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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re R.J. CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B348642

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/16/26 In re R.J. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re R.J., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B348642
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. J073529)
Law. (Ventura County)

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.-D.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B.-D.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her infant daughter, R.J., and
selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
§ 366.26.)2 Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding
that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply. She
contends conditional reversal is required to allow further ICWA
inquiry. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2024, R.J. tested positive for drugs at birth. The
Ventura County Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a
petition alleging R.J. suffered or there was substantial risk that
she would suffer serious physical harm or illness due to Mother’s
substance abuse issues. (§ 300, subd. (b).)
Before the detention hearing, Mother completed a Parental
Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) form. She checked a
box stating “I am or may be a member of” a federally recognized
Native American tribe. She identified the “Cherokee” tribe and
left the “location of the tribe” blank. Mother told the social
worker that R.J.’s deceased maternal great-grandfather, Marion
P., “was Cherokee and may have been enrolled or eligible for
enrollment.” Mother had no further information and stated that
maternal grandmother had more information, but she was also
deceased.
The social worker also interviewed maternal aunt, Amanda
D., who reported that Marion P. was Cherokee. She did not know
if he was enrolled but said he had “tribal involvement.” She also
reported that maternal grandmother tried to obtain membership
but was not eligible for enrollment. The social worker also
interviewed maternal uncle, Josh D., who also said Marion P.
was Cherokee but he did not know if he was enrolled in a tribe.
He said that Marion P. did not receive financial support from a
tribe. He also reported maternal grandmother was not enrolled.

2 Father is not a party to this appeal.

2
The jurisdiction and disposition report stated that a social
worker interviewed maternal great uncle, Chuck P., who is the
son of Marion P. and the father of M.W., who is Mother’s cousin
and the prospective adoptive mother. He reported that maternal
great grandmother said that Marion P. was Cherokee but was not
registered. He said that he was “positive that [Marion P.] was
not registered because the family tried to check into it ‘but
nothing came up.’ ” He and other relatives also completed genetic
testing, none of which provided any results for Native American
ancestry. The social worker also called maternal great aunt,
Sherlyn P.,3 who reported that Marion P. and his wife Phyllis P.
wanted to register with the Cherokee tribe so that they could
receive dividends from the casinos. Sherlyn P. reported that
around 2000–2001, Phyllis and Marion P., accompanied by
maternal great aunt and uncle, went to North Carolina to “go
through the books for the Cherokee Tribe and attempted to trace
their lineage and register for the tribe.” However, the trip was
unsuccessful and they were unable to register with the Cherokee
tribe.
A social worker also spoke to maternal cousin, J.W., who
reported that there was a “rumor that the family had Cherokee
lineage but after various relatives took ancestry tests, this was
disproven.” The social worker had a follow-up call with Amanda
and Josh D. Amanda D. said that Marion P. passed away over 15
years prior, and she further explained that maternal
grandmother tried to register herself and her children (Mother
and maternal uncles) but was denied due to “not having enough
of the Cherokee blood” to register. She further said that she did

3 Maternal great aunt’s name is alternatively spelled
“Cherlynn” in the record.

3
not believe R.J. would be able to register since the other relatives
were not able to do so. Based on the new information, the Agency
found there was “no evidence provided of eligibility for or actual
membership or enrollment in a federally recognized Native
American tribe,” and it recommended the court find ICWA does
not apply.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile
court sustained the petition and ordered reunification services to
Mother.
In the six-month status review report, the Agency noted
that the social worker met with Sherlyn P., who reviewed the
Indian Child Inquiry (ICWA-010) form and responded that the
family’s Native American ancestry was “just a lot of talk within
the family but no, I don’t believe so.” She denied any enrollment
in a federally recognized Native American tribe or connection.
The social worker also asked mother’s cousin, M.W., about the
ICWA-010 form. She replied, “[T]here were some talks but no
connection.” She denied any enrollment in a federally recognized
tribe or connection. A social worker contacted Mother’s father,
who reviewed the ICWA-10 form and reported, “[N]o, not that I
am aware of.” He denied any enrollment in a federally
recognized tribe or connection.
At the six-month review hearing, the Agency recommended
terminating Mother’s reunification services because she had not
progressed in her case plan and it was unlikely she would achieve
and sustain sobriety to reunify with R.J. The juvenile court
terminated Mother’s services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court held
a hearing in July 2025 and asked if anybody in the courtroom
had information that R.J. may be a Native American child or
eligible or enrolled into a federally recognized tribe. Mother

4
stated that Marion P. was “full-blooded Cherokee” and that she
believed he was a registered member, but did not know which
Cherokee tribe. The court asked maternal grandfather if he had
any information. He said he did not know “the exact tribe.”
Maternal grandfather also suggested that Marion P. was from
the “midwest area” and believed he was from Ohio. When the
court asked if there was anyone else who might have further
information regarding Marion P.’s membership, Mother and
maternal grandfather identified maternal great uncle and aunt,
Chuck and Sherlyn P.
In its section 366.26 report, the Agency recommended
Mother’s parental rights be terminated and adoption be selected
as the permanent plan. R.J. had been in the neonatal intensive
care unit before being placed in different foster homes, and in
May 2025, she was placed with M.W. and her husband J.W. in
Virginia. R.J. had begun to establish a stable and nurturing
attachment to her prospective adoptive parents. In a
memorandum, the Agency further reported that a social worker
contacted Sherlyn and Chuck P. with regard to possible Cherokee
ancestry with Marion P. They responded that “their family does
not have any Cherokee ancestry or any Native American
ancestry.” They also provided a “23 and Me” snapshot for Chuck
P., who is the son of Marion P. The snapshot shows 0% Native
American ancestry.
At the contested section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court
found there was “no reason to believe or know that [R.J.] is a
Native American child” and that ICWA does not apply. The court
terminated Mother’s parental rights and selected adoption as the
permanent plan.

5
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the Agency failed to comply with its
inquiry duties under ICWA and that a conditional remand is
necessary to allow a complete inquiry. Mother does not contend
the Agency overlooked any relatives in its inquiry, but she
contends the Agency had the duty to further investigate and
notify Cherokee tribes after Mother and some relatives
mentioned possible Cherokee ancestry. We are not persuaded.
The juvenile court and the Agency “have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child [in a dependency
proceeding] . . . is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
An “Indian child” is either (1) a member or citizen of an Indian
tribe or (2) eligible for membership or citizenship and is a
biological child of a member or citizen of an Indian tribe.
(§ 224.1, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (B).) When a child is placed into the
temporary custody of a county welfare department, the duty to
inquire “includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting
child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is
domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); Cal. Rules of Court,4 rule
5.481(a)(1); In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1132 (Dezi C.).)
“When the agency has ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian
child is involved, further inquiry regarding the possible Indian
status of the child is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e); see also rule
5.481(a)(4).) The required further inquiry includes (1)
interviewing the parents and extended family members; (2)
contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State

4 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

6
Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child
may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a
tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).) At this stage, contact with a
tribe ‘shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or
electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt
of [ICWA] notices,’ and ‘sharing information identified by the
tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
eligibility determination, as well as information on the current
status of the child and the case.’ (Id., subd. (e)(2)(C).).” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1132–1133, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘The duty to provide notice [to a child’s tribe] arises only if
[the agency] or the court “knows or has reason to know that an
Indian child is involved.” ’ ” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
566, 598; § 224.3, subd. (a).)
The juvenile court may make a finding that ICWA does not
apply if the county department’s inquiry and due diligence were
“proper and adequate” and there is no reason to know whether
the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) The court’s factual finding that ICWA
does not apply is “subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
A juvenile court’s “fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘ “On a well-
developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to
determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the
less developed the record, the more limited that discretion
necessarily becomes.” ’ [Citations.]” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th

7
at p. 1141, citing In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101–
1102 (Kenneth D.).) “If, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings
that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not
apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record
documentation as required by California law (rule 5.481(a)(5)),
there is no error and conditional reversal would not be
warranted.” (Dezi C., at p. 1141.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
findings that the Agency’s inquiry and due diligence were proper
and adequate and that ICWA did not apply because there was no
reason to believe R.J. was an Indian child. The record of the
Agency’s inquiry, as we have summarized above, is “well-
developed.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141; Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1101.) It reflects the Agency inquired
diligently throughout the dependency proceedings regarding
Mother’s claim of potential Cherokee ancestry by interviewing
family members, some of whom Mother herself identified as
family members who would have further information regarding
Marion P.’s Cherokee ancestry. When the Agency interviewed
Chuck P., he was “positive that [Marion P.] was not registered
because the family tried to check into it ‘but nothing came up.’ ”
Additionally, Sherlyn P. reported that Marion P. attempted to
trace his lineage and register for the tribe, but the attempt was
unsuccessful.
Other family members gave further indication that R.J. or
Mother was not a member or eligible for membership in a
Cherokee tribe. Maternal aunt and uncle Amanda and Josh D.
reported that maternal grandmother tried to obtain membership
for herself and her children, including Mother, but was denied.
Amanda D. said that she did not believe R.J. would be able to
register since the other relatives were not able to do so. J.W. and

8
M.W. also similarly reported that the Cherokee lineage was a
“rumor” and that “there were some talks but no connection” to
membership in a Cherokee tribe. Together, this evidence
supports the finding that there was no reason to believe R.J. was
an Indian child and that ICWA does not apply. For these
reasons, Mother’s reliance on In re Claudia R. (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 76 is not persuasive. There, the child welfare agency
failed to ask “reasonably available” family members about the
children’s ancestry. (Id. at p. 88.) We conclude further inquiry to
an unspecified Cherokee tribe was not warranted. (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(A)–(C).)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. DEROIAN, J.


Judge of Santa Barbara County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

9
Gilbert A. Romero, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

---

Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.