Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kathleen M. Addessa v. J. Christian Bollwage Parking Garage

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-0357-25

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.8K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0357-25

KATHLEEN M. ADDESSA and
PAUL ADDESSA, her husband,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

J. CHRISTIAN BOLLWAGE
PARKING GARAGE, PARKING
AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF
ELIZABETH,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

CITY OF ELIZABETH,

Defendant.

---

Submitted January 20, 2026 – Decided March 27, 2026

Before Judges Natali and Bergman.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County,
Docket No. L-3565-24.
Law Offices of James H. Rohlfing, attorneys for
appellants (Amanda J. Hickey, of counsel and on the
briefs).

Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins,
attorneys for respondents (Eric G. Kahn, of counsel;
Rubin M. Sinins, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On leave granted, defendant Parking Authority of the City of Elizabeth

(Authority) appeals from a Law Division order denying its motion to dismiss

plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with the notice requirements set forth in

the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3. After our

review of the record and application of the relevant legal principles, we reverse.

I.

We recite the underlying facts and procedural history based on the

summary judgment record. On December 19, 2023, plaintiff Kathleen Addessa 1

was at the J. Christian Bollwage Parking Garage (Garage) 2 in Elizabeth when

she allegedly fell and sustained injuries. The Garage is owned and operated by

1
We refer to Kathleen Addessa as plaintiff, as Paul Addessa's claim is per quod
only.
2
As disclosed in defendant's brief, the J. Christian Bollwage Parking Garage is
not an actual legal entity but rather the name of the parking garage which is
located at 37 Caldwell Place in Elizabeth and owned by the Authority.

A-0357-25
2
the Authority, which was created by municipal ordinance pursuant to N.J.S.A.

40:11A-1 to -26. On February 8, 2024, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim with

the City of Elizabeth (City) Law Department located at City Hall in Elizabeth.

The Notice of Claim named the City, the Garage, and the Parking Authority as

targeted entities, and included all information required under N.J.S.A. 59:8 -4.

On February 20, 2024, the City responded by letter, formally denying plaintiff's

claim and advising her that the City does not own, operate, maintain, nor control

the Garage. The letter did not specifically disclose the owner and operator of

the Garage was the Authority.

On the date plaintiff's accident occurred, the Authority prepared an

incident report concerning plaintiff's fall, conducted an investigation, and

notified its insurance carrier, who acknowledged receipt of the claim. It is

undisputed that at no point was a TCA notice served directly on the Authority,

nor is there evidence in the record that the City forwarded the Notice of Claim

served on it to the Authority.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Garage, the Authority, the City, and

other fictitious entities on September 30, 2024. On March 14, 2025, the Garage

and Parking Authority moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, contending she

failed to serve a notice of claim on the Authority as required by N.J.S.A. 59:8-

A-0357-25
3
8. The trial court heard oral argument, denied defendants' motion, and ordered

limited discovery focusing exclusively on the TCA notice issue.

After completion of the limited discovery, defendants moved for

dismissal3 for the second time, again citing plaintiffs' failure to comply with

TCA notice requirements. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing they substantially

complied with the notice requirements and there was a lack of prejudice to

defendants. Plaintiff also asserted the Authority should be equitably estopped

from raising TCA notice defenses. Plaintiff did not move for an order permitting

her to file a late notice on the Authority under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9. Following oral

argument, the court issued an order denying defendants' motion.

The court found although the plaintiff had only served a timely tort claim

notice on the City, and not directly on the Authority, her actions were reasonable

due to the confusing representations on the Garage's signage suggesting the

Authority was part of the City. The court determined the doctrine of substantial

compliance applied since the defendants were immediately aware of the

incident, investigated and prepared a report, and suffered no prejudice. The

court also held based on the confusing signage on the Garage that the doctrine

3
The trial court converted defendants' motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment as it contained evidence outside of the pleadings. R. 4:6-
2(e).
A-0357-25
4
of equitable estoppel applied to defendants, in order to prevent a manifest

injustice.

The court reasoned that plaintiff's service of the TCA Notice on the City

also satisfied notice requirements for the Authority, determining this was

reasonable, since the Authority's independent status from the City was not

evident from the signage in the Garage and public representations on its website.

The court stressed confusion was foreseeable, and the plaintiffs should not be

penalized, particularly when defendants could have clarified the appropriate

owner of the Garage and the claim procedures required to file claims.

We granted the Authority's motion for leave to file an interlocutory

appeal. On appeal, defendants contend the trial court erred because plaintiff

failed to comply with the strict notice requirements of the TCA by not serving a

timely notice directly on the Authority, a separate public entity from the City.

The Authority maintains equitable estoppel and substantial compliance are

inapplicable because there was no affirmative misleading conduct or "technical

defect," as there was a complete absence of notice to the proper entity. The

Authority asserts that responsibility for proper service rested with the plaintiffs

and the trial court improperly shifted the burden by focusing on the Garage's

A-0357-25
5
signage, which accurately reflected the Authority’s name per statute, and that

no legal authority requires public signage to specify service requirements.

II.

We review the disposition of a summary judgment motion de novo,

applying the same standard used by the trial court. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J.

36, 59 (2015) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540

(1995)). Like the trial court, we view whether "the competent evidential

materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed

issue in favor of the non-moving party." Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J.

76, 91 (2013) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540). If ''the evidence 'is so one-sided

that one party must prevail as a matter of law,'" courts will "not hesitate to grant

summary judgment." Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The TCA governs claims against a public entity. "'[T]he Act establishes

the procedures by which claims may be brought', including a mandatory pre-suit

notification of [the] claim." Rogers v. Cape May Cnty. Office of the Pub. Def.,

208 N.J. 414, 420 (2011) (quoting Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 116

(2000)). A claimant may not bring an action against a public entity under the

A-0357-25
6
TCA unless he complies with its notice requirements set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:8-

8, which in pertinent part states:

A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for
injury or damage to person or to property shall be
presented as provided in this chapter not later than the
90th day after accrual of the cause of action. . . . The
claimant shall be forever barred from recovering
against a public entity or public employee if:

The claimant failed to file the claim with the public
entity within 90 days of accrual of the claim.

[(emphasis added).]

The purpose of the notice to the proper public entity defendant is:

(1) to allow the public entity at least six months for
administrative review with the opportunity to settle
meritorious claims prior to the bringing of suit; (2) to
provide the public entity with prompt notification of a
claim in order to adequately investigate the facts and
prepare a defense; to afford the public entity a
chance to correct the conditions or practices which gave
rise to the claim; and (4) to inform the [public entity] in
advance as to the indebtedness or liability that it may
be expected to meet.

[Beauchamp 164 N.J. at 121-22 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).]

A "claim for injury or damages . . . against a local public entity shall be

filed with that entity." N.J.S.A. 59:8-7 (emphasis added). The TCA requires

that a claimant serve a Notice of Claim upon the public entity allegedly involved

A-0357-25
7
in the matter. Ibid.; N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. A claimant's unfamiliarity with the TCA's

requirements does not, however, excuse the failure to file the notice with the

correct public entity. S.P. v. Collier High Sch., 319 N.J. Super. 452, 465 (App.

Div. 1999). "[I]gnorance of the [TCA's requirements] . . . 'without more, does

not constitute sufficient reason for . . . delay.'" Ibid. (quoting O'Neill v. City of

Newark, 304 N.J. Super. 543, 552 (App. Div. 1997)).

We first address the Authority's argument that the court erred in finding

the plaintiff substantially complied with the TCA's notice provisions by the

service of the TCA Notice on the City. "[S]ubstantial compliance means that

the notice has been given in a way, which though technically defective,

substantially satisfies the purposes for which notices of claims are required."

Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. Super. 204, 216 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Lameiro

v. W. N.Y. Bd. of Educ., 136 N.J. Super. 585, 588 (Law Div. 1975)). In

Lameiro, the court stated:

Substantial compliance, however, is based on the
notion that substantially all of the required information
has been given to those to whom the notice should be
given and that it has been given in a form which should
alert the recipient to the fact that a claim is being
asserted against the sovereign.

[136 N.J. Super. at 588 (emphasis added).]

A-0357-25
8
Based on our review of the record, plaintiff failed to serve—and never has

served—a notice of claim on the Authority at any time, nor did she move for an

order permitting a late notice of claim to be filed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8 -9.4

Having failed to timely notify the Authority of its claim, we conclude plaintiff

is barred from now asserting a claim against the Authority.

Plaintiff cannot successfully assert that she substantially complied with

those requirements when she made no attempt to file a TCA Notice against the

Authority. See Margolis & Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, cmt. on

N.J.S.A. 59:8-3 (2025). A TCA Notice served upon the wrong public entity

does "not absolve plaintiff[] of the obligation to promptly identify [the proper

4
N.J.S.A. 59:8-9, in pertinent part, states:

A claimant who fails to file notice of his claim within
90 days as provided in section 59:8-8 of this act, may,
in the discretion of a judge of the Superior Court, be
permitted to file such notice at any time within one year
after the accrual of his claim provided that the public
entity or the public employee has not been substantially
prejudiced thereby. Application to the court for
permission to file a late notice of claim shall be made
upon motion supported by affidavits based upon
personal knowledge of the affiant showing sufficient
reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances for
his failure to file notice of claim within the period of
time prescribed by section 59:8-8 of this act or to file a
motion seeking leave to file a late notice of claim within
a reasonable time thereafter. . . .
A-0357-25
9
public entity] and serve a timely notice of claim." McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J.

463, 479 (2011). In addition, the filing of plaintiff's complaint cannot be

considered substantial compliance with the notice requirements. Guzman v.

City of Perth Amboy, 214 N.J. Super. 167, 172 (App. Div. 1986).

Here, plaintiff acknowledged that she had not served the appropriate entity

and she failed to file a motion for leave to file a late notice of claim afforded by

the TCA. Because no motion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 was before it, we

conclude the trial court improvidently denied the Authority's motion for

summary judgment. Plaintiff's argument that service of the TCA Notice on the

City substantially complied with the TCA's requirement to serve the Authority

is unpersuasive as the TCA is clear the notice of claim for damages shall be filed

with that entity." N.J.S.A. 59:8-7 (emphasis added). Because plaintiff never

served the Authority nor was granted leave to file a late notice of claim against

it, the dismissal of her complaint was required.

We now turn to defendants' assertion that the trial court erred by

determining the Authority was equitably estopped from asserting its TCA notice

defense.

Equitable estoppel is conduct, either express or
implied, which reasonably misleads another to his
prejudice so that a repudiation of such conduct would
be unjust in the eyes of the law. The doctrine is rarely

A-0357-25
10
invoked against a governmental entity . . . . Nonetheless
equitable considerations are relevant to assessing
governmental conduct and may be invoked to prevent
manifest injustice. In rare cases, courts have invoked
equitable estoppel to relax the requirements of the Tort
Claims Act when the defendant has misled the plaintiff
about a material issue.

[McDade, 208 N.J. at 480 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).]

We part ways with the trial court's determination that equitable estoppel

applied in this instance. Plaintiff's failure to timely file either the TCA Notice

or a motion seeking leave to file a late TCA Notice was not attributable to any

act or omission on the part of the Authority. Based on our review of the record,

we differ from the trial court's finding that the signage in the Garage and the

Authority's website was confusing or misled the plaintiff. The sign

appropriately identified its owner and operator as the Authority. As pointed out

by the Authority, the City was statutorily required by resolution to title the

agency as the "Parking Authority of the City of Elizabeth." See N.J.S.A.

40:11A-4. We conclude the sign stating such was not misleading. We further

note there is no obligation in the TCA requiring the Authority to post signage or

other directives concerning the appropriate procedure to file claims against it as

suggested by the trial court.

A-0357-25
11
Based on our review of the record, we conclude the Authority did not

engage in any affirmative act to mislead plaintiff, a necessary element of

equitable estoppel. Further, the record shows plaintiff made no inquiry nor

conducted any investigation, to ascertain the identity of the owner or entity

responsible for maintaining the Garage, even after the City clearly informed

plaintiff by letter sent several weeks prior to the expiration of the 90 -day

statutory period that it did not own or operate the Garage.

We conclude because plaintiff did not file and serve the TCA Notice on

the Authority within ninety days of her fall, did not move for leave to file a late

notice of claim, nor has she met the legal requirements to invoke the doctrines

of substantial compliance or equitable estoppel, defendant's motion for dismissal

of plaintiff's complaint was required.

Reversed.

A-0357-25
12