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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Karaba

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 25-0218

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (37)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Cynthia J. Bailey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ISAAC KARABA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0218
FILED 03-19-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-113273-001
The Honorable Michael S. Mandell, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michael J. Woodburn
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Colin F. Stearns
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. KARABA
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Isaac Karaba appeals his conviction and sentence for escape
in the second degree. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining
Karaba’s conviction. See State v. Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 287 n.3 (2022).

¶3 On March 19, 2024, Karaba, a native Swahili speaker, arrived
in Phoenix from Kenya and went to his cousin’s apartment. A few hours
later, the cousin’s roommate called 911 and alleged that Karaba had
attacked him with a kitchen knife. When police arrived, Karaba remained
inside the apartment for several minutes despite officers’ repeated
commands to exit. When Karaba finally emerged, he was holding two
kitchen knives. The officers ordered Karaba to drop the knives and tased
him when he did not.

¶4 Karaba was arrested for felony aggravated assault and taken
to a hospital for a post-taser examination. There, an officer questioned him
and Karaba responded in English. The officer then placed Karaba, who was
handcuffed and barefoot, in the back of a patrol car to take him to jail. On
the drive, Karaba began shouting in a foreign language and kicking the
seats. When Karaba refused to stop kicking, the officers in the car requested
other officers prepare a “wrap” restraint and returned with Karaba to the
hospital parking lot.

¶5 Once there, an officer cracked open the rear passenger door
to tell Karaba to stop kicking. At this point the restraint was not ready and
the officer did not intend to remove Karaba from the vehicle. Karaba
immediately slid across the rear seat from the driver’s side, stuck his legs
out of the car, and attempted to push open the door against the officer’s
efforts to keep it shut. Karaba “had at that point gotten his body outside of
the door, and it actually pushed [the officer] back from the door.” Karaba
placed both feet on the ground and stuck his head outside the car while

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STATE v. KARABA
Decision of the Court

speaking rapidly in a foreign language. Officers then secured Karaba,
removed him from the car, and positioned him to apply the restraint.

¶6 The State charged Karaba with aggravated assault and escape
in the second degree. At trial, Karaba testified in his own defense with the
aid of a Swahili interpreter. The jury found Karaba guilty on the escape
charge only and the court sentenced him to one year of supervised
probation.

¶7 Karaba timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) sections 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Karaba contends insufficient evidence supported his
conviction for escape in the second degree. A conviction must be supported
by sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Reinhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588 (1997). “We examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and
resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” Id. at 588-89. We
reverse “only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to
support the conviction.” State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 341, ¶ 109 (2022)
(citation omitted).

¶9 Escape in the second degree requires proof that the defendant
(1) was arrested for a felony and (2) knowingly escaped or attempted to
escape from custody. A.R.S. § 13-2503(A)(2). The defendant need not know
the nature of the arrest or its felony classification to be found guilty of
escape. State v. Walker, 181 Ariz. 475, 480 (App. 1995). Nor is conviction of
the underlying offense required to sustain a charge of escape; custody for
the underlying offense is sufficient. State v. Stevens, 154 Ariz. 510, 513 (App.
1987).

¶10 Karaba was arrested for felony aggravated assault, satisfying
the first element of escape. A.R.S. §§ 13-1204(A)(2), (F). He was also placed
in custody. “Custody means the imposition of actual constructive restraint
pursuant to an on-site arrest.” A.R.S. § 13-2501(4) (internal quotations
omitted). Karaba was clearly in custody while he was handcuffed and in
the back of a patrol car. See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 244, 247 (App.
1980), vacated in part on other grounds, 128 Ariz. 226, 232-33 (1981) (affirming
the defendant’s escape conviction where he freed himself from a locked
patrol car).

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STATE v. KARABA
Decision of the Court

¶11 Karaba argues, however, that there is insufficient evidence
that he escaped or attempted to escape from custody. Karaba is correct that
he did not successfully escape from custody. He was at least partially inside
the patrol car during the parking lot altercation until the officers removed
and restrained him. As Karaba never left the officers’ custody, he did not
escape.

¶12 However, the evidence is sufficient to prove Karaba
attempted to escape from custody. In the context of the statute, “attempt”
takes on its plain and ordinary meaning of to try or to endeavor. State v.
Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 499 (App. 1995). Karaba yelled and kicked from the
backseat of the patrol car until the officers parked the car to restrain him.
He then darted across the backseat as soon as the door opened, got his head
and feet outside the patrol car, and pushed against the officer’s efforts to
keep the door closed and hold him inside the car. Based on this evidence,
a rational trier of fact could conclude that Karaba was trying to free himself
from the officers’ custody. Cf. State v. Bear, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0615, 2009 WL
2031901, at *3, ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. July 14, 2009) (mem. decision) (holding there
was sufficient evidence to convict appellant of escape where she removed
a handcuff and reached for the car door to exit a patrol car, without
successfully exiting the car).

¶13 Finally, Karaba argues that even if he partially exited the
patrol car, he did not knowingly try to escape. He argues that on the day
of his arrest he was confused by his interactions with the police, had trouble
communicating with them because of the language barrier, and therefore
could not have formed the requisite intent to escape. A defendant acts
knowingly when, “with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described
by a statute defining an offense,” the defendant “is aware or believes that
the person’s conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists.”
A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b). Despite Karaba’s confusion, a reasonable jury could
have concluded Karaba knew he was in custody in the police car, officers
meant to keep him inside the car, and that he was not permitted to leave
the car.

¶14 The evidence establishes that Karaba was arrested for a felony
and was placed into custody. A rational trier of fact could also conclude
that Karaba was attempting to exit the car and free himself from custody
and that he acted knowingly when he did so. The evidence suffices to
support Karaba’s conviction for escape in the second degree.

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STATE v. KARABA
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm Karaba’s conviction and sentence.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM

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