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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Robert Bruce Cole v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-CR-01996
• Judges: Foley, Tavitas, Weissmann

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by Judge Tavitas

FILED
Mar 26 2026, 8:48 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana
Robert Bruce Cole,
Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff

March 26, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-1996
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court
The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D02-2403-F4-11

Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas
Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 1 of 10
Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Case Summary
[1] Robert Cole appeals his conviction for child molesting, a Level 4 felony. Cole

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a forensic interview

of the victim in this case (“Victim”) after finding that Victim was a protected

person and unavailable as a witness under the Protected Person Statute, Indiana

Code Section 35-37-4-6. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting Victim’s forensic interview. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue
[2] Cole raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting a forensic interview of Victim.

Facts
[3] During a forensic interview in February 2024, Victim reported that “Bob”

touched Victim’s penis over his clothing. State’s Ex. 1 at 9:00-9:54. Bob was

later identified as Cole, who was Victim’s neighbor. During an interview with

law enforcement, Cole admitted that he touched Victim “where [he] really

shouldn’t have . . . on his penis.” State’s Ex. 3R at 12:54.

[4] On March 12, 2024, the State charged Cole with child molesting, a Level 4

felony. The State also alleged that Cole was an habitual offender.

[5] The State filed a motion to introduce Victim’s forensic interview at trial, and

the trial court held a Protected Person Statute hearing. Victim testified

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 2 of 10
remotely at the hearing and stated that Cole “touched [his] private part” over

his clothing. Tr. Vol. II p. 86. Cole was given the opportunity to cross-examine

Victim, but he declined.

[6] A family case manager with the Department of Child Services testified that

Victim was removed from his mother’s care in April 2025 due to neglect and

abuse in the home and has been placed in hospitals, facilities, and intensive

foster care services. Victim has suffered physical abuse and sexual abuse other

than the sexual abuse from Cole. Victim “struggles with a lot of trauma,”

depression, and suicidal ideation; “has a lot of outbursts because of” the

trauma; and is “fairly fragile”— “a lot . . . has happened to him in a short

amount of time.” Id. at 94, 99. The family case manager was concerned about

Victim testifying because “every bit of trauma that we add to this makes it that

much worse for him.” Id.

[7] Melinda Eisenbise, the “wrap facilitator” 1 for Victim’s family, testified that

Victim has experienced destructive behaviors, self-mutilation, and suicidal

ideation. When Eisenbise drove Victim to a meeting with the prosecutor

regarding this matter, Victim was dizzy, nauseous, and “just really nervous” on

the way there. Id. at 121. Subsequently, Victim had five “acute stays” 2 in

1
Eisenbise testified that a wrap facilitator works with families and children who have mental health issues
and monitors their care.
2
An acute stay “can be anywhere between three, three days to less than a month.” Tr. Vol. II p. 121. On the
other hand, a residential stay is “six months or more, typically.” Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 3 of 10
facilities due to his mental health and was then referred for a diagnostic

evaluation. Id. at 122. According to Eisenbise, discussing any sexual abuse is a

trigger for Victim, and Victim gets “extremely physically ill over it.” Id. at 123.

Eisenbise did not feel that testifying would be “a good thing” for Victim. Id.

[8] A clinical psychologist testified that she performed a diagnostic evaluation of

Victim. She diagnosed Victim with having experienced physical and sexual

abuse; post-traumatic stress disorder; major depressive disorder; panic disorder;

and sensory integration disorder. Victim’s panic attacks involve “difficulty

breathing, shaking, wanting to run, getting angry, [and] lashing out . . . .” Id. at

1. When asked about sexual abuse that he endured, Victim refused to discuss

the abuse, paced about the room, and then left the room. Victim has thoughts

about hurting himself. The psychologist had “significant concerns” regarding

Victim’s ability to testify in front of Cole and the jury. Id. at 108. She believed

Victim would be triggered by “that kind of pressure,” and she was unsure “what

kind of behaviors you might see out of him because of that pressure.” Id. at

108.

[9] The trial court granted the State’s motion and found that: (1) Victim was a

protected person; (2) his forensic interview was sufficiently reliable; and (3)

Victim was unavailable for trial “because his testimony in the physical presence

of [Cole] will cause him to suffer serious emotional distress such that he cannot

reasonably communicate.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 201. Accordingly, the

trial court concluded that Victim’s forensic interview was admissible at trial.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 4 of 10
[10] A jury trial was held in June 2025, and Victim’s forensic interview was

admitted at trial over Cole’s objection. Cole testified and denied touching

Victim, but Cole also testified that he falsely told law enforcement that he

touched Victim to spur an investigation into the abuse in Victim’s household.

The jury found Cole guilty as charged. Cole waived his right to a jury trial

regarding the habitual offender enhancement, and the trial court found that

Cole was an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Cole to eight years in

the Department of Correction for the child molesting conviction, enhanced by

six years for Cole’s status as an habitual offender. Cole now appeals.

Discussion and Decision
[11] Cole challenges the trial court’s admission of Victim’s forensic interview

pursuant to the Protected Person Statute. According to Cole, Victim did not

qualify as “unavailable” under the Statute. We review challenges to the

admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Combs v. State,

168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only when the decision is

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error

affects a party’s substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind.

2013).

[12] Our Supreme Court has cautioned that the Protected Person Statute “impinges

upon the ordinary evidentiary regime,” which requires trial courts to exercise “a

special level of judicial responsibility.” Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 703

(Ind. 2003). The Protected Person Statute “lists certain conditions under which

evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible will be allowed in cases
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 5 of 10
involving certain crimes against ‘protected persons.’” Setlak v. State, 234 N.E.3d

215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Shoda v. State, 132 N.E.3d 454, 462 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2019)), trans. denied. “Among the crimes to which the protected

person statute applies are sex crimes under Indiana Code chapter 35-42-4,

which includes child molesting.” Id. A “protected person” is defined as

including “a child who is less than fourteen (14) years of age at the time of the

offense but less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of trial.” I.C. § 35-

37-4-6(c)(1).

[13] The Protected Person Statute provides, in relevant part: 3

(e) A statement or videotape that:

(1) is made by a person who at the time of trial is a
protected person, as defined in subsection (c);

(2) concerns an act that is a material element of an offense
listed in subsection (a) or (b) that was allegedly committed
against the person; and

(3) is not otherwise admissible in evidence;

is admissible in evidence in a criminal action for an offense
listed in subsection (a) or (b) if the requirements of
subsection (f) are met.

3
The Protected Person Statute has undergone various amendments throughout the years, but the language at
issue here has remained the same.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 6 of 10
(f) A statement or videotape described in subsection (e) is
admissible in evidence in a criminal action listed in subsection (a)
or (b) if, after notice to the defendant of a hearing and of the
defendant’s right to be present, all of the following conditions are
met:

(1) The court finds, in a hearing:

(A) conducted outside the presence of the jury; and

(B) attended by the protected person in person or by
using closed circuit television testimony as
described in section 8(f) and 8(g) of this chapter;

that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement or videotape provide sufficient indications
of reliability.

(2) The protected person:

(A) testifies at the trial; or

(B) is found by the court to be unavailable as a
witness for one (1) of the following reasons:

(i) From the testimony of a provider, and
other evidence, if any, the court finds that the
protected person’s testifying in the physical
presence of the defendant will cause the
protected person to suffer serious emotional
distress such that the protected person
cannot reasonably communicate.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 7 of 10

---

Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 (emphasis added).

[14] Cole does not challenge the trial court’s determination that Victim was a

protected person and that Victim’s forensic interview provided sufficient

indications of reliability; rather, Cole challenges the trial court’s finding that

Victim was unavailable for trial “because his testimony in the physical presence

of [Cole] will cause him to suffer serious emotional distress such that he cannot

reasonably communicate.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 201.

[15] We first note that Cole did not object on this basis when the forensic interview

was admitted at trial. Cole objected that Victim was not subject to cross-

examination and that admission of the forensic interview would violate his

rights of confrontation and due process. Cole made no specific objection

regarding Victim’s unavailability pursuant to the Protected Person Statute.

Accordingly, this issue is waived. 4 See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070,

1077 (Ind. 2001) (holding that defendant’s objection was waived because his

argument on appeal was different than his argument at trial); Zuniga v. State,

237 N.E.3d 1168, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that, when a party raises

an argument on appeal predicated on grounds substantially different from those

raised at trial, any allegation of error is waived), trans. denied.

4
Cole makes no fundamental error argument.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 8 of 10
[16] Waiver notwithstanding, we are unpersuaded by Cole’s argument. Cole claims

that Victim’s serious emotional distress was caused by other factors in Victim’s

life and that Cole’s physical presence would not cause serious emotional

distress. Cole argues that “there must be a causal relationship between the

emotional distress and the physical presence of the defendant.” Appellant’s Br.

p. 15. The language of the Protected Person Statute, however, does not require

that all of the victim’s emotional distress be caused by testifying in the physical

presence of the defendant, and we decline to require trial courts to parse the

various traumatic reasons for a victim’s emotional distress.

[17] The State presented clear evidence that Victim experiences severe emotional

trauma when discussing any of the sexual abuse he has suffered, including the

sexual abuse he suffered at Cole’s hands. After merely meeting with the

prosecutor to discuss the matter, Victim had five acute stays in mental health

facilities. Discussing any sexual abuse is a trigger for Victim and causes Victim

to become “extremely physically ill.” Tr. Vol. II p. 123. Victim’s clinical

psychologist had “significant concerns” regarding Victim’s ability to testify in

front of Cole and the jury. Id. at 108. She believed Victim would be triggered

by testifying in court.

[18] The State presented sufficient evidence that Victim was unavailable for

purposes of the Protected Person Statute because testifying in the physical

presence of Cole would cause Victim to suffer serious emotional distress such

that Victim could not reasonably communicate. Accordingly, the trial court did

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 9 of 10
not abuse its discretion by admitting Victim’s forensic interview pursuant to the

Protected Person Statute.

Conclusion
[19] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the forensic interview,

and we affirm Cole’s conviction for child molesting, a Level 4 felony.

[20] Affirmed.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Bruce W. Graham
Graham Law Firm P.C.
Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton
Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1996 | March 26, 2026 Page 10 of 10