Medina v. State - Felony Murder and Assault Convictions Appeal

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: Ma rch 3, 2026 S26A036 2. MEDINA v. THE STATE. M C M I LLIAN, Justice. Terran ce Me din a appe als from his conv icti ons fo r fel ony murder, aggr avat ed ass ault, and p osses si on of a firearm d uring t he comm ission o f a felo ny in co nnect ion with t he shoo ting de ath o f James T horn ton. 1 On ap peal, M edi na argu es that (1) the ord er in 1 The crimes were committed on or about July 20, 2015. In January 2016, a DeKalb County grand jury indicte d Medina for malice murde r, felony murder, aggravate d assault, and p ossession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At a jury tria l in January 20 19, Med ina was found not guilty of malice murder wh ile the j ury could not re ach a un animous ver dict on the remaining count s, resulting in a part ial mistrial. After reindictment on the same counts, except for malice mur der, a jury tria l took place in February 2 022 where Medina was found gu ilty on all three coun ts. On February 1 6, 2022, the trial court sentenc ed Medin a to ser ve life in prison w ith the possibility of parol e for felony murder and five consecutiv e years in prison for possess ion of a firearm during t he commissi on of a felony. Th e aggrav ated assault co unt was merged for sentenci ng purposes. Medina timely filed a motion for ne w trial, which was amended through new co unsel on Febru ary 6, 2023. Followin g a hearing, the tria l court den ied the motion for new tria l, as amende d, on Ap ril 21, 2025. Medina timely file d a notice o f appeal to this Court on May 1, 20 25. The appeal was docketed t o the term of this Court be ginning in De cember 20 25 and was orally argu ed on Febr uary 3, 2 026. NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre me Court Rule 27, the Co urt’s r econsid eratio n, and ed itorial revisio ns by th e Report er of Decis ions. Th e versi on of the opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geo rgia Rep orts, desig nated as the “Final Copy, ” will r eplace a ny prior version on the Court ’s website and doc ket. A bound volume of the Georgia Repo rts will contain the final a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 whi ch th e trial cou rt ch ose to g ive the charg es on j ustif icat ion confus ed wh at w as r equi red f or the s epara te de fense s of self - defen se and def ense o f habi tation, (2) Medin a’s tri al c ounsel rende red ineffe ctive assist ance by fai li ng to obje ct when the p rosecutor arg ue d in clos ing that de fens e of h abit atio n did not ap ply beca use the ho u se where the sh ooting t ook pl ace was no t Medina’s per sona l dwelling, and (3) th e trial cou rt er red in charg ing that th e St ate must make a prima faci e case when an indic tme nt cha r ges t hat a crime m ay be commi tted by separate w ays o r met hods. For th e r eason s that foll ow, we affi rm. The ev iden ce at trial sh owed that on Ju ly 20, 2015, Me dina visite d his f amily’ s for mer hom e in DeKalb Count y. T he hom e was where M edina g rew up, but for about ten years it had not been occup ied by an y fami ly membe r, al though the utilitie s were st ill on and M edin a pai d the tax es. Accord ing to Medina, he visited the home reg ularl y to clean and p erf orm mai nten ance on the h ome. During tho se visit s, Medina b egan seeing more eviden ce of c rimi nal activi ty and break - ins aro und the house, and l aw enfor cement had

3 been cal led on se veral occasi ons i n connecti on with th is su spect ed crimina l ac tivit y. Afte r Medina e ntere d the ho use on July 2 0, he went ups tairs to his former bed room. Medin a tes tifi ed tha t afte r open in g the doo r to the be droom, he saw a man, late r ident ified to be Thornto n, in a bed loo king at Medina, at which po int Medina pulled out his gun, point ed it at t he ma n, and told hi m to “show me [you r] h ands” as it “loo ked to me lik e he was trying to do so mething or find som ething with his ha nds, and I want ed to make s ure he was not go ing to get his hands on so met hing tha t could be us ed a gainst me.” Me dina testifie d that the m an did no t show his hand s, b ut inste ad he stood up with a sheet wrapp ed arou nd him and w alked back and for th across th e bed and the ro om in “an errat ic pat tern” a few fe et from him. Medi na stat ed that h e rep eat edly told th e man to stop wh at he was doi ng an d to back aw ay f rom h im. A ccordi ng to Medi na, the m an event ually go t “right up in [his] fa ce” and ma de a “threa tening gest ure” with his hand next to Me dina’s fa ce. At tha t point, Medina shoved the man back, wh o th en began s cream ing and wav ing hi s

4 arms arou nd bef ore “rushing at” Med ina. M edina testifi ed th at he shot the man o nce in the chest in se lf - defens e and then call ed 91 1. Sergean t Lyn Schule r, a detecti v e with the D ekal b C ount y P olice D e par tment, responded to the 911 call. He testifi ed that the hous e look ed ab and oned and that there did not appea r to be any sign s of fo rced entry. In the be droo m wh ere M edina shot T horn ton, there d id not app ear to have been a stru ggl e as the re wer e no i tem s knock ed ove r, an d it app eared to Sergean t Sch ul er th at Thorn ton was asl eep w hen M edina en tered th e room becau se Thornt on “ha d a bedshe et lo osely ti ed around his wais t that was still intac t.” Dr. Geoffr ey Smith, the med ical exam in er who perfor m ed Thornton’s auto psy, tes tifie d that the only inj ury o f signif ica nce was a gunshot to the chest, whic h was the cause o f deat h. The gun was “proba bly about a f oot or so” fro m Thor nton when s hot. Dr. Smith te stif ied t hat the injur y was “cer tainly c onsis tent” with Thor nto n lying in t he be d asle ep, wa king up a nd start ing to sit up, a nd being s hot a nd then slu mpin g over back in th e bed. Medina called a firearm, blood spatte r, and crime scen e rec onst ructi on exp ert a s a wi tness w h o

5 tes tified t hat the evid ence from the sce ne wa s consist ent wit h the gun being fire d while Thornt on c ame at Medina, who f ired f rom th e doorway of the be droom. 1. Medin a firs t arg ues th at the trial court e rred b y gi ving a mislea ding and conf using jur y instr uct ion on se lf - defens e and defen se of habi ta tion. Sp ecifi call y, Medi na asser ts t hat because t he “se lf defens e and the defe nse of habit at ion instr uctio ns were imperm issi bly blen ded toge ther,” the cha rge “al tered th e true meani ng of th ese two s epara te an d di stin ct pri nci ples of law. ” At the clos e of the eviden ce, t he tri al court ch arged on affirm ativ e defe nses an d jus tificat ion g eneral ly. See Sugge sted Patte rn Jury Instru cti ons 3.0 0.0 0 and 3.0 1.10. The court then charge d the def in ition of habi tati on from OCG A § 16 -3 - 24. 1, 2 follow ed by self - defens e and def ens e of ha bitati on. See Suggested Patte rn Jury Instru ction s 3.10.10 and 3.12.10. Af te r this, t he trial court in struct ed on reasonabl e beli efs, n o duty t o ret reat, thr eats 2 OCGA § 16-3-24.1 provides: “A s used on Code Section s 16-3- 23 and 16 - 3- 24, the term ‘habitation’ m eans any dwelling, motor v ehicle, or place of business … .”

6 justif ying homic ide, forci ble f elon y, an d exces sive force. S ee Sugg ested P atte rn Ju ry Ins truc tions 3.10. 12, 3.10. 13, 3. 16.10, 3.10.1 1, and 3.16.20. How ever, the trial court did n ot read the tit le of the instruc tion when giv ing the ins truc tio n or otherwise clearly ident ify which char ge it wa s giving as it was instructing t he jur y, inste ad going fr om one inst ruction t o the next. At the conc lusion of the t rial cour t’s ch arge, M edi na ob ject ed t o the w ay in whi ch th e tri al court r ead these i nstru ctions, argu ing th at the t rial cou rt m ay have conf used t he jur y when it gave the inst ruct ions b ack - to - bac k without any cl arific ation as to wh ich charg e the trial cou rt was giving and in read ing th e inst ruct ions o ut - of - order from th e w ay they ar e arra nged in the S uggest ed Pattern Jur y Inst ruc tions, b ut t he tr ial court ov erruled the obj ecti on. Each juror re ceive d a cop y of t he jury charge for deli ber ations. On app eal, Medina does no t claim tha t indiv idually any o f the charge s we re im prop er, but rath er tha t the order in whic h the tr ial court ch ose to gi ve th e cha rges con fused w hat w as r equi red for the separa te def enses of sel f - def ens e and de fens e of h abitat ion.

7 However, reading th e jury ins tructi ons as a w hole, w e conclude tha t Medin a has fail ed to show any erro r. See Clark v. St ate, 315 Ga. 423, 440 (2023) (“In evalu atin g a cl aim th at th e tri al cou rt was requi red to giv e certa in jury inst ruct ions, we v iew the c harge a s a whole to determi ne w heth er the j ury was fu lly and fai rly instru cted. ”) (quot ation m arks omitted); Ja ckson v. State, 306 Ga. 475, 47 7 (201 9) (“A ju ry in structi on must be adj us ted to th e evid ence an d embo dy a correct, applicabl e, and com plet e state m ent of law.” (cit atio n and punct uatio n omitt ed)). As an init ial ma tte r, we rec ognize t hat the trial cour t did not give t he inst ructio ns in the most logic al o rder, cha rging on the def inition of habita tio n and then on self - defense an d then switc hing back t o def ense of h abita tion an d t hen self - d efen se again. Moreo ver, whi le chargi ng on these def enses, the trial court did not cl early expla in whet her an ins truc tio n pertai ned to sel f - de fense or def ense of habit ation. How ever, t he tri al court fu lly charged on both th e general con cept of jus tifica tion and the sp ecifi cs of both self - defe nse and de fens e of h abitation, and Medi na d oes n ot c hall enge any of

8 thes e individ ual inst ruct ions. Alt hough Me dina cla ims tha t the charge wron gl y in corpor ated into defense of ha bitat ion th e c oncep t that the defend ant believ e that h is u se of f orce w as n ecess ary and that his rea sona ble be lief prompted his us e of dead ly for ce, defe nse of habita tion also requ ires that the defenda nt reas onabl y believe that hi s us e of fo rce was neces sar y. OCGA § 16 -3- 23 provides: “ A per son is just ifie d in thr eat ening o r using for ce ag ainst anot her when a nd t o the e xte nt that he or s he reasona bly believes that such threat or for ce is necessa ry to prev ent o r termi na te such other ’s unlawful e ntr y into or a ttack up on a hab itat ion.” (empha sis a dded). See Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 257 (2010) (“[T ]he el ements s et fo rth in the int rod uctory claus e [in OCGA § 16 -3- 23], howeve r they are const rued, are neces sary to justify the use of any f orce or threa ts of forc e in defe nse of hab itat ion in any circu mstan ces.”). Medina als o arg ues th at the instr uctio ns in correctl y incorp orated oth er con cepts relate d to s elf - d efen se i nto the defens e of hab itatio n, such as the d efen dan t cou ld not be the ag gres sor, words al one can nev er justi fy d eadl y force, the vict im’s ha nds or fists

9 had t o be f ound to b e de adly w eap ons, and th e defendant co uld not use ex cessi ve f orc e. But upon re viewing the c harges as a wh ole, we do not s ee th at the order in wh ich t he trial cou rt gav e the charg es conf used t he defe nse s becau se the tri al cou rt sepa ratel y a nd correct ly ins tructe d on se lf - def e nse a nd t he defe nse of habit atio n and th e princi ple s rela ted to th ese defenses. See Clar k, 315 Ga. at 440; Jackson, 306 Ga. at 4 77. Acco rdingly, this e numer ation fa ils. 3 2. Medi na nex t argu es t hat h is trial coun sel rend ered ineffe ctive assi stan ce by f ail ing to obje ct w hen th e pros ecutor argu ed that defense of h abita tion d oes not a pply b ecause th e house where 3 The State argues that defense of habitat ion does not apply u nder OCGA § 16 -3- 23(2) if a ho meowner enters hi s home and finds an intruder ins ide because defense of habitati on only applie s to repel an unla wful entry. We reject this argument as th e cases cited to supp ort that argument c oncern OCGA § 16 - 3- 23(1) and (3), not OCGA § 16 -3- 23(2), which was at issue in this case. See Nesbit v. State, 321 Ga. 240, 248 (202 5). The plain language of OCGA § 16 -3- 23(2) indicates that the defense of habit ation may be asser ted against s omeone who has already unlawfully and forc ibly enter ed the resid ence. To th at end, OCGA § 16 -3- 2 3(2) provides that a “pe rson is justified in th e use of force which is intended or likely to cause deat h or great bod ily harm on ly if ... [t]hat force is used against another pers on who is not a m ember of the fa mily or household and who unlawfully and forcibly ent ers or has unlawful ly and forcibly entere d the residence ... . ” (emphasis added). Se e Hammond v. Stat e, 277 Ga. 612, 61 5 (2004) (concluding that OCGA 16 -3- 23(2) “only requir es the occupant to kno w that an unlawful e ntry has occurred before he is justifi ed in using deadly force”).

10 the vi ctim w as s hot was not Medina ’s perso nal dwelling. Duri ng cl osin g argu ments, th e pros ecut or arg ued that th e house involve d in th e cas e was n ot Med ina’s residen ce because Medina lived in Athens, the house was ab andon ed an d boa rded u p, and no one was living the re. The p rosecutor s tated, “ [S] o again, that hous e is not bein g us ed as a resi den ce, def ense of h abitati on gone.” In re spons e, M edi na’s couns el a rgued that the ho use was a resid ence as it w as not a band oned, and Medina ke pt it ems at the ho use a nd paid tax es and uti liti es for th e hou se. Also, tr ial couns e l argued that one’s house stil l counts as a resi dence for pu rpos es of defense o f habitati on eve n if it is uno ccup ied for some time: What if you are goi ng out of the cou ntry, sabbati cal study, or wha teve r, and you leave your ho me f or two y ears? You haven ’t sl ept i n it for tw o ye ars an d you leav e th at fo reign country and com e back h ere and walk in the doo r an d ther e is a na ked man insid e that beg ins to men ace you ... so t hat means that t hat’s not yo ur dwe lling? After clos ing argum ents, th e cou rt ch arged th e jury in conne ction w ith the defe nse of ha bitat ion that “as use d in OCGA secti on 16 -3 - 23, the t erm hab itat ion means any dw elling” a nd tha t:

11 A defe ndant is justif ied in using force against anothe r that is inte nded or like ly to ca use dea th or serio us bodily injury whe n: One, t he other perso n is making or has ma de an unla wful and fo rcibl e ent ry i nto th e re siden ce; Two, th e def endant kn ows or has reas on to beli eve t he othe r person is making o r ha s made a n unlawful a nd forcibl e entry, and; Three, the othe r person is not a membe r of the fa mily or house hold. To pre vail o n this claim of ine ffecti ve assistanc e, Medina mus t show bot h def ici ent per form ance and result ing pre judice. Se e Stric kland v. Washing ton, 466 US 668, 687 (198 4). T o show defi cien t perfo rmanc e, Med ina “mus t demon str ate that cou nsel perform ed couns el’s duties in an obj ectiv ely u nreas onabl e way, consi derin g al l of the c ircumst ances and in the light o f preva iling prof ess ional norms. ” Payne v. Stat e, 314 Ga. 322, 328 – 29 (2 022). “ The law recogn izes a s trong presu mpt ion that c oun sel pe rform ed reason ably,” and Medina “bears th e burd en o f overc omin g th is presumpti on.” Block er v. S tat e, 31 6 Ga. 568, 578 (20 23) (ci tation an d punct uatio n omit ted). Medi na “mus t show th at no reas onabl e

12 lawy er woul d have d one wh at hi s l awyer di d, or w ould have fai led to do what his la wyer did not.” Id. (cit ation and punct uation omitted). To esta bli sh preju dic e, Medina “must sho w tha t there is a reason able prob abi lit y that, but fo r cou nsel’s defici ency, the resu lt of th e tri al w ould have been differen t.” Zayas v. S tat e, 31 9 Ga. 40 2, 409 (2024) (citation and pun ctua tion om itt ed). If ei th er pr ong i s no t met, we nee d not addr ess the oth er. Id. We conclude th at trial c oun sel w as not d efici ent be caus e, know ing that th e trial cou rt wa s goin g to charg e on def ense o f habitati on, co unse l mad e a re ason able stra tegi c de cis ion to cou nte r the prose cuto r’s argum ent with vigor ous ar gument rather th an object. I t wa s a cont est ed issue whethe r t he house met the definit ion of habit ation and wh ether Medina wa s just ified in using de adly forc e in def ending a gainst s ome one who ha d “unlaw fully a nd forc ibly entered the re sidence” u nder O CG A § 16 -3- 23(2). 4 Tria l couns el reason ably sought to highlight the weakn ess of th e Stat e’s argumen t 4 The term “residence” is not defined in OCGA § 16 -3- 23 and was not defined in th e jury instruct ions. At trial, Medina primarily relied on this subsection in assert ing defense of h abitation.

13 in orde r to butt ress Med ina’ s justifica tio n defense. See Varner v. State, 206 G a. 72 6, 734 – 35 (201 9) (exp laining tha t co unsel ma y have vali d strat egic reas ons f or n ot objecti ng to op posing cou nsel ’s argum ent mis stat ing the la w); Goodr um v. State, 303 Ga. 414, 417 – 18 (20 18) (determining that trial couns el mad e a rea sona ble strateg ic d ecision in decidi ng t o coun ter “absu rd” a rguments mad e by the pros ecutor rath er than to obj ect to th ose stat emen ts). There fore, this enumer atio n fails. 3. Finally, Med ina ar gues t hat the tr ial cour t erred in char ging that the S tate only needed t o mak e a pri ma fa cie cas e of the crime charge d wh ere that crime m ay be c ommit ted by sep arat e way s or methods becaus e i t low ered the S ta te’s burden of proof. As e xplaine d below, w e review thi s clai m for pl ai n err or, and w h il e we ag ree tha t the t rial co urt c learly a nd obv iously e rre d in giving this inst ruc tion, we concl ude th at Medi na h as not s hown how the err or li kely affec ted the out come of th e tri al, s o he h as not sh own pl ain error. At th e char ge confe renc e, t he Sta te re quest ed a non - p atter n jury c harge on “conjunc tio ns,” whic h not only inst ructe d the j ury o n

14 the me aning o f conjunc tions within the cha rge but also provided that the S tate was requ ired to m ake a pri ma fa cie ca se of the crime charge d by pro of of any one o f th e met hods alleg ed i n the ind ictmen t. Medin a obje cted to th e ch arge on two bases, including tha t ther e was no conjunc tio n used in the felo ny murder co unt a nd “[t]he c ourt i s alread y goin g t o tel l them th at each parti cul ar count of each parti cular offen se has to be pr oven bey ond a reas onable dou bt as to its ow n el ement. So anyth in g else i s basica lly making a comment on the e vide nce at this p oint in t ime. ” Aft er ove rruling t he obj ection, the tr ial court charged t he jury as follo ws, wit h the lang uage Med ina chall enges on appeal in italic s: When a defe ndant is charged wit h a viola tion of the law in an indic tme nt where t he crime may be committe d in separa te w ays or methods, an d sa id cri me is ch arged as being commi tted in m ore than one w ay or meth od, the crime might be char ged conjunc tively, using the wor d “and ” to list all ways or metho ds. Howe ver, t he state is not req uired to prov e all of suc h separ ate wa ys or metho ds allege d in the indic tment; rather, the st ate must make a p rima f acie c ase b y pro of of any one of the wa ys or method s. Medin a renew ed h is obj ection to th is ju ry charg e a t the conclu sion

15 of th e trial cou rt’ s jury ins tructi on. As an init ial ma tter, altho ugh Medina objec ted to this instr uctio n, he did no t object on the gr oun ds th at i t low ered th e State’ s burden of pro of or poi nt to the r eference t o “p rima f acie case ” as er ror. “B ecaus e [Medi na] did n ot obj ect t o th ese j ury ch arges on the gr oun ds he now rai ses befor e the jury reti red to del iber ate, appell ate r eview of his claim s is precl uded u nl ess th e parti cul ar jur y instr uctio n in que stio n was ‘plain e rro r which aff ects [his] s ubst antia l right s.’ ” Woodard v. State, 29 6 Ga. 803, 806 (201 5) (cit ation o mitte d). To est ablish plain error: Firs t, the re mus t be an err or or defec t – some sort of “[d]ev iation fro m a leg al rul e” – that h as not been intent ionally relinq uished or a bando ned, i.e., affirm ativ ely wai ved, by the app ellan t. Secon d, the l egal error m ust be cl ear or obvi ous, rather than subject to reason able d ispu te. Third, the err or must h av e aff ected the a ppella nt ’ s sub sta ntial r ights, which in t he or dinar y case mean s he mu st demon strat e that i t “af fect ed th e outcom e of the trial cou rt pr oce edin gs.” F ourt h an d finally, if the abo ve thre e pron gs are satisfied, th e appell ate c ourt h as the d isc retion to rem edy the erro r – discre tio n which ought t o be exercis ed only if the error “‘seri ousl y affe ct[s ] the fai rness, i ntegri ty or publi c reput ation of ju dici al pr oceedi ngs.’” Walton v. S tate, 3 22 Ga. 401, 408 (2025) (cit ations om itted).

16 It was a cle ar and obviou s err or to charg e that the Stat e was only requir ed to make a “p rima f acie case” of on e of t he way s o r means allege d in the indict ment. See Mo hamed v. Stat e, 27 6 Ga. 706, 70 8 (2003) (hold ing that a statu te ch arged t o the ju ry cons titute d “an imp erm issible shift ing of the b urden of proo f” whe re the sta tute st ated t hat “s uch p ossess ion s hall be prim a - faci e eviden ce” th at a crimi nal v iol ation h ad occu rred); Fl emi ng v. Sta te, 138 Ga. Ap p. 97, 97 (1976) (hol din g that it was err or t o cha rge that the Sta te only needs to m ake out a “pri ma faci e case ” and that th e defen dant h as t he burd en to introd uce evid ence to ov ercom e t he State’ s prim a fa cie cas e); Bush v. State, 129 G a. App. 160, 16 0 (1973) (same). As e xplaine d in Bartle tt v. State, 196 Ga. A pp. 174, 17 5 (1990), th e “p rima f aci e cas e” l angu age in the “conj uncti ons ch arge” appear s to be refe rrin g to th e Stat e’s bu rden to ov ercom e a defen dant’ s mot ion fo r a di rec ted verdic t, not the Stat e’s bu rden a t trial, and ha s no place in j ury inst ruc tions. However, we concl ude that M edina has f ail ed to sh ow that the error l ik ely af fect ed th e ou tcome of th e t rial u nder th e third pro ng

17 of the pl ain error s tanda rd. Med ina admi tted th at he shot T hornton, and t he primar y issue a t trial was w hethe r Medina w as justif ied. The j usti fication defen ses w ere not affect ed by the “p rima f acie c ase ” charge bec ause al thoug h the ch arg e redu ced th e bu rden o f pro of on the “way s o r met hods alleg ed i n the i ndi ctment,” Medi na’s justif icat ion defens es we re not a lleged in the ind ictme nt. As a resul t, the “pri ma faci e” langu age di d not r educ e the St ate’s bu rden of dispr oving M edina ’s j ustific atio n def enses. Beca use the eviden ce tha t Med ina shot Thor nto n was overwhe lming and the tria l court otherwi se pr operly i nstru cted th e ju ry on t he bey ond -a- reas onable - doubt - stand ard a s it appl ied to th e State’s burd en to d isp rove th e justif icat ion d efenses, Medina has not shown tha t the err or like ly affec ted th e out come of th e t rial. See Mohamed, 276 Ga. at 70 9 (stat ing tha t an impe rmis sible instr uction “ is harmle ss so long as the in structi on w as appli ed to an el ement of th e cri me that was not at is sue in the tria l, and if the evid enc e of guilt is ov erwhe lming”). Cf. Debelbot v. St ate, 3 08 Ga. 1 65, 169 (2020) (mis chara cterizatio n of re asona ble do ubt standa rd wa s “un iquel y harm ful” becau se th e

18 case w as al most e nti rely ci rcu msta ntial and tw o individua ls had the opp ortunit y to inflic t the tra uma that le d to the death). Judgment a ffi rmed. A ll the Jus tices concur.