Mitchell v. The State - Murder and Knife Possession Conviction Appeal

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: Ma rch 3, 2026 S26A 0419. MI TCHELL v. THE ST ATE. P ETERSON, Chief Jus tice. Johns on Bell Mitc hell appeals h is convi ction s for malice murder an d posses sion of a knife during t he c ommission o f a fe lony ste mming from the stabbing d eath o f his son, S haun Mitche ll. 1 On 1 Shaun died on December 15, 2 011. In M arch 2012, a Fult on County grand jury returned an indictment against Mitch ell, charging him w ith malice murder, felony murder, aggrav ated ass ault, and possessio n of a knife during the commission of a felo ny. At a jury trial i n Januar y 2013, t he jury f ound Mitchell guilty on al l counts. Mitchel l was sentenced to ser ve life in prison o n malice murder an d a conse cutive five - year term for the pos session count. The remaining counts were mer ged or v acated by ope ration of law. S ee Leeks v. State, 296 Ga. 515, 5 23 – 24 (2015). Mitchell, throug h counsel, timely filed a motion for new trial in February 2013, but it took 1 2 years for that motion to be resolved. The record does not clearly show the rea son for the inordinat e delay, but Mitchell himself doe s not seem to be resp onsible. T he record does not sh ow that trial counsel formal ly withdrew from the case, but in 2014, Mitchell filed pro se motions ask ing f or a ppointed appell ate counsel and for a hearing on his motion for new trial. After he filed those pro se motio ns, Mitchell was appointed counsel. In Janu ary 201 5, the trial court denie d Mitchell’s requ est fo r a hearing on th e basis of precede nt in effect at the ti me providing th at NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre me Court Rule 27, the Co urt’s rec onsiderat ion, a nd editori al revisi ons by t he Report er of Decis ions. Th e versio n of the opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geo rgia Repo rts, d esignat ed as the “Fi nal Copy,” will replac e any prior version on the Court’s websi te and docket. A bound volu me of t he Georgia Repo rts will contai n the final a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 app eal, Mit chell argues th at the trial c ourt erred in refusi ng to cons ider his motio n for immunity fro m prosecut ion under OCGA § 16 -3- 2 4.2, which he file d on the first d ay of his trial. He also argues that the t rial cou rt er red in ov erruli ng h is obj ection to th e prosecu tor ’s sta tem ent i n clo sin g argu ment that Mi tchel l was a “mea n drunk.” We conc lude that t he trial co urt did not abuse it s discre tion in refusing to consid er M itchell’ s OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 Mitchell did not ha ve the rig ht to b e represented by cou nsel and also file motions on his own. But see Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 87 6 (2023) (overturni ng precedent that pro se filings from repres ented individuals were legal nulli ties and holding that trial courts had the dis cretion to accept suc h filings). Several different counsel su bstituted in a t vario us times as Mitchell’ s attorney; at least some of them appea red for status confer ences over the years, and one filed an amended motion for new trial in 2019 that merely argued th e general grounds and an evidentiar y error. Another attorney b egan representing Mitchell in 2020, but w aited fiv e years, until June 2025, to file a n amen ded motion for new trial that raised a sufficiency of the evi dence claim. In Aug ust 2025, Mitche ll’s attorney waived an evidenti ary hearing on the motion for new trial, and the court entered an or der denying it. Mitchell ti mely appeal ed, and his appeal was docketed to this Court’s term begin ning in December 2 025 and submitt ed for a decision on the briefs. None of the claims raised in the mo tion for new trial or on appeal required the development of a record or the appointment of new, post- conviction counsel. I ndeed, current counsel waived an evidentiary hea ring on the motion for new trial. In short, t here was no good re ason for the subst antial delay in resolving t his post - c onviction matter. W e must say, yet again, th at “ it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal jus tice system, includin g trial courts and prosecut ors as well as defe nse counsel and def endants, t o ensure that the appropriat e post - convictio n motions are filed, litigated, a nd decided without unnecess ary delay. ” Owens v. S tate, 303 Ga. 254, 2 5 8 (2018).

3 motio n under the c ircumst ances. A nd becau se th ere was eviden ce to suppor t the pr osecu tor’ s sta teme nts, the trial co urt al so did n ot abuse i ts di scre tion in al lowi ng th e pros ecut or’s s tatem ent s. Theref ore, w e a ffi rm. View ed in the ligh t most fav ora ble t o th e v erdict s, th e trial evide nce sho wed the follo wing. Just af ter mi dni ght on D ecember 15, 2011, Mitche ll and his adult son, Sha un, got into a n argume nt in the kitch en o f Mit ch ell’s h om e. T he a rgum ent began becau se Mi tch ell woke up his then - 11 - yea r - old daughte r to clean t he kitchen la te at night and ref used to perm it Shaun’s girlfr iend t o do it f or her. The men beg an bumping into eac h other, and Mitche ll pushe d S haun. Shaun t hen pushed Mitchell a gainst a co unter, at whic h time Mitch ell g rabb ed a kni fe an d r epea tedly s tabb ed S haun. One of t he famil y membe rs called 911, and d uring the ca ll, Mitc hell got on the phone and said, “ I stabbe d my son” bec ause “he came at me and trie d to jum p on me.” S haun die d as a result of a stab wound t o his che st that p enet rated his heart. Mitch ell w as a rreste d. When he was being pro cessed into th e

4 jail, he repo rted that he h ad been drin kin g. Mi tchel l rep orted th at he had on e b eer. One of Mit chell ’s ch il dren, who was pre sent during the in ciden t an d obs erved the s tabbing, t estif ied t hat s he o bserv ed seve ral liquo r bott les in Mit chell’s room, including an o pen bott le, the mor ning af ter the fa tal stabb ing. Mitch ell’s trial beg an on Jan uary 28, 2 013, w hen the ju ry was sele cted and sw orn. On the fo llowing mor ning, bef ore any wit nesses were c all ed, th e prosecu tor info rm ed th e tri al co urt th at Mitchel l had submit ted a motion fo r immunity fro m prosecut ion unde r OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2. The pros ecutor st ated that if Mi tchell w anted to hav e a hear ing, Mitc hell could t estif y “today,” since he had the burd en of proof. In res pons e to a qu estion from the tria l court ab out t he time limits f or f iling a motio n, th e prose cuto r sta te d that th e moti on shou ld hav e be en fil ed at l east 10 d ays bef ore trial. T he tri al c our t ruled t hat the m otion was n ot tim ely bec ause th e j ury h ad alrea dy been s elect ed an d swo rn an d sta ted that M it chell w as fre e to argue self - defense during his t rial. At tr ial, M itche ll called no witne sses and a rgued th at he acted in self - d efens e.

5 1. Mitche ll argues th at the trial cou rt erred in refusi ng to cons ider his OCG A § 16 -3- 24.2 motion, becau se th e stat ute contains no de adline to file an immun ity mot ion. He argu es that th e trial court w as w rong to r ely on the d eadl ines impos ed by th e disc overy statute, OCGA § 17 - 16 -4, 2 because even if th e dea dli nes un der that statute applied, th e h arsh rem ed y of ex clusion of evi denc e is a conse quenc e for a discover y violatio n only upon a sho wing of bad fait h and prej udice, 3 neit her of whic h was sh own h ere. But it is not clear th at the tri al court reli ed on OCGA § 17 - 16 - 4 in refus ing to cons ider Mitc hell’s OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 m otion. T he co urt m erel y sai d that it wou ld n ot cons ide r the moti on be caus e the tri al was underw ay and di d not ref eren ce t he 10 - day - befo re - trial argu ment raised by the Sta te. And Mitc hell has no t shown tha t the t rial c ourt 2 In criminal cas es, when a defend ant opts into recipr ocal discovery, OCGA § 17 - 16 - 4 generally req uires t he State to make av ailable certain evidence — among other things, releva nt statements made by the d efendant and evide nce the St ate intends to use a s evidence at trial — to the def endant no later than ten da ys prior to trial. That statu te also requires the defen d ant to provide material s the defenda nt intends to introduce as evidenc e at trial within ten days of timely comp liance by the State, b ut not later than five days prior to trial. See O CGA § 17- 16 - 4(a), (b). 3 See OCGA § 17- 16 - 6.

6 abus ed it s discretio n in ref using to co nsider t he motio n at t hat po int. The st atute at issue, OCGA § 16 - 3- 24.2, p rovides t hat “[a ] person who u ses threat s o r for ce in acco rdanc e with C ode Sec tion 1 6 - 3- 20, 16 -3- 21, 16 -3- 23, 16 -3- 23.1, 16 -3- 24, or 17 -4- 20 sha ll be immune f rom crimina l pro secut ion,” subj ect to a n exce ption no t raised h ere. Mitc hel l is corre ct th at thi s statu te do es not say w hen a n OCGA § 16 -3- 2 4.2 motio n must be f iled, includ ing wheth er it must be fil ed pr etrial. See, e.g., Gude v. State, 31 3 G a. 859, 87 1 (2022) (n oting th at “nothin g in the lang uage of O CGA § 16 -3- 24.2 requir es an imm un ity m otion to be fil ed pre trial ”); State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 297 (20 20) (sa me). Indeed, OCGA § 16 -3 - 24.2 provides imm unity beyon d jus t the trial, as “p rosecu ti on” i s defi ned as “ all legal proc eedin gs by w hich a p erson ’ s liab ility for a cr ime is dete rmined, commencing wit h the ret urn of the indic tme nt or the filing o f the a ccusatio n, and incl uding the f inal disp ositio n of the cas e upon appeal.” OCGA § 16 -1- 3(14) (emphasis adde d). Because the immunit y pro vided under OCGA § 16 -3- 24. 2 extends beyon d prote ction from t rial, the pl ain tex t of the stat ute d oes n ot pr eclude

7 a defen dan t from filing a m otio n during or after the tr ial. The St ate arg ue s that w e have h eld th at OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motio ns mus t be decided prior to trial, citi ng to sev eral ca ses i n which we ha ve s aid a s much. B ut tho se cases we re in a di ffe ren t post ure and thus d o not apply here. I n ou r f irst case i nterp reti ng OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2, we held that the tria l court er red in ref using to rule o n the d efenda nts’ im munity mot ions that were file d b efore trial. Fair v. St ate, 284 Ga. 165, 16 6 (20 08). We hav e often rep eated Fair ’s lan guag e that OCGA § 16 -3- 24. 2 motion s mu st b e det ermin ed prior to tri al. S ee, e.g., State v. Su tton, 297 Ga. 222, 2 25 (20 15); Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 418 (2013); Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 41 2 – 13 (20 08). Bu t each of t hos e cases addres sed on ly m otions that we re filed befor e t rial. W e have never held that a n OCGA § 16 -3 - 24. 2 motio n is time - bar red if it i s filed after a tri al st arts. See Gude, 313 Ga. at 871 (declining to decid e whethe r a motion f iled nea r the end of th e defen dant ’s tri al was un timel y becau se th e tri al cou rt altern ativ ely ru led on the m erit s). Thus, the cases cited by the St ate only stand for th e pro positi on t hat OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motio ns filed

8 befor e tri al m ust be d ecid ed before tri al, not that all OCGA § 1 6 -3- 24.2 motio ns must be f iled bef ore tri al. Se e Schoick et v. State, 312 Ga. 82 5, 83 2 (2 021) (“ It is, of cours e, axi omat ic t hat a de cisi on ’ s holdi ng is limited to the fa ctual con text of the cas e being decided an d the is sues t hat contex t nece ssarily r aise s. Langua ge that sounds like a hold ing — bu t ac tuall y exc eed s the scop e of the case ’ s factu al contex t — is not a holding n o mat ter h ow mu ch it sound s like one. ”). That said, that the immun ity st atute d oes no t itself impos e a dea dline f or OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motion s doe s not mea n that the defe ndant’s right t o file such a motion is unf ett ered. U nder OCGA § 17 -7- 110, “ [a]l l p retrial moti ons, including demur re rs and special plea s, shall be filed within ten days af ter the dat e of arraignme nt, unless t he time for f iling is extende d by the court.” Th e plain lang uage of the statu te sets out the gen eral rul e to file a pret rial motio n — ten d ays aft er th e dat e of arrai gnm ent — and provi des that a trial cou rt h as th e dis cret ion to ext end that dead line. See Scott v. State, 36 8 Ga. App. 310, 310 – 11 (20 23) (under OCGA § 17 - 7- 110, th e tri al cou rt has th e di screti on t o con side r a motion f iled

9 beyond the ten - day st atuto ry dead line, but it i s not re quired to do so). C f. Allen v. State, 300 Ga. 50 0, 50 3 (201 7) (refusing to c onsider merits of d efend ant’s p retrial motion filed 21 m onths af ter ten - day statut ory d eadl ine w here t here was no ind icat ion trial cour t gran ted an exte nsion). Nothing in the tex t of OCGA § 17 -7- 110 prev ents its app licatio n to mot ions file d under the imm unity st atut e. And Mitche ll point s to no other requ irem ent, st atuto ry o r othe rwise, tha t woul d force a trial cou rt to accep t a n OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motion filed after OCGA § 17 - 7- 110’ s ten - day p eriod laps es. As relev ant h ere, Mitche ll f iled his mo tion a fter his tria l sta rted, cle arly outs ide of the ten - day peri od se t ou t in OCGA § 17 - 7- 110, and the record show s no indica tion tha t he rece ive d an exte nsion. Mitchel l su ggests tha t th e t rial cour t w as nev erth eless oblig ated to consi der his immunity mot ion, re gardle ss of whe n it was filed. But t h e onl y requ irem ent w e have hel d th at th e law i mpos es is for a trial co urt to dec ide be fore trial a m otion that is fil ed before tria l. Mitc hell has ide ntifie d no requ iremen t, stat utory or oth erwi se, that wou ld forc e a trial court to cons ider bef ore tria l a n OCGA § 16 -

10 3- 24.2 motion filed af ter OCGA § 17 -7- 11 0’ s ten - day period lapses. Thu s, the re qui remen t for a tri al c ourt to consi der a pre trial OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motion wa s no t trigg ered. For OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motion s fil ed afte r the t en - day peri od liste d in OCGA § 17 -7- 110, a tri al c ourt h as t he di scret ion to consi der th em, bu t it i s not requ ired to do so. See OCGA § 1 7 -7- 110 (giving t rial c ourts discr etion t o extend the d eadline). Cf. Gude, 313 Ga. at 8 70 (tri al cou rt den ied on merits a n OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 mot ion filed near the end o f trial, as wel l as alterna tively find ing that motio n was unt imely); State v. Smith, 347 Ga. Ap p. 28 9, 29 2 (2018) (see ing no plain error in tr ial court cons ider ing OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motio n f iled after t he tri al s tart ed). A nd given a trial cou rt’s w id e discre tion in how to conduct th e tri al, 4 Mitchell c annot show t hat t he tria l court abused its discret ion in declining t o dela y the ongo ing tria l in ord er to hold a hearing and cons ider t he merits of his OCGA 4 See Watkins v. Sta te, 278 G a. 414, 415 (2004) (“ No princip le is bett er settled than that in the conduct of tr ials, both civil and criminal, a broad discretion is vested in the judge belo w, and that that d iscretion will no t be controlled by this court unles s it is manifest ly abused. ” (quotati on marks omitted)).

11 § 16 -3- 2 4.2 motion. Moreov er, nothi ng p reclu ded M itc hell from as kin g the trial court, after the conc lusion o f the trial, to re visit it s prior ruling on his OCGA § 16 -3- 24. 2 motio n. In Hipp, 293 Ga. 415, we con clu ded that trial cou rts “retai n the aut hority in cr iminal cas es to change their inter locutory r ulings pr ior t o the e ntry of a final j udgment.” Id. at 417. This autho rity e xtends t o rulings o n a n OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 motion and al lows a t rial cou rt to grant immu ni ty before entry of a final jud gment, even after a jury has reje cted a def endan t’s clai m of self - def ense at tri al. Id. at 418. T her e is n o ind ication that Mi tchel l ever ask ed the tri al court to rec ons ider i ts ru li ng on h is OCGA § 16 - 3- 24.2 motion aft er th e jury return ed its verdi ct an d pri or to the t rial court ’s f inal jud gment. Moreov er, Mi tch ell has not argu ed th e me rits of h is sel f - defen se clai m, ei th er to th e trial co urt on his motion for new trial or on app eal. D e spite ar guing in his mot ion for new trial, as par t of his gener al gro unds claim, t hat his act ions sho wed that he wa s guilty of volu ntary m ansl aug hter, rath er than mu rder, h e di d not argu e th at

12 his ac tions w ere justif ied co mplete ly as a matt er o f sel f - defen se, su ch that he would be no t guilty o f any crim e. See D eme ry v. S tate, 287 Ga. 80 5, 80 9 (201 0) (“[I ]f [a defe ndant ] is justif ied in killin g unde r OCGA § 16 -3- 21 [self - defense], h e is guilt y of no c rime at a ll. ” (c lean ed up)). He als o has not arg ued on app eal th at the evi denc e showe d that he act ed in self - defense, ev en und er a low er stand ard necess ary t o p rev ail on a n OCGA § 16 -3- 24. 2 motion. 5 In ot her word s, Mitc hell has had o pportunitie s to co ntinue ar guing the merit s of his self - def ense cl aim bef ore th e trial cou rt and befo re thi s Court, and has ch osen n ot to. Un de r th ese ci rcum stan ces, and g iven the lack of a uthorit y req uiring it, Mit chell pr ovides no co mpelling argum ent t hat we sh ould vacat e an d reman d to t he tri al court to 5 We also note tha t the jury was fu lly instructed on s elf -defense, including the State’ s burden to disprov e it beyond a reasonable dou bt. See Allen v. State, 317 Ga. 1, 7 (2 023). This standard is far more stringen t for the State than the by -a- preponderance bur den Mitchell wou ld have had to carry if the trial court had heard his motion. See Bunn, 284 Ga. at 413 (“to avoi d trial, a defendant bears the burden of s howing that he is ent itled to immuni ty under OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 by a preponder ance of the evidence”). As the Attorney General points out, Mitchell has n ot shown what, if any, evidence he would have offered in support of his immun ity motion or how th at evidence would have been different than the evide nce presented at tri al.

13 hold a hearing o n his OCGA § 16 -3- 24.2 mot ion a t this sta ge in the proce eding s. 2. Mitche ll next argue s that the trial cour t abused its discr etion in overr uling his o bje ction t o the pros ecu tor’s r efer ence t o Mitche ll as a “mean d runk” in clo sing argume nt, because ther e was no evi denc e he w as dru nk at the t im e of th e inci den t, let alon e that he was mea n when he was drunk. He als o arg ues th at becaus e the trial c ourt over rul ed hi s in itial objec tion, th e pros ecut or w as embold ened to c on tinu e an u nwarr anted and u nsu ppor ted a ttack by repea tedly r efer rin g to hi m as a “m ean dru nk. ” We d isag ree th at th e court a bused it s di screti on. “A prosec utor has wide latit ude in the conduc t of closing argum ent, th e bo un ds of wh ich ar e in the tri al cou rt ’ s dis cret ion.” Ridley v. S tate, 315 Ga. 452, 4 58 (2023) (c leaned up). Altho ugh a prosecu tor “is pr ohibi ted f rom inj ectin g in to … clos ing argum ent extrin sic an d pr ejudi cial materi als that h ave n o basi s in the eviden ce,” Kyler v. State, 270 Ga. 81, 85 (19 98), a pro secut or is allow ed to argu e in ferenc es that can r eason ably be mad e from th e

14 eviden ce p resen ted at tri al, Men efee v. Stat e, 301 Ga. 505, 515 (201 7). Here, Mitche ll admitt ed that he dra nk on t he n igh t o f t he sta bbing, a nd a witness sa id that ther e was an empty bottle of alco hol in his r oom. In the prose cutor’s fi rst “m ean dru nk ” refer ence, the pr osecu tor argu ed that Mi tch el l was n ot att empt in g to avoi d an y ser ious bod ily injur y since he pus hed S haun first, and argued th at “may be [Mitc hell’s] j ust a mean d runk” give n that his respon se t o the verbal alte rcation was excess ive an d unjustifie d and showe d a level of an ger and mal ice. Given the e vidence t hat Mitche ll had be en drinking, a nd the wide latitude a prosec utor ha s in its clo sing argum ent, we s ee n o abuse of the trial cour t ’ s disc reti on in overr uling Mitc hell’s object ion. Judgment affirmed. All t he Ju stice s con cur.