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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

City of Riverside v. RLI Insurance Co.

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: D085905

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (701)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF RIVERSIDE, D085905

Cross-complainant and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. CVR12203266)
v.

RLI INSURANCE COMPANY,

Cross-defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Chad W. Firetag, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Office of the City Attorney, City of Riverside, Rebecca L. McKee-
Reimbold, Jessica Rico-Zuber, Cecilia Rojas and Jacob Castrejon for Cross-
complainant and Appellant.
Nicolaides Fink Thorpe Michaelides Sullivan, Matthew Joseph Hafey,
Mark J. Sobczak and Yevgenia Altman for Cross-defendant and Respondent.
The City of Riverside (the City) appeals from a judgment of dismissal
after the granting of a demurrer as to its cross-complaint against RLI
Insurance Company (RLI). The City asserts the trial court erred by
concluding that RLI was improperly joined as a party in an action against its
insured, Design Services, Inc. (DSI) based on the general rule announced in
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880 (Royal Globe)
that a “plaintiff may not sue both the insurer and the insured in the same
lawsuit.” (Id. at p. 891.) The City contends this case is distinguishable in
part because here, both DSI and the City are named insureds of RLI. We
agree, reverse the judgment of dismissal, and remand the matter to the trial
court for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The present case arises from a tragic accident in which Ferial Harb was
struck by a vehicle, driven by Brian Gene Bozarth III, while walking on or
near a roadway in Riverside, California. Harb died from his injuries.
A. The Harbs’s Complaint
Ali Harb, Ibrahim Harb, and Lama Harb (collectively, the Harbs) filed
a complaint against the City, the County of Riverside, the State of California,
Brian Gene Bozarth III, and Melissa Bozarth, the owner of the vehicle
(collectively, the Bozarths). The Harbs asserted causes of action for
dangerous condition of public property against the City, county, and state;
negligence against the Bozarths; wrongful death against all defendants; and
recovery under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 et seq. against all
defendants.
As to the first cause of action for dangerous condition of public
property, the Harbs alleged, in part, that the roadway where the accident
occurred had been the site of numerous prior collisions; was unreasonably
dangerous; lacked sufficient signs or signals; had inadequate visibility; and
that the dangerous conditions were concealed. The Harbs incorporated these
same allegations into the third and fourth causes of action.
The City answered the complaint with a general denial and asserted
numerous affirmative defenses, including that others contributed to any
negligence or harm.

2
B. The City’s Cross-complaint
The City then filed a cross-complaint against numerous third-party
contractors and consultants, including DSI, as well as an arborist, a
landscape and design contractor, and their respective insurance agencies,
including RLI. The City included causes of action for indemnification,
apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, breach of contract, and insurance
bad faith.
In the operative second amended cross-complaint (the Cross-
Complaint), the City alleged that it entered into an agreement with DSI, by
which DSI agreed to provide professional consulting services for a citywide
LED street light conversion project. The contract required DSI to evaluate
the street lighting, including on the street where the accident occurred, and
provide professional services “to sequence the replacement of lighting”
between 2016 and 2022. The City alleged further that “DSI’s assessment of
the lighting compliance [on the street at issue] and its recommendation for
LED replacement timing is, at least in part, challenged by the [Harbs] and
the cause of the [accident at issue]. The conduct of DSI, e.g. sufficiency of
compliant lighting visibility and recommendations for timing of replacement
are the work that has, in part, prompted [the Harbs’s] actions against the
City; and, the contract between DSI and the City require DSI to provide it a
defense and indemnity against [the Harbs’s] action.”
Regarding RLI, the City alleged that its agreement with DSI “required
DSI to obtain insurance policies to protect the City against claims arising out
of DSI’s work, including their negligence,” and that RLI—DSI’s insurer—
agreed to name the City as an additional insured on all RLI policies
concerning the City’s interests in its agreement with DSI. “Certificates of
Insurance were provided proving the City’s status as an additional insured on
DSI’s insurance policies between 2016 for its work on the City’s lighting,

3
including compliance of the lighting [on the street at issue].” The City
tendered defense and indemnity to RLI. The City included at least some of
the relevant policies, as well as an endorsement from RLI noting that the
City was added as an additional insured. RLI refused “to defend and
indemnify the City for [Harbs’s] lawsuit against the City for dangerous
condition on public property arising from the work of [DSI] under the
contract,” which was attached to the Cross-Complaint as an exhibit.
C. RLI’s Demurrer to the City’s Cross-complaint
RLI demurred to the City’s Cross-Complaint. RLI asserted that it was
improperly joined as a liability insurer for cross-defendant DSI, and that the
complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action.
As to the first contention, RLI argued, “[u]nder California law, an
underlying third-party action against an insured cannot be joined with an
insurance coverage lawsuit against that same defendant’s insurer, because
such a lawsuit necessarily informs the jury of the presence of insurance,
which violates both the letter and spirit of California Evidence Code [section]
1155. The City can easily avoid the palpable prejudice to [DSI] by bringing a
separate insurance coverage action if it wishes to litigate its alleged
entitlement to additional insured coverage under the RLI policy issued to
DSI.” The City relied primarily on Royal Globe, in
which the California Supreme Court held that a cross-complainant “may not
sue both the insurer and the insured in the same lawsuit,” based on the
“letter and spirit” of Evidence Code section 1155. (Royal Globe, supra,
23 Cal.3d at p. 891.)
Here, RLI argued further, the Harbs had sued the City, and the City
had, in turn, sued both DSI and RLI in the same Cross-Complaint, alleging
that DSI’s “negligent provision of its professional consulting services”
contributed to the accident at issue. Doing so, RLI asserted, directly violates

4
Royal Globe’s mandate against joining an insured and its insurer as
defendants in the same liability action.
In its response, the City argued that RLI’s reliance on Royal Globe was
misplaced because the City alleged it was an actual insured of, and in
contractual privity with, RLI. The City asserted it is not a third-party
stranger to the contract and that it was not seeking to recover tort damages

from RLI or its insured, DSI.1 The City asserted its contract with DSI
required that DSI provide general liability insurance naming the City as an
additional insured, and that RLI, through its agent, provided the City with a
certificate that conforming insurance was issued. Thus, its claims were
based on RLI’s denying the tender and unreasonably interpreting the
relevant policy to deny the City its rights and benefits under the policy.
Accordingly, the City asserted this case is more like Royal Surplus Lines Ins.
Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193 (Royal Surplus), in which
the court determined the general rule in Royal Globe did not apply to a first-
party additional insured in an action against the named insured and the
named insured’s insurer. (Royal Surplus, at p. 200; see also 4 Cal. Insurance
Law & Practice (2026) ch. 41, § 41.20.)
In addition, the City asserted a cross-complaint is generally considered
to be a separate action from that initiated by the complaint, and that the
proper approach if there was any potential for prejudice (i.e., by alerting the
jury to a potential insurance claim) would be to sever or bifurcate the actions.
Finally, in its reply, RLI asserted Royal Surplus was inapt because
there, the injured party had settled and was no longer part of the case,

1 The City also agreed to dismiss the first two causes of action, for
indemnification and apportionment, against RLI.

5
removing the potential for prejudice arising from the jurors being aware of a
claim for insurance coverage.
D. The Trial Court’s Ruling
After considering the briefing and hearing argument from the parties,
the trial court sustained RLI’s demurrer without leave to amend, explaining:
“The City has standing to bring its contract claims
against RLI, assuming that a valid insurance policy was
issued to Design Services naming the City as an additional
insured. However, the issue is whether RLI may be joined
in the present liability action consistent with Evidence
Code [section] 1155. In Royal Surplus, relied on by the
City, the Court held that there was no risk of prejudice
under Section 1155 because the third-party plaintiffs’
claims against the insured had settled. ([Royal Surplus,
supra,] 110 Cal. App. 4th at [pp.] 200–201.) By contrast, in
the present action, [Harbs’s] wrongful death claims remain
active. As such, the Court finds the risk that Design
Services or the City may be prejudiced by the jury’s
knowledge of the insurance policy remains. Furthermore,
bifurcation may not prevent the jury from learning that the
alleged tortfeasor is insured since the insurance company
would still be named party in the action, and discovery
initiated by plaintiff against the insurer could conceivably
hamper its defense of the insured.”

The trial court noted that the remaining grounds for demurrer were
moot, and that the ruling did not prevent the City from filing a separate
action against RLI. The court then entered a judgement of dismissal after
demurrer as to RLI.
The City timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
The City’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in
determining that the City could not name RLI in its Cross-Complaint as a
matter of law.

6
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a
demurrer, our standard of review is de novo, i.e., we exercise our independent
judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of
law.’ ” (Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 629, 650.) In doing so, “we must assume the truth of all facts
properly pleaded by the plaintiffs, as well as those that are judicially
noticeable.” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001)
25 Cal.4th 809, 814.)
B. Relevant Legal Authorities
1. Royal Globe
In Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court held that a third party
(i.e., an injured individual) may sue an insurer for knowingly committing
certain enumerated unfair claims settlement practices “with such frequency
as to indicate a general business practice” in violation of Insurance Code

section 790.03, subdivision (h)(5), (14),2 “but that the third party’s suit may
not be brought until the action between the injured party and the insured is
concluded.” (Royal Globe, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 884.) There, the plaintiff,
“filed an action for personal injuries incurred as a result of a fall when she

2 Insurance Code section 790.03 provides, in relevant part, “The
following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice any of the following unfair claims
settlement practices:
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and
equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become
reasonably clear.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an
attorney.” (Ins. Code § 790.03, subd. (h)(4), (14).)

7
slipped at a food market. She joined as defendants Royal Globe Insurance
Company [Royal Globe], which had issued a policy of liability insurance to
the market” and an independent insurance adjustment company, asserting a
cause of action under Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h)(5)
against Royal Globe. (Royal Globe, at p. 884.)
The court in Royal Globe focused most of its written opinion on its
conclusion that Insurance Code section 790.03 permitted a private right of
action against an insurer, but also stated, at the end:
“Finally, we agree with defendant that plaintiff may not
sue both the insurer and the insured in the same lawsuit.
Section 1155 of the Evidence Code provides that evidence of
insurance is inadmissible to prove negligence or
wrongdoing. The obvious purpose of the provision is to
prevent the prejudicial use of evidence of liability insurance
in an action against an insured. [Citations.] A joint trial
against the insured for negligence and against the insurer
for violating its duties under subdivision (h) would
obviously violate both the letter and spirit of the section.
[Fn. omitted.]
“Moreover, unless the trial against the insurer is postponed
until the liability of the insured is first determined, the
defense of the insured may be seriously hampered by
discovery initiated by the injured claimant against the
insurer. In addition, damages suffered by the injured party
as a result of the insurer’s violation of subdivisions (h)(5)
and (h)(14) may best be determined after the conclusion of
the action by the third party claimant against the insured.
Thus, plaintiff’s claim against defendant was brought
prematurely and the trial court should have sustained
defendant’s demurrer and granted the motion for judgment
on the pleadings on that ground.” (Royal Globe, supra, 23
Cal.3d at pp. 891–892.)
2. Moradi-Shalal
About 10 years later, in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 304 (Moradi-Shalal), the California

8
Supreme Court reconsidered its prior holding in Royal Globe regarding the
validity of a private right of action based on Insurance Code section 790.03.
The Court explained that Insurance Code section 790.03 was derived from
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Model Unfair Claims
Practices Act, and that many other states with similar statutes had declined
to follow the reasoning in Royal Globe. (Moradi-Shalal, at p. 297.) It also
acknowledged several concerns that had arisen since Royal Globe, including
the potential to increase insurance costs, and the inherent conflict of interest
for insurers, “who must not only protect the interests of its insured, but also
safeguard its own interest from the adverse claims of the third party
claimant.” (Moradi-Shalal, at p. 302.)
After further discussion, the court reversed its prior holding and
concluded that Insurance Code section 790.03 was not intended “to create a
private civil cause of action against an insurer that commits one of the
various acts listed” in subdivision (h). (Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at
p. 304.) However, the court noted that trial courts do “retain jurisdiction to
impose civil damages or other remedies against insurers in appropriate
common law actions, based on such traditional theories as fraud, infliction of
emotional distress, and (as to the insured) either breach of contract or breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Moradi-Shalal, at
pp. 304–305.)
The court went on to clarify that its decision to overrule Royal Globe
did not impact those cases that were still pending, and, in that context,
addressed whether settlement “concluded” an action as required by Royal
Globe, “[f]or purposes of the present case and other pending Royal Globe
actions which are not affected by the decision here.” (Moradi-Shalal, supra,
46 Cal.3d at p. 305.)

9
In doing so, the court reiterated three reasons why it would be
improper to join an insurer in a pending action against the insured: 1) It
would violate both the letter and spirit of Evidence Code section 1155; 2) “a
joint trial would hamper the defense of the insured on the liability question”;
and 3) “ ‘damages suffered by the injured party as a result of the insurer’s
violation of [Insurance Code section 790.03,] subdivisions (h)(5) and (h)(14)
may best be determined after the conclusion of the action by the third party
claimant against the insured.’ ” (Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 306.)
The court held that, for those cases still pending, “an injured claimant
has a right of recovery under Royal Globe only upon proof that the insured
was actually liable to the third party claimant,” and that a claimant who had
settled his underlying claim against the insured could not subsequently sue
the insurer for damages for statutory bad faith committed in the process of
reaching the settlement. (Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 308, 311.)
However, in Moradi-Shalal, as in Royal Globe, the court’s statements
regarding the potential issues involved in joining an insurer in a pending
action against the insured were made specifically in the context of claims
brought by the injured party (the plaintiff) asserting the defendant’s insurer
improperly failed to pay (or settle) a valid insurance claim for the underlying
injury. In such cases, the merits of the plaintiff’s claims regarding the cause
and extent of the injury would necessarily be fundamentally important to
both the claims against the insurer and the insured. In other words, if the
claim was not valid in the first instance, it would follow that the insurer had
a reasonable basis for denying it.
3. Royal Surplus
The court addressed a slightly different scenario in Royal Surplus.
(Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 193.) There, a group of tenants sued
Ocean, the owner of a residential apartment complex, over renovations at the

10
complex. (Id. at p. 196.) Ocean tendered its defense to its subcontractors,
including Ultimate Construction (Ultimate), and their insurance carriers,
including Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger), but they refused. (Id. at
p. 197.) As here, Ranger was the general liability insurer for Ultimate and
the contract between Ocean and Ultimate required that Ocean be named as
an additional insured on Ultimate’s general liability policy. (Id. at p. 196.)
After settling the case, Ocean and Royal (Ocean’s insurer) sued its
subcontractors and their insurers. (Id. at p. 197.) In the operative first
amended complaint, Ocean and Royal asserted causes of action for breach of
contract for failing to defend and indemnify against the subcontractors, and
causes of action for equitable subrogation, equitable contribution, and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith against the insurers, including Ranger.
(Ibid.)
The trial court “sustained Ranger’s demurrer without leave to amend
solely on the ground of misjoinder in that it was improper to name both the
insured and insurer in the same action,” and the Court of Appeal reversed.
(Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 198.) Ranger relied on Royal
Globe, but the court pointed out that Royal Globe involved a third-party
claim, not a claim by an additional named insured, and Ranger cited no cases
in which Royal Globe’s holding was applied to an additional named insured.
(Royal Surplus, at p. 200.) Because Ocean was an “additional insured,” it
was a “first party” claimant and was not prohibited from suing both the
insurer and its insured in the same suit. (Ibid.) “The duty of an insurer to
provide a defense to an additional insured is broad and applies when there is
only a potential for coverage and extends to the entire action.” (Royal
Surplus, at pp. 203–204; see also 2 Cal. Insurance Law & Practice (2023)
ch. 13, § 13.02 [“ ‘Additional’ insureds’ . . . may—like named insureds—bring

11
an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Additional . . . insureds may have direct contractual rights under the
policy . . . .”].)
Regarding Evidence Code section 1155, the court explained that a
breach of contract claim was not a tort claim and that the insurance policy
would need to be admitted into the case regardless, to prove whether Ranger
met its obligation to procure a policy including Ocean as a named insured.
(Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 201–202.) Addressing
Ranger’s related claim that “its defense of Ultimate could be hampered by
discovery propounded on behalf of appellants such that it makes sense for an
action against it to be commenced only after the conclusion of Ocean’s claims
against Ultimate,” the court explained that Ranger had not shown that the
disclosure of relevant documents in discovery would constitute a violation of
any duty owed to its insured. (Id. at p. 201.) In addition, the court noted that
Civil Code section 2860 provides that there is no conflict of interest as to
claims or allegations in a litigation for which the insurer denies coverage.
(Royal Surplus, at p. 201.) Finally, the court concluded that prejudice may
flow in the opposite direction if Ranger did not remain in the action, as the
coverage issues between Ultimate and Ranger were “inextricably
intertwined.” (Id. at p. 203.)
Ultimately, the court found that, despite the discussion in Royal Globe
and Morardi-Shalal, “there is no requirement that an action against the
third party tortfeasor be finally determined and liability established for the
insured to proceed against her own insurance company for bad faith.” (Royal
Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 204.) The court concluded by noting:
“At the hearing, the court acknowledged appellant could file a separate action
against Ranger, and it would probably be declared a related case. It appears

12
that approach is a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, rather than
apply a hypertechnical rule, the possibility of bifurcation should be explored
in this case.” (Id. at pp. 204–205.)
C. RLI Was Not Improperly Joined
Here, as in Royal Surplus, the City asserts that it entered into a
contract with DSI that “required DSI to obtain insurance policies to protect
the City against claims arising out of DSI’s work, including their negligence.”
And the City includes an endorsement indicating it is listed as an additional
named insured on the policy DSI obtained from RLI. Based on those
allegations, the City asserts claims that arise in contract, not tort, against
RLI. The City asserts that Royal Surplus is therefore controlling in this case.
We are persuaded by the reasoning in Royal Surplus. Here, the City,
as an additional insured under the RLI policy, is in the same position as the
additional insured in Royal Surplus. By naming the City as an additional
insured, RLI undertook an independent written contractual obligation to the
City for certain insurance protections. In other words, the City is a first-
party additional insured with privity of contract and standing to sue RLI and,
thus, the prohibition against suing an insured and insurer in the same action
does not apply. (Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 200; see also
California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1986) 184
Cal.App.3d 1428, 1433 (California State Auto) [declining to extend Royal
Globe to a bad faith action by an insured against her own insurance
company].)
We acknowledge that there are two minor distinctions between Royal
Surplus and the present case. First, the underlying claims have not been
settled in this case. Whereas the complaint in Royal Surplus was a stand-
alone complaint following a settlement, here the City has filed a cross-
complaint to the Harbs’s complaint for wrongful death damages, which has

13
not yet been resolved. Second, the City has asserted both contract claims and
claims for indemnification and apportionment against DSI. But neither
requires a different outcome.
First, there is no significant distinction between a separate complaint
and a cross-complaint, which is itself, generally considered to be a separate
action from that initiated by the complaint. (Westamerica Bank v. MBG
Industries, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 109, 134 [“cross-complaint is
generally considered to be a separate action from that initiated by the
complaint.”]; see also Glenwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Prosher
Development Ltd. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1005 [“ ‘A complaint and a
cross-complaint in a single lawsuit are for most purposes treated as
independent actions.’ ”].) Notably, RLI concedes Royal Surplus would be
“more on point” if the City had sued DSI and RLI in a separate complaint
instead of the Cross-Complaint.
Second, to the extent there is any potential for prejudice (i.e., by
alerting the jury to a potential insurance claim), the proper approach would
be to sever or bifurcate the actions, as the City suggested in the trial court.
As the Legislative Committee comment to Code of Civil Procedure section
428.10, subdivision (a) explains, “Any undesirable effects that might result
from joinder of causes under Section 428.10 may be avoided by severance of
causes or issues for trial under Section 1048 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
(See also Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 205 [“It is within the
discretion of the court to bifurcate issues or order separate trials of actions,
such as for breach of contract and bad faith, and to determine the order in
which those issues are to be decided.”]; Ahmed v. Peterson (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 374, 377 [“But this problem is easily remedied. The breach of
contract cause of action against the Auto Club can be bifurcated from the

14
cause of action against Peterson. ‘[T]he jury trying the issue of [Peterson’s]
liability for damages [will be] afforded no knowledge of his insurance
coverage.’ ”].) “The trial court is empowered to determine the order in which
the issues to be determined are tried and may order the . . . complaint tried
before the cross-complaint.” (California State Auto, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1433.)
RLI asserts, as Ranger did in Royal Surplus, that the Harbs and the
City could attempt to seek discovery of materials from RLI’s claim file,
thereby driving a wedge between RLI and its own insured. But the analysis
in Royal Surplus is on point here as well. The claims against RLI are
contract claims and to the extent the City seeks discovery regarding the
insurance policy itself, or its interpretation, there is no conflict of interest to
address. Any remaining issues can be handled by the trial court’s inherent
authority to determine the order of issues at trial. (See Royal Surplus, supra,
100 Cal.App.4th at p. 201; California State Auto, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1433.) To the extent RLI asserts the City is not an additional named
insured, that matter should be resolved in conjunction with the claims
against DSI, who the City alleges had a contractual obligation to ensure the
City was named as an additional insured, just as it was in Royal Surplus.
(Royal Surplus, at p. 203.)
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by concluding
RLI could not be properly joined in the City’s Cross-Complaint, and by
sustaining the demurrer on that ground. Accordingly, we will reverse the
trial court’s order and the resulting judgment of dismissal.
D. The Trial Court Can Address the Remaining Issues on Remand
RLI asserts that we should sustain its demurrer on the alternate
grounds presented. The trial court declined to reach these additional
arguments as it concluded they were rendered moot by its granting of the

15
demurrer without leave to amend on the misjoinder issue. We note that DSI
and another named insurer raised at least somewhat similar arguments in
their own demurrers, and the trial court sustained those demurrers but
granted the City leave to amend. Thus, the City may have already amended,
or prepared an amendment to, the Cross-Complaint in ways relevant to the
alternate grounds presented by RLI. The parties and the trial court may now
be in a better position to amend the pleadings and/or address related
arguments regarding the allegations asserted against RLI. For those
reasons, while we acknowledge the standard of review permits us to decide
the issues as a matter of law, we decline to do so and, instead, remand the
matter to the trial court for further consideration of these additional
arguments in the first instance.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal in favor of RLI is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its order sustaining
RLI’s demurrer to the City’s Cross-Complaint without leave to amend. The
trial court shall consider RLI’s remaining grounds for demurrer. The City is
awarded costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

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