Sanders v. The State - Appeal of Murder Convictions

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: Ma rch 3, 2026 S26A022 2. SANDERS v. THE S TATE. C O LVIN, Jus tice. Appe llant Jos hua Sander s appeals his convict ions for ma lice murder and rel ated offen ses i n c onnecti on w ith the shooti ng de ath s of Lat orey Hard en (“Lato rey ”) a nd her mo ther, Pam ela H arden (“Pamela ”). 1 The tria l evidenc e, which inc luded sur veillance footage 1 The crimes occurr ed on January 6, 2022. On Ap ril 21, 2022, a Toom bs County grand jury indicted Appel lant for malice mur der (Counts 1 and 7), felony murder (Counts 3 and 9), possess ion of a firearm during the commiss ion of a felony (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12), aggrava ted assault (Counts 5 an d 11), cruelty to children in the first degr ee (Counts 13 an d 14), and theft by taking (Count 15). A jury trial w as held from May 2 2 through 25, 2023, and t he jury found Appellant gu ilty of all counts. The trial court sente nced Appellant to serve consecutive terms of life in priso n without the possibility of parole for each count of malice murder (Counts 1 and 7), consecutive t erms of five years in prison for each of two counts of possession of a fi rearm during the commission of a felo ny (Counts 2, 8), concurrent terms of 20 years in prison for each count of cru elty to children in the first degree (Counts 13 and 14), and a concurrent term of f ive years in prison for theft by taking (Count 15). Th e trial court merged the remaining counts, a lthough the counts of felony murder (Counts 3 and 9) were actually vacate d by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371 – 72 (1993). Appell ant timely filed a mo tion for new trial NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre me C ourt Rule 27, the Cour t’s reco nsiderati on, and ed itorial r evisions by the Repor ter of Decis ions. Th e version of the opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geor gia Report s, desi gnated as the “Final Copy,” wi ll repla ce any prior version on the Court’s websi te and docket. A bound volu me of the Georgi a Reports will con tain the final a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 of the shoo ting, eyewit ness te stimony, a nd testimo ny from Appe llant himself, showe d that, fo llowing a brief, tum ultuous, romant ic relati onsh ip bet ween Appell ant and L ator ey, Ap pell ant sh ot an d kil led L atorey and P amela outsi de of L ator ey’s r esid ence i n V id alia. On app eal, A ppel lan t rai ses on e en umer ation of error. He claims that mot ion - for - new - tr ial counse l was const itutio nally ineffe ctiv e for fail in g to rais e a clai m that tri al cou nsel was ineff ective for failing to “ sha pe ” and “ guide ” Ap pel lant’s testi mon y on dir ect e xaminatio n, whic h Appella nt cont ends r eflect ed negati vely on h is ch ara cter. But this claim, “which sim ply recas t [s] his tr ial - co unsel ine ffect ivenes s claim [] as [a] mo tion - for - new - t r ial ineffe ctiv eness cl aim[], [is] pr oced urall y barr ed.” Pugh v. S tate, 3 18 Ga. 706, 723 (2024) (quo tati on mark s om itte d). App ell ant’s argum ent on app eal fo cuses on tr ial cou ns el’s ineffect ive as sistance on May 26, 2023, a nd amended the motion through new c ounsel on Decemb er 30, 2024, and Fe bruary 18, 20 25. Follo wing a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial on Aug ust 12, 2025. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal directed to this C ourt. The case wa s assigned to this Court’s term beginning i n Decembe r 2025 and was submitted for a decision on t he briefs.

3 in cond ucting Ap pella nt’s direc t exam inatio n, rather t han on motion - for - ne w - trial couns el’s decisio n not t o pur sue an inef fect ive - assistance - of - tria l - counsel cl aim regard ing Appel lant’s dire ct exami nation. An d Appel lant r equ ests a reman d in thi s cas e only to conduct a h eari ng “to determ in e if d efen se cou n sel” pe rform ed defici ently, not t o determ ine w he ther moti on - for - new - trial cou nsel was d eficient. As we have “cons istently held, ” a defen dant cann ot resus citat e a s peci fic clai m of ineffe ctiv e assi stan ce of tri al c ounsel that was n ot raised at the m otion for new tri al stag e by recasti ng the cl aim on appeal as on e of i neffe ctiv e assi sta nce o f moti on - for - new - tria l counsel fo r failing t o raise th e sp ecific clai m o f tri al couns el’s in effe cti venes s. Id. at 723 – 24 (quotati on m arks omitted). Ac cordi n gly, thi s claim fails. 2 Judgment affirmed. All t he Ju stice s con cur. 2 If Ap pellant “wishes to p ursue a claim that his pos t - conviction coun sel was ineffective, he must do so through a petition for a wri t of habeas corpus. ” Id. at 724 n.1 5 (cleaned up).

4 P ETERSON, Chief Just ice, co ncurring. I join t he de cision of the Co urt in full; it is a f aithful a pplic atio n of a long - s tandi ng rul e that w e c reat ed re quiri ng cl aim s of ineffe ctiv eness of tri al c ouns el to be raise d on a moti on for new trial. I writ e sepa ratel y to poi nt out th e harm tha t rule has cau sed our crimi nal j usti ce s ystem, and to encou rage the Gene ral A ssem bly to change it. Georgi a’s p ost - conviction litiga tion s yste m is a mess. It’s a mess i n larg e pa rt be cause of a seri es of well - meaning b ut shor t - sigh ted d ecision s thi s Cou rt mad e o ver the c ours e of sev eral dec ades. Thos e decis ions had a wo rthy goal: seek ing to en sure th at indigent defe ndants were entitle d to app ointed co unsel f or litigating claims of inef fecti ve assi stanc e of coun sel. But th e m eans w e used t o purs ue that go al h ave m ade th ing s worse, n ot bet ter. Thes e means we re to requ ire tha t ineff ectiv enes s claim s be raised i n a mo tio n for new tri al. S ee Simpson v. State, 250 Ga. 365, 367 (1 982). In S impson, w e cited no lega l author ity in suppo rt of this

5 rule, w hi ch even tuall y was refi ned in to a requ iremen t th at ineffe ctiv eness cl aims “ be rai sed befor e appea l if the op portun ity to do so i s av ailab le [.]” Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183, 184 (19 96) (emp hasis o mitted). This, in turn, l ed us t o req uire that ne w co unsel be ap point ed t o li tig ate the moti on f or new t rial, as trial coun sel cannot li tigate thei r own in effecti ven ess. See Garland v. Stat e, 283 Ga. 201 (2008) (h oldi ng th at becau se an appel lan t must rai se ineffe ctiv eness on a mo tion for new tri al, and tria l co unsel c annot do that, new counsel mus t be app ointe d); Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 65 4, 656 (198 6) (stati ng th at in C astell v. Kemp, 254 G a. 55 6 (198 5), we “sust ained the tr ial cour t in finding tha t the ethica l prohib ition again st a l awyer acti ng al so as a w itn ess precl ude d h is pres enti ng a claim of inef fect ive ass ist ance of c oun sel con cerni ng the trial wh ich he, hims elf, ha d cond ucted”). And then our subseq uent interp retat ion of the Ge orgi a Ru les o f Pr ofessi onal Con duct m eans that the ne w counsel ca nnot c om e from th e sam e circui t publ i c defen der’s offi ce th at handl ed the trial. See In re F ormal Ad viso ry Opinion 10 -1, 293 Ga. 397 (2013) (“ In re FAO 10 -1 ”). See als o E va ns

6 v. State, 322 Ga. 652, 682 (2025) (Pet erson, C.J., co ncurri ng) (notin g that In r e FA O 10 -1 “has caus ed seri ous pr oblems for th e crimi nal justic e syste m in Georgia ” and propo sing that the Court consid er ado pting a ne w Rule of Prof essiona l Conduc t regar ding conf lict impu tation for pu bli c defen der offi ces). The re sult of all of this is that we ha ve back ed into a syste m that p rioriti ze s in effecti venes s cl aims (whi ch h ave a l ow su cces s rate) i n exch ang e for i mposi ng seri ous costs. Su bstitu tin g new couns el and then lit igating a motio n for new tr ial (including an eviden tiary hea ri ng) i nevi tably tak es m aterial ly lon ger t o do, even under t he b est o f ci rcums tan ces. 3 Moreove r, pr even tin g tri al cou nsel fro m litigating (or at lea st being involv ed in) the appeal mak es much harde r the liti gat ion of clai ms of preserv ed tri al cou rt erro r (wh ich have a h igh er su ccess r ate). Se e James C. Bon ner Jr., The D ecline, 3 And the c ircumsta nces often are not t he best; delays in su bstitution of new counsel, and repeated su bstitutions of new counsel, of ten results in cases being left adrift for years. See, e.g., Owens v. State, 30 3 Ga. 254, 25 4 n.1 (201 8) (noting that, after motion for new trial was filed, case invo lved “eight years of delay in preparing the trial tr anscript and shuffling of Ap pellant ’ s appellate counsel” before an a mended motio n for new trial was f iled).

7 Fall, an d P ossi ble R esurre cti on of I ndig ent A ppell ate Ad vocac y in Georg ia, T he A ppel late R eview, pag es 1, 1 0 – 14 (Win ter 201 1) (arti cle in news lett er of S tate B ar of Geo rgia’s Ap pell ate P ractic e Secti on by f orme r dire ctor of GP DC Appel late Di vis ion). Giv en the short comin gs of our s ystem, it is un surpri sin g to lea rn th at we h ave made ou rsel ves an outli er. Th e fed eral g ove rnmen t and most stat es leave i neff ectiv eness cl aim s for resol ution on h abeas. Se e Massa ro v. U nited Sta tes, 538 US 50 0 (2 003); Ry an C. T u ck, Ineffe ctive - Assist ance - of - Counsel Bl ues: Naviga ting the Muddy Water s of Georg ia Law afte r 201 0 Sta te Su preme C ou rt De cisi ons, 45 G a. L. Rev. 119 9, 1202 (2011). Giv en that ou r sy stem d elays th e resol ution of n early al l crimi nal d irect a ppeals, th at mea ns th at wh en we do rev erse or vacate a jud gmen t, th e pass age of ti me has r ende red re trial hard er (if not imp ossibl e): w itn esses may have di ed, m emori es hav e f aded, e viden ce may hav e been l ost, etc. An d in those r are cases i n w hich a convi ction i s rev ersed for reason s t hat me an th e law prohi bits th e State f rom re tryi ng the cas e, th e def endan t enti tl ed to releas e has

8 wasted years of thei r li fe in p rison firs t. We also do all of this in the mo st ineffic ient way possib le. This system forces di strict atto rneys ’ off ices to di vert resou rces f rom prosecu tin g cri mes and in stead, a s soon as a defen dan t is convi cte d and sen ten ced, s pend y ears reli tigati ng al l of th e sa me issues in the same cou rt on t he moti on for n ew trial. It forc es pu bli c def ende r offic es to str etch lim ited d oll ars to pr ovide m ul tip le law yers to comple te a sin gle di rect appe al th at takes onl y on e law yer i n mos t other s tat es and th e feder al sy stem. No rati onal pers on w oul d have ch osen th e sys tem w e have toda y if prese nted with it as a whole. And thoug htful lead ers in the publi c defen der c ommu ni ty hav e at times advoc ated for ch ange. See Bonn er, Th e App ell ate R eview, pa ges 1, 10 – 14 (cri tici zin g “perver se” system that enco urag ed “casu al su bstitu tion s” of cou nsel to handle ineffe ctiv e assi stan ce of cou nsel clai ms, i rresp ecti ve o f thos e clai ms’ seriou sness). B ut b ecau se th is sy stem evol ved s low ly ov er d ecad es, we hav en’t paus ed to c onsid er t he br okenn ess o f the sys tem. W e should.

9 Although t his Co urt la rgely cre ated this syste m one dec ision at a time ove r deca des, the res ulti ng mess now exc eeds ou r abil ity to fix it unila ter ally. W e could chan ge at leas t som e of t he rul es w e impos ed one at a time a s they aris e in cas es be fore us; for exam ple, we coul d end th e requ irem ent t o rais e inef fecti ven ess a t the fi rst avail able op por tuni ty, an d (as I hav e prev iousl y su ggeste d) adopt a conf lict rule spe ci fic t o publ ic d efen ders. But t he n atu re o f a cou rt changing legal r ules in c ases means tha t we can ’t ch ang e them al l at once. Mo re imp ortan tly, thos e ch anges w ould impr ove our sys tem only if co mbined with o ther change s that we lack the aut hority to impos e. For ex am ple, sendi ng i neff ectiven ess cl aim s to h abeas is an impro veme nt only if it is paire d with creat ing a limited statut ory righ t to cou nsel in h abeas for cert ain claim s. Tak ing th e thous ands of ine ffecti ven ess clai ms li tigat ed each ye ar in moti ons f or n ew trial acro ss all 51 judic ial circ uits and se nding them a ll to habe as proce eding s ov ers een by t he re latively small handf ul of circ uits t hat hous e Georg ia p ris ons w oul d be a se rious pr oblem for judi cial work loads. A nd a shif t of t his sort would likely r equir e bud get shif ts.

10 All of t hose things — creatin g a li mited ri ght to coun sel for s ome habeas proc eedi ngs, ad justi ng habea s ven ue, an d budge t adjus tment s — are the s ort of thin g th at far excee ds the j udi cial power. But th e good n ews is th at the Gen e ral As sembly has the pow er to mak e at l east many of the se ch anges. V irtu ally al l of the rul es ou r decisi ons s et u p are si mpl y crea ture s of d eci sion al law, not interp retat ions of th e Ge orgia or Un ited St ates Con stitu tion s t hat woul d be much h arder t o alt er. And t he one cle ar cons titut ional ruling in Garland (regarding the n ecessity of c onfl ict - f ree c ounsel for clai ms th at mus t be rais ed on d irect a ppe al) w as a con tin gent ruling; t he co nstitutio nal hold ing follo wed fro m our require ment to raise i neffe ctiv enes s at th e ea rlies t opp ortu nity. If that p rocedu ral r ule wer e changed, the const itutiona l holding st rikes me a s likely to be abrog ated. In short, the system is broken. We did a lot of the break ing. But it will re quire legislat ive act ion to fix it. I am au tho rized to s tat e th at Pr esi din g Jus tice W arren, Ju stic e

11 Bethe l, Justic e McMillian, J ustic e LaGrua, Justice Colvin, and Just ice Pinson jo in in this c oncur rence.