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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of OC

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1742

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1742 Peo in Interest of OC 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1742
Mesa County District Court No. 23JV99
Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of O.C., a Child,

and Concerning J.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 19, 2026

Todd Starr, County Attorney, John Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand
Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie Burt, Counsel for Youth, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for O.C.

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 J.C. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child

legal relationship with O.C. (the youth). Father contends that the

juvenile court erred by finding that (1) he could not become fit

within a reasonable time and (2) there was no less drastic

alternative to termination. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect raising concerns that K.C.

(mother) was subjecting the then-eleven-year-old youth to physical

abuse. Father, who had been convicted on two counts of sexual

assault on a child involving different children, was serving an

indeterminate prison sentence throughout the dependency and

neglect action. A protective order entered in his criminal case

prevented him from having contact with the youth.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the youth dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for both parents. The

Department later moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights.

Two years after the petition was filed, the juvenile court terminated

mother’s and father’s parental rights following a contested hearing.

Mother does not participate in this appeal.

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II. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶4 Father first contends that he “substantially complied” with his

court-ordered treatment plan, and that the juvenile court failed to

fully consider the “significant change” in his status during the

course of the dependency and neglect action when it determined

that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 We will not disturb a juvenile court’s factual findings unless

they are “so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.”

People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).

¶6 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders

them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care

to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health

needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2), C.R.S. 2025. “In

determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to

change within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether

any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social

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history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶7 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must

be determined by considering each particular child’s physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs. Id. at ¶ 25. A

“reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a

parent has made recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is

not required to give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at

¶¶ 24-25.

B. Analysis

¶8 The juvenile court found that father was not fit and was not

likely to become fit within a reasonable period of time. The court

found that father “continues to express his love for [the youth] and

told the Court that he just wants the Court to order whatever is

best for [the youth].” The court noted father’s long-term

incarceration and found that, because he was serving an

indeterminate sentence, father “will be incarcerated for the

foreseeable future.” The court received a certified order from

father’s 2013 criminal case and noted that “as part of his sentence

he is not allowed to have contact with anyone under eighteen years

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of age,” including the youth. The court found that this situation

affected father’s “fitness and his corresponding ability to meet [the

youth]’s needs within a reasonable time.”

¶9 The record supports these findings. Father testified that he

was required to complete sex offense-specific treatment for his

criminal sentence and had been on the waiting list to receive that

treatment for more than ten years. Father testified that his

treatment was in progress, he had met five of the seven required

criteria, and he estimated that it would take “anywhere from nine

months to indeterminate” to complete the remaining two criteria.

Father testified that he believed there was a legal pathway to

pursuing contact with the youth but “chose[] to put that on hold”

after a conversation with the youth’s therapist.

¶ 10 Furthermore, the caseworker provided uncontroverted

testimony that the youth was “a little toddler, one, two year[s] old”

when he last had contact with father. The youth was thirteen years

old at the time of the termination hearing. The caseworker, an

expert in child welfare and child protection, opined that building a

relationship between father and the youth would require “a lot of”

therapeutic work. The caseworker opined “it really would be

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starting completely over to try to build that bond” and cautioned

that doing so would be more difficult because the youth is “at an

age where he can decide if he wants to do that or not.”

¶ 11 Father contends that he was in substantial compliance with

the treatment plan. The caseworker’s uncontested testimony was

that father was “active in engaging in what [was] available to him”

during his incarceration, including individual therapy, substance

dependence treatment, anger management, community college

courses, and facility employment. But “even substantial

compliance” may not be enough “to render the parent fit.” People In

Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶ 11. Despite father’s engagement,

the issue that required the court’s intervention — father’s inability

to protect the youth from mother or provide the youth with proper

parental care because of the criminal protection order — remained

unchanged.

¶ 12 Father also contends that he and the child could “begin

contact within a reasonable period of time” because he might be

paroled after completing treatment. But father’s own testimony was

that the soonest he might complete treatment was nine months

from the hearing, and that the actual time was “indeterminate.”

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Thus, because there is record support for the juvenile court’s

finding that father would not become fit within a reasonable time,

we will not disturb it. See S.Z.S., ¶ 27 (finding record support for

the court’s finding).

III. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 13 Next, father claims that the juvenile court erred by finding

there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 14 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal relationship.

People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 19; People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. In considering less drastic

alternatives, the court bases its decision on the best interest of the

child, giving primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental,

and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). For example,

the court may consider whether an ongoing relationship with the

parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child and the

child’s need for permanency when determining whether there is a

viable alternative to termination. People in Interest of A.R., 2012

COA 195M, ¶¶ 38, 41.

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¶ 15 After considering alternatives, the juvenile court determined

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination that

would meet the youth’s need for permanency. In doing so, the

court noted that the youth wanted to be adopted and needed

permanency “as soon as possible.” Thus, there is record support

for the court’s determination that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination and, therefore, we may not disturb that

determination. See People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34

(“We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings for

clear error.”).

¶ 16 Father asserts that the child would have benefited from the

opportunity to have a relationship with him, and that there was

conflicting evidence about the youth’s desire for adoption and the

youth’s desire for a relationship with father. We presume that the

juvenile court considered all the evidence before it when it made its

decision, even if it did not make specific findings as to every issue

presented. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329-30

(Colo. App. 2007). Although father testified that he believed the

youth wanted a relationship with him, there was also evidence to

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the contrary. We reject father’s assertion because we cannot

reweigh the evidence. S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 17 Father also asserts that the termination severed the youth’s

right to one day pursue contact with father. Even if this were true,

it is for the youth, not father, to assert this right. “Except in certain

limited circumstances, ‘a litigant must assert [their] own legal rights

and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or

interests of third parties.’” C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 18

(quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013)). Father

does not assert that any aspect of this case presents such “limited

circumstances.” Thus, we decline to address this argument.

IV. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment terminating father’s parent-child legal

relationship with the youth is therefore affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

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