Jackson v. Rivers - Real Property Dispute
Summary
The South Carolina Court of Appeals issued a non-precedential opinion in the case of Carol Jenkins Jackson and Judy Sharon Jenkins Watkins v. Michael F. Rivers. The court affirmed in part and remanded in part the circuit court's order regarding fee simple absolute title to disputed real property.
What changed
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has issued a non-precedential opinion in the real property dispute case of Jackson v. Rivers, docket number 2023-001278. The appellants challenged the circuit court's findings regarding ownership of disputed property, arguing insufficient evidence for the claimed ownership since 1933 and a failure to address other ownership claims. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision in part and remanded the case in part.
This opinion is non-precedential and should not be cited as precedent except under specific circumstances outlined by SCACR Rule 268(d)(2). For legal professionals involved in real estate litigation or property law in South Carolina, this case highlights the importance of clear title evidence and comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law in property disputes. No specific compliance actions or deadlines are imposed by this non-precedential ruling.
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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Carol Jenkins Jackson v. Michael F. Rivers
Court of Appeals of South Carolina
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 2023-001278
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Combined Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Carol Jenkins Jackson and Judy Sharon Jenkins Watkins,
Appellants,
v.
Michael F. Rivers, R.M. Lapp, Trustee for the St. Helena
Asset Trust, Heirs of Harrison Rivers, Heirs of Ophelia
Rivers, Heirs of Harold W. Rivers, Heirs of Rachael
Chisholm, Heirs of Florence C. Parker, Heirs at Law of
Rueben M. Chisholm, and also Vernell I. Smashum,
Barbara McClarking, Beverly J. Scott, Amos Williams,
Clifford Huff, Sandra Mack-Huff, a Trustee for the
Margaret Loyd Sumpter Trust Dated August 30, 2002,
Joseph A. Moore all of whom are believed to be adjacent
landowners and are made Defendants in this action, and
also all other persons unknown having or claiming to
have any right, title, estate, interest in or lien upon the
real property or any part thereof described in the
complaint herein, as John Doe and Mary Roe, including
all persons who may be deceased, minors, in the military
service of the United States with the naming of Title 50
United States Code, referred to as the Service Members
Civil Relief Act, as amended, persons on Compos Mentis
and any other disability, Defendants,
Of whom Michael F. Rivers is the Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2023-001278
Appeal From Beaufort County
Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-130
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Filed March 18, 2026
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART
R. Thayer Rivers, Jr., of R. Thayer Rivers, Jr. Law Ofc.,
of Ridgeland, for Appellants.
Harold Fred Kuhn, Jr., of Kuhn Law Firm LLC, of
Beaufort, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Carol Jenkins Jackson and Judy Sharon Jenkins Watkins
(Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order finding Michael F. Rivers holds fee
simple absolute title in two pieces of disputed real property (the Disputed
Property). Appellants argue the circuit court erred because (1) the evidence does
not support the circuit court's finding that Rivers and his predecessors owned the
Disputed Property since 1933 and (2) it failed to make any findings of fact or
conclusions of law as to Appellants' ownership of the remaining property against
any other parties. We affirm in part and remand in part pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.
We hold evidence supports the circuit court's findings that Harrison and Ophelia
Rivers, Rivers's parents and predecessors, acquired title to the Disputed Property
because they satisfied the requirements for the ten-year statute of limitations for
adverse possession as well as the twenty-year period for the presumption of a
grant, thereby establishing complete and proper title which transferred to any
subsequent owners. Rivers and two nearby property owners testified that Harrison
and Ophelia, who acquired property from Appellants' predecessor in 1933, farmed
the Disputed Property from at least 1960s until Ophelia's death in the late 1980s;
furthermore, one of the nearby property owners testified she believed the farming
was visible from the road. See Hilton Head Plantation Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc.
v. Donald, 375 S.C. 220, 223, 651 S.E.2d 614, 616 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Generally, an
action to quiet title to land lies in equity."); id. ("However, when the defendant's
answer raises an issue of paramount title to land, such as would, if established,
defeat plaintiff's action, the issue of title is legal."); Wigfall v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59,
60-61, 367 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1988) ("Therefore, in a case tried without a jury, the
factual findings of [the court] regarding title will not be disturbed on appeal unless
found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the [court]'s findings.");
Jones v. Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 12, 681 S.E.2d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 2009) ("For the
purpose of constituting adverse possession by a person claiming title founded upon
a written instrument, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied
when it has been 'usually cultivated or improved,' and when it has been 'protected
by substantial enclosure.'" (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-67-230 (1)-(2) (2005)));
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-67-230 (3) (2005) (stating land shall also be deemed to have
been possessed and occupied "[w]hen, although not enclosed, it has been
used . . . for the purposes of husbandry or for the ordinary use of the occupant");
Jones, 384 S.C. at 15, 681 S.E.2d at 14 ("A person claiming adverse possession
must have personally held the property for ten years, and tacking is allowed only
between ancestor and heir."); Getsinger v. Midlands Orthopaedic Profit Sharing
Plan, 327 S.C. 424, 430, 489 S.E.2d 223, 225-26 (Ct. App. 1997) ("In addition to
the [ten]-year statute of limitation for adverse possession, South Carolina common
law recognizes the [twenty]-year presumption of a grant."); id. at 430, 489 S.E.2d
at 226 ("Under the presumption of a grant, the time of possession may be tacked
not only by ancestors and heirs, but also between parties in privity in order to
establish the [twenty]-year period."); id. ("To constitute adverse possession, which
results in obtaining title to the disputed property, the possession must be
continuous, hostile, open, actual, notorious, and exclusive for the requisite
period."); id. ("The claimant's possession must be hostile to not only the true
owner, but also to the rest of the world so as to indicate his exclusive ownership of
the property."); id. ("These elements must also be present in the presumption of a
grant."); Taylor v. Heirs of William Taylor, 419 S.C. 639, 655, 799 S.E.2d 919, 927
(Ct. App. 2017) (holding the claimants, by establishing the elements of adverse
possession, "acquired complete and proper title" to the property); Jones, 384 S.C.
at 16, 681 S.E.2d at 14 (finding a transfer of possession in 1998 from the adverse
possessor to a third party did not defeat the adverse possession claim when it was
litigated in 2005 because the ten-year statutory period was complete in 1997).
Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.We hold the circuit court erred when it failed to rule on Appellants' action to
quiet title in the remaining portion of the real property. Here, Appellants brought
action to quiet title in 4.33 acres of real property and the circuit court only ruled
that Rivers held fee simple absolute title in the Disputed Property. Although the
circuit court noted in its findings of fact that "[i]t was not disputed by any of the
parties that [Appellants] own[ed] that portion of the 4.31 acres located to the north
of the 'Fence Encroachment,'" such a finding of fact did not constitute a ruling on
Appellants' action to quiet title in that same real property, and Appellants are
entitled to a specific ruling concerning their ownership of the remaining acreage
against any other parties. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-67-10 (2005) ("Any person in
possession of real property . . . may bring an action against any person who claims
or who may or could claim an estate or interest therein or a lien thereon adverse to
him for the purpose of determining such adverse claim and the rights of the parties,
respectively."). Accordingly, we remand this issue for a ruling by the circuit court.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART.1
WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
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