Colorado Court of Appeals opinion on ETG case

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of ETG

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1296

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.4K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1296 Peo in Interest of ETG 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1296
El Paso County District Court No. 24JV30001
Honorable Diana May, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.T.G., a Child,

and Concerning M.G-G and C.G.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER*
Román, C.J., and Graham*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 26, 2026

Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney,
Mathew Feldman, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado for
Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado for Appellant M.G-G

Ainsley Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado for
Appellant C.G.
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.G.-G. (mother)

and C.G. (father) appeal the judgment terminating their

parent-child legal relationships with E.T.G. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services (the

Department) opened this case when the child was four months old.

At that time, the family was involved in another dependency and

neglect case concerning the child’s siblings. Before this case

opened, both parents pled guilty in criminal cases to felony child

abuse resulting in serious bodily injury (SBI) to one of the child’s

siblings, Z.G. The juvenile court later noted that Z.G., an infant at

the time of her injuries, had experienced “malnutrition and neglect.”

¶3 In this case, the Department and mother entered a stipulation

by which mother agreed to admit the child was dependent or

neglected. In exchange, the Department agreed to “enter” a

treatment plan for mother, instead of pursuing a theory that no

appropriate treatment plan could be devised at the dispositional

hearing. See § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2025. Father also entered

an admission, and the court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected.

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¶4 The Department proposed treatment plans for both parents,

and the court later adopted a treatment plan for father. But for

several months, the Department and mother could not agree on an

acceptable treatment plan for mother. During this period, mother’s

probation was revoked in her criminal case and she was sentenced

to eight years in the Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶5 Eventually, the court adopted the treatment plan objectives

proposed by the Department months prior. Not long after, the

parties stipulated to nearly all aspects of the treatment plan.

¶6 The Department later moved for termination on the grounds

that (1) no appropriate treatment plans could be devised to address

the parents’ unfitness, and (2) their treatment plans did not render

them fit. See § 19-3-604(1)(b), (1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Around this

time, father was released from the DOC. At the contested

termination hearing a few months later, the Department pursued

only the theory of no appropriate treatment plan. See

§ 19-3-604(1)(b). A year and a half after the case opened, the court

terminated the parental rights of both parents.

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II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 Under limited circumstances, a juvenile court may find after

adjudication that an appropriate treatment plan cannot be devised

for a particular parent. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I); People in Interest of

Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 16. One of those circumstances is when a

parent is unfit based on SBI of a sibling due to proven parental

abuse or neglect. §§ 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), 19-3-604(1)(b)(IV). When a

court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no appropriate

treatment plan can be devised based on SBI to a sibling, it may

terminate a parent’s rights. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(II).

¶8 Under specific circumstances, a court may “find that no

appropriate treatment plan can be devised for a parent after it has

already approved a treatment plan for the parent.” Z.P.S., ¶¶ 19,

1. The court may proceed to termination even when, as here, the

existing dispositional order includes the provision of a treatment

plan for the parent. Id. at ¶ 29; see People in Interest of C.Z., 2015

COA 87, ¶¶ 3-5, 48.

¶9 When a child is under six years old, as in this case, the court

must consider the expedited permanency planning provisions,

which require that the child be placed in a permanent home as

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expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S.

2025.

¶ 10 A juvenile court’s judgment terminating parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law involving application of

the termination statute to the evidentiary facts. People in Interest of

A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. The credibility of the witnesses and

the sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, as well

as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are all within

the juvenile court’s discretion. Id. Thus, we review the court’s

factual findings for clear error and will set them aside only if they

lack any support in the record. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 48. But we review

de novo the court’s legal conclusions based on those facts. People

in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

III. No Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 11 On various theories, both parents argue that the juvenile court

erred when it found that no appropriate treatment plan could be

devised to address their unfitness. We conclude that the juvenile

court did not err.

¶ 12 Both parents assert that the court failed to consider their

fitness at the time of the termination hearing. We disagree. The

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court found that the parents were unfit based on the SBI to Z.G.

See § 19-3-604(1)(b)(IV). Put another way, the court found that the

parents were unfit at the time of the termination hearing, such that

a treatment plan could not be devised to address their unfitness.

See id. The law permitted the court to do so, notwithstanding the

fact that treatment plans were in effect at the time of the

termination hearing. See Z.P.S., ¶ 29; C.Z., ¶¶ 3-5, 48.

¶ 13 With respect to mother, the court took judicial notice of the

fact that she pled guilty to felony child abuse resulting in SBI in

violation of section 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(IV), C.R.S. 2025, in El Paso

County District Court Case No. 22CR5846. See People v. Sa’ra, 117

P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A court may take judicial notice of

the contents of court records in a related proceeding.”).

¶ 14 A guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a criminal

charge. Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8. In her plea

agreement, mother admitted that the crime “actually occurred” and

“happened exactly as defined by the elements of the crime.” Thus,

by pleading guilty, mother admitted that she had, with criminal

negligence,

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caus[ed] an injury to a child’s life or health, or
permit[ted her] to be unreasonably placed in a
situation that pose[d] a threat of injury to [her]
life or health, or engage[d] in a continued
pattern of conduct that result[ed] in
malnourishment, lack of proper medical care,
cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an
accumulation of injuries that ultimately
result[ed] in . . . [SBI].

See § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(IV). The court also took judicial notice of

the fact that, nine months before the termination hearing, mother

was sentenced to eight years in the DOC.

¶ 15 As to father, the court took judicial notice of the fact that he

entered a guilty plea in El Paso County District Court Case No.

22CR5833. Like mother, father admitted through his plea to the

elements of felony child abuse resulting in SBI to Z.G. in violation of

section 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(IV). See Neuhaus, ¶ 8. As noted by a

minute order in his criminal case, father and the prosecution

stipulated to the probable cause affidavit as the factual basis for his

plea. See Sa’ra, 117 P.3d at 56. Both the criminal and juvenile

courts took judicial notice of the probable cause affidavit, which

indicated that Z.G. was “listless and lethargic and . . . emaciated.”

¶ 16 In addition, the court considered photographs which were

admitted into evidence that depicted Z.G. when she was first

6
hospitalized due to her condition. Finding that they were

“shocking,” the court found that the pictures showed an “extremely

ema[ci]ated young child” and “significant substantial child abuse.”

It also found that the parents had severely physically abused Z.G.

Moreover, the court considered the fact that the child was four

months old when this case opened and was nearly two years old at

the time of its ruling. It found that, in light of Z.G.’s injuries,

returning the child to the parents would amount to “putting [him] at

grave risk.”

¶ 17 The record supports the court’s findings. A social worker from

the hospital testified that Z.G. was “in the hospital for quite some

time” due to her “very serious condition.” After being qualified as

an expert in child protection casework, the supervising caseworker

opined that (1) Z.G. had experienced “severe neglect”; (2) Z.G.’s

injuries raised “substantial concerns” about rehabilitating the

parents within a reasonable amount of time; (3) the neglect to Z.G.

raised “a concern for another child that would be so heavily

dependent on their caregiver for their survival”; (4) the child was

“substantially at a higher risk for still being harmed” if returned

home to either parent. The caseworker also noted that the case had

7
been open over a year and a half, and opined that expedited

permanency was important for children under six. See

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123.

¶ 18 We also address, and reject, father’s argument that the court

improperly considered evidence that it had previously considered

when it approved a treatment plan for father. He correctly points

out that he had pled guilty over a year before the court adopted his

treatment plan. But the court’s reliance on evidence concerning

Z.G.’s injuries was proper even if the court had previously

considered that evidence. See Z.P.S., ¶ 38 (holding that the juvenile

court did not err when it modified the dispositional order by relying

on evidence that “had already been considered by the court, or

could have been presented to the court, at the earlier dispositional

hearings”).

¶ 19 Mother contends that the court was required to more explicitly

“tie” the SBI to Z.G. to her unfitness at the time of the hearing.

Mother cites no authority for this proposition. And, for reasons that

we have set forth, namely the fact that the SBI to Z.G. was the basis

for the finding of unfitness, we disagree. See § 19-3-604(1)(b(IV);

see also Z.P.S., ¶ 32 (“[T]he court’s authority to modify the

8
dispositional order is not limited to those situations in which

circumstances have changed.”).

¶ 20 Nor are we persuaded by father’s due process arguments.

¶ 21 Generally, procedural due process is satisfied when a parent

receives notice of the proceedings, an opportunity to be heard and

defend, and the assistance of counsel. See People in Interest of E.B.,

2022 CO 55, ¶ 16. Father claims that he was not provided notice

that the Department was proceeding to termination “under only the

theory that no [appropriate] treatment plan could be devised.”

(Emphasis added). But as his trial counsel conceded,

¶ 22 the Department’s termination motion notified father that one

of the grounds it intended to rely on was that no appropriate

treatment plan could be devised. Because father had notice that

the Department sought termination on this ground, he did not

suffer a due process violation. See id.

¶ 23 Father also asserts that he was denied the opportunity to be

heard because the court denied his motion to continue, preventing

his expert witness from completing her report or testifying. But he

does not explain how his expert’s report or testimony would have

impacted the outcome on the case and thus fails to show how he

9
was prejudiced by not presenting this evidence. See People in

Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007) (a parent

may not obtain relief on a due process claim absent a showing of

harm or prejudice).1

IV. Mother’s Plea Agreement Contention

¶ 24 Relying on criminal case law, mother argues that she and the

Department entered into a “plea agreement,” through which the

Department agreed that it would “not proceed to termination under

the theory of no appropriate treatment plan.” She asserts that the

court erred when it did not enforce the “plea agreement” or allow

her to withdraw her admission when the Department did not

“uphold its end” of the agreement. For a number of reasons, we

reject these contentions.

A. Additional Background

¶ 25 The parties’ “plea agreement” was memorialized in a written

order. The order stated that “[m]other will be entering [an

1 To the extent father argues in his reply brief that the evidence on

which the court relied was insufficient for it to conclude that the
SBI to Z.G. was “due to proven parental abuse or neglect,” see § 19-
3-604(1)(b)(IV) (emphasis added), we do not address it. See In re
Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31 (we do not consider
arguments made for the first time in a reply brief).)

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admission with a waiver of a factual basis] on the contingency that

[the Department] will enter a treatment plan rather than pursue No

Reasonable Treatment Plan at the Disposition Hearing.” The parties

also recited the terms of their agreement during a hearing. The

county attorney stated that mother’s admission was “contingent

upon the Department’s agreement that [it] will not be filing for no

reasonable treatment plan for a disposition,” and that “[the

Department] will be adopting a treatment plan.”2 Mother’s counsel

then confirmed that the county attorney accurately stated the

agreement, reiterating that mother’s admission was contingent on

the fact that “there will be a treatment plan.”

¶ 26 More than six months before the termination hearing, the

court adopted the objectives of a treatment plan for mother. While

the parties never resolved a disagreement over whether she should

participate in a mental health or a psychological evaluation, they

agreed to all other aspects of her treatment plan five and a half

months before the termination hearing.

2 Only the court can enter a treatment plan.The parties may
propose and submit a treatment plan, but it becomes enforceable
only when the court approves it. See § 19-3-508(1), C.R.S. 2025.

11
¶ 27 At the termination hearing, mother’s counsel objected to the

Department pursuing termination on a theory of no appropriate

treatment plan and asked to withdraw her admission. Counsel

stated that mother’s “understanding was that the agreement was

that [the Department] would never pursue a finding of no

reasonable treatment plan based on [mother’s] previous conviction,”

which was “exactly what [wa]s happening now.”

¶ 28 The court overruled mother’s objections and permitted the

Department to proceed on the theory of no appropriate treatment

plan, and it did not allow mother to withdraw her admission. It

concluded that, “[w]hile mother made the initial

admission . . . contingent upon the Department agreeing not to

proceed on no reasonable treatment plan, the Department did

honor that and provide[d] a treatment plan and has since

determined that there is no reasonable treatment plan at this point

available.”

B. Analysis

¶ 29 Mother relies exclusively on criminal law and cites no

authority for the proposition that plea agreements are utilized in

dependency and neglect cases. See § 16-7-301, C.R.S. 2025

12
(governing plea agreements); Crim. P. 11(f) (same). Nor are we

aware of any such authority. On the contrary, dependency and

neglect proceedings are civil in nature. C.R.J.P. 1; People in Interest

of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 214 (Colo. App. 2007); see People in Interest of

A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[A] dependency and

neglect case is not a quasi-criminal proceeding . . . .”). The Rules of

Civil Procedure, not the Rules of Criminal Procedure, apply in these

proceedings when a procedure is not addressed in the Children’s

Code or the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. See C.R.J.P. 1; Z.P., 167

P.3d at 214. Therefore, there are no plea agreements in

dependency and neglect proceedings, and the Department and

mother never entered into a plea agreement.

¶ 30 Nevertheless, mother asserts that the “plea agreement,” or her

interpretation of it, precluded the Department from relying on the

no appropriate treatment plan ground at the termination hearing.

¶ 31 We first observe that under the Children’s Code, the parties

are precluded from stipulating to any restrictions upon the court’s

duty to protect the best interests of a child. People in Interest of

G.K.H., 698 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Colo. App. 1984) (holding that the

government’s stipulation with a parent not seek termination of his

13
parental rights “interfere[d] with the court’s duty to protect the

child”); People in Interest of A.R.S., 502 P.2d 92, 94 (Colo. App.

1972); see Z.P.S., ¶ 23 (“[T]he Children’s Code is . . . designed to

protect children’s welfare and safety by providing procedures to

serve their best interests.”). Thus, there is serious doubt that the

“plea agreement” conferred any enforceable rights on mother,

especially with respect to the grounds for termination, and we

disapprove of such agreements or stipulations. See G.K.H., supra.

¶ 32 Moreover, even if the juvenile court erred in not enforcing the

alleged “plea agreement,” on this record, we conclude that any error

was harmless, or to the extent that the error was of a constitutional

dimension, and assuming without deciding that the constitutional

harmless error standard applies in dependency and neglect

proceedings, constitutionally harmless. See People in Interest of

T.M.S., 2019 COA 136, ¶ 26 (recognizing that the Colorado Supreme

Court has not addressed whether the constitutional harmless error

standard applies with respect to a parent’s constitutional rights in

dependency and neglect cases).

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V. Father’s Less Drastic Alternatives Contention

¶ 33 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

no less drastic alternative to termination existed because the child’s

paternal grandmother was a willing and available permanent

placement option for the child.

¶ 34 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(b). C.Z., ¶ 61. In doing so, the court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); C.Z., ¶ 61. For a less drastic

alternative to be viable, it must do more than “adequately” meet a

child’s needs; rather, the less drastic alternative must be the “best”

option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a

less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and

order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we

must affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 35 Here, the juvenile court considered the possibility of an

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to paternal

15
grandmother, who volunteered to be a placement around the time of

the termination hearing. But it concluded that termination, rather

than an APR to paternal grandmother, was in the child’s best

interests. See A.M., ¶ 32.

¶ 36 The court found that paternal grandmother and father spent

several years out of contact and reconnected shortly before the

termination hearing. It also found that paternal grandmother had

never met the child and that when father had custody, he did not

make efforts to “have [the child] engage” with her.

¶ 37 The child was placed with three of his siblings at the time of

the hearing, and the court determined it was in his best interests to

remain with his siblings, as opposed to moving him to a “strange

home.” See § 19-3-500.2(1)(a) (legislative declaration recognizing

that “[i]t is beneficial for a child who is removed from his or her

home and placed in foster care to be able to continue relationships

with his or her brothers and sisters”). The court also considered

the child’s young age, nearly two years old at the time of the

hearing. And it found that all the child “ha[d] known” since he was

four months old was his caring, stable foster placement with his

siblings. See § 19-3-604(3); C.Z., ¶ 61.

16
¶ 38 The record supports the court’s findings. Paternal

grandmother testified that she had learned about the child a month

before the termination hearing and reestablished contact with

father around that time. Prior to that, she had no contact with

father for several years and was unaware why the Department was

involved with the family. The caseworker testified that moving the

child to paternal grandmother’s home would mean placing him with

someone he does not know and taking him out of the home he

“ha[d] been in for a while” with his siblings.

¶ 39 The child also had visits with his three other siblings who were

in different placements, and the caseworker stated that there were

plans for those visits to continue. The caseworker noted that the

child had been receiving occupational therapy for his sleep schedule

and behaviors while in his placement. And she testified that, while

there was not yet enough information to make a final decision

about placement, she preferred to keep the child in his current

placement and “achieve permanency that way.” See also People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 29 (noting that a juvenile court

may consider the child’s need for permanency when determining

whether there is a viable less drastic alternative to termination).

17
¶ 40 Because the record supports the court’s findings, we must

affirm its determination. See B.H., ¶ 80.

VI. Disposition

¶ 41 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.

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