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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Abou-Chakra v. Abou-Chakra CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B344252

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (62.7K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26 Abou-Chakra v. Abou-Chakra CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MAE ABOU-CHAKRA, B344252

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. ED040238)
v.

BASSAM R. ABOU-CHAKRA,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jannet Perez Santiso, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Noelle M. Halaby and Noelle M. Halaby for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

Bassam R. Abou-Chakra appeals the family court’s order
denying his request to terminate his obligation to maintain life
insurance for the benefit of Mae Abou-Chakra, his former
spouse.1 We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to remove this obligation from the parties’ stipulated
judgment and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bassam and Mae were married on July 30, 1988, and
separated on September 8, 2008. The parties signed a Stipulated
Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage (Stipulated Judgment) in
2016. In the Stipulated Judgment, Bassam agreed to pay Mae
$5,400 per month for spousal support. Under the same heading
of “Spousal Support,” Bassam agreed to maintain life insurance
for Mae’s benefit:
“33. [Bassam] shall immediately seek, purchase and
maintain life insurance in the amount no less than
$500,000, with [Mae] as beneficiary. [Bassam] shall
send quarterly proof to [Mae].”
Paragraph 33 is the only mention of life insurance in the
Stipulated Judgment. The Stipulated Judgment also
divided the parties’ property, including Bassam’s
retirement benefits.
In April 2024 Bassam filed a Request for Order for
Modification or Termination of Spousal Support (RFO). The RFO
also included a request for the court to terminate the

1 We refer to Bassam and Mae by their first names to avoid
confusion; no disrespect is intended.

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requirement to maintain life insurance because Bassam had
retired, effective November 1, 2024.
In November 2024 the court held a hearing on the RFO.
On the modification of spousal support, Bassam argued that
when he retired, Mae would get a share of the retirement benefits
and that this should meet her support needs. Accordingly, the
court should modify monthly spousal support to $0 and terminate
jurisdiction. On the life insurance issue, Bassam argued: “If
there is no spousal support order, then my client has no
obligation to [Mae]. Therefore, his life insurance should not –
there’s no insurable interest [Mae] has. [Bassam] has no
obligation to [Mae]. [Bassam] should be able to leave life
insurance to whomever he wants or no longer have that
obligation.” Bassam also argued that Family Code section 43602
provided authority for the court to modify the life insurance
provision.
Mae argued that monthly spousal support should be
increased because of increases in her cost of living and greater
needs due to medical issues.3 On the life insurance issue, Mae
argued: “A life insurance benefit is also a – can be placed as in
the spousal support, as well as in the assets. It’s a benefit. It’s
not technically an asset. It’s a benefit. But nowhere in the
judgment do the parties contemplate that if spousal support
and – reduced to [$0] that she loses that benefit. That’s not
contemplated in the judgment.”

2 Further statutory references are to the Family Code.
3 Under section 213, a “responding party may seek
affirmative relief alternative to that requested by the moving
party, on the same issues raised by the moving party” without
filing a separate request for order.

3
The court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the section 4320
factors. Among other things, the court considered that the
marriage lasted more than 20 years. For most of the marriage,
Bassam encouraged Mae to devote her time to raising the
children and domestic duties. At one time, Mae enrolled in an
accounting program that she later quit at the behest of Bassam.
Mae has “nominal marketable skills.” The court noted that Mae’s
dedication to the household allowed Bassam to promote and
advance his career. Bassam’s income more than doubled post-
judgment (from around $12,000 per month to $26,497) and now
in retirement was $18,484 monthly. Mae was diagnosed with
various ailments, including serious ongoing medical issues. With
Bassam’s retirement, the court found that Mae’s share of the
retirement benefits would exceed her monthly spousal support.
The court also considered that the parties had agreed that
Bassam would maintain life insurance for the benefit of Mae.
The court found that Mae failed to meet her burden of
showing a material change in circumstances to warrant an
increase in spousal support and denied that request. The court
found that with Bassam’s retirement, Mae would be receiving a
portion of his retirement benefits that was $601.86 over the
current monthly spousal support order and granted Bassam’s
request for a downward modification of monthly spousal support
to $0. The Court reserved jurisdiction over the issue of spousal
support.
Regarding Bassam’s request to terminate his obligation to
maintain life insurance for Mae’s benefit, the court first looked at
the Stipulated Judgment. The court noted that the Stipulated
Judgment did not require the court to remove or even consider
removal of the obligation in the event the court modified monthly

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spousal support to $0. The court acknowledged Bassam’s
argument that the court had authority under section 4360 to
modify the life insurance provision but questioned whether the
life insurance provision in the Stipulated Judgment was made
under section 4360. The court explained that it was denying the
request for two reasons. First, there was nothing in the
Stipulated Judgment that indicated the life insurance provision
was made under section 4360. Second, even if section 4360
applied, the court stated it was exercising its discretion not to
terminate the provision.
Bassam timely appealed.4

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
In ordering or modifying spousal support, “the court must
consider the mandatory guidelines of section 4320. Once the
court does so, the ultimate decision as to amount and duration of
spousal support rests within its broad discretion and will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” (In re
Marriage of Kerr (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 87, 93, fn. omitted.) In
determining the needs of a supported spouse, a court may order a
supporting party to purchase and maintain an annuity, life
insurance or a trust where it is just and reasonable in view of the

4 Mae has not filed a brief. “However, we do not treat the
failure to file a respondent’s brief as a ‘default’ (i.e., an admission
of error) but examine the record, appellant’s brief, and any oral
argument by appellant to see if it supports any claims of error
made by the appellant.” (In re Marriage of Riddle (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1078, fn. 1.)

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circumstances of the parties. (See § 4360, subd. (a).)5
Determination of what is just and reasonable relating to
annuities, insurance, or trusts for a supported spouse are within
the sound discretion of the court. (In re Marriage of Ziegler
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 788, 793 [“In our view, the trial court acted
well within its discretion when it concluded it was ‘just and
reasonable’ to order [Appellant] to continue to make payments on
the survivor benefit plan”].) We review an order under
section 4360 for abuse of discretion.

B. Under Section 4360, the Family Court Had Discretion To
Modify the Life Insurance Provision
Bassam argues section 4360 applies to the Stipulated
Judgment and gives the court the authority to modify or
terminate his obligation to maintain life insurance. The court
has discretion to modify or terminate an order under section 4360

5 Section 4360, subdivision (a), provides: “For the purpose of
[s]ection 4320, where it is just and reasonable in view of the
circumstances of the parties, the court, in determining the needs
of a supported spouse, may include an amount sufficient to
purchase an annuity for the supported spouse or to maintain
insurance for the benefit of the supported spouse on the life of the
spouse required to make the payment of support, or may require
the spouse required to make the payment of support to establish
a trust to provide for the support of the supported spouse, so that
the supported spouse will not be left without means of support in
the event that the spousal support is terminated by the death of
the party required to make the payment of support.”

6
unless the parties agreed otherwise in writing. (See § 4360,
subd. (b).)6
In this case, the parties signed the Stipulated Judgment.
Both parties agreed to the life insurance provision, and the court
entered the life insurance provision as a term in the judgment for
this case. The parties did not include any language agreeing that
the provision could not be modified or terminated, so the court
has discretion to modify or terminate the provision.

C. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining
To Terminate the Life Insurance Provision in the Stipulated
Judgment
Bassam argues the trial court abused its discretion
because, after reducing monthly spousal support to $0, it did not
terminate Bassam’s obligation under the Stipulated Judgment to
maintain life insurance for the benefit of Mae. In making this
argument, Bassam argues that if Mae’s monthly spousal support
is reduced to $0, then there is no need for the life insurance.
Having just considered the section 4320 factors in modifying
spousal support, the family court then considered the Stipulated
Judgment and declined to terminate the provision.
Bassam argues that because the life insurance provision is
in the “Spousal Support” section of the Stipulated Judgment, “the
spousal support obligation and life insurance obligation are
interrelated.” But that fact alone does not advance Bassam’s

6 Section 4360, subdivision (b), provides: “Except as
otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, an order made
under this section may be modified or terminated at the
discretion of the court at any time before the death of the party
required to make the payment of support.”

7
position. Bassam argues that the life insurance is for support
after his passing. If this is accurate, then both the monthly
spousal support and the life insurance are elements of the
parties’ agreed spousal support.
There is nothing in the agreement tying the maintenance of
life insurance to the amount of monthly spousal support. There
is no language indicating conditions under which the obligation
could be removed. If the parties had intended for the
requirement to maintain life insurance to exist only while
Bassam was required to pay monthly spousal support,
conditional language could have been included. It was not.
In addition to monthly spousal support and the life
insurance, the Stipulated Judgment provided for the division of
Bassam’s retirement benefits. At the time of the Stipulated
Judgment, the parties agreed that, among other things, Mae
would receive monthly spousal support, be the beneficiary of life
insurance on Bassam, and receive a portion of Bassam’s
retirement benefits.
The court engaged in an extensive analysis of the
section 4320 factors regarding spousal support. The court
considered that it was a long-term marriage, more than 20 years.
For most of the marriage, Bassam wanted Mae to devote her time
to raising the children and domestic duties, and at one time, Mae
enrolled in an accounting program that she later quit at the
behest of Bassam. Accordingly, Mae has nominal marketable
skills. The court noted that Mae’s dedication to the household
allowed Bassam to promote and advance his career, and Bassam
benefited from that post-judgment as his income more than
doubled prior to his retirement. Mae had been diagnosed with
medical issues that she claimed prevented her from working and

8
increased her costs of living and support needs. With Bassam’s
retirement, the court found that Mae’s share of the retirement
benefits would exceed her monthly spousal support. The court
also considered that the parties had agreed as part of the
Stipulated Judgment that Bassam would maintain life insurance
for the benefit of Mae.
After addressing all this and other information, the court
reduced monthly spousal support to $0 but declined to terminate
the life insurance provision that the parties had previously
agreed upon. Given this extensive analysis and consideration of
the specific circumstances in this case, we do not find an abuse of
discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order denying termination of Bassam’s life insurance
obligations under the Stipulated Judgment is affirmed.

GIZA, J. *
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

• Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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