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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Baul CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B344981

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/17/26 P. v. Baul CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B344981

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA063524)
v.

JOEL BAUL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Neetu S. Badhan-Smith, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.

Jake E. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Chelsea Zaragoza,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Joel Baul (defendant) appeals
from the denial of resentencing relief pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.75. Defendant contends, and the People agree, the
resentencing court erroneously relied on a previously stricken
enhancement for a sexually violent offense, as well as an
unalleged prior conviction for a sexually violent offense in finding
defendant ineligible for resentencing. The record establishes
error. We therefore reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND2
In 2009, the People charged defendant with carjacking
(§ 215, subd. (a); count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); counts 2 & 5), assault with intent to commit rape
(§ 220, subd. (a); count 3), and second degree robbery (§ 211;
count 4). The People also alleged defendant personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon during the commission of counts 1
and 4 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). It was further alleged defendant
served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section
667.5, subdivision (b) and suffered two prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
Finally, it was alleged defendant suffered two prior strike
convictions pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)).
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged,
with the exception being he was convicted of attempted robbery

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 Because the facts of the underlying offense are not relevant
to the instant appeal, we omit them.

2
(§§ 211, 664) in count 4. The jury found true the allegations that
(1) defendant had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd.
(b)) for a 1981 rape (former § 261(2)) in case No. A620492, a 1990
robbery (§ 211) in case No. SA004025,3 and petty theft (§ 666) in
case No. LA044653; (2) defendant had been convicted of two
serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) for the same 1981 rape and
1990 robbery; and (3) defendant had previously been convicted of
six prior strike convictions within the meaning of the Three
Strikes law.
The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a
total of 119 years to life as a third strike defendant. In count 1
(carjacking), the trial court imposed the high term of nine years
tripled, or 27 years, with a one-year enhancement for the weapon
use, 10 years for two 5-year priors, and three years for three 1-
year priors for a total of 41 years to life. In count 3 (assault with
intent to commit rape), the trial court imposed a consecutive term
of 25 years to life with one year for the weapon use, 10 years for
two 5-year priors, and three years for three 1-year priors for a
total of 39 years to life. In count 4 (robbery), the trial court
imposed a consecutive term of 25 years to life, with one year for
the weapon use, 10 years for two 5-year priors, and three years
for three 1-year priors for a total of 39 years to life. The trial
court stayed sentences of 38 years to life in counts 2 and 5 under
section 654.
On direct appeal, pursuant to People v. Jones (1993) 5
Cal.4th 1142, this court modified the judgment to strike two of
the three prior prison term enhancements imposed in counts 1

3 In 1990, in case No. SA004025 defendant was convicted of
rape and robbery. However, the People alleged only a prior
prison term enhancement for the robbery conviction in SA004025.

3
through 5 because they were also used to enhance defendant’s
sentence pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). (People v.
Baul (Apr. 2, 2012, B225051) [nonpub. opn.].) Specifically, the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements stemming from the
1990 robbery conviction and the 1981 rape conviction were
stricken, and, as a result, only the five 1-year prison prior
enhancements stemming from defendant’s section 666 petty theft
conviction remained. The judgment was otherwise affirmed.
(People v. Baul, supra, B225051.)
In 2022, defendant was identified as an individual eligible
for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.4 The trial court
appointed counsel for defendant who filed a motion for
resentencing. The People opposed resentencing beyond striking
the now-invalid enhancements.
In 2025, a hearing on the motion was held during which the
trial court found defendant was ineligible for resentencing relief
pursuant to section 1172.75. The court pointed to the
information that alleged a prior prison term enhancement for a
1981 rape conviction as well as the fact that defendant also
suffered a rape conviction from “the ‘90s.” Because rape is a
sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 6600, and Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision
(a) excludes from relief any prior prison term enhancement
imposed for a sexually violent offense, the court denied relief.
Review of the record reveals neither the court nor the
parties discussed that defendant’s prior prison term

4 Many of the minute orders from proceedings in the superior
court refer to former sections 1171 and 1171.1. On July 1, 2022,
former sections 1171 and 1171.1 were renumbered to sections
1172.7 and 1172.75, respectively, without substantive change.

4
enhancement for the 1981 rape conviction had been stricken or
that such an enhancement for the 1990 rape conviction was never
alleged.5
Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. The trial court erred by using defendant’s stricken
enhancement for his 1981 rape conviction as well as
defendant’s unalleged 1990 rape conviction as the
basis to deny relief pursuant to section 1172. 75
A. 1981 rape conviction and stricken enhancement
The parties agree the trial court improperly relied on a
stricken section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement stemming
from defendant’s 1981 rape conviction in denying resentencing
relief pursuant to section 1172.75. We also agree.
“Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) invalidates ‘[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.’” (People v. Green (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 365, 370 (Green).) Section 261 (rape) is listed as a
sexually violent offense in Welfare and Institutions Code section
6600, subdivision (b).
However, “a stricken enhancement cannot be a ‘sentence
enhancement that was imposed’ under section 1172.75,
subdivision (a).” (People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003,

5 The resentencing court noted defendant’s sentence had
been “amended in 2014” by “taking 10 years off for the 5[-]year
prior, and the 1[-]year prior and is, now, at 109 years.”

5
1007.) As noted, this court struck the section 667.5, subdivision
(b) enhancement stemming from defendant’s 1981 rape
conviction. As such, it may not serve as the basis for denying
resentencing relief under section 1172.75.
B. 1990 rape conviction
The parties also agree the trial court improperly relied on
defendant’s 1990 rape conviction as a basis for denying him
section 1172.75 resentencing relief. Again, we agree.
In 1990, in case No. SA004025, defendant was convicted of
both rape and robbery. However, for purposes of the current
case, the prosecution only alleged a prior prison term
enhancement for the 1990 robbery, not the rape. The allegation
was found true and the enhancement for the prior prison term
stemming from the robbery was imposed. Because the
enhancement was for robbery, “the section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement which became part of [defendant’s] sentence was
not ‘imposed for’ his conviction of a sexually violent offense as
required by the plain terms of section 1172.75.” (Green, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 371.) Because a one-year prior prison term
enhancement was not alleged, proved, or imposed for the 1990
rape conviction, it may not be used to deny defendant
resentencing relief pursuant to section 1172.75.6

6 Furthermore, as discussed, the enhancement imposed for
the prior prison term stemming from the 1990 robbery conviction
was stricken by this court on direct appeal. (See People v. Tang,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007 [“a stricken enhancement
cannot be a ‘sentence enhancement that was imposed’ under
section 1172.75, subdivision (a)”].)

6
Having concluded the court erred in finding defendant
ineligible for relief, we remand for further resentencing
proceedings pursuant to section 1172.75.
II. The abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect
the correct number of imposed section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements
As discussed, in 2012, this court ordered defendant’s
judgment modified to strike 10 of his 15 prior prison term
enhancements and ordered the abstract of judgment amended to
reflect the change. (People v. Baul, supra, B225051.) An
amended abstract of judgment filed on September 28, 2018,
reflected just such a change.
During the March 14, 2025 proceedings in the superior
court, the court also addressed a motion by defendant to vacate
his remaining restitution fines. The court granted defendant’s
request pursuant to section 1465.9, subdivision (b)7 and ordered
the abstract of judgment amended. A new abstract of judgment
issued on July 31, 2025, reflected the change to defendant’s
restitution; however, it also listed eight of the 10 previously
stricken prior prison term enhancements. This is a clerical error.
The abstract of judgment should list imposition of five 1-year
enhancements—one on each count—for defendant’s prior prison
term served in connection with his 2004 petty theft conviction in

7 Section 1465.9, subdivision (b) provides, “On and after
January 1, 2022, the balance of any court-imposed costs pursuant
to Section 1001.15, 1001.16, 1001.90, 1202.4, 1203.1, 1203.1ab,
1203.1c, 1203.1m, 1203.4a, 1203.9, 1205, 1214.5, 2085.5, 2085.6,
or 2085.7, as those sections read on December 31, 2021, shall be
unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment
imposing those costs shall be vacated.”

7
case No. LA044653. “Courts may correct clerical errors at any
time . . . .” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
Because the abstract of judgment incorrectly lists eight of
defendant’s previously stricken section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements, we direct the trial court to amend the abstract of
judgment to reflect imposition of five prior prison term
enhancements to conform with this court’s 2012 opinion in People
v. Baul, supra, B225051.

DISPOSITION
The judgment on resentencing is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct a full
resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75. The trial court
is also directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect
imposition of five enhancements pursuant to section 667.5,
subdivision (b) and to forward a certified copy to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

8