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April 1, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Adam Lee Maskell v. State of Arkansas

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 203

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (52.9K)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 203
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-25-226

Opinion Delivered April 1, 2026
ADAM LEE MASKELL
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BRADLEY
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 06CR-22-25]
V.

HONORABLE QUINCEY ROSS,
STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge

Adam Maskell (Maskell) appeals from a negotiated plea to a Class B felony possession

of a firearm by certain persons and the sentence of five years’ imprisonment as a habitual

offender. Maskell raises seven points on appeal. Maskell’s first two arguments on appeal ask

this court to hold that Judge Puryear had no jurisdiction to sign an amended order of recusal;

accordingly, Judge Ross, who was appointed upon Judge Puryear’s recusal, should have

recused himself because he was appointed by an order entered without jurisdiction. Third,

Maskell argues that Judge Ross abused his discretion by refusing to recuse himself because

he was biased against Maskell. Maskell next argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by not holding an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw plea and by denying his

motion to withdraw plea. Finally, he argues he was denied his right to allocution and that
the judge who signed his sentencing order had no jurisdiction to do so. Finding no error,

we affirm.

On May 25, 2022, officers discovered a firearm on Maskell’s person when he was

stopped and frisked near the residence of Patrick Smith, whom Maskell had reportedly

threatened that day. Maskell was charged in the Bradley County Circuit Court, and Judge

Crews Puryear was assigned to Maskell’s case. Maskell, a self-claimed paralegal, was allowed

to proceed pro se when he was arraigned on August 15, 2022. Maskell first confirmed that

he understood the possible punishment for his charges, including Class B felony possession

of a firearm by certain persons as a habitual offender.

At a pretrial hearing on April 10, 2023, Maskell informed the court that he had filed

a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition and/or a stay of proceedings alleging that

Judge Puryear had tampered with evidence and aided in suppressing exculpatory evidence.

The Arkansas Supreme Court denied Maskell’s petitions in a formal order dated October

28, 2022. Judge Puryear addressed Maskell’s allegations that he had been impartial toward

Maskell.

On April 21, 2023, Maskell filed a pro se motion seeking the disqualification of Judge

Puryear. In this motion, Maskell alleged, as he had done in his petition to the Arkansas

Supreme Court, that Judge Puryear received hand signals from the public defender that led

to rulings against Maskell in a suppression hearing. He made several other allegations, such

as witness tampering and impartiality by Judge Puryear. In the motion, he also stated that he

had reported Judge Puryear for judicial misconduct. When this recusal motion was addressed

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on May 22, 2023, Judge Puryear reiterated that he did not harbor any bias or hold any

interest in the outcome, but he voluntarily recused himself.

On May 22, 2023, Judge Puryear entered an order of recusal transferring the case in

accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 16. On July 21, Judge Puryear issued an

amended order for recusal that “corrected” the previous order and stated that the case would

not be reassigned under Administrative Order No. 16 but rather directed the circuit clerk

“to transfer this matter as per the Tenth Judicial District Administrative Plan to Division 4.”

The case was then reassigned to Bradley County Circuit Court Judge Quincy Ross.

On September 19, Maskell filed a motion seeking Judge Ross’s recusal alleging, in

part, that he lacked jurisdiction because the case was transferred in noncompliance with the

reassignment process set forth under Admin. Order No. 16. He also alleged that Judge

Puryear had engaged in fraud and “handpicked” Judge Ross, which warranted his recusal or

disqualification. He also questioned Judge Ross’s impartiality because Judge Ross and Judge

Puryear had been photographed together. At a pretrial hearing on October 2, Maskell

reiterated his claim regarding Judge Puryear’s alleged noncompliance with Administrative

Order No. 16. At that same hearing, Maskell informed the court that he had filed a coram

nobis petition due to the transfer of his case to Judge Ross. Judge Ross then continued the

matter until the coram nobis petition was addressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The

supreme court denied this petition on January 22, 2024.

3
After that denial, Judge Ross addressed Maskell’s recusal motion and denied it on

February 8.1 In denying Maskell’s motion, Judge Ross explained that he would have been

assigned to Maskell’s case under Admin. Order No. 16 because he was the only other judge

who handled criminal matters in the Bradley County Circuit Court under the Tenth Judicial

District Administrative Plan. Judge Ross also rejected Maskell’s claim that photographs of

Judges Puryear and Ross together created an appearance of impropriety warranting his

disqualification.

Maskell filed an interlocutory notice of appeal of Judge Ross’s order denying his

motion to recuse. Judge Ross entered an order on March 12 resetting the pretrial hearing

and jury trial due to the pending interlocutory appeal.

On April 10, before the interlocutory appeal had been decided, Judge Ross held a

Zoom hearing at which Maskell stated that he had reported Judge Ross and his ex-wife for

lying to the police about an alleged shooting incident. Judge Ross scheduled another hearing

for April 22 to discuss whether Maskell would be able to proceed and represent himself at

the jury trial.

At a hearing held on June 10, Maskell pleaded guilty to Class B felony possession of a

firearm by certain persons as a habitual offender. Upon questioning by the court, Maskell

stated that he understood the range of punishments for his crime. Maskell also confirmed

that it was his voluntary decision to plead guilty and that his judgment was not impaired by

1
The written order denying the recusal motion was filed on February 15, 2024.

4
any drugs, alcohol, or medications at that time. After he provided a detailed account of his

crime, the court accepted Maskell’s guilty plea and accepted the negotiated sentence of five

years. At Maskell’s request, the court postponed the imposition of the sentence until July 29

so that he could work and take care of his family.

On July 2, 2024, Maskell filed a motion to withdraw his plea before entry of judgment

pursuant Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1. In this motion, Maskell asserted that withdrawal of his plea

was necessary because (1) his plea had been coerced by Judge Ross; (2) it was the result of

ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he was “under the influence” of Gabapentin and

Trazodone at the time of his plea.

Maskell initially failed to appear for the sentencing hearing that was scheduled for

July 29. A pickup order was issued, and Maskell was finally brought before the court on

September 24. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court read its order denying

Maskell’s motion to withdraw his plea into the record. After Judge Ross read his order

denying the motion to withdraw plea into the record, Maskell’s request to argue the motion

was denied. Maskell was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment as a habitual offender for his

commission of Class B felony possession of a firearm by certain persons pursuant to his plea

agreement. Maskell asked whether he would have the opportunity to speak before the

sentence was imposed, and the court denied this request. A corresponding sentencing order

was entered that same day. Maskell argues that this sentencing order was signed by Judge

Puryear after he lost jurisdiction over this case.

5
Maskell’s first three points on appeal are with respect to motions and orders that were

entered before he entered his guilty plea on June 10, 2024. His first argument is that Judge

Puryear violated Administrative Order No. 16 when he entered the amended order of recusal

on July 21, 2023, stating that his case would be transferred according to the county

administrative plan. The amended order was entered before June 10, 2024, the date that

Maskell’s unconditional guilty plea in which he expressly waived his appellate rights was

accepted.2

Except as provided by Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.3(b), there shall be

no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 1(a) (2023).

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.3(b) allows a defendant to enter a conditional guilty

plea under certain specified circumstances. Maskell did not enter a conditional plea under

Rule 24.3(b).

Our supreme court has recognized two other exceptions to Arkansas Rule of

Appellate Procedure–Criminal 1(a). An appeal may be taken after a guilty plea when there

is a challenge to the testimony or the evidence presented in a sentencing hearing separate

from the plea itself. Burgess v. State, 2016 Ark. 175, at 4, 490 S.W.3d 645, 648. An appeal

may also be taken from the denial of a postjudgment motion to amend an incorrect or illegal

sentence following a guilty plea. Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. App. 304, 5 S.W.3d 41 (1999).

2
Regardless of Judge Puryear’s execution of the amended order, it is undisputed that
this case would have been assigned to Judge Ross under the original order of recusal directing
the circuit clerk to follow Administrative Order No. 16. Accordingly, any argument with
respect to jurisdiction has no merit.

6
When the appeal from a guilty plea does not fall under one of these exceptions, we must

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Starks v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 182, 574 S.W.3d 700. Neither

of these exceptions applies to Maskell’s appeal with respect to whether Judge Puryear had

jurisdiction to effectuate the amended order. Therefore, there is no merit to this point of

appeal.

In his second and third arguments on appeal, Maskell argues that the trial court erred

by denying his motions to recuse Judge Ross. His second argument is that the order denying

Judge Ross’s recusal was erroneous because Judge Ross was “selected” by Judge Puryear in

the amended order in contravention of Administrative Order No. 16. His third argument is

that the trial court erred in not ordering Judge Ross’s recusal because he was biased against

Maskell. The order denying recusal was entered on February 15, 2024, which was before

June 10, 2024, the date Maskell entered his unconditional guilty plea in which he expressly

waived his appellate rights.

We decline to address these two points on appeal for the same reasons as discussed

under Maskell’s first argument that this court has no jurisdiction to rule on the merits.

Neither of the exceptions explained above applies to Maskell’s appeal of the order denying

Judge Ross’s recusal.

With respect to Maskell’s next two arguments on appeal, Maskell states that the trial

court abused its discretion by not affording him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to

7
withdraw his guilty plea and by not affording him the right to allocution3 at the sentencing

hearing.

Maskell’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea cited three grounds to his motion: (1)

coercion by Judge Ross; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he was “under the

influence of Gabapentin and Trazadone when he entered the negotiated plea.” At the

hearing, Judge Ross immediately read his order denying the motion to withdraw plea into

the record. Maskell asked the court whether he would be allowed to argue that motion, and

the court told him that he would not be able to do so. The judge then immediately began

imposing the sentence.

With respect to the denial of Maskell’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, a hearing on the

motion is “limited to those instances in which the defendant’s motion raises substantial

issues of law or fact and should be denied when the files and record conclusively show that

the defendant is entitled to no relief.” Aikens v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 161, at 6 (quoting

Green v. State, 362 Ark. 459, 467, 209 S.W.3d 339, 343 (2005)).

There was no evidence that the judge coerced Maskell into entering the plea at the

plea hearing. The judge’s questions to Maskell were very thorough, and Maskell’s responses

were clear that he understood his rights before entering the plea. He also attested that he

3
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-106(b) (Repl. 2016) provides, “When the
defendant appears for judgment, he or she must be informed by the court of the nature of
the indictment, his or her plea, and the verdict thereon. . . . He or she must be asked if he
or she has any legal cause to show why a judgment should not be pronounced against him
or her.”

8
was not under the influence of any drugs at the plea hearing, and the colloquy does not

suggest that he was impaired. The judge did not abuse his discretion in his decision to rule

on the motion to withdraw plea without an evidentiary hearing.

With respect to the sentencing hearing and the argument that Maskell was denied his

right to allocution, the judge accepted the plea at the plea hearing, and at that hearing

Maskell had ample opportunity for allocution. The pertinent parts of the colloquy with

respect to sentencing at the plea hearing follow:

[THE COURT]: Very well. Mr. Maskell, I understand that you
wish to change your plea from not guilty to guilty
this evening; is that correct?

[MASKELL]: Yes. Based on a few terms.

[THE COURT]: All right. I see where you were charged with
possession of a firearm by certain persons. That’s
a class B felony. It carries a range of five to thirty
years in prison and a fine of up to $15,000. You
could receive a sentence up to thirty years in
prison, fine of up to $15,000. You were charged
as a felon. You were also charged as an habitual
offender. You have the right to plead not guilty
and be tried before this Court or by a jury of your
peers. The burden will be on the State of proving
your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you
understand that, Mr. Maskell?

[MASKELL]: Yes, sir.

[THE COURT]: Do you hereby state that your judgment is not
now impaired by any drugs, alcohol or
medication?

[MASKELL]: It is not.

9
[THE COURT]: Do you understand the minimum and maximum
possible sentence you could receive?

[MASKELL]: Yes, sir. It’s five to thirty, I believe.

[THE COURT]: Do you understand that your plea of guilty is a
waiver of your right to a trial by a jury and of your
right to appeal to any other court?

[MASKELL]: I see that in there, yes.

[THE COURT]: Okay. All right. Do you fully understand what you
are – what you are charged with having done?

....

[THE COURT]: Are you certain that your plea of guilty has not
been induced by any force, threat or promise
apart from the plea agreement itself?

[MASKELL]: As long as everything in the plea agreement is
honored, I’m good with it.

....

[THE COURT]: All right. If your negotiated plea involves a
sentence of imprisonment, do you state that no
one has made you any promises regarding parole
eligibility, earning of meritorious good time, early
release or anything of that nature to get you to
enter this plea?

[MASKELL]: That is correct. They can’t on this charge.

....

[THE COURT]: All right. You signed this paperwork?

[MASKELL]: That is correct, sir.

10
[THE COURT]: All right. Mr. Mazzanti, I recognize your signature,
sir. All right. Let’s go to the recommendation.
The State is asking for five years ADC for the
possession of a firearm by certain persons.

....

[THE COURT]: Let me hear from you, Mr. Maskell, as to the
punishment of five years. Let me hear from you.

[MASKELL’S COUNSEL]: What do you need to hear?

[THE COURT]: Well, we are here to accept a plea – well, I guess to
hear the plea at this point in time. And then we
will – we will sentence him.

[MASKELL’S COUNSEL]: Oh, Your Honor, he is – Mr. Maskell is asking
that sentencing be postponed until July 29 and
that he’s willing to waive the 30-day requirement.

[MASKELL]: Correct. It was agreed upon with all parties, Mr.
Harrod as well.

[THE COURT]: All right. Mr. Maskell, let’s – the Court is in
agreement with allowing you to enter your plea
for five years ADC time along with all the other
portions of this saying fines and things of that
nature and restitution. All right. And also the
conditions that they have asked for which is that
you check in with the sheriff’s office, both
sheriff’s offices. All right.

It is clear from the record that the judge was on the brink of imposing the sentence

at the plea hearing when counsel interjected that there was an agreement to allow Maskell

some time to work and spend time with his family. Here, his plea had been accepted by the

court at the plea hearing when the judge stated “the court is in agreement with allowing you

to enter your plea for five years ADC time along with all the other portions of this saying

11
fines and things of that nature and restitution.” Maskell was given ample opportunity to

allocute at that hearing. And after doing so, the judge agreed to the delayed imposition.

Also, the plea agreement that was accepted by the judge imposed the minimum

sentence for a Class B felony—five years. Maskell made no argument that he was prejudiced

by not being able to speak after the plea was accepted but before the imposition of the

negotiated sentence, and we find no prejudice.

Maskell next asserts that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was erroneously

denied because the plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made because he was “under

the influence of Trazodone and Gabapentin.” Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1(a)

provides that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right before it is accepted

by the court. It is uncontested that the circuit court accepted Maskell’s guilty plea on June

10, 2024, and denied his motion to withdraw his plea before entry of judgment on

September 24. When a motion is denied after acceptance but before judgment, the court in

its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea to “correct a manifest injustice

if it is fair and just to do so,” considering the reasons advanced by a defendant and any

prejudice the withdrawal of a plea would cause the prosecution in reliance upon his plea.

Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(a). A withdrawal of a plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if

the defendant, in part, “proves to the satisfaction of the court that . . . the plea was

involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charges or that the

sentence imposed could be imposed[.]” Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(b)(iii).

12
A defendant’s plea is an intelligent act when “done with sufficient awareness of the

relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Martin v. State, 2015 Ark. 147, at 6, 460

S.W.3d 289, 293 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). Relevant

considerations include the accused’s prior experience with the judicial system. Peterson v.

State, 296 Ark. 324, 326, 756 S.W.2d 897, 898–99 (1988). In Pettit v. State, 296 Ark. 423,

758 S.W.2d 1 (1988), the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s plea colloquy

supported that he intelligently entered his plea with knowledge of its ramifications, despite

having taken tranquilizers that same day.

A circuit court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be affirmed absent

an abuse of discretion. Fogle v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 183, at 6, 596 S.W.3d 593, 598. When

a record demonstrates a factual basis for a plea and the accused initially admits that the plea

is voluntary, the defendant faces an “uphill climb” to overcome the consequences of the plea.

Mangrum v. State, 70 Ark. App. 46, 51, 14 S.W.3d 889, 892 (2000).

At the plea hearing in this case, the judge asked Maskell an extensive list of questions.

Maskell went through a very specific explanation of the crime he committed. He understood

the terms of the negotiated sentence. He specifically denied ingesting drugs before the plea

hearing. Maskell clearly understands the judicial system. The trial judge did not abuse his

discretion by denying Maskell’s motion to withdraw plea.

With respect to Maskell’s final issue on appeal, that Judge Puryear originally signed

the sentencing order, there is no evidence that Judge Puryear signed any order after the

13
amended order of recusal. This is an unsupported contention and provides no basis to

reverse the guilty plea.

Affirmed.

HARRISON and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Adam Maskell, pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

14