CBSA Expiry Review Determination for Oil Country Tubular Goods from China

Ottawa,

March 24, 2026

Concerning an expiry review determination under paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of the Special Import Measures Act respecting certain oil country tubular goods originating in or exported from China.

Statement of Reasons—Expiry review determination: Oil Country Tubular Goods 1 (OCTG1 2025 ER)

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Executive summary

[1] On October 10, 2025, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT), pursuant to subsection 76.03(1) of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA), initiated an expiry review of its order made on December 10, 2020, in Expiry Review No. RR-2019-005, of the dumping and subsidizing of certain oil country tubular goods from China (Subject Goods).

[2] As a result of the CITT’s expiry review, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) initiated an expiry review investigation to determine, pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of SIMA, whether the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping and/or subsidizing of the subject goods.

[3] The CBSA received responses to its Canadian Producer expiry review questionnaire (ERQ) from Welded Tube of Canada Corporation (“Welded Tube”) Footnote 1, Interpro Pipe & Steel, Inc. (“Interpro”) Footnote 2, and Tenaris Canada Footnote 3 (collectively, the “Canadian producers”).

[4] Close of record documents Footnote 4, as well as case briefs Footnote 5, were also received from the Canadian producers, which included information in support of its position that continued or resumed dumping of the subject goods from China, and the subsidizing of such goods from China, are likely if the CITT’s order is allowed to expire.

[5] The CBSA received a response to its importer ERQ from Cantak Corporation, Footnote 6 Trimark Tubulars Ltd. Footnote 7 and Mertex Canada Ltd. Footnote 8 No importer filed a case brief or a reply submission.

[6] The CBSA received no responses to its exporter/foreign producer. No exporters or foreign producers filed a case brief or a reply submission.

[7] The CBSA did not receive a response to the subsidy ERQ from the Government of China, nor did the Government of China provide a case brief or reply submission.

[8] Analysis of information on the administrative record indicates a likelihood of continued or resumed dumping into Canada of certain OCTG from China should the CITT’s order expire. This analysis relied upon the following factors:

• Continued dumping and subsidizing over the period of review
• Global overcapacity and China’s slowing economy
• Economic conditions in China
• Trade measures in other jurisdictions and

• International market conditions
  [9] In addition, analysis of information on the administrative record indicates a likelihood of continued or resumed subsidizing of certain OCTG originating in or exported from China should the CITT’s finding be rescinded. This analysis relied upon the following factors:

• Tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada

• Continued availability of subsidy programs for OCTG exporters/producers in China
  [10] The CBSA, having considered the relevant information on the administrative record and the foregoing factors, has determined under paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of SIMA that the expiry of the order:

1. in respect of certain oil country tubular goods originating in or exported from China is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods into Canada and
2. in respect of certain oil country tubular goods originating in or exported from China is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of subsidizing of the goods exported to Canada

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Background

[11] On March 23, 2010, the CITT issued its findings in Inquiry No. NQ-2009-004. In its injury findings, the CITT found that the dumping and subsidization of certain oil country tubular goods from China and have caused injury to the domestic industry.

[12] Since the CITT’s findings, this case has been subject to six re-investigations and 8 normal value reviews. The CBSA’s most recent re-investigation to update the normal values, export prices and amounts of subsidy was concluded on January 31, 2025.

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Product definition

[13] The goods subject to the order under review are defined as:

“Oil country tubular goods including, in particular, casing and tubing, made of carbon or alloy steel, welded or seamless, heat-treated or not heat-treated, regardless of end finish, having an outside diameter from 2 3/8 inches to 13 3/8 inches (60.3 mm to 339.7 mm), meeting or supplied to meet API specification 5CT or equivalent standard, in all grades, excluding drill pipe, seamless casing up to 11 3/4 inches (298.5 mm) in outside diameter, pup joints, welded or seamless, heat-treated or not heat-treated, in lengths of up to 3.66 m (12 feet), and coupling stock, originating in or exported from China.”

Inclusions, exclusions and additional information

[14] For a full list of inclusions, exclusions and for additional product information please see the relevant sections on the Measures in Force.

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Period of review

[15] The period of review (POR) for the CBSA’s expiry review investigation is from January 1, 2022 to June 30, 2025.

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Canadian industry

[16] The vast majority of domestic production of certain oil country tubular goods is produced by Welded Tube, Interpro and Tenaris. All three producers listed provided a response to the CBSA’s Domestic Producer ERQ.

Welded Tube

[17] Welded Tube was founded in 1970 in Concord, Ontario and has been a family-owned Canadian business since its inception. As a fully integrated North American producer Welded Tube produced OCTG at three facilities during the period of review. Footnote 9

Interpro

[18] Interpro, formerly Evraz Canada, began operations in 1957 in Regina. Interpro produces OCTG at a number of locations across Canada, with its head office based out of Regina, SK. Footnote 10

Tenerais

[19] Tenaris has played a role in the Canadian OCTG market dating back to the 1980’s. Beginning as a spot importer and evolving into a comprehensive producer of OCTG in Canada. Tenaris produces OCTG at two manufacturing facilities and its ultimate parent company, Tenaris S.A. is based out of Luxembourg. Footnote 11

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Canadian market

[20] The Canadian production and the apparent market for OCTG cannot be disclosed as the total value and volume of Canadian production of OCTG during the POR was based on confidential information filed by a limited number of Canadian producers. The imports of OCTG from China are presented in dollars in Table 1 and Table 2.

| Source | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Q1-Q2 2025 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| China | 114,862,868 | 83,859,019 | 60,003,446 | 23,482,142 |
| Chinese Taipei | 474,035 | 509,587 | 2,521,083 | 1,590,962 |
| India | 4,234,281 | 5,076,938 | 6,150,203 | - |
| Indonesia | - | - | - | - |
| South Korea | 5,848,270 | 5,014 | 255,743 | 131,534 |
| Thailand | 1,102,868 | 1,122,456 | 211,161 | 1,418,873 |
| Ukraine | 19,337,448 | 29,693,657 | - | - |
| Vietnam | - | - | - | 4,800,736 |
| Turkiye | 19,095 | - | - | - |
| Total subject imports | 145,878,865 | 120,266,671 | 69,141,636 | 31,424,247 |
| 1 Totals may vary from row-by-row addition due to rounding | | | | |

| Source | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Q1-Q2 2025 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| China | 48,503 | 26,866 | 22,299 | 6,547 |
| Chinese Taipei | 312 | 281 | 2,262 | 565 |
| India | 1,743 | 2,048 | 2,311 | - |
| Indonesia | - | - | - | - |
| South Korea | 2,700 | 1 | 77 | 73 |
| Thailand | 712 | 466 | 133 | 565 |
| Ukraine | 10,616 | 14,031 | - | - |
| Vietnam | - | - | - | 2,378 |
| Turkiye | 2 | - | - | - |
| Total subject imports | 64,588 | 43,693 | 27,082 | 10,128 |
[21] As detailed in Table 1 and Table 2 above, subject imports of OCTG declined throughout the POR since 2022 and have stabilized over the last three years in both value and volume.

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Enforcement data

[22] As detailed in Table 3 below, the enforcement of the CITT’s order by the CBSA during the POR has resulted in the assessment of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports of subject goods from China in the amount of $5,379,781.

| Source | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Q1-Q2 2025 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| China | $2,941,987 | $726,278 | $175,289 | $1,536,227 |

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Parties to the proceedings

[23] On October 14, 2025, the CBSA sent a notice concerning the initiation of the expiry review investigation and ERQs to known Canadian producers, importers and exporters. A list of all interested parties is found in Appendix A.

[24] The ERQs requested information relevant to the consideration of the expiry review factors found under subsection 37.2(1) of the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR).

[25] Three domestic producers, Tenaris, Interpro, and Welded Tube provided a response to the CBSA’s Domestic Producer ERQ. In addition, the trio provided additional close of the record documents as well as case briefs in support of their position that continued or resumed dumping and subsidizing of OCTG from China is likely, if the CITT’s order is allowed to expire.

[26] Three importers, Mertex Canada Ltd., Trimark Tubulars Ltd., and Cantak Corporation participated in the expiry review investigation by providing a response to the Importer ERQ. No importers filed a case brief or a reply submission.

[27] No exporters or producers participated in the expiry review investigation by providing a response to the exporter/foreign producer ERQ. Nor did any exporters or foreign producers file a case brief or a reply submission.

[28] The Government of China did not provide a response to the Subsidy ERQ, nor did it provide a case brief or reply submission.

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Information considered by the CBSA

Administrative Record

[29] The information considered by the CBSA for purposes of this expiry review investigation is contained on the administrative record. The administrative record includes the information on the CBSA’s Exhibit Listing, which is comprised of the CITT’s administrative record at initiation of the expiry review, CBSA exhibits, and information submitted by interested persons, including information which parties feel is relevant to the decision as to whether dumping and/or subsidizing is likely to continue or resume if the order is rescinded. This information may consist of expert analyst reports, excerpts from trade magazines and newspapers, orders and findings issued by authorities of Canada or of a country other than Canada, documents from international trade organizations and responses to the ERQs, if any, submitted by domestic producers, importers, exporters and foreign producers as well as by the Government of China.

[30] For purposes of an expiry review investigation, the CBSA sets a date after which no new information submitted by interested parties will be placed on the administrative record or considered as part of the CBSA’s expiry review investigation. This is referred to as the “closing of the record date.” For this expiry review investigation, the closing of the record date was December 3, 2025. This deadline allows parties time to prepare their case briefs and reply submissions based on the information that is on the administrative record.

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Position of the parties: Dumping

Parties contending that continued or resumed dumping is likely

Domestic producers: Tenaris, Interpro and Welded Tube (Collectively, the Canadian Producers)

[31] In their ERQ response and case briefs, the Canadian producers argued that continued or resumed dumping is likely should the order be allowed to expire. The Canadian producers each provided the CBSA with additional information prior to the close of the record in support of its position. Each party further expanded and elaborated on their position in their respective case briefs. The following section summarizes the arguments of the Canadian producers collectively.

[32] The factors identified by the Canadian producers in support of their position are summarized as follows:

• Continued dumping and subsidizing over the period of review
• Global overcapacity and China’s slowing economy
• Economic conditions in China
• Trade measures in other jurisdictions and
• International market conditions

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Continued dumping and subsidizing over the period of review

[33] The Canadian producers referenced the CBSA’s compliance statistics showing that subject goods continued to be sold to Canada during the POR and that SIMA duties were collected from subject goods from both countries. The CBSA’s compliance statistics show that OCTG producers remain interested in the Canadian market and duties were collected every year of the OCTG. The Canadian producers argue that Chinese OCTG producers exported substantial volumes of OCTG in 2022 when normal values did not accurately reflect market conditions. When normal values reflected up-to-date market conditions, volumes declined from China.

[34] Chinese producers were able to quickly export larger volumes of OCTG in 2022 when demand for energy had surged following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia-Ukraine armed conflict. Canada’s position as an energy supplier leads Canada to be ground for the dumping of OCTG goods. Chinese producers exported smaller volumes of OCTG following the proceedings which updated normal values near the end of 2022 and in 2023 but SIMA duties as a percentage of value for duty were higher.

[35] Canadian producers argue that without the finding in place, the volume of dumped and subsidized exports to Canada will almost certainly rise and the margin of dumping and subsidizing will also rise as producers compete for market share in Canada.

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Global overcapacity and China’s slowing economy will limit market opportunities for subject countries and incentivize continued or resumed dumping

[36] Canadian producers argue that the combination of systemic global steel overcapacity and China’s deteriorating domestic economy creates a "crisis" level of excess supply that will inevitably be directed toward open markets like Canada. Footnote 15 Despite international calls for capacity reduction, Chinese state-owned enterprises have continued to expand production, leading to a collapse in global prices and the displacement of producers in market economies. Footnote 16 Domestic producers highlight that while China’s steelmaking capacity remains massive at approximately 1.14 billion tonnes, its domestic consumption is projected to continue declining through 2026 as its housing market bottoms out. Footnote 17

[37] This imbalance is further exacerbated by a sharp contraction in China’s domestic demand for OCTG specifically. Footnote 18 Producers point to reports from the International Energy Agency (IEA) showing that China’s oil demand growth has slowed dramatically due to the rapid deployment of electric vehicles, the expansion of high-speed rail, and a prolonged downturn in the property sector. Footnote 19 Domestic producers point to recent findings of CBSA’s Seamless Casings Expiry Review which determined with domestic demand reaching a plateau or declining, Chinese OCTG producers—who are already highly export-oriented—are forced to seek foreign markets to maintain their high production levels and throughput. Footnote 20

[38] Furthermore, Canadian producers contend that because OCTG is a price-sensitive commodity, Chinese exporters must use dumped pricing to secure market share in any available jurisdiction. Footnote 21 They argue that as other major markets like the United States and the European Union become increasingly restrictive through tariffs and safeguards, Canada remains a highly attractive "target" for the diversion of these excess, unfairly traded goods. Footnote 22 Without the continued protection of the current Order, producers maintain that the Canadian market would likely be flooded with dumped Chinese OCTG as producers seek to relieve their internal "capacity crisis." Footnote 23

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China's economic conditions

[39] China’s domestic steel market is currently in what industry analysts describe as a "deep crisis," driven primarily by a prolonged downturn in the property sector. Footnote 24 In June 2025, S&P Global reported a 12.31 percent year-over-year decline in Chinese domestic steel consumption. Analysts predict that domestic demand will continue to fall through 2026 as the housing market bottoms out. Footnote 25 These conditions exert extreme downward pressure on prices and force Chinese producers to seek export markets to maintain production levels. Canadian producers argue these dynamics create a "capacity crisis" that compels Chinese suppliers to offload surplus supply in open markets like Canada. Footnote 26

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China's OCTG demand

[40] China’s domestic demand for OCTG is slowing significantly due to a "visible" deceleration in oil demand growth. The International Energy Agency (IEA) attributes this to the rapid deployment of electric vehicles (EVs), the expansion of high-speed rail, and the ongoing property sector crisis. Footnote 27 Because Chinese OCTG producers are highly export-oriented and operate with capacity utilization rates often below 80%, they require high export volumes to maintain throughput. Canadian producers argue that with domestic demand reaching a plateau, exports remain the only viable option for Chinese mills to sustain operations. Footnote 28

[41] In summary, the Canadian producers argue that the production imperative, global steel excess capacity concerns and China’s disruptive impact on the global OCTG export market all provide important context which creates an environment where producers in China would be incentivized to sell goods to Canada at dumped prices if the finding was rescinded.

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China's steel industry and global trade measures

[42] Chinese exporters face an increasingly restrictive global trade environment, with over 50 anti-dumping measures currently in force against Chinese steel tubular products worldwide. Footnote 29 Major markets like the United States and the European Union have implemented rigorous safeguards and tariffs—such as the EU's 25 percent duty and reduced quotas—to prevent the influx of cheap Chinese steel. Footnote 30

[43] The Canadian producers argue that these existing trade remedies in other jurisdictions are an important factor in determining whether or not dumping would continue or resume in the event that the order is rescinded. Numerous other trade remedies against Subject Goods across numerous jurisdictions increases the likelihood that Subject Good producers will resume exporting OCTG to Canada at dumped prices if the order expires, the Canadian producers argue.

[44] Other trade measures like safeguards and tariff-rate quotas have been imposed on Subject Countries, limiting the availability of alternative export markets. The European Union has a global steel safeguard covering OCTG until June 30, 2026, which includes China. Over quota volumes are subject to a 25% duty, although this is likely to increase to 50% duty in June of 2026. Footnote 31 The United Kingdom has similar measures in place. Footnote 32 Most significantly, U.S. Section 232 tariffs continue to restrict access to one of the largest steel markets in the world.

[45] Canadian producers argue that these global restrictions result in "diversion," where Chinese goods blocked from other markets are redirected toward Canada. Footnote 33 While Canada has implemented its own 25 percent surtax on Chinese steel, producers maintain that without the underlying SIMA Order, exporters could simply lower prices to absorb the surtax, rendering it ineffective at preventing dumping.

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China's export orientation

[46] Chinese producers are inherently export-oriented, with major entities like Tianjin Pipe Corporation (TPCO) maintaining global marketing networks covering over 100 countries. Footnote 34 Record evidence from the POR indicates that China's reliance on exports has only intensified as domestic demand weakens. Footnote 35 Footnote 36 Canadian producers argue that the recent "explosion" of Chinese imports in 2022—which surged 638% for seamless goods—proves that China will immediately exploit any opportunity to flood the Canadian market if price disciplines are relaxed. Footnote 37

[47] The Canadian producers argue that a substantial portion of Chinese OCTG production is utilized by domestic OCTG users, leaving Chinese producers to seek sales in export markets for their products. The Tribunal previously found that the production in excess of domestic demand confirms a net-export orientation of the Chinese domestic producers. Footnote 38 The Canadian producers provided examples of Chinese producers, such as China Petroleum Technology and Development Corporation, Footnote 39 Dalipal Footnote 40 and Hengyang Valin Steel Tube Co., Ltd. Footnote 41 to emphasize their capacity and desire to serve export markets.

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Chinese OCTG exports to Canada were at dumped prices

[48] The administrative record demonstrates that Chinese OCTG was consistently dumped during the POR. The CBSA collected over $5 million in SIMA duties between 2022 and mid-2025, with nearly $3 million collected in 2022 alone. Footnote 42 Canadian producers point to this as evidence that Chinese exporters are unable to compete in Canada at fair market prices and will resume dumping if the finding order is rescinded.

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International market conditions

[49] International market conditions for OCTG have deteriorated following a brief post-pandemic recovery, characterized now by volatility and softening demand. Global oil prices are projected to decline over the next 12 to 24 months due to a supply glut from non-OPEC+ production and slowing demand growth in key markets like China. Footnote 43 As drilling activity correlates directly with oil prices, this downturn is expected to suppress global demand for OCTG, intensifying competition among exporters to secure sales in the few remaining stable markets.

[50] Simultaneously, the global steel industry is facing a deepening crisis of overcapacity. The OECD reports that global excess steel capacity is projected to reach 637 million tonnes in 2025, with China accounting for a disproportionate share. Footnote 44 This structural imbalance is exacerbated by China's slowing domestic economy, particularly the collapse of its property sector, which has traditionally absorbed vast quantities of steel. With domestic consumption waning, Chinese producers are under immense pressure to export to maintain capacity utilization rates. Footnote 45

[51] The Canadian producers argue that international market conditions for OCTG continued to show expanding production capacity that exceeds global consumption, discussed in the previous section. This will encourage excess low-priced OCTG into global markets with Canada being a prime export market in the event that the finding is rescinded. Prices in North America remain substantially higher than Asian OCTG prices and OCTG consumers in Canada are likely to remain interested in Subject Goods if the finding is rescinded.

[52] In contrast to this bleak international outlook, the Canadian market remains relatively attractive. Canadian producers argue that this disparity, supported by evidence on the record, between a stable, high-value Canadian market and a depressed global market will inevitably attract diverted Chinese volumes if the anti-dumping measures are removed.

[53] Under Canada’s Tariff-Rate Quota system , Canadian producers argue exporters can use their quota volumes under the TRQ system if the measures expire, which would allow them to ship to Canada within their quota limits duty free, arguably at dumped prices.

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Parties contending that continued or resumed dumping is unlikely

Importers

[54] No case briefs or reply submissions were submitted contending that the dumping of the subject goods from China is not likely to continue or resume if the order is rescinded.

Exporters and foreign producers

[55] No case briefs or reply submissions were submitted contending that the dumping of the subject goods from China is not likely to continue or resume if the order is rescinded.

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Consideration and analysis: Dumping

[56] In making a determination under paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of SIMA whether the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods, the CBSA may consider the factors identified in subsection 37.2(1) of the SIMR, as well as any other factors relevant under the circumstances.

[57] The following analysis structures the arguments presented by the domestic industry according to these regulatory factors:

• Continued dumping and subsidizing over the period of review (a)
• Global overcapacity and China’s slowing economy (c)
• Economic conditions in China; (d)
• Trade measures in other jurisdictions (f) and
• International market conditions (h)

Continued dumping and subsidizing over the period of review

[58] CBSA compliance statistics show that during the period of review, subject goods remained dumped and/or subsidized. In every year of the period of review SIMA duties were collected from OCTG products subject to this measure from China.

[59] Compliance data shows that Chinese imports of OCTG were priced below-market prices in the POR and were charged SIMA duties. These imports disrupted the domestic market and demonstrated dumping to gain market share. SIMA duties in the first half of 2025 are already on pace to exceed those of 2022 despite a significantly reduced volume of imports indicating a higher margin of dumping from OCTG imported from China. Footnote 46

[60] The administrative record demonstrates a clear propensity for Chinese exporters to dump Subject Goods when enforcement mechanisms are not fully aligned with market realities. During the POR, specifically in 2022, Chinese imports surged by over 600% when normal values became detached due to rapid global price increases. Footnote 47 This "explosion" of imports ceased only after the CBSA concluded re-investigations in 2023 to update normal values, at which point Chinese import volumes collapsed. This pattern confirms that Chinese exporters are unable to compete in the Canadian market at non-dumped prices and will immediately revert to dumping if the Order is rescinded.

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Global overcapacity and China’s slowing economy

[61] The global steel market is facing worsening conditions due to excess production capacity and sluggish demand. Post-COVID recovery was short-lived, and now the imbalance between growing production and weakening demand, notably in Asia, is expected to persist through 2027. Footnote 48 This oversupply is creating instability and incentivizing producers to seek new markets to maintain output and reduce costs. Despite international challenges, Canada is seen as a relatively stable and attractive market for OCTG exports over the next 12–18 months. The evidence on record establishes that China possesses massive, systemic overcapacity. China’s crude steel capacity remains at approximately 1.14 billion tonnes, with State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) controlling 41% of this total. Footnote 49

[62] Specific to the goods at issue, Chinese seamless OCTG capacity is projected to reach 30 million tonnes by 2025. Footnote 50 With domestic utilization rates hovering below 80% and internal demand plateauing due to the property sector crisis, Chinese producers face a "capacity crisis." Footnote 51 This structural imbalance creates a powerful imperative to export excess production to maintain throughput, characterizing the industry as heavily export-oriented.

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Market conditions and commodity nature

[63] OCTG is a price-sensitive commodity, meaning that purchase decisions are driven primarily by price. Consequently, to capture market share in Canada, Chinese exporters must undercut domestic prices.

[64] Internationally, demand is softening. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that China’s oil demand growth has slowed dramatically due to the rapid deployment of electric vehicles and a downturn in the construction sector. Footnote 52 This contraction in China’s home market forces producers to look outward, making the relatively stable and higher-priced Canadian market a prime target for resumed dumping.

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Trade measures and diversion

[65] The global trade landscape has become increasingly hostile to Chinese steel. The United States has escalated Section 232 tariffs to 50%, and the European Union has tightened its safeguard quotas.

[66] These measures effectively close off major alternative markets. Canadian producers argue that this creates a high risk of diversion, where Chinese steel originally destined for the U.S. or EU will be redirected to Canada. Without the protection of the Order, Canada would become a "dumping ground" for this displaced global supply.

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Determinations

[67] Based on evidence on the record, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping into Canada of certain oil country tubular goods from China.

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Position of the parties: Subsidizing

Parties contending that continued or resumed subsidizing is likely

Domestic producers

[68] The Canadian producers provided case briefs supporting their position that subsidizing from China is likely to continue or resume in the event the order is allowed to expire.

[69] In assessing the likelihood of continued or resumed subsidizing, the CBSA considers the factors under SIMR subsection 37.2(1), particularly those relating to the nature of subsidy programs and the behaviour of the foreign government.

[70] The Canadian producers contend many factors relate to both dumping and subsidization that have already been presented in the dumping section of this report:

• Continued dumping and subsidizing over the period of review
• Global overcapacity and China’s slowing economy
• Economic conditions in Türkiye
• Trade measures in other jurisdictions and
• International market conditions These positions will not be re-iterated here, please refer to the relevant section in the dumping portion for a summary of the Canadian producer’s position on these factors.

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Parties contending that continued or resumed subsidizing is unlikely

[71] No case briefs or reply submissions were submitted contending that the subsidizing of certain oil country tubular goods from China is not likely to continue or resume if the order is rescinded. No submissions were received from the Government of China.

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Consideration and analysis: Subsidizing

[72] In making a determination under paragraph 76.03(7)(a) of SIMA whether the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods, the CBSA may consider the factors identified in subsection 37.2(1) of the SIMR, as well as any other factors relevant under the circumstances.

[73] In assessing the likelihood of continued or resumed subsidization from China should the CITT’s order be rescinded, the CBSA relied on the information on the administrative record which includes the responses to the various ERQs from all interested parties.

[74] The CBSA solicited information from potential producers and exporters of subject OCTG in China, it received no responses to the Exporter/Foreign Producer ERQ.

[75] No producers nor exporters submitted case briefs or reply submissions for the CBSA to consider in making a determination. No importers of subject OCTG from China filed a case brief or reply submission. Furthermore, the Government of China did not provide a response to the Subsidy ERQ, nor did the Government of China provide a case brief or reply submission.

Nature and continued availability of subsidy programs

[76] The domestic industry submits that the Government of China (GOC) continues to provide extensive actionable subsidies. While the number of identified programs has grown from 38 in the original investigation to 113 in the 2015 re-investigation, Footnote 53 evidence submitted by Tenaris Canada identifies 42 additional subsidy programs and policy measures implemented since the last expiry review in 2020. Footnote 54 Furthermore, the CBSA has consistently found actionable subsidies in the Chinese steel sector across numerous other recent proceedings. As of late 2025, Canada maintains 14 countervailing duty orders against various Chinese steel products, confirming that subsidization remains a prominent feature of the industry.

[77] Recent evidence confirms these programs remain active. In April 2023, the CBSA determined a subsidy amount of 21.31 RMB per metric tonne for Dalipal Pipe Company, verifying that Chinese producers continue to benefit from financial contributions that lower their cost of production. Footnote 55

[78] The Canadian producers noted that SIMA duties, which includes amounts collected for subsidy, collected from exports of subject goods from China were present in every year of the period of review. Footnote 56

Role of government and industrial policy

[79] The Canadian producers argue that the Chinese steel sector is heavily directed by the state. The GOC’s "14th Five-Year Plan" and "Made in China 2025" initiative explicitly aim to build China into a "trade powerhouse" by supporting high-value manufacturing exports like OCTG. Footnote 57

[80] This state direction is operationalized through SOEs, which account for nearly half of China's steel capacity. These entities receive preferential treatment, including equity infusions and loans at below-market rates, which insulate them from market forces and encourage overproduction despite falling demand. Footnote 58

[81] As a result of the aforementioned continued availability of subsidy programs for OCTG exporters in China, there is an increased likelihood that OCTG exported from China to Canada will resume or continue to be subsidized, if the CITT’s order expires.

Global countervailing measures

[82] The existence of countervailing measures in other jurisdictions serves as evidence of systemic subsidization. There are currently 14 countervailing duty orders in force against Chinese steel in Canada and 27 in the United States. Footnote 59 This widespread international sanctioning confirms that subsidization is not limited to a few companies but is a fundamental characteristic of the Chinese steel economy.

Determination

[83] Based on evidence on the record, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of subsidizing of certain oil country tubular goods originating in or exported from China.

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Conclusion

[84] For the purpose of making determinations in this expiry review investigation, the CBSA conducted its analysis within the scope of the factors found under subsection 37.2(1) of the SIMR and considered any other factors relevant in the circumstances. Based on the foregoing analysis of pertinent factors and consideration of information on the administrative record, on March 9, 2026, the CBSA made a determination pursuant to paragraph 76.03(7) of SIMA that the expiry of the finding made by the CITT on December 10, 2020, in Expiry Review No. RR-2019-005, in respect of certain oil country tubular goods originating in or exported from China:

1. in respect of certain oil country tubular goods originating in or exported from China is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of the goods into Canada and
2. in respect of certain oil country tubular goods originating in or exported from China is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of subsidizing of the goods exported to Canada

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Contact us

[85] For further information, please contact the SIMA Registry listed below:

Email: simaregistry-depotlmsi@cbsa-asfc.gc.ca

Sean Borg
A/Executive Director
Trade and anti-dumping programs directorate

Footnotes

Footnote 1 Exhibit 12 (NC) - Response to producer ERQ - Welded Tube

Return to footnote 1 referrer

Footnote 2 Exhibit 14 (NC) - Response to producer ERQ - Interpro

Return to footnote 2 referrer

Footnote 3 Exhibit 18 (NC) - Response to producer ERQ - Tenaris

Return to footnote 3 referrer

Footnote 4 Exhibit 24 (NC) - Close of Record Attachments from Interpro and Welded Tube & 26 (NC) Close of Record Attachments from Tenaris

Return to footnote 4 referrer

Footnote 5 Exhibit 31 (NC) - Case brief filed on behalf of Interpro and Welded Tube & Exhibit 33 (NC) - Case brief filed on behalf of Tenaris

Return to footnote 5 referrer

Footnote 6 Exhibit 16 (NC) - Response to importer ERQ - Cantak

Return to footnote 6 referrer

Footnote 7 Exhibit 20 (NC) - Response to importer ERQ - Trimark

Return to footnote 7 referrer

Footnote 8 Exhibit 23 (NC) - Response to importer ERQ - Mertex

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Footnote 9 Exhibit 12 (NC) - ERQ Producer Response Welded Tube

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Footnote 10 Exhibit 14 (NC) - ERQ Producer Response Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc.

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Footnote 11 Exhibit 18 (NC) - ERQ Producer Response - Tenaris

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Footnote 12 Exhibit 28 (NC) - CBSA compliance statistics - day 50

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Footnote 13 Exhibit 28 (NC) - CBSA compliance statistics - day 50

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Footnote 14 Exhibit 28 (NC) - CBSA compliance statistics - day 50

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Footnote 15 Exhibit 31 (NC) Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc. and Welded Tube of Canada Corporation Case Brief, pg. 7

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Footnote 16 Exhibit 29 (NC) Global Market, "OECD calls for action amid record growth in global steel capacity surplus."

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Footnote 17 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 3, World Steel, "Worldsteel short Range Outlook - October 2025" (October 13, 2025).

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Footnote 18 Exhibit 33 (NC) Tenaris Case brief, pg. 26

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Footnote 19 Exhibit 26 (NC) Attachment B.4: International Energy Agency, "Global Energy Review" (2025), pg. 14-15

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Footnote 20 Seamless Casing, "Statement of Reasons - Expiry review determination" (1 March 2024), SC 2023 ER

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Footnote 21 Exhibit 31 (NC) Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc. and Welded Tube of Canada Corporation Case Brief, pg. 2-3

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Footnote 22 Exhibit 31 (NC) Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc. and Welded Tube of Canada Corporation Case Brief, pg. 1

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Footnote 23 Exhibit 33 (NC) Tenaris Case brief, pg. 19

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Footnote 24 Exhibit 31 (NC) Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc. and Welded Tube of Canada Corporation Case Brief, pg. 16-17

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Footnote 25 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 3, World Steel, "Worldsteel short Range Outlook - October 2025" (October 13, 2025)

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Footnote 26 Exhibit 31 (NC) Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc. and Welded Tube of Canada Corporation Case Brief, pg. 18

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Footnote 27 Exhibit 33 (NC) C.17: National Energy Administration, "Guiding Opinions of the national Energy Administration and Other Departments on Promoting High-Quality Development of Energy Equipment", September 15, 2025

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Footnote 28 Exhibit 33 (NC) C.15: Zhiyanzhan Industry Research Institute, "In-depth Research and Investment Prospect Analysis Report on China's Oil Well Pipe Industry", March 16, 2025

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Footnote 29 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 52, WTO, AD/CVD Measures in Force

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Footnote 30 Exhibit 24 (NC) 24 NC Attachment 46, WTO, "Notification Pursuant to Article 12.1(C) of the Agreement on Safeguards (Extension)" (May 29, 2024).

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Footnote 31 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 46, WTO, "Notification Pursuant to Article 12.1(C) of the Agreement on Safeguards (Extension)" (May 29, 2024).

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Footnote 32 Exhibit 22 (NC) Attachment 93: Ilze Jozepa, "UK steel safeguards", House of Commons Library

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Footnote 33 Exhibit 31 (NC) Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc. and Welded Tube of Canada Corporation Case Brief, pg. 30

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Footnote 34 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 27, TPCO, "Profile".

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Footnote 35 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 1, OECD, "OECD Steel Outlook 2025" (May 27, 2025)

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Footnote 36 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 2, S&P Global, "China's domestic steel demand falls further, exports hit another high in May" (June 25, 2025)

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Footnote 37 Exhibit 12 (NC) Attachment Q24-4

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Footnote 38 Seamless Carbon or Alloy Steel Oil and Gas Well Casing, RR-2023-004 para 54.

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Footnote 39 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 15, CPTDC, "About"

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Footnote 40 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 16, Dalipal, "Company Profile"

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Footnote 41 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 17, Hengyang Valin Steel Tube, "Corporate Profile"

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Footnote 42 Exhibit 28 (NC) CBSA Compliance Statistics

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Footnote 43 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 42, The Chronicle Journal, "Oil Traders Brace for Glut: A Bearish Tide and Lessons from Geopolitical Spikes" (November 25, 2025).

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Footnote 44 Exhibit 26 (NC) Attachment B.9: OECD Steel Outlook 2025, published May 2, 2025, Figure 1.3

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Footnote 45 Exhibit 31 (NC) Interpro Pipe & Steel Inc. and Welded Tube of Canada Corporation Case Brief, pg. 16-17

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Footnote 46 Exhibit 28 (NC) CBSA Compliance Statistics Day 50

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Footnote 47 Exhibit 12 (NC) Q24-4 Statistics Canada Import Data

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Footnote 48 Exhibit 26 (NC) Attachment B.9: OECD Steel Outlook 2025, published May 2, 2025, pg 28

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Footnote 49 Exhibit 26 (NC) Attachment C13: Iron and Steel Metallurgy, "A comprehensive overview of 200 steel mills in China! Baowu Group, Ansteel Group, Hebei Iron & Steel Group, Shagang Group, Jianlong Group, Jingye Group…", (November 8, 2024)

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Footnote 50 Exhibit 26 (NC) Attachment C.20: MySteel, "Seamless steel pipe exports surged in the third quarter, with overseas demand becoming a key growth engine", (October 24, 2025)

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Footnote 51 Exhibit 26 (NC) Attachment C.15: Zhiyanzhan Industry Research Institute, "In-depth Research and Investment Prospect Analysis Report on China's Oil Well Pipe Industry", (March 16, 2025)

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Footnote 52 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 36, Oil & Gas Journal, "Macquarie: China's oil demand outlook improves heading into 2026" (September 30, 2025).

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Footnote 53 Oil Country Tubular Goods (July 17, 2020), OCTG1 2020 ER (CBSA) at para 120.

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Footnote 54 Exhibit 33 (NC) Tenaris Case brief, section IV

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Footnote 55 Oil Country Tubular Goods and Seamless Casing, "Conclusion of normal value review" (April 11, 2023), OS 2022 UP1 (CBSA).

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Footnote 56 Exhibit 28 (NC) - CBSA compliance statistics - day 50

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Footnote 57 Exhibit 24 (NC) Attachment 13, CSET, " 14th Five Year Plan ", pg. 35

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Footnote 58 Exhibit 33 (NC) Tenaris Case brief, section IV

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Footnote 59 Exhibit 26 (NC) Attachment E.2: US Department of Commerce, AD/CVD Proceedings (filtered for China, steel-related actions), retrieved November 30, 2025

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Date modified:

2026-03-24