Jump To

Top Caption Syllabus [Combined Opinion

                  by Andrew J. Becke](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10825965/coconino-community-v-the-property-tax/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Coconino Community v. the Property Tax

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 1 CA-TX 25-0001

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (62.4K)

• PDF

Syllabus

Under A.R.S. § 42-17051 and Article 9, Section 19 of the Arizona Constitution, can a community college district include two constitutionally required increases (an annual 2% increase and an increase or decrease to reflect change of property subject to taxation) to the maximum primary property tax levy limit while phasing in a voter-approved base levy limit reset?

Combined Opinion

                        by Andrew J. Becke

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

COCONINO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

THE PROPERTY TAX OVERSIGHT COMMISSION,
Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-TX 25-0001
FILED 03-27-2026

Appeal from the Arizona Tax Court
No. TX2024-000143
The Honorable Erik Thorson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Gust Rosenfeld, P.L.C., Phoenix
By Charles W. Wirken, Nathan D. Schott
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Bergin, Frakes, Smalley & Oberholtzer, PLLC, Phoenix
By Brian M. Bergin, Anthony R. Napolitano
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 The Property Tax Oversight Commission (“Commission”)
appeals the tax court’s decision that the Coconino Community College
District (“District”) adopted a primary property tax levy within the legal
limit. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In May 2022, Coconino County voters approved the District’s
request to reset the base levy limit from about $9 million to about $14.7
million beginning in tax year 2022. The ballot language told voters a “YES”
vote would reset the levy limit “beginning in tax year 2022,” and that the
new amount “shall be the base for determining levy limitations . . . for
subsequent years.” By statute, this increase was phased in incrementally
over the following three years. See A.R.S. § 42-17056(F)(1)(a)–(c).
Specifically, for the first tax year after voter approval, the levy limit equals
the original base levy limit plus one-third of the difference between the
original base levy limit and the new base levy limit. For the second tax year,
the levy limit equals the original levy limit plus two-thirds of the difference
between the original levy limit and the new levy limit. Finally, in the third
tax year, the base levy limit equals the voter approved amount.

¶3 For tax year 2022, the District phased in one-third of the new
base levy limit, and the Commission approved the District’s calculations.
For tax year 2023, however, the District phased in another one-third of the
new base levy limit, but also included a 2% “growth” increase and a “new
construction” increase to reflect the change in property subject to taxation,
as required by the Arizona Constitution. Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 19 (1), (4), (6).

¶4 The Commission rejected the District’s calculations for the
2023 levy limit, stating the calculations were incorrect and exceeded the
maximum allowable amount, because the District included the 2%
“growth” and “new construction” increases. The District objected,

2
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

petitioned the Commission to reconsider its decision, and requested a
hearing.

¶5 After a hearing, the Commission denied the District’s petition
to reconsider, relying on the phase-in process language from A.R.S. § 42-
17056(F)(1)(b), (c). Specifically, the Commission concluded that the levy
limit for tax year 2023 “must be less than or equal to the [original levy limit]
plus two-thirds of the difference” between the original levy limit and the
new levy limit, and that the 2024 tax year levy limit “must be less than or
equal to the [new levy limit].” Id.

¶6 The District appealed this decision to the tax court, which
reversed, finding that the District’s position correctly harmonized the
Arizona constitutional provisions with A.R.S. § 42-17056(F). The court
instructed the Commission to “approve the addition of the growth and new
construction levy limit increases during the three-year phase-in period of
the base levy limit increase.”

¶7 Upon entry of a final judgment, the Commission timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -170(C), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 At issue is whether a community college district can include
the 2% “growth” increase and the “new construction” increase as required
by the Arizona Constitution while phasing in a voter-approved base levy
limit reset.

¶9 We review the interpretation of constitutional provisions and
statutes de novo. Ross v. Bennett, 228 Ariz. 174, 176, ¶ 6 (2011). We start with
the applicable text, Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Hobbs, 253 Ariz. 478, 482, ¶ 10
(2022); In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18, ¶ 5 (2024), and unless ambiguous,
apply it without resorting to other means of textual construction, Heath v.
Kiger, 217 Ariz. 492, 494, ¶ 6 (2008); In re Drummond, 257 Ariz at 18, ¶ 5.

¶10 In interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions, we do
so not in isolation but in context with other provisions covering the same
subject matter. Roundtree v. City of Page, ___ Ariz. __, __, ¶ 13, 573 P.3d 65,
69 (2025). However, “a statute cannot circumvent or modify constitutional
requirements.” Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 434, ¶ 24 (2021). If the statutory
term is ambiguous, then “we may use alternative methods of statutory
construction, including examining the rule’s historical background, its
spirit and purpose, and the effects and consequences of competing

3
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

interpretations.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142,
¶ 17 (2024).

¶11 The relevant provisions of Article 9, Section 19, of the Arizona
Constitution provide:

(1) The maximum amount of ad valorem taxes levied by any
county, city, town or community college district shall not
exceed an amount two per cent greater than the amount
levied in the preceding year.

....

(4) The limitation prescribed by subsection (1) shall be
increased each year to the maximum permissible limit,
whether or not the political subdivision actually levies ad
valorem taxes to such amounts . . . .

(5) The voters, in the manner prescribed by law, may elect to
allow ad valorem taxation in excess of the limitation
prescribed by this section.

(6) The limitation prescribed by subsection (1) of this section
shall be increased by the amount of ad valorem taxes levied
against property not subject to taxation in the prior year and
shall be decreased by the amount of ad valorem taxes levied
against property subject to taxation in the prior year and not
subject to taxation in the current year . . . .

¶12 Part (1) allows for a 2% “growth” increase to the maximum
levy limit every year. Part (4) makes the 2% “growth” increase to the
maximum levy limit mandatory regardless of whether the entity levies the
maximum amount of primary property taxes. Part (6) mandates a “new
construction” increase or decrease to the maximum levy limit every year to
reflect the increase or decrease of property subject to taxation. Part (5)
allows voters to approve taxation in excess of the maximum levy limit.

¶13 The legislature, as it is authorized to do, has enacted statutes
implementing this constitutional provision. Ariz. Const. Art. 9, § 19(7).
A.R.S. § 42-17051 implements Parts (1), (4), and (6) by spelling out the
specific calculations for determining the maximum levy limit each year.
These calculations include both the 2% “growth” increase and the “new
construction” increase. Section 42-17202 provides the procedure a
community college district must follow when asking the voters to approve

4
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

a maximum levy limit in excess of the limitation spelled out in Article 9,
Section 19. The voters do so by approving temporary secondary property
taxes.

¶14 Section 42-17056 establishes the procedure for setting up an
initial base levy limit for entities that did not levy primary property taxes
in the prior year. This statute also provides entities with the procedure for
resetting the base levy limit after a certain number of years. Id. at (F).

¶15 The procedure to set the initial base levy limit is as follows:
“If a . . . community college district did not levy primary property taxes in
the preceding tax year, the governing body shall submit a proposed amount
to be raised by primary property taxes for approval of the voters.” § 42-
17056(A). If approved by the voters, the amount “will be the base for
determining levy limitations for . . . subsequent fiscal years.” § 42-17056(B).

¶16 To reset the base levy limit, a community college district must
wait at least twenty but not more than thirty-five years after approving the
initial base levy limit to “resubmit a proposed amount . . . for approval by
the voters.” § 42-17056(F). If the voters approve, the implementation is as
follows:

(a) The first tax year following approval pursuant to this
paragraph must be less than or equal to the previously
approved amount plus one-third of the difference between
the previously approved amount and the amount approved
pursuant to this paragraph.

(b) The second tax year following approval pursuant to this
paragraph must be less than or equal to the previously
approved amount plus two-thirds of the difference between
the previously approved amount and the amount approved
pursuant to this paragraph.

(c) The third tax year following approval pursuant to this
paragraph and each subsequent tax year must be less than or
equal to the amount approved pursuant to this paragraph.

Id. at (F)(1).

¶17 The Commission urges us to interpret § 42-17056(F) as
forbidding the two increases spelled out in the Arizona Constitution and
A.R.S. § 42-17051 during this phase-in process. Specifically, it argues that
because § 42-17056(F)(1)(a)–(c) requires the levy limit during the first,

5
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

second, and third years following voter approval to be “less than or equal
to the [new levy limit],” it must be less than $14.7 million, the new base levy
limit by year three. Although the Commission’s position has some logic, it
is inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme.

¶18 Section 42-17056 deals with setting and resetting the base levy
limit from which the maximum levy limit for subsequent years is calculated.
Article 9, Section 19 specifically deals with the increases to the maximum
levy limit. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 19 (“The maximum amount of ad valorem
taxes levied . . . shall not exceed an amount two per cent greater than the
amount levied in the preceding year . . . .”) (emphasis added).

¶19 “Base” is generally understood to be “the bottom of
something considered as its support.” See Base, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/base (last visited
February 12, 2026). Therefore, the base levy limit is the bottom or foundation
of the levy limit. The section’s title, “Initial base levy limit if no primary
property taxes were levied in the preceding tax year; subsequent levy
amount” indicates the legislature intended to make this section about
setting and resetting the base levy limit. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris,
237 Ariz. 98, 102, ¶ 13 (2014) (“[S]tatutory title headings . . . can aid in its
interpretation.”).

¶20 “Maximum” is defined as “the greatest quantity of value
attainable or attained.” Maximum, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/maximum (last visited
February 12, 2026). The maximum levy limit is increased every year by
adding a 2% “growth” increase. There is also a constitutional “new
construction” increase (or decrease) to the previous year’s levy limit
depending on whether the amount of property subject to taxation has
increased or decreased. Article 9, Section 19’s annual increases (or
decreases) to the maximum levy limit are mandatory, and distinct and
separate from the base levy limit reset allowed by Section 42-17056(F).

¶21 A district initially sets its base levy limit through an election
process. A.R.S. § 42-17056(A)–(E). After at least twenty but not more than
thirty-five years from setting the initial base levy, a district may resubmit a
proposed amount to reset the base levy limit. § 42-17056(F). Subsection F
specifically states a community college district “with a primary property
tax levy that was initially established pursuant to this section may resubmit a
proposed amount.” (Emphasis added). The plain language indicates this
statute specifically deals with the base levy amount. When voters approve a
base limit reset, they are voting to start the process anew with a different

6
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

base number. As the ballot language told the voters, this newly adopted
amount—“beginning in tax year 2022”—would “be the base for determining
levy limitations . . . for subsequent years.” (Emphasis added).

¶22 It is through this statute that the District reset its base levy
limit to about $14.7 million in May 2022. Part of the Commission’s argument
is that Section 42-17056(F)(1) explicitly states that the tax years following
approval of the new base levy limit “must be less than or equal to the
proposed amount,” and thus, the actual levy imposed must be less than or
equal to $14.7 million. Not so. The base levy limit must be less than or equal
to the proposed amount. We are unaware of any constitutional or statutory
language that states the two constitutionally required increases are satisfied
by resetting the base levy limit under A.R.S. § 42-17056, or that suggests
these increases are paused for the three-year phase-in of the new base levy
limit.

¶23 The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized the importance
of these annual increases. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.
v. Apache Cnty., 172 Ariz. 337, 340 (1992). The Court noted that failing to
include the two increases each year results in growth that is “‘lost’ forever.”
Id. The policy underlying Article 9, Section 19 is to allow growth of the
maximum levy limit by 2%, increased or decreased to reflect “the
proportionate change in the size of the tax base resulting from the addition
to or removal of property from the tax roll.” Id. at 339. And “[a]ny other
interpretation of the provision would freeze the tax levy and hold it
constant no matter what growth the state might experience and what
governmental needs might be created by such growth.” Id. at 342. Thus, any
“freeze” of these constitutionally required increases would be
inappropriate.

¶24 The Commission’s argument that resetting the base levy limit
under A.R.S. § 42-17056 “overrides” the maximum levy limit increases is
similarly unpersuasive. Specifically, the Commission asks us to conclude
that the District can either reset its base levy limit or it can receive the
constitutionally required increases, but not both, since the first supplants
the second. However, § 42-17056 is not the statutory mechanism the
legislature created to “override” the maximum levy limit.

¶25 The legislature clearly provided for an override of the
maximum levy limit through A.R.S. § 42-17202 using secondary property
taxes, which is aptly titled “Community college district levy limit override.”
See A.R.S. § 42-17202(A)–(C) (providing a community college district with
the means to request voters approve taxes in excess of the maximum levy

7
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

limit); see also Mountain States Legal Found. v. Apache Cnty., 146 Ariz. 479, 481
(App. 1985) (noting the legislature permitted voters to override the
limitation through implementation of secondary property taxes). As
discussed supra ¶¶ 18–22, § 42-17056 is not an override—it resets the base
levy limit that is used to calculate the maximum levy limit in subsequent
years. Additionally, even an override under § 42-17202 is not an “either/or”
proposition. After receiving its annual increases, a district may ask the
voters to approve secondary property taxes in excess of the year’s
limitation. See A.R.S. § 42-17202(A).

¶26 The Commission also argues that including the two increases
subverts Article 9, Section 19’s purpose: to limit taxation. But the tax court’s
ruling did not remove limits on taxation; instead it acknowledged required
limits while permitting constitutionally mandated increases. Although the
purpose of Article 9, Section 19 is to curb “excessive spending,” it also
specifically mandates 2% “growth” and “new construction” increases each
year to the maximum allowable primary property taxes. See Mountain States
Legal Found., 146 Ariz. at 480–81. Allowing the District to take these annual
increases after a voter-approved reset of the base levy limit does not subvert
this purpose—it upholds it by capping annual increases, albeit at a level
slightly higher than what the Commission would prefer.

¶27 Finally, the Commission’s argument that including the 2%
“growth” increase and “new construction” increase in the phase-in
calculations “would create great uncertainty for voters evaluating the ballot
measure to approve a levy reset” is similarly unpersuasive. The ballot
language told voters that, if approved, the District would reset the levy limit
to about $14.7 million “beginning in tax year 2022,” and that figure would
be the base “for determining levy limitations . . . for subsequent years.” A
reasonable voter would presumably read that to mean (1) the base levy limit
will be about $14.7 million starting in 2022 and (2) future levy limitations
will be based on this new base levy limit. Pausing the two increases,
increases that happen every year, does not track the statutory language or
otherwise create “clarity” or “predictability” as the Commission contends.

¶28 In sum, construing the constitutional and statutory provisions
in harmony and applying their plain language, we hold that the District can
include the 2% “growth” increase and the “new construction” increase
provided for under Article 9, Section 19 of the Arizona Constitution during
the phase-in of the new base levy limit under A.R.S. § 42-17056. See Fragoso
v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 431–32, ¶ 13 (App. 2005) (“We endeavor to harmonize
statutes . . . with the Arizona Constitution.”)

8
COCONINO COMMUNITY v. THE PROPERTY TAX
Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶29 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

9