed [] Brooks in a different light. … I’d have to
going in, I’d have to explain [] Brooks, but [] Brooks presented
well. So it was going to make it a little tougher to make the jury
… sympathetic to him. It’s just a little bit more work, … but [based
upon Brooks’s] choice, because he was going to trial, I didn’t have
a choice but to try to do it. But the records, … I didn’t like them.

….

They were bad. I mean, the case would have been better. That
number would have never gone to 20 [years] without [the
additional evidence]. … So they were kind of tough talking. But
that still didn’t mean that [Brooks] was not defending himself on
the day in question. And that’s what we always had … going in

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our favor. And that’s what I had too. That’s what I had to work
with. [Brooks] had a great background. He was … from a good
family, Philadelphia Catholic high school, college, work. He had
good parts to present to the jury. I didn’t like the records, but
there was absolutely nothing in his presentation, when he
presented himself to you, you never saw that person who was
writing.

Id. at 59-60 (punctuation modified).

Attorney Burns testified that on the scheduled trial date, the

Commonwealth presented its 20-40-year plea offer. Id. at 63. Attorney

Burns discussed the offer with Brooks for approximately 45 minutes, but

Brooks still wanted to go to trial. Id. at 62. Attorney Burns informed the trial

court that Brooks wanted to go to trial. Id. After going to her car to obtain

Brooks’s clothing for trial, Attorney Burns again discussed the offer with

Brooks for another 15-20 minutes. Id. According to Attorney Burns, “after

the second time, [Brooks is] still saying he wanted to go to trial.” Id. Attorney

Burns testified that ADA Mann would not decrease the minimum sentencing

offer below 20 years. Id.

Attorney Burns also explained her concerns regarding the

Commonwealth’s Pa.R.E. 404(b) evidence. Id. at 100. Attorney Burns

indicated that the Commonwealth had a recording of the 911 call during the

burglary. Id. at 101. She testified,

I heard the evidence. I saw the evidence in the burglary case. …
I was not confident that after trial, [the trial court] would run the
burglary concurrent. I wasn’t confident about that. … I thought
that the judge might find the evidence in the burglary case to be
egregious enough to warrant a consecutive sentence. And that
was what our conversation was mainly on that day.

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Id. Attorney Burns stated, “I knew [ADA] Mann absolutely was going to ask

for the burglary to run consecutively.” Id. at 102. Further, “[b]ased upon

my experience with prior sentences with [the trial judge,] after having heard

the evidence, specifically with respect to the burglary case, I knew it was a

possibility that [the judge] could run the burglary consecutively.” Id. 102-

03.

Attorney Burns indicated that she never expressed a preference to

Brooks: “I let him make the decision. [Brooks] was a smart guy. He didn’t

have any problems understanding, no problems with comprehension, and was

a great critical thinker.” Id. at 63. Attorney Burns informed Brooks that their

worst-case scenario was a conviction of third-degree murder. Id. at 64.

Attorney Burns testified that upon entering the courtroom, the trial

judge conducted a colloquy, then conversed with Brooks. Id. A discussion

ensued between Brooks and his family, and, according to Attorney Burns,

“there was a lot of confusion. It was a lot of yelling.” Id. at 69. At that time,

Brooks’s family encouraged him to take the Commonwealth’s plea deal. Id.

Brooks subsequently acquiesced, and accepted the Commonwealth’s plea

offer. Id.

Attorney Burns acknowledged that following sentencing, Brooks asked

to withdraw his plea. Id. at 73. At that time, Attorney Burns told him “what

I told everybody. You’re sentenced. It’s too late.” Id. According to Attorney

Burns,

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I also tell my clients, and what I know I told [Brooks], is because
after 30 years, you kind of say things the same every time.
Sometimes you get what you asked for. You withdraw, you know,
sometimes if it gets granted the number goes up. There’s no
guarantee that you get sentenced and your number goes down.
Sometimes it goes up. But when [Brooks] called me, I’d never
even entertained [sic]. … [B]ut I never told him that I didn’t know
how to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, just that I did not
find that it was going to be successful.

Id. at 75.

Thus, the evidence is uncontradicted that Brooks was informed of the

plea offer, in court and on-the-record, on June 15, 2018. N.T., 6/15/18, at 3-

1. Brooks confirmed that Attorney Burns discussed the plea offer with him

the weekend before the August 7, 2018, status hearing. N.T. (PCRA Hearing),

9/29/23, at 42, 48. At the August 7, 2018, status hearing, the prosecutor

stated that he had discussed the plea offer with Attorney Burns, who informed

him that Brooks “is, in fact, rejecting that offer and requesting a trial date in

this matter[.]” N.T., 8/7/18, at 3. There is no evidence contradicting the fact

that Attorney Burns communicated the plea offer to Brooks, and that Brooks

rejected the offer prior to the August 7, 2018, status hearing.

The PCRA court did not find ineffectiveness based upon any advice given

to Brooks by Attorney Burns. Rather, the PCRA court based its ineffectiveness

finding on Attorney Burns’s failure to attend the August 7, 2018, status

hearing, sending stand-in counsel in her place. There is no evidence that

would support a finding that Brooks would have accepted the plea offer, if

Attorney Burns had been present. Rather, the uncontradicted evidence shows

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that the Commonwealth communicated the offer to Brooks on June 15, 2018.

N.T., 6/15/18, at 3-6. The uncontradicted evidence further confirms that

Attorney Burns discussed the offer with Brooks the weekend before the August

7, 2018, status hearing, and Brooks rejected the offer.

Finally, there is no evidence that but for Attorney Burns’s absence from

the August 7, 2018, status hearing, Brooks would have accepted the plea

offer. See Rizor, 304 A.3d at 1054. Rather, all evidence points otherwise.

Under these circumstances, we conclude the PCRA court erred in determining

that Attorney Burns rendered ineffective assistance by failing to attend the

August 7, 2018, status hearing. See id. Our analysis does not conclude at

this point.

In its second issue, the Commonwealth challenges the PCRA court’s

determination that Brooks tendered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea

on May 6, 2019. Commonwealth’s Brief at 36. The Commonwealth points out

the PCRA court’s contradictory statement, in its April 22, 2025, opinion

[Attorney Burns’s] ineffectiveness raised … in the PCRA petition and amended

PCRA petition.” Id. at 37 (quoting PCRA Court Opinion, 4/22/25, at 7). The

Commonwealth further claims that the PCRA court’s order, granting relief to

Brooks, did not render any findings regarding the competency of counsel’s

assistance during the May 6, 2019, guilty plea hearing. Id. According to the

Commonwealth,

[i]f the defendant entered an involuntary plea due to counsel’s
ineffectiveness, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the plea. The

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lower court cannot leave in place a plea it believes to be
involuntary.

Id. at 37-38.

The Commonwealth argues,

[Brooks] did not argue before the [PCRA] court that the plea he
entered on the day of trial was not knowing and voluntary because
“there [were] no indications when [Attorney] Burns told him that
she could not do better than the nine to 20 years offered[,]”
Supplemental Memorandum …, 11/2/23, at 11, and that “[h]er
failure to tell [] Brooks that she could not do better than the offer
in August prior to the commencement of trial was ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Id. at 12….

Id. at 38. The Commonwealth states that “any ineffectiveness related to the

earlier plea offer does not render the subsequent plea involuntary.” Id.

The Commonwealth further challenges the PCRA court’s statement that

Brooks only learned of the 20-40-year plea offer on the day of trial. Id.

According to the Commonwealth, Attorney Burns testified that Brooks was

informed of the 20-40-year plea offer at the hearing on the Commonwealth’s

Pa.R.E. 404(b) motion, which took place in late January 2019. Id. at 39. The

Commonwealth states this offer was again extended during a pretrial

conference shortly before jury selection. Id. The Commonwealth points out

that the PCRA judge also presided over Brooks’s guilty plea hearing, and

accepted the plea as knowingly and voluntarily tendered. Id. Finally, the

Commonwealth argues that Brooks failed to establish any deficient

performance by Attorney Burns that resulted in manifest injustice. Id. at 41.

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Our review discloses that at the PCRA status hearing on December 12,

2024, the PCRA court announced its ruling on Brooks’s PCRA petition. The

PCRA court vacated Brooks’s judgment of sentence, but accepted Brooks’s

guilty plea. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 6 (the PCRA court stating, “To make it

clear, we are accepting the guilty plea. We feel the guilty plea was, in fact,

knowing, openly, [and] intelligently made.”). The PCRA court’s subsequent

order, entered on December 16, 2024, did not invalidate Brooks’s guilty plea.

See PCRA Court Order, 12/16/24 (vacating the judgment of sentence only).

On January 8, 2025, the PCRA court filed an amended order clarifying

that the PCRA court vacated Brooks’s judgment of sentence in the murder

case, and dismissed Brooks’s PCRA allegations related to his burglary case.

PCRA Court Order, 1/8/25, at 1. Again, the PCRA court did not invalidate

Brooks’s guilty plea as unknowing and involuntary.

However, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court opines that

upon review of the notes of testimony from May 6, 2019, it

questioned under the circumstances whether [] Brooks’s guilty
plea was voluntary. The record reflects [] Brooks was, at a
minimum, overwhelmed on the day he entered the guilty plea —
the same day jury selection was scheduled to commence. This
court, upon recollection of the events and review of this record in
this case, recognizes [] Brooks was a youthful defendant, did not
have a proper understanding of the jury trial process, appeared
to be emotionally distraught, encountered pressure from his
attorney and the family members present in court, was given the
impression the Commonwealth offer likely would get better (and
notwithstanding this, the offer became staggeringly worse), and
on the day of trial[,] received an offer equal to the statutory
maximum for third degree murder and was told he would be
risking a life sentence if he did not plead guilty. This court

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acknowledges, under these circumstances, the validity of []
Brooks’ guilty plea could be disputed.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/22/25, at 11-12 (emphasis added). The PCRA court

thereafter found Attorney Burns ineffective regarding her preparation of

stand-in counsel, and that “Brooks proved by a preponderance of the evidence

his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent.” Id. at 13.

At this point, we are perplexed as to the rationale expressed in the PCRA

court’s opinion, as it previously had found Brooks to have knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily tendered his guilty plea. See N.T., 12/12/24, at

6 (the PCRA court stating, “To make it clear, we are accepting the guilty plea.

We feel the guilty plea was, in fact, knowing, openly, [and] intelligently

made.”). Further, the PCRA court entered no order invalidating Brooks’s guilty

plea as unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. Thus, the record clearly

contradicts the statements in the PCRA court’s opinion. Based upon the record

before us, Brooks’s guilty plea, entered on May 6, 2019, remains valid.

Accordingly, we vacate the PCRA court’s order granting PCRA relief, and

reinstate Brooks’s May 6, 2019, judgment of sentence. 7

PCRA Court Order vacated. Brooks’s judgment of sentence is reinstated.

Superior Court jurisdiction is relinquished.

---

7 Based on our resolution of Brooks’s first two issues, we need not address his

remaining claim.

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Date: 3/17/2026

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