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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re S.D. CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B345209

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/16/26 In re S.D. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

IN re S.D., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B345209
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. 24JD-00036)
(San Luis Obispo County)

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS
OBISPO DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,

Respondent,

v.

N.D.,

Appellant.

N.D. (Mother) appeals an order granting the petition of
respondent Department of Social Services (DSS) to modify a prior
order granting visitation and reunification services. (Welf. &
Inst. Code,1 §§ 388, 395, subd. (a)(1).) She contends the juvenile
court abused its discretion when it found continued visitation
would be detrimental to her son, S.D. She also contends the
disentitlement doctrine should have barred DSS’s petition
because the agency failed to provide her with court-ordered
reunification services. We will affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DSS filed a dependency petition regarding S.D. pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g) and (j) in March of 2024. DSS
alleged Mother suffered a mental health crisis requiring
hospitalization. Mother had longstanding substance abuse issues
and prior juvenile dependency cases involving three other
children. Father had previous convictions for domestic violence
and sexual abuse of a minor. DSS placed S.D. with a confidential
resource family in San Luis Obispo. The juvenile court ordered
S.D. detained from Mother and ordered weekly one hour
supervised visits.
The court sustained the section 300 petition after a
contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing. It initially
bypassed reunification services for both parents. Mother later
petitioned to modify the bypass order. (§ 388.) She submitted
exhibits showing she was participating in substance abuse
treatment, mental health services, and parenting education. The
court granted her petition in November of 2024. It ordered
reunification services, including substantially increased
visitation, vacated the section 366.26 hearing, and set a combined
six- and twelve-month review hearing in April of 2025. Mother
received two hours of supervised visitation with S.D. weekly.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

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DSS petitioned to suspend visitation in February of 2025
after S.D. began refusing to attend. (§ 388.) His resource family
reported that he suffered nightmares and soiled himself before
visits. He resumed self-harm behaviors like picking his cheek
and lips. In addition, Mother frequently violated the terms of
visitation by feeding S.D. candy and offering him new toys. She
called the police in advance of her last visit, resulting in a
confrontation in S.D.’s presence when he refused to leave his
resource family’s car. Mother texted the resource mother
afterward: “Why are you holding my son from me? I know you
are attached to him but you have no right to keep him from me.
You are . . . breaking the court order. You are not his mother.
Stop trying to hold him from [me] you scared Bitch. Fuck you
dumb cunt. That’s my son.”
S.D.’s mental health therapist told DSS she saw a “stark
difference” in the boy after visitation increased. She
recommended Mother not attend sessions going forward. S.D.’s
occupational therapist said Mother interrupted sessions by
performing tasks on his behalf, giving him unwanted affection,
discussing case issues, and confronting S.D.’s resource mother
about his care. S.D.’s skills and communication regressed when
Mother attended, and he appeared uncomfortable and nervous.
Minor’s counsel supported the petition and expressed concern
about Mother’s compliance with her medications.
Mother blamed DSS for S.D.’s refusing to visit. She
accused social workers of having no interest in complying with
the November 2024 order granting reunification services because
the resource mother sought to adopt S.D. Mother believed DSS
filed the section 388 petition to influence the outcome of the
upcoming 12-month review hearing. She stated S.D.’s current
placement was “entirely inconsistent with supporting the ideals

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of family reunification” and described the resource mother as
going “out of her way to . . . trash [Mother] at every opportunity.”
Mother requested the juvenile court “reiterate the [November
2024] order that the department comply and offer [her]
reasonable services so . . . [she] can get back on track and have S.
returned home.”
The court granted the petition. It stated: “I agree with
[minor’s counsel] that there is evidence supporting detriment.
The issues with [Mother] and the boundaries which caused
issues: Improper discussions, excessive affection, not following
the rules, bringing toys. I agree with [minor’s counsel] that
there’s a safety risk in [Mother] not taking medication, and it is
an acute childhood experience to have brought the police. I find
credible the evidence regarding S.’s reactions to visits. I am
finding that the visitation continued is detrimental and the
continued efforts are contrary to the well-being of the minor
child, keeping . . . the best interest of the child in mind. So the
visits are suspended per the request in the JV 180 that was
outlined by the Court. I also do not find that concurrent planning
has evidence of conflict.”2
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A parent or interested person may petition to modify a
juvenile court order by alleging: (1) changed circumstances or
new evidence justifies the requested order; and (2) the requested

2 The court terminated reunification services in September

and set a selection and implementation hearing. We denied
Mother’s petition for extraordinary writ challenging the order.
(N.D. v. Superior Court (Sept. 15, 2025, B346614) [nonpub. opn.].)
Her appeal of the subsequent order terminating parental rights is
pending. (In re S.D. (B349845, app. pending).)

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order is in the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subds. (a)(1) & (b).)
The petitioner bears the burden of proof on each issue. (In re
Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 48, overruled on other
grounds by In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636, fn. 5.) “A
ruling on a section 388 petition is ‘committed to the sound
discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should
not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly
established. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus, we may not reverse
unless the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason . . . .” (In
re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088-1089.)
Order Suspending Visitation
“Visitation is an essential component of any reunification
plan.” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972.) It “shall
be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the
child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The juvenile court, however,
may terminate visits upon finding they are detrimental to the
child. (In re F.P. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 966, 973; § 362.1, subd.
(a)(1)(B); see Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
659, 673 [“the juvenile court may deny visitation by finding that
forced contact with a parent is harmful to the child”].)
Mother contends the record contains no material evidence
of changed circumstances supporting the section 388 ruling. She
argues S.D. exhibited the same purported signs of detriment long
before the juvenile court ordered reunification services in
November of 2024. Similarly, she describes her own behavioral
problems during visits—such as offering toys and candy,
discussing her case, and confronting the resource mother—as
issues present since the case’s inception. She posits DSS
preferred adoption and “was not particularly interested” in
developing an evidentiary record showing the positive aspects of
her relationship with S.D. DSS focused its efforts on proving

5
visitation was detrimental instead of providing the court-ordered
services she needed to reunify with S.D.
We reject at the threshold Mother’s argument that DSS
could not base its petition on evidence S.D. resumed behaviors he
exhibited before the November 2025 order. Such logic would
tacitly accept a child’s continuing signs of detriment so long as
they suffered similarly in the past. The record supports the
juvenile court’s finding regardless. S.D’s therapists stated that
he regressed when Mother began participating in his sessions.
His reluctance to attend visits before the court’s November 2024
order grew into active resistance. Social workers described him
stiffening like a board when carried toward Mother on one
occasion. At the February 7 visit, he climbed back into his
resource mother’s car and repeatedly refused to get out. The
February 14 visit was cancelled after he refused to climb in the
social worker’s car to attend. The juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion by considering S.D.’s clearly stated preferences. It
need not have accepted Mother’s alternative narrative that
“brainwashing” by DSS and his resource family caused him to
feel this way.
Disentitlement Doctrine
Mother contends the disentitlement doctrine should have
“prevented [DSS] from even bringing the section 388 petition”
because it violated the November 2024 order to provide her with
reunification services. We disagree. “Under the disentitlement
doctrine, a reviewing court has inherent power to dismiss an
appeal when the appealing party has refused to comply with the
orders of the trial court.” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v.
ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265, italics
added.) “In dependency cases, the doctrine has been applied only
in cases of the most egregious conduct by the appellant, which

6
frustrates the purpose of dependency law and makes it
impossible to protect the child or act in the child’s best interests.”
(In re E.M. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 467, 474, italics added.)
Mother is the appealing party here. We decline to use the
doctrine to address the merits of an argument not before us, i.e.,
whether DSS complied with an order of the juvenile court.
DISPOSITION
The order dated April 1, 2025 suspending Mother’s
visitation is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

7
Matthew G. Guerrero, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

---

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Appellant.
Jon Ansolabehere, County Counsel, and Vincent M. Uberti,
Deputy Counsel, for Respondent.

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