Bhushan Raosaheb Anbhule And Others vs Union of India - Writ Petition

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Bhushan Raosaheb Anbhule And Others vs The Union Of India Through The Secretary ... on 5 March, 2026

Author: Vibha Kankanwadi

Bench: Vibha Kankanwadi

2026:BHC-AUG:12365-DB

                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                           BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                           WRIT PETITION No. 15256 OF 2025

       1.   Bhushan Raosaheb Anbhule
            Age : 50 years, Occ : Business,
            R/o. 'Anubhule Bangalow', Savedi Road,
            Premdan Chowk, Ahilyanagar-414001.

       2.   Ragini w/o. Rajesh Patil
            Age : 56 years, Occ: Business,
            R/o. Ashwini Hospital, Plot No.62,
            Shahu Nagar Housing Society,
            Jalgaon - 425001.

       3.   Saurabh Baburao Nadgauda
            Age : 61 years, Occ: Business,
            R/o. House No. 13-A 2/2 11,
            Ideal Co. Opp. Housing Society,
            Doctor Colony, Burudgaon Road,
            Near, ITI, Ahilyanagar - 414001.

       4.   Kamlesh Chirangilal Gupta
            Age : 56 years, Occ : Business,
            R/o. Chiranjilal Gupta Lovely House,
            Block No. 4, Nehru Road Near
            Hotel Midland Santacruz East
            Mumbai 400055.                            -----PETITIONERS

                                       VERSUS

       1.   The Union of India
            Through the Secretary
            Ministry for Road Transport and
            Highways, New Delhi

       2.   The National Highway Authority of India
            G-5 & 6, Sector 10 of Dwarka
            New Delhi 110075.
            Through its General Manager
            (Environment and Public Grievances)

       3.   The Executive Engineer/Project Director

       WP-15256-2025.odt                                           1 of 21
  National Highway Division,
 Sarasnagar Road, Behind Market Yard,
 Ahmednagar.

1. The Competent Authority & Sub-Divisional Officer Sub Division Nagar, Ahmednagar, Dist. Ahmednagar ----RESPONDENTS

Mr. S. N. Gaikwad, Advocate for petitioners
Mr. Avinash Borulkar, Advocate for respondent No. 1
Mr. R. S. Wani, AGP for respondent-State

                            CORAM : Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi &
                                    Hiten S. Venegavkar, JJ.
                            DATE      : 05th March, 2026

JUDGMENT (PER : Hiten S. Venegavkar,J.) : -

1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

has been filed by the petitioners seeking a declaration that the action of

the respondent authorities in constructing National Highway No. 222

through the properties of the petitioners situated at Survey Nos. 369/2

and 370/2 of village Kedgaon, Taluka and District Ahilyanagar is illegal,

arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 , 19(1)(g) , 21 and 300A of the

Constitution of India as well as the provisions of the [National Highways

Act, 1956](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1222415/). The petitioners have also sought directions to the respondent

authorities to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 3C(2) of

the National Highways Act, 1956 on the basis of the objections dated

16.08.2024 submitted by them. In the alternative, the learned advocate

appearing for the petitioners has orally prayed that the respondent

WP-15256-2025.odt 2 of 21
authorities be directed to decide the objections and representations

submitted by the petitioners in accordance with law.

1. The petitioners claim to be owners of certain non-agricultural

commercial plots particularly described in the memo of petition, situated

adjacent to the existing Kalyan-Ahmednagar-Nanded-Nirmal road

passing through village Kedgaon. According to the petitioners, the said

road was originally a two-lane road and on account of increased traffic

congestion and growth in vehicular movement the authorities decided to

widen the road and convert it into a four-lane national highway. The

petitioners submit that their plots were not included in the initial

notification published in the Official Gazette on 05.05.2016 declaring the

intention of the Central Government to acquire lands for development of

National Highway No. 222. According to them, subsequently the

alignment of the highway project was altered at the pressure of some

political persons and portions of their lands came to be affected by the

acquisition proceedings.

1. The petitioners further contend that their lands had already

been converted into non-agricultural plots pursuant to permission

granted as far back as on 01.06.1983 and the plots were being used for

commercial purposes. Petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 are stated to be medical

practitioners intending to establish a trauma hospital on the said plots,

WP-15256-2025.odt 3 of 21
whereas petitioner Nos. 2 and 4 are stated to be contractors intending to

develop the land by constructing a commercial complex. According to the

petitioners, despite the non-agricultural status of their lands, the

respondent authorities treated the lands as agricultural lands while

initiating acquisition proceedings and proceeded to acquire only a portion

of the plots.

1. It is the case of the petitioners that by acquiring only part of

their plots and leaving the remaining portions unacquired, the

respondent authorities have rendered the remaining land unusable and

commercially non-viable. The petitioners further contend that in the

vicinity of their land a flyover and a 12 metre service road have been

constructed and in view of various guidelines governing construction near

highways, the remaining portion of the land cannot be effectively

utilized. According to the petitioners, this partial acquisition has caused

severe injury and severance to their property.

1. The petitioners state that from time to time they have

submitted objections before the competent authority in response to

notifications issued under the National Highways Act, 1956 and that on

16.08.2024 they submitted a detailed representation requesting the

authorities either to acquire the entire land or to compensate them for

the injury caused to the remaining portion of their plots. The grievance

WP-15256-2025.odt 4 of 21
of the petitioners is that these objections and representations have not

been properly considered by the authorities and that the authorities have

proceeded with the construction of the highway and have determined the

payment of compensation for only the acquired portion of the land.

1. When the matter was earlier heard by this Court on

27.01.2026, a specific query was raised to the learned advocate

appearing for the petitioners as to how the petitioners had demonstrated

that the remaining portion of their land had suffered severance or injury

on account of the acquisition proceedings. The petitioners sought time to

place additional material on record in support of their contentions.

Accordingly an additional affidavit dated 20.02.2026 came to be filed

placing on record a Government Resolution dated 14.05.2018 issued by

the Public Works Department of the State of Maharashtra.

1. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioners at considerable length and having perused the pleadings and

the documents placed on record, we find that the arguments advanced

during the course of hearing are fundamentally different from the reliefs

sought in the writ petition.

1. The principal prayer in the petition seeks a declaration that

the action of the respondent authorities in constructing National Highway

WP-15256-2025.odt 5 of 21
No. 222 through the properties of the petitioners is illegal and arbitrary

and contrary to the Constitution and the National Highways Act, 1956.

However, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the

petitioners has not clearly taken a firm stand that the petitioners have

any objections to the construction of the national highway nor to the

acquisition of their lands for that purpose, save and except the pleading

that the lands were not part of earlier notification for acquisition. There

are no pleadings as well to the effect that the petitioners have objection

to the entire acquisition of lands for the construction of National Highway

No. 222. The grievance mainly projected before this Court is that the

authorities ought to have acquired the entire land of the petitioners

instead of acquiring only a part thereof and secondly that the authorities

have wrongly considered the petitioners' plots as agricultural lands when

they are commercial and non-agricultural lands since 1983.

1. The case therefore, sought to be urged during arguments is

entirely different from the case pleaded in the petition. The law is well

settled that a party cannot plead one case in the petition and seek relief

on a completely different basis during arguments. The writ court is

required to adjudicate only upon the pleadings and reliefs specifically set

out in the petition.

1. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, (1988) 4 SCC 534,

WP-15256-2025.odt 6 of 21
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in writ proceedings the facts

constituting the cause of action as well as the relief sought must be

clearly pleaded and the petitioner cannot rely upon facts which are not

pleaded. Similarly, in State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3

SCC 436, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that relief not founded

on pleadings cannot be granted and parties cannot be permitted to raise

entirely new grounds during arguments.

1. In the present case, the petitioners have challenged the

construction of the national highway itself, whereas the grievance now

sought to be projected is that the remaining portion of their land has

become unusable due to partial acquisition. These are two entirely

different causes of action. On this ground alone the petition is liable to

fail.

1. Even otherwise, the petitioners have not placed on record

any cogent material demonstrating that the remaining portion of their

land has suffered severance or injurious affection due to the acquisition.

1. It is undoubtedly true that acquisition of a portion of land

may in certain circumstances cause injury or severance to the remaining

property of the landholder and that compensation for such injury is

recognised in acquisition jurisprudence. When a part of the land of a

WP-15256-2025.odt 7 of 21
person is acquired, the owner may be entitled to compensation not only

for the land acquired but also for the diminution in value of the

remaining land due to severance. It is therefore recognized that

compensation must include damages sustained by reason of injury

caused to the remaining portion of land.

1. Thus, while determining compensation in cases of

compulsory acquisition the authorities must consider the impact of

acquisition upon the remaining property of the landholder. Accordingly,

compensation must be determined in a just and fair manner taking into

account all relevant factors affecting the value and usability of the land,

under the statutory scheme compensation for severance and injurious

affection to remaining land is also recognised under Section 23(1) of

Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

1. However, the claim of severance or injury to remaining

portion of land cannot be accepted merely on the basis of assertions or

bare pleadings. The claimant must place adequate documentary and

technical material demonstrating the nature and extent of the injury

suffered by the remaining land.

1. In the present case, despite the opportunity granted by this

Court, the petitioners have not produced any material demonstrating

WP-15256-2025.odt 8 of 21
that the remaining portion of their land has suffered injury or severance.

The Government Resolution dated 14.05.2018 placed on record by the

petitioners merely relates to constitution of a committee to study the

issue of building permissions near highways and does not establish that

the remaining land of the petitioners has become incapable of lawful use.

1. In the absence of such material, it would not be appropriate

for this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction to undertake an adjudication

of the alleged injury to the remaining land.

1. At the same time, it is not in dispute that the petitioners

have submitted representations before the competent authority raising

their grievances, particularly the representation dated 16.08.2024.

Though the present petition does not contain a specific substantive

prayer seeking a direction for decision of the said representation, the

learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that prayer clause 'F'

deals with the same. Thus, submits that if the authorities are directed to

consider the representation in accordance with law the grievance of the

petitioners would stand substantially addressed.

1. Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the

case, we are of the view that while the writ petition as framed does not

merit interference under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners

WP-15256-2025.odt 9 of 21
may pursue their representation before the competent authority in

accordance with law. Questions relating to compensation, severance or

injury to the remaining land are essentially matters falling within the

domain of the statutory authorities under the acquisition framework.

1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in [Competent Authority v.

Barangore Jute Factory](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/874426/), (2005) 13 SCC 477 has held that issues

relating to compensation under the National Highways Act are matters to

be determined by the competent authority in accordance with the

statutory scheme.

1. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition stands

dismissed. However, it is clarified that if the petitioners pursue their

representation before the competent authority seeking appropriate relief

in accordance with law, the competent authority shall consider the same

on its own merits and in accordance with the provisions of the [National

Highways Act, 1956](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1222415/) and the applicable legal principles.

1. Before parting with the matter, we deem it appropriate to

observe that during the course of hearing a broader issue had arisen for

consideration before this Court, namely as to how and on what basis a

landholder can demonstrate that the remaining portion of his land, after

partial acquisition, has suffered severance or injurious affection so as to

WP-15256-2025.odt 10 of 21
entitle him to appropriate relief or compensation. Though the present

case does not warrant adjudication of that issue on merits for want of

sufficient material placed on record by the petitioners, the question

nevertheless assumes significance in view of the recurring nature of such

disputes arising out of acquisition proceedings.

1. The jurisprudence relating to compensation for severance

and injurious affection is well recognised in acquisition law. Even under

the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 23 specifically

recognise the right of a landowner to claim compensation not only for the

land actually acquired but also for damages sustained by reason of

severing the acquired land from the remaining land or by reason of

injurious affection to the other property of the claimant.

1. Before a writ court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution,or before the competent authorities or any

court of law. Therefore, the landowner must demonstrate, through

objective material, that the acquisition of part of his holding has resulted

in identifiable prejudice to the remaining land which the authority failed

to consider.

1. The land owner generally establishes severance or injurious

affection through documentary and technical material placed on record.

WP-15256-2025.odt 11 of 21
First, the claimant must show the physical configuration of the holding

before and after acquisition. This is typically done by producing revenue

records such as the 7/12 extract, village maps, survey maps, and a

comparative layout showing how the acquired portion divides the holding

or affects access. If the acquisition results in fragmentation of the parcel,

landlocking, loss of frontage to a road, or irregular shapes rendering

cultivation or development difficult, such facts must be demonstrated

through maps, site plans, and satellite imagery. Courts often treat these

materials as relevant because they objectively show the effect of

severance.

1. Second, the land owner may produce valuation material

demonstrating diminution in the value of the remaining land. This may

include valuation reports by approved valuers, development plans, land

use records, or sale instances of similarly situated plots which show that

the residual parcel commands a lower market value due to reduced

access, loss of frontage, or fragmentation. Evidence of development

potential lost because of the acquisition can also be relevant, particularly

where the remaining parcel becomes unsuitable for its previous use.

1. Third, the claimant may rely on technical reports showing

practical injury to the usability of the land. For instance, agricultural

evidence showing that irrigation channels, access roads, drainage, or

WP-15256-2025.odt 12 of 21
internal pathways have been disturbed can establish injurious affection.

In urban contexts, evidence that the remaining plot has lost building

potential due to setback rules, reduced plot size, or planning regulations

may also demonstrate injury.

1. Fourth, the pleadings must specifically articulate the nature

of damage suffered. Courts generally expect the landowner to plead and

show that the remaining land has suffered one or more identifiable

consequences such as loss of access to a public road, division of the

holding into inconvenient fragments, substantial reduction in

development potential, impairment of irrigation or drainage facilities, or

measurable diminution in market value.

1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that

compensation for severance or injurious affection is not automatic

merely because a portion of the land is acquired; the claimant must

establish the extent of the injury to the remaining property. This principle

was recognised in Balammal v. State of Madras (AIR 1968 SC 1425),

where the Court declined to award severance damages in the absence of

proof of injury to the remaining land. Conversely, in [Tribeni Devi v.

Collector of Ranchi](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/444729/) (AIR 1972 SC 1417), the Court accepted that when

part of a holding is acquired and the remainder suffers diminution in

value, compensation for severance may legitimately be awarded. The

WP-15256-2025.odt 13 of 21
conceptual distinction between severance and injurious affection was also

clarified by the Supreme Court in [Walchandnagar Industries Ltd. v.

State of Maharashtra](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/112341437/) ((2022) 5 SCC 71). The Hon'ble Supreme Court

held that

"28. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. As the
dispute now stands confined only to three heads of claims,
namely, (i) rails and sleepers; (ii) rolling stocks; and (iii)
increase in transportation cost, we shall deal with them
itemwise.

Law on compensation for severance and injurious
affection

1. Before we consider the aforesaid three heads of claim
   itemwise, it may be useful to take note of the legal principles on
   the basis of which these claims are to be tested.

2. Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
   provide two lists of matters respectively, namely.

(i) matters to be considered in determining compensation;
and

(ii) matters to be neglected in determining compensation.
31. Section 23(1), which alone is relevant for our present
purposes, is extracted as follows:

"23, Matters to be considered in determining
compensation - (1) In determining the amount of
compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act,
the Court shall take into consideration

     first,          the market value of the land at the date
                     of the publication of the notification
                     under [Section 4](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/343012/), sub-section (1);

secondly the damage sustained by the person
interested, by reason of the taking of

WP-15256-2025.odt 14 of 21
any standing crops or trees which may
be on the land at the time of the
Collector's taking possession thereof;

thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the
person interested, at the time of the
Collector's taking possession of the
land, by reason of severing such land
from his other land;

fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the
person interested, at the time of the
Collector's taking possession of the
land, by reason of the acquisition
injuriously affecting his other property,
movable or immovable, in any other
manner, or his earnings;

fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of
the land by the Collector, the person
interested is compelled to change his
residence or place of business, the
reasonable expenses (if any) incidental
to such change; and

    sixthly,      the damage (if any) bona fide resulting
                  from diminution of the profits of the
                  land between the time of the publication
                  of the declaration under [Section 6](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/881851/) and
                  the time of the Collector's taking
                  possession of the land.

1. In simple terms, the six items covered by Section 23(1), which are to be taken into consideration by the court in determining compensation, can be summarised as follows:

32.1. The market value of the land on the date of publication of
notification under Section 4(1).

32.2. The damage to standing crops or trees, which are on the
land at the time of the Collector taking possession.

32.3. The damage sustained by reason of severing such land

WP-15256-2025.odt 15 of 21
from the

32.4. The damage sustained by reason of the acquisition
injuriously affecting the other property, movable or immovable,
in any other manner or the in earnings, of the person interested.

32.5. The reasonable expenses incurred by the person
interested, in changing his residence or place of business, when
he is compelled to do so in consequence of the acquisition

32.6. The damage bona fide resulting from diminution of the
profits of the land between the time of publication of the
declaration under Section 6 and the time of the Collector's
taking possession.

1. The points arising for determination in these appeals revolve
   around clauses "thirdly" and "fourthly" of Section 23(1). These
   clauses are referred to in common parlance as clauses
   concerning "severance" and "injurious affection" respectively.

2. But clauses "thirdly" and "fourthly" of Section 23(1) cannot
   be considered in isolation. They have to be read together with
   Section 49 which reads as follows:

"49. Acquisition of part of house or building - (1) The
provisions of this Act shall not be put in force for the purpose of
acquiring a part only of any house, manufactory or other
building, if the owner desires that the whole of such house,
manufactory or building shall be so acquired:

Provided that the owner may, at any time before the
Collector has made his award under Section 11, by notice in
writing, withdraw or modify his expressed desire that the whole
of such house, manufactory or building shall be so acquired:

Provided also that, if any question shall arise as to
whether any land proposed to be taken under this Act does or
does not form part of a house, manufactory or building within
the meaning of this section, the Collector shall refer the
determination of such question to the Court and shall not take
possession of such land until after the question has been
determined.

In deciding on such a reference the Court shall have

WP-15256-2025.odt 16 of 21
regard to the question whether the land proposed to be taken is
reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the
house, manufactory or building.

(2) If, in the case of any claim under Section 23, sub-
section (1), thirdly, by a person interested, on account of the
severing of the land to be acquired from his other land, the
appropriate Government is of opinion that the claim is
unreasonable or excessive, it may, at any time before the
Collector has made his award, order the acquisition of the whole
of the land of which the land first sought to be acquired forms a
part.

(3) In the case last hereinbefore provided for, no fresh
declaration or other proceedings under Sections 6 to 10 both
inclusive, shall be necessary, but the Collector shall without
delay furnish a copy of the order of the appropriate Government
to the person interested, and shall thereafter proceed to make
his award under Section 11."

1. It may be noted that clause thirdly of Section 23(1)
   

   relates only to land as it speaks only about the severance of the
   acquired land from the unacquired land and the damage
   sustained as a consequence. In contrast, clause fourthly of
   Section 23(1) deals with the damage sustained by the person
   interested, due to the injurious affection, (i) of his other
   movable property; (ii) of his other immovable property; and (iii)
   of his earnings. In other words what is injuriously affected at the
   time of Collector's taking possession of the land, may either be
   the unacquired portion of the immovable property or other
   movable property or even the earnings of the person interested.

2. It may also be noted that the expression used in clause
   fourthly is "earnings", while the expression used in clause sixthly
   is "profits". But clause sixthly is confined only to diminution of
   the profits of the land between the time of publication of the
   declaration under Section 6 and the time of the Collector taking
   possession.

3. Coming to Section 49, it deals with two contingencies. They
   are,

(i) cases where what is sought to be acquired is only a part of
any house, manufactory or other building; and

WP-15256-2025.odt 17 of 21

(ii) cases where a claim for compensation under the head
"severance" under clause thirdly of Section 23(1) arises.

37.1. Insofar as the first contingency is concerned there is a bar
under sub-section (1) of Section 49 for the acquisition of a part
only of any house, manufactory or other building, if the owner
desires that the whole of such house, manufactory or building
shall be so acquired.

37.2. Insofar as the second contingency is concerned, there is a
choice given to the appropriate Government to order the
acquisition of the whole of the land, if the appropriate
Government is of the opinion that the claim for severance
compensation is unreasonable or excessive.

1. The distinction between the scope of sub-section (1) and the
   scope of sub-section (2) of Section 49 was brought out by this
   Court in Harsook Das Bal Kishan Das v. LAO³ as follows: (SCC
   pp. 259-60, para 12)

     "12. The object of [Section 49(1)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1222415/) of the Act is to give to the
   

   owner the option whether he would like part to be acquired. The
   Government cannot take the other part under Section 49(1) of
   the Act unless the owner says so. Section 49(2) of the Act has
   nothing to do with Section 49(1) of the Act. Section 49(2) of the
   Act gives the option to the Government only where the claim
   under the third clause of Section 23(1) of the Act is excessive.
   Reference to the third clause of Section 23(1) of the Act makes
   it clear that the claim under the third clause of Section 23(1) is
   for severance. The Government in such a case of acquisition of
   the remaining portion of the land under Section 49(2) of the Act
   saves the public exchequer money which otherwise will be the
   subject-matter of a claim for severance."

2. In the case on hand, the provisions of Section 49(1) have
   no application. This is due to the fact that the appellant never
   desired that the whole of the manufactory shall be acquired by
   the Government. In fact, the total extent of land owned by the
   appellant was about 16,000 acres, on which a township had
   come up. Therefore, there was no occasion for the appellant to
   exercise any option invoking Section 49(1). In any case, the
   appellant actually requested the Government to acquire land

WP-15256-2025.odt 18 of 21
from other people, to divert the trolley line. Therefore, Section
49(1) has no application to the case on hand.

1. Section 49(2) also may not have any application for the
   reason that the appropriate Government did not think fit to seek
   acquisition of the whole of the land on which the remaining
   portion of the trolley line existed, on the ground that the claim
   for severance compensation was unreasonable or excessive.
   Therefore, it is enough for us to go back to clauses thirdly and
   fourthly of Section 23(1) without the constraints of sub-sections
   (1) or (2) of Section 49.

2. As we have indicated earlier, clause thirdly relates to the
   damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of
   severance of the acquired land from the unacquired land, at the
   time of Collector's taking possession of the land. In contrast,
   clause fourthly of Section 23(1) deals with the damage
   sustained by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting, (i)
   the other movable property; (ii) the other immovable property;
   and/or (iii) the earnings of the person interested.

3.        Thus, the land owner must not merely assert injury but must
   

place credible material such as maps, revenue records, valuation reports,

planning documents, and site evidence demonstrating that the

acquisition has materially diminished the value or utility of the remaining

land and that the statutory authority failed to consider those

consequences while determining compensation.

1. Such material would enable the competent authority or the

Court to objectively determine whether the acquisition has indeed

resulted in severance or injurious affection and, if so, the extent of

damage suffered by the remaining property.

WP-15256-2025.odt 19 of 21

1. It must however be clarified that the determination of

severance and injury caused is essentially a fact-specific exercise

depending upon the nature of the property, the purpose of acquisition,

the physical configuration of the land and the regulatory framework

governing its use. Therefore, while broad guiding principles may be

indicated, the ultimate determination in each case must necessarily

depend upon the facts and evidence placed before the competent

authority.

1. In the present case, despite opportunity granted by this

Court, the petitioners have not placed on record any such material

demonstrating that the remaining portion of their land has suffered

severance or injury caused to left out land, within the meaning of

acquisition law. The Government Resolution dated 14.05.2018 relied

upon by the petitioners merely indicates constitution of a committee to

study the issue of building permissions near highways and does not by

itself establish that the petitioners' remaining land has become incapable

of lawful use.

1. In the absence of such material, this Court is unable to

adjudicate the claim of severance or injurious affection in exercise of writ

jurisdiction.

WP-15256-2025.odt 20 of 21

1. Nevertheless, as observed earlier, the petitioners have

submitted representations before the competent authority raising these

grievances. The dismissal of this petition shall therefore not preclude the

competent authority from examining such representation as permissible

under the statutory framework, and take an appropriate decision in

accordance with law.

1. Accordingly, as mentioned above, writ petition stands

dismissed. However in the interest of justice the aforesaid liberty to

pursue the representations pending before the authorities is granted.

Respondents are directed to decide the same in accordance with law

within 8 weeks from today . There shall be no orders as to costs.

(Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.) (Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.)

B. S. Joshi

WP-15256-2025.odt 21 of 21